Part II


 

APPROACH

While approaching the front lines, the Hussars found that the ground between Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse and Norrey-en-Bessin had been mined by The Regina Rifles forcing them to stay on the road. Indeed, at 13:20 hours a frantic message went from 2 CAB to 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (3 CID) asking if there were mines laid in this area. That basic information had not been passed on. The oversight caused the start line to be changed, from the east-west Caen-Bayeux railway line, to a north-south track lying west of Norrey. A change of direction for the attack of 90 degrees.

The mines forced the Hussars to go through Norrey, instead of around it as planned. The dusty road to the village was bordered on the left with a dense growth of trees and on the right by thick Norman bocage shrub. The village itself had been heavily shelled, with the gaunt remains of the church steeple rising from the centre of the ruins. The narrowness of the streets meant the tanks had to proceed in single file. Near the centre of the village a 90 degree right turn was required just short of the church, but the confined space meant that each tank in turn had to back and fill to negotiate the corner, further delaying the attack. Throughout the entire approach march an Hussar officer maintained a running commentary on the regimental radio net so that RHQ could track their progress. One crew commander, Sergeant Leo Gariepy, of 'B' Squadron, grew tired of the non-stop travelogue and switched off his radio that was on the RHQ net. That action left him with only the set on the squadron net.

(93)
2 CAB Sherman III. Note the use of track links
as additional protection.

While the Hussars were advancing, the radio monitoring service of 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitlerjugend) had not been idle. On June 9th a knocked out Canadian tank near Authie had been found to contain copies of Canadian wireless procedures and codes. These were now used to monitor the Hussars radio traffic. Learning that an attack was underway, the Germans prepared to shell and mortar Norrey-en-Bessin. 'B' Squadron had cleared the village and 'C' was arriving when the shelling started. Then, Lieutenant-Colonel Colwell's tank ran over a mine left at the side of the road, and lost a track. This mishap impeded the forward movement of RHQ and 'A' Squadron. Colwell dismounted and, in the midst of the shelling, tried to sort out the traffic jam. He pulled the remainder of the regiment out of the village and back up the road toward Bretteville to where they could support the tanks that had gotten through.

When 'B' Squadron broke out of the confines of the village, hatches were closed, and the troops deployed into the box formation normally used for movement across open country. Squadron Headquarters and 5th Troop were in the centre. Leading were 1st Troop left and 2nd right. Bringing up the rear were 3rd Troop left and 4th right. The infantry company had one platoon with the central troop and the other two with the troops bringing up the rear. Company and Squadron HQs were co-located.

The attackers were now across the start line, a north-south track on the western edge of Norrey. The infantry were still mounted on the tanks. The approach march had been in a southerly direction. The turn in the centre of Norrey had caused the direction of advance to face west. The unsuspecting Canadians were now driving into a pocket of enemy positions. On their right, north, lay Panzergrenadier companies 5 and 6 of the 2nd Battalion 26th SS. To the front, west, its 7 Company in the Chateau du Mesnil-Patry, and behind, farther back in the village, the battalion headquarters. To their left, south, were more dug-in Germans, 3 and 2 companies of SS-Panzerpionier-bataillon 12, the divisional engineer unit. Farther away, several kilometres to the south-west of Le Mesnil-Patry, was Sturmbannführer [Major] Karl-Heinz Prinz's 2nd Panzer Battalion, 12th SS. Prinz, who was about to win the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, had with him two tank companies, numbers 5 and 6, commanded respectively by Untersturmführer (Second Lieutenant) Willi Kandler and Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Ludwig Ruckdeschel. Both companies were equipped with the 75mm Panzer Mark IV.

Lieutenant Dunkelman, who had expected the assault force to stop and be briefed on the fire support arrangements, ran over to meet the advancing tanks, then stood by the road, angry and dumbfounded as the squadron swept past him. Of course, he had not been advised of the last minute change of start line.

The new start line, on the west side of Norrey, was being held by 13 Platoon, 'C' Company, The Regina Rifles. It was crossed at 14:37 hours, seventeen minutes after the revised start time of 14:20 hours.


Le Mesnil-Patry:

Title Page Preparation The Battle - "B" Sqn The Battle - "C" Sqn
Withdrawal   Aftermath

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© Chris Johnson, 1997