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[pi] THE INTRODUCTION

The feelings, which dictate this publication, have originated from the contents of a Narrative, signed by Sir Henry Clinton, late Commander in Chief in America. In which Narrative, events are attributed to my conduct during the campaign of 1781, which, I trust, it will appear, were by no means the unavoidable consequences of any part of it.

The materials, hitherto produced, cannot be deemed complete, either in form or substance. There were many deficiencies in the papers laid before the House of Lords; in particular, four letters, dated July the 24th, August the 16th, 20th, and 22d, from me to Sir Henry Clinton, were wanting; one of which contained my reasons at large for undertaking the [p ii] march into Virginia: This omission, as the Secretary of State informed the House, was owing to their not having been transmitted by the Commander in Chief. Four other letters (three of them dated the 2d, 27th, and 30th of August, and one the 14th, 15th, and 18th of October) from Sir Henry Clinton to me, were read to the Lords, according to the order of their dates; although they were only delivered to me, by the Secretary to the Commander in Chief, in the latter end of November, at New-York, above a month after my surrender; and consequently, their contents could not influence my conduct in any manner.

I own I am perfectly aware of the impropriety of publishing official letters for private reasons; but, since the measures with respect to America have now undergone a total change, I hope, I shall in some degree stand excused for producing the whole correspondence, in my possession, relative to the principal transactions of that campaign; as it is the most candid and complete mode, in my power, of submitting them to the public consideration.

The perusal of this Correspondence will, I think, render not only the military, but every other reader a competent judge of the propriety [p iii] of my conduct, either when I acted under positive orders, pressing contingencies, or discretionary powers.

It is foreign to the present purpose, and I shall therefore not endeavour to enumerate the many difficulties, which I had to struggle with, in my command of the Southern district, previous to the march into North Carolina, in the beginning of the year 1781. This measure was thought expedient not only by me, but by the Commander in Chief: I was principally induced to decide in favour of its expediency from a clear conviction, that the men and treasures of Britain would be lavished in vain upon the American war, without the most active exertions of the troops allotted for that service; and, that, while the enemy could draw their supplies from North Carolina and Virginia, the defence of the frontier of South Carolina, even against an inferior army, would be from its extent, the nature of the climate, and the disposition of the inhabitants, utterly impracticable. The many untoward circumstances, which occurred during the four months succeeding the complete victory of Camden, had entirely confirmed me in this opinion. Our hopes of success, in offensive operations, [p iv] were not founded only upon the efforts of the corps under my immediate command, which did not much exceed three thousand men; but principally, upon the most positive assurances, given by apparently credible deputies and emissaries, that, upon the appearance of a British army in North Carolina, a great body of the inhabitants were ready to join and co-operate with it, in endeavouring to restore his Majesty's Government.

The disaster of the 17th of January cannot be imputed to any defect in my conduct, as the detachment was certainly superior to the force against which it was sent, and put under the command of an officer of experience and tried abilities. This mifortune, however, did not appear irretrievable; and to have abandoned, without absolute necessity, the plan of the campaign, would have been ruinous and disgraceful: ruinous, by engaging us in a defensive system, the impracticability of which I have already stated; and disgraceful, because the reasons for the undertaking still existed in their full strength, the public faith was pledged to our friends in North Carolina, and I believed my remaining force to be superior to that under the command of General Greene. [p v] That this opinion was well founded, the precipitate retreat of that General from North Carolina, and our victory at Guildford, after his return with Virginia reinforcements, are sufficient proofs.

The unexpected failure of our friends rendered the victory of Guildford of little value. I know that it has been asserted or insinuated that they were not sufficiently tried upon this occasion: But can any dispassionate person believe, that I did not give every encouragement to people of all descriptions to join and assist us, when my own reputation, the safety of the army, and the interests of my country, were so deeply concerned in that junction and assistance? All inducements in my power were made use of without material effect; and every man in the army must have been convinced, that the accounts of our emissaries had greatly exaggerated the number of those who professed friendship for us, as they must have observed, that a very inconsiderable part of them could be prevailed upon to remain with us, or to exert themselves in any form whatever.

