Part I

BACKGROUND

The 1st Hussars had been the hardest hit Canadian armoured regiment during the D-Day landings, suffering 43 personnel casualties, 20 of them fatal. Their heavy tank losses had resulted in the two D-Day assault squadrons, 'A' and 'B', being temporarily amalgamated, 'A' Squadron contributing nine tanks and 'B' Squadron four to the common pool. As a stop gap measure a Fort Garry Horse (FGH) officer, Captain Cyril Tweedale, had brought forward seven FGH tanks and crews from 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade's (2 CAB) reserve to reinforce the Hussars on the 8th of June. Tweedale himself was allocated to Major D'Arcy Marks' 'C' Squadron. On the 10th of June the Hussars received 20 new tanks and many replacement crewmen. The Hussars' Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Colwell, now reorganized his regiment, reforming 'B' Squadron under the command of an aggressive, young officer, Captain Harry Harrison, previously the 2i/c of 'C' Squadron. 'B' Squadron received 12 of the new tanks bringing their total number up to 21. In an effort to ensure that each crew had at least some experienced members the crew rosters were shuffled. This was not a matter of concern because the regiment had been promised 24 hours in which to rest the exhausted veterans who had carried on without a substantial break since the landings. Among the replacements were three lieutenants joining the regiment for the first time, one of whom, Lieutenant Jamie Martin, 7/11 Hussars, was seconded from 2CAB's own Headquarters (HQ) Squadron.

At 21:00 hours on the 10th, 2 CAB's commander, Brigadier Bob Wyman, convened a planning conference with his COs to discuss forthcoming operations. The brigade would make two attacks on the 12th of June. One, by the FGH, would clear the Mue Valley. The other, by the 1st Hussars, was designed to capture the village of Cheux which had actually been a D-Day objective. These would would be the first operations that the brigade would conduct on its own, as up until this point all of 2 CAB's activities had been in support of infantry operations.

Colwell did not return to his regimental harbour until 04:00 hours when he brought news of the Cheux operation. A short time later, at 07:30 hours, orders were received at 2 CAB headquarters to make the attack a day earlier than planned. The change in plan was passed to the Hussars by 08:00 hours and frenzied preparations began. It was only five hours to the designated start time.

During D-Day, the Queen's Own Rifles (QOR) of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade had been the hardest hit Canadian infantry unit. The battalion had incurred 143 casualties, 61 of them fatal. One company, 'D', had been landed away from the battalion, encountering very little opposition. By the time the company rejoined the unit, the beach-head had been secured with 'D' Company still at close to 100 per cent strength. On the 11th the QOR was enjoying a relatively quiet day of cleaning up and digging slit trenches in their newly occupied battalion area at Neuf-Mer, when disquieting rumours started to circulate about an impending attack. The orders for the battalion were not received until 11:00 hours, then, like the Hussars, their unit bivouac became a scene of organized mayhem.

PREPARATION

Brigadier Wyman held his Orders Group at his headquarters in Bray at 11:00 hours. Two QOR companies, 'D' and 'A', would accompany the 1st Hussars as the lead assault element. The remaining two rifle companies would be with the FGH's 'B' and 'C' squadrons in the second wave. In reserve was the third regiment of 2 CAB, The Sherbrooke Fusiliers. The Hussar order of march would be 'B', 'C', 'Regimental HQ', and 'A'. To get to the objective, the village of Norrey would be bypassed. Then, the village of Le Mesnil-Patry would be secured by 'B' Squadron of the Hussars and 'D' Company of the Queen's Own, supported by the Hussars' 'C' Squadron on their right flank. Once that was accomplished, 'D' Company would be joined by the QOR's Mortar and Anti-tank Platoons. The remaining Hussar squadrons, along with 'A' Company QOR, would then by-pass Le Mesnil-Patry and continue on to occupy the final objective, the high feature south of Cheux.

Immediately upon receiving warning of the new time of the attack the QOR CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Jock Spragge, sent his mortar platoon commander, Lieutenant Ben Dunkelman, forward to begin fire planning. Dunkelman met with his counter-part from the Regina Rifles, who were holding the front line, and together they developed their plan.

The CO 1st Hussars issued his orders at 12:15 hours. The operation was due to start at 13:00, less than an hour away. Needless to say there was insufficient time and the 13:00 timing was not met.

Due to the time constraints the information passed on by Colonels Colwell and Spragge never reached the troops. The outline plan and the direction of advance was given to the troop leaders and platoon commanders, but that was all. The QOR riflemen marched the short distance south, from Neuf-Mer to Bray, and mounted the tanks for the move forward. 'D' Company was on board 'B' Squadron's vehicles.

Having infantry ride on tanks was, and still is, a recognized technique for getting both organizations forward together. It is never used in contact with the enemy however, because the tanks cannot fire their guns nor traverse their turrets with infantry on them. For the infantry's part a tank in action is an unattractive place to be as it draws fire. As well, the infantryman cannot use his rifle with any sort of accuracy sitting on a continuously moving platform. At the start of the operation these matters were of less concern than getting to the start line [departure point for an attack] as quickly as possible.

The 'C' Squadron departure was held up when Lieutenant Bill McCormick of 2nd Troop found a leaking fuel line in his tank and exchanged vehicles with his troop corporal. A gap of a few hundred yards opened up between the lead squadrons as 'B' roared off into the distance.

Le Mesnil-Patry:

Site Map

© Chris Johnson, 1997