Part V

AFTERMATH

The evening was a somber one for the Queen's Own and the Hussars. Only eleven unwounded men of 'D' Company initially came back from the wheat field, although others turned up later. Just four of 'B' Squadron's tanks came back. Only two, those of Corporal Jim Simpson and Sergeant Harry Gristey had full crews. Just before the action was joined, Gristey had been ordered back by the Squadron second-in-command when his tank lost a motor. When Gristey returned to the battlefield, now mounted on a 17 pounder 'Firefly', 'B' Squadron had ceased to exist. The other two returning tanks, those of Lieutenants Bruce Deans and Jamie Martin, had lost their crew commanders. Corporal Simpson and his crew helped to pull the dead officers from the turrets and replenish the ammunition so the tanks could go back into action.

To man these four vehicles 'B' Squadron had two sergeants, one corporal and a handful of troopers. Because the squadron had been so recently reorganized there was confusion as to who was missing. The only complete nominal role was in the pocket of the 2i/c, Captain Smuck. John Smuck's body was one of those lying in the orchard. The unpleasant job of searching for, and identifying the dead fell primarily to the two padres, Honorary Captains Currie Creelman of the Hussars and J.C. Clough of the Queen's Own."In some cases the bodies were indistinguishable from one another, simply a mass of cooked flesh welded together in the great heat; we had to sift through this for identity tags."

The day had cost the Hussars 45 fatal casualties. The list included 7 officers, 6 NCOs and 32 men. In addition, 1 officer and 1 NCO were wounded, 1 officer and 2 men were prisoners of war. A total of 37 tanks were destroyed [34 of the 75mm marks and 3 of the 17 pounders, another 13 tanks were damaged but repairable]. The QOR losses were 1 officer and 53 men killed and 1 man died of wounds; 3 officers, 30 men wounded and 11 men prisoners of war. Total QOR losses for the day were 98 out of a 'D' company strength of 120 all ranks. Total Canadian losses for the day were 148.

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Capt. Andy Fife, "A" Sqn 1st Hussars, leaning on the side plate of a Sherman V at Bray, Normandy. The force of an internal explosion has peeled the 1.5" thick side armour plate away from the weld seams. The hull roof has also been bent upwards under the gun mantlet. Note the AP shot penetration to the engine compartment. Capt. Fife wears the standard RAC Mark I steel helmet that was adopted by the CAC. Normally, the helmet was not worn unless the owner was in immediate danger of shell fire.

The defenders reported that 2nd Battalion 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment had 2 officers, 1 NCO and 15 men killed; 6 NCOs and 26 men wounded and 1 man missing. The Pioneer Battalion lost 1 officer, 1 NCO and 27 men killed; 1 officer (the Medical Officer), 3 NCOs and 45 men wounded, along with 5 men missing. Prinz's 2nd Battalion 12th Panzer Regiment lost 1 man killed, 7 wounded, 1 officer and 4 men missing. Total German casualties 189. Three panzers had been knocked out, one of which was later returned to action.

The action at Le Mesnil-Patry should not have turned out as it did. The original plan to clear the Mue Valley on the 11th and then seize the high ground at Cheux was feasible. The reason the programme failed was because 2 CAB had tried to do too much too quickly. The idea to advance the plans for the Cheux operation by 24 hours came from the Army commander, General Sir Miles Dempsey. He wanted the Canadian attack to parallel one carried out by the British 69th Brigade on the Canadian's right flank. As the British Official History states, the orders did not reach the Canadians in time. Exactly where and how the orders got off track has not been explained.

Le Mesnil-Patry, and other actions like it, led to the introduction of tank telephones later in the campaign. This device, attached to the rear of the tank, allowed an infantryman to shelter behind the vehicle while speaking directly with the crew commander, even if his hatch were closed. These actions also led to a somewhat belated instruction from 21 Army Group dated 30 September 1944. This document directed higher formations, brigade and division, to avoid arbitrarily assigning H-Hours and then not leaving adequate time for squadron and company level planning. These developments were the positive legacy of Le Mesnil-Patry.

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Knocked out Shermans recovered to Bray, Normandy following the
Action at Le Mesnil-Patry.

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Photograph of Lieutenant W.R.C. 'Bill' Little taken in the ruins
of Norrey-en-Bessin sometime after the action at Le Mesnil-Patry.

Little was a troop leader in 'A' Squadron whose DD tank was swamped during the assault on the beaches. Picked up by a British ship and returned to the UK, under vehement protest, he did not get back to the Regiment until 12 June 1944. When he spoke with the author on 6 June 1992 he said; "When I returned to the Regiment I found that all my friends were dead or missing and no one could tell me why or how." That conversation was the genesis of this article.

M.R. McNorgan

The author, M.R. McNorgan,
commanding a Centurion at Gagetown, New Brunswick.

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© Chris Johnson, 1997