This disappointment, and the wants and distresses of the army, compelled me to move to Cross-creek; but meeting there with no material [p vi] part of the promised assistance and supplies, I was obliged to continue my march to Wilmington, where hospitals and stores were ready for us. Of this move I sent information by several expresses to Lord Rawdon, but unfortunately they all failed. My intention then was, as soon as I should have equipped my own corps, and received a part of the expected reinforcement from Ireland, to return to the upper country; in hopes of giving some protection to South Carolina, and of preserving the health of the troops, until new measures could be concerted with the Commander in Chief.

The march of General Greene into South Carolina, and Lord Rawdon's danger, made my situation very critical. Having heard of the arrival of a pacquet from Europe, without any certain accounts of the sailing of the reinforcement, I thought it too hazardous to remain inactive; and, as it was impossible to receive in time any orders or opinions from Sir Henry Clinton to direct me, it became my duty to act from my own judgment and experience; I therefore upon mature deliberation, decided to march into Virginia, as the safest and most effectual means of employing the small corps, under my command, in contributing towards the general [p vii] success of the war. I came to this resolution principally for the following reasons, -- I could not remain at Wilmington, lest General Greene should succeed against Lord Rawdon, and, by returning to North Carolina, have it in his power to cut off every means of saving my small corps, except that disgraceful one of an embarkation, with the loss of the cavalry, and every horse in the army: From the shortness of Lord Rawdon's stock of provisions, and the great distance from Wilmington to Camden, it appeared impossible, that any direct move of mine could afford him the least prospect of relief: in the attempt, in case of a misfortune to him, the safety of my own corps might have been endangered; or if he extricated himself, the force in South Carolina, when assembled, was, in my opinion, sufficient to secure what was valuable to us, and capable of defence in that province. I was likewise influenced by having just received an account from Charles-town of the arrival of a frigate with dispatches from the Commander in Chief, the substance of which, then transmitted to me, was, that General Phillips had been detached to the Chesapeak, and put under my orders; which induced me to hope, that solid operations might be adopted [p viii] in that quarter: and I was most firmly persuaded, that, until Virginia was reduced, we could not hold the more southern provinces; and that, after its reduction, they would fall without much resistance, and be retained without much difficulty.

With these sentiments, I joined General Phillips's corps at Petersburgh on the 20th of May, a few days after his death; but from his papers, and dispatches from the Commander in Chief, directed to him, which I received at that place on the 24th of May, I found there were other projects in contemplation, which to me were entirely new. The Commander in Chief having desired General Phillips to give his opinion concerning the scheme of operations in the Upper Chesapeak, and the design upon Philadelphia, I thought it my duty, as I was then in his place, to offer mine: which was, that I could not see sufficient grounds for approving of either of these schemes; nor indeed could I bring myself to think any other plan, but the attempt to reduce Virginia, at that time either expedient or important. But I informed Sir Henry Clinton that I should repair to Williamsburgh about the time when I should probably receive his answer, in order to be in readiness to execute his commands; [p ix] and that I should employ the intermediate space in destroying such of the enemy's stores and magazines, as might be within my reach.

Whoever reads the Correspondence will see, that, since Sir Henry Clinton had declared positively in his first, and in several subsequent dispatches, against the plan of reducing Virginia, no explicit alternative was left to me, between complying with the requisition (contained in his letters of the 11th and 15th of June) of such troops as I could spare from a healthy defensive station, or engaging in operations in the Upper Chesapeak: The choice of a healthy situation was controlled by other material considerations; for, whilst he stated in such strong terms the imminent danger of New York, or the important effects, which he expected from the expedition against Philadelphia, I did not think myself authorized to detain any part of the troops he so earnestly required; merely upon my opinion of the difference of the quality of the air of Williamsburgh, York, or Portsmouth; from the latter of which only, as it was already fortified, I could afford an immediate detachment. And with respect to the operations in the Upper Chesapeak, [p x] it will be remarked, that, although that plan had been for some time under the consideration of the Commander in Chief, he did not seem inclined to take more share in the responsibility than barely to recommend it: and many reasons, but particularly my recent failure in a similar attempt, deterred me from undertaking it, without an explicit instruction. Accordingly, that I might be enabled to comply with those orders of the 11th and 15th of June, I passed James-river, (my remaining force being insufficient to fortify and maintain a post on the Williamsburgh Neck) and embarked the troops required with all possible dispatch. And it will be seen by the Correspondence, that the Commander in Chief's opinion of the indispensable necessity of an harbour for line of battle ships only appears in his letter of the 11th of July, after he had been acquainted, that the troops, intended for the expedition against Philadelphia, would be soon ready to sail.

