Part IV


 

(98)
Knocked Out "B" Sqn Sherman V of the 1st Hussars at Bray, Normandy. There are a minimum of eight AP penetrations visible in this photo. Note that in both this photo and the following one, the tracks have been stripped from the hulks. This made recovery that much easier and the salvaged track was then tack welded to serviceable Shermans in an effort to improve their armour protection.

 

WITHDRAWAL

With the better part of two squadrons lost, and fearing a German counter-attack in strength, Colwell ordered 'B' and 'C' Squadrons to pull back. 'C' Squadron acknowledged, there was no reply from 'B'. Sergeant Gariepy, in the village, later admitted that he might have received the message, had his set on the RHQ net not been turned off. Most survivors now turned back. Major Marks personally covered the withdrawal of his squadron to Norrey.

Captain Tweedale:

Major Marks and I found our tanks to be the only ones left, so we laid smoke and retired but the road was blocked by an over turned tank [Gordon's]; with [Trooper D.T.] Briggs' skill as a driver, however, we did a skid turn on a dead cow, plowed through several walls in the village and got out.

Over the radio Brigadier Wyman ordered Colwell to hold his ground so that reinforcements could be sent up. Colwell did not receive the message. He was now located 1,000 yards north of Norrey-en-Bessin with nine tanks, the remains of 'C' Squadron that he had retrieved from Norrey. As he had feared, the enemy shelling of Norrey had brought down more buildings and totally blocked the road. The withdrawing 'C' Squadron tanks had been instructed to knock down walls to find an alternate exit. One did so, immediately falling into a basement. The FOO could have been used to cover the withdrawal to Norrey, but Captain Rivaz was dead. The only supporting fire the Canadians now had came from Lieutenant Dunkelman's mortars.

Major Frank White, the Hussar's regimental second-in-command, arranged 1st Troop 'A' Squadron and the surviving 'C' Squadron tanks, along the Caen-Bayeux railway line as a blocking force and awaited the onslaught.

Wyman too feared a counter-attack. He called all of his COs to an O Group at his headquarters and informed 3 Division that "considerable numbers of enemy tanks are moving north-east from Le Mesnil-Patry." In 7 Brigade there was a clearer view of events. They informed 3 CID that the tanks moving north-east from Le Mesnil-Patry were Canadian, not enemy. One half hour after Wyman's call for the COs to gather, Colwell arrived at 2 CAB headquarters to report in person.

(107)
Knocked out Sherman V Duplex Drive of the 1st Hussars.


Le Mesnil-Patry:

Title Page Preparation Approach The Battle - "B" Sqn
The Battle - "C" Sqn   Aftermath

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© Chris Johnson, 1997