Hampton-road was recommended by that order; but, as it was, upon examination, found totally unfit for the purpose desired, every person can judge, whether the order did not then, in its spirit, become positive to occupy York and Gloucester; the only harbour in the Chesapeak, [p xi] that I knew of then, or indeed that I have heard of since, in which line of battle ships can be received, and protected against a superior naval force: and, as the harbour was the indispensable object, I thought it unnecessary to enter into a description of the disadvantage of the ground, against a land attack, since there remained no other choice.

When the arrival of the French fleet, and the approach of General Washington, were known to Sir Henry Clinton, it will appear by the Correspondence, that his promises of relief in person were uniform; without giving me the smallest particle of discretionary power, different from holding the posts that I occupied. Every reader will therefore be competent to judge, whether, under these circumstances, and as I could not but suppose that the Commander in Chief spoke from a perfect knowledge of his own resources, and of the force of the enemy, it would have been justifiable in me either to abandon, by the evacuation of York, a considerable quantity of artillery, the ships of war, transports, provisions, stores, and hospitals, or, by venturing an action, without the most manifest advantage, to run the risk of precipitating the loss of them.

[pxii] Although the Marquis de la Fayette advanced his light troops early in September to Williamsburgh, he did not take post there with his army till reinforced with the French troops from the West Indies, under the command of Brigadier de St. Simon. I could, at that time, after leaving some slight guards in the works, have marched out a little more than four thousand men, partly composed of troops unaccustomed to action. The enemy were in a strong position, and considerably superior in number, but I should have attacked them without hesitation, if I had thought myself at liberty, after a victory, to escape into the Carolinas, with the troops that were able to march. No other object appeared sufficient to justify this measure; for our labour would have been materially interrupted by an action, and even a victory, unless it had extended to the annihilation of the Marquis de la Fayette's corps, without considerable loss on our side, (two events not to be expected) would not have enabled us to make a successful defence against the army then approaching, under the command of General Washington: But a defeat would probably have been followed with the immediate loss of our post, which, until the end of September, [p xiii] was in a most defenceless state: and as I could never have proved, that I should not have been relieved, I should have been exposed to public execration, as a man, who, having reason to expect the early arrival of the Commander in Chief to supersede him in his command, had, in hopes of personal reputation from a victory, sacrificed the essential interest of his country. Far less could I have ventured an action without the most evident advantage, after the junction of General Washington; a decision, which nothing could have justified, but a certainty that I could not be relieved: in that case, I should have fought before I was hemmed in by the enemy's works, believing a victory, over great disparity of numbers in the open field, to be possible; but a successful defence, without relief, in such a post, and against such an attack, to be impossible.

My resolution at last, of attempting to escape with part of the army, could only have been dictated by despair. The enemy's immense train of battering artillery had now nearly reduced our fresh earthen works to ruins: The attacks were conducted with so much caution, that we had no opportunity of making any material impression upon them: The batteries [p xiv] of the second parallel, which I knew in a few hours would compel us to surrender at discretion, were nearly completed; and I had then lost all hopes of relief. If the sudden gale of wind had not prevented our passage of the river, Brigadier de Choisy, who lay with a small corps a few miles from Gloucester, would have been attacked at day-break by the greatest part of our force; after which, being without baggage, I should have gained the upper country by rapid marches, mounting my infantry, by collecting horses on the way, and leaving my intended route doubtful, until I was opposite to the fords of the great rivers; I then intended to have turned off to the northward, expecting that the enemy would principally take their measures to prevent my escape to the southward. The success of this attempt would, no doubt, have been precarious; an I cannot say that it would have been practicable to have reached New York; but, in our desperate situation, I thought it well deserved a trial.

I shall make no other remark upon the enumeration that is made of the troops under my orders, tan that a great part of them were dispersed in garrisons, totally out of my reach, and that some regiments had hardly any existence, [p xv] but in name. I am not in possession of the general returns of the southern district for the year 1781, but those of the corps under my immediate command, at different periods, are annexed to the Correspondence.

During that campaign, I reckoned among the many other embarrassments which I had to encounter, that, on some important occasions, it was impossible to communicate with, or to receive instructions from the Commander in Chief, in time to enable me to act according to his wishes: But, I trust, it will appear from the Correspondence now laid before the public, -- that our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity, and unwillingness to take an active and useful part, -- that the move to Wilmington was rendered necessary from the distresses of the troops, and the sufferings of the numerous sick and wounded, -- that the march into Virginia was undertaken for urgent reasons, which could not admit of my waiting for the approbation of the Commander in Chief, -- that I did not establish the station in Virginia, but only reinforce it, -- that I occupied the posts of York and Gloucester by order, and was induced [p xvi] to remain in them by the prospect of relief, uniformly held out to me by the Commander in Chief, -- and, that, during the considerable interval between my arrival at Petersburgh, and that of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, my corps was completely at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, either to be withdrawn, or employed in the Upper Chesapeak, or sent back to the Carolinas, -- and consequently, that my conduct and opinions were not the causes of the catastrophe, which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.

CORNWALLIS.

MANSFIELD-STREET,
Feb. 10, 1783.

CONTENTS.

P A R T   I.

CORRESPONDENCE
Between General Sir HENRY CLINTON, K.B. Commander in Chief, and Earl CORNWALLIS,
RELATIVE TO THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTH-CAROLINA.

No. I. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B.	Jan. 18, [1781],	1
No. II. Sir Henry Clinton's Answer to Earl Cornwallis,	Mar. 5, [1781],	5
No. III. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Ap. 10, [1781],	9
No. IV. Sir Henry Clinton's Answer to Earl Cornwallis,	Ap. 30, [1781],	13
----- Duplicate of Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, (inclosed,)	Ap. 13, [1781],	18
No. V. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Ap. 23, [1781],	20
----- Inclosed Copies of Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 6, to Lord George Germain,	Ma. 17, [1781],	22
----- Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 7, to Lord George Germain,	Ma. 17, [1781],	23
----- A Proclamation of	Fe. 20, [1781],	34
----- Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 8, to Lord George Germain,	Ma. 17, [1781],	35
----- Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 9, to Lord George Germain,	Ap. 18, [1781],	44
----- A Proclamation of	Mar. 18, [1781],	47
----- Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 10, to Lord George Germain,	Ap. 18, [1781],	48
----- Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 11, to Lord George Germain,	Ap. 23, [1781],	50
No. VI. State of the Troops that marched with the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis at different Periods of Time,		53

P A R T   II.
RELATIVE TO EARL CORNWALLIS'S MARCH INTO VIRGINIA.

No. I. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Ap. 24, [1781],	55
----- Inclosed a Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to Major General Phillips,	Ap. 24, [1781],	56
No. II. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Ma. 2, 8, [1781],	58
No. III. Sir Henry Clinton's Instructions to Major General Phillips,	Ma. 10, [1781],	61
No. IV. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	May 20, [1781],	64
No. V. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	May 29, [1781],	67
No. VI. Earl Cornwallis's Answer to Sir Henry Clinton,	July 24, [1781],	74
No. VII. State of the Troops, that matched with the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis,	May 1, [1781],	77

P A R T   III.
RELATIVE TO THE OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA.

No. I. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	May 26, [1781],	79
No. II. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	May 26, [1781],	80
No. III. Sir Henry Clinton to Maj. Gen. Phillips,	Mar. 14, [1781],	85
No. IV. Sir Henry Clinton to Maj. Gen. Phillips,	Mar. 24, [1781],	87
No. V. Sir Henry Clinton to Maj. Gen. Phillips,	Ap. 11, [1781],	90
No. VI. Sir Henry Clinton to Maj. Gen. Phillips,	Ap. 26, [1781],	95
------ Inclosing the Substance of several Conversations between Sir Henry Clinton and Maj. Gen. Phillips, before his Departure for the Chesapeak,		100
No. VII. Sir Henry Clinton to Maj. Gen. Phillips,	Ap. 30, [1781],	105
No. VIII. Sir Henry Clinton to Maj. Gen. Phillips,	Ma. 11, [1781],	111
No. IX. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	June 15, [1781],	112
----- Duplicate inclosed in No. IX. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	June 11, [1781],	113
No. X. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	June 30, [1781],	118
No. XI. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	June 28, [1781],	126
No. XII. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	July 8, [1781],	129
No. XIII. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	July 12, [1781],	132
No. XIV. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	June 8, [1781],	133
No. XV. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	June 19, [1781],	137
No. XVI. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	July 1, [1781],	141
No. XVII. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	July 17, [1781],	142
No. XVIII. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	July 11, [1781],	145
No. XIX. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	July 15, [1781],	146
No. XX. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	July 26, [1781],	152
No. XXI. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Au. 20, [1781],	153

P A R T   IV.
RELATIVE TO OCCUPYING AN HARBOUR FOR LINE OF BATTLE SHIPS.

No. I. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	July 8, [1781],	161
No. II. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	July 11, [1781],	167
No. III. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	July 26, [1781],	170
----- Inclosed Extracts of Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to General Phillips,	[Mar 10, 1781]	175
[----- Inclosed report of Lieut. Sutherland, Engineer]	[Jul 25, 1781]	[177]
----- The Report of the Engineer and Copies of the Opinions of the Commanders of his Majesty's Ships in Chesapeak relative to Point Comfort,	[Jul 25, 1781]	[179]
No. IV. Admiral Graves to Earl Cornwallis,	July 12, [1781],	180
No V. Earl Cornwallis to Admiral Graves,	July 26, [1781],	181
No. VI. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Au. 12, [1781],	182
No. VII. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Au. 11, [1781],	183
No. VIII. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Au. 16, [1781],	185
No. IX. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Au. 22, [1781],	186

P A R T   V.
RELATIVE TO THE DEFENCE OF YORK, IN VIRGINIA.

No. I. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Au. 31, [1781],	189
No. II. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Sep. 1, [1781],	190
No. III. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Sep. 2, [1781],	ibid.
No. IV. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton	Sep. 4, [1781],	191
No. V. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Sep. 8, [1781],	ibid.
No. VI. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Sep. 2, [1781],	193
No. VII. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Sep. 6, [1781],	195
No. VIII. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Sep. 16, [1781],	196
No. IX. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Sep. 24, [1781],	197
No. X. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Sep. 29, [1781],	199
No. XI. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Sep. 25, [1781],	200
No. XII. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Oct. 3, [1781],	201
No. XIII. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Sep. 30, [1781],	202
No. XIV. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Oct. 11, [1781],	204
No. XV. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Oct. 15, [1781],	205
No. XVI. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Oct. 20, [1781],	206
----- Inclosed Earl Cornwallis to General Washington	Oct. 17, [1781],	[214]
----- General Washington to Earl Cornwallis	Oct. 17, [1781],	215
----- Earl Cornwallis to General Washington	Oct. 17, [1781],	ib.
----- General Washington to Earl Cornwallis	Oct. 18, [1781],	217
----- Earl Cornwallis to General Washington,	Oct. 18, [1781],	218
----- Copy of the Articles of Capitulation		220
No. XVII. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Nov. 30, [1781],	227
No. XVIII. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,	Dec. 2, [1781],	228
No. XIX. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Dec. 2, [1781],	230
No. XX. State of the Troops under the command of Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis in Virginia at different Periods of Time		[facing 236]
No. XXI. State of the Army in Virginia under the Command of Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis,	Oct. 18, [1781],

P A R T   VI.
LETTERS FROM SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B. TO EARL CORNWALLIS.
DELIVERED AT NEW-YORK A MONTH AFTER EARL CORNWALLIS'S SURRENDER.

No. I. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Aug. 2, [1781],	237
No. II. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Aug. 27, [1781],	251
No. III. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Aug. 30, [1781],	253
No. IV. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,	Oct. 14, 15, and 18, [1781],	257

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