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[continued]
P A R T VI.
LETTERS FROM SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B.
TO EARL CORNWALLIS.
DELIVERED AT NEW-YORK A MONTH AFTER EARL
CORNWALLIS'S SURRENDER.
N U M B E R I.
Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, August 2d, 1781.
[Received from the Secretary at New York, Nov. 19, 1781.]
My Lord,
I was last night honoured with your Lordship's letters of the 24th and 27th ultimo, by Captain
Stapleton; and it gives me no small concern to observe by the tenor of them, that you are
displeased with the opinions I took the liberty of giving
[p238]
in my letter of the 29th of May, respecting the probable consequences of your retreat from Cross
Creek to Wilmington, and march from thence to Petersburg; and with what I said to your
Lordship in my letters of the 8th and 11th of last month, on your design of abandoning the
Williamsburg Neck, and retiring with your army to Portsmouth. Therefore, as it was not my
intention to give offence, and is extremely my wish to be properly understood by your Lordship,
I
request your attention for a few moments to the following elucidation of my sentiments on both
those subjects.
The high opinion I entertained of your Lordship's military talents, and the respect I had for your situation as second to myself, induced me, from the moment you took charge of a separate command, to leave you at full liberty to act in it as you judged best for the King's service. And I am persuaded your Lordship is not insensible that I constantly pursued this line of conduct towards you during all your operations in the Carolinas; aiming at no other merit than that of diligently attending to your wants and supplying them; -- whilst I was content to remain here myself, upon the very confined defensive, to which I was reduced, by the large detachments I had sent to the southward in support of your progress.
Although your Lordship was, as you have observed[,] subjected by this means to a certain degree of [p239] anxiety and responsibility; it does not appear that I was exonerated of my share of them. I could not, therefore, but be personally and anxiously interested in your successes and disappointments. And, though I have a respect for your Lordship's judgment, and am apt to doubt my own when it differs from it; yet it is certainly a duty I owe to my station as Commander in Chief, to express my dissent from any measure your Lordship adopts, when I apprehend that the consequences may be prejudicial. This, my Lord, being the case with respect to the move taken notice of in my letter of the 29th May (and I most sincerely wish experience had convinced me I was mistaken) I immediately communicated to your Lordship my sentiments of the event, and how I thought it might have been obviated. In these it seems I am not so fortunate to have your concurrence. But I must confess they are not the least altered by your Lordship's arguments; being still of opinion, that, under the circumstances in which you describe your troops to be, you could have fallen back from Crosscreek to the Pedee, with much greater ease and safety, than you could have marched double the distance to Wilmington, through a country which you report to be entirely hostile: and I should suppose Lord Rawdon might have moved to the Pedee without interruption to join you, with every refreshment your army wanted; as there does not appear, to have been at that time, an enemy [p240] between that river and Camden; and before you reached the Pedee, the country would probably have been so opened, that your orders for that purpose might have got to his Lordship with as much expedition and safety, as your note did from Guildford after the battle.
And with respect to your Lordship's subsequent move, I hope you will pardon me if I continue to dissent from the policy of the measure, tho' you happily surmounted the danger of it; as I fear the advantages resulting from your junction with the Chesapeak army will not compensate the losses which immediately followed your quitting Carolina, -- notwithstanding General Greene's wishes to the contrary; which, I apprehend, meant nothing more than a gasconade, to boast the success he expected from a second action with your Lordship's army, in case it had directed its steps towards him instead of Virginia.
I hope your Lordship will likewise excuse me for expressing the uneasiness I feel at the observation you make respecting my opinion of the Virginia force; because it seems to convey an insinuation, which I am not conscious of deserving. And I trust, that as I know myself to be incapable of wresting opinions to serve particular purposes, it will appear, that what I have said at different periods, on that or any other subject, has been perfectly consonant and candidly what I thought. I beg leave, therefore, to contrast [p241] with each other what I have said, in this and my other letters, on the force of Virginia; and I request your Lordship will be pleased to point out the impropriety which gave rise to that observation.
In the letter your Lordship quotes I say, :I should not have thought even the one under Major-general Phillips in safety, at Petersburgh, at least for so long a time." In the one of June 8th, "Your Lordship will see by La Fayette's letter, that you have little more opposed to you than his corps, and an unarmed militia." And in that of June 11th, "where, as appears by the intercepted letters of Washington and La Fayette, they are in no situation to stand against even a division of that army. And your Lordship may possibly have opposed to you from 1500 to 2000 Continentals, and (as La Fayette observes) a small body of ill armed peasantry, full as spiritless as the militia of the Southern Provinces, and without any service." At the period alluded to in the first letter, General Phillips was at Petersburg with only 2000 men, uncovered by works. Fayette was opposed to him with his own corps, Steuben, Muhlenberg, &c. and all the militia of the province, and expected to be soon joined by Wayne with the Pennsylvania line. I therefore certainly had cause to be apprehensive for General Phillips's corps, in case Greene had, on hearing of your Lordship's move from Wilmington, fallen back, and calling La Fayette to him, placed himself with their [p242] united force between your Lordship's and the Petersburg army, ready to strike at either, as it suited his purpose. But when the other letters were written, my opinion of the Virginia force was formed from the Rebel letters just intercepted, which fully described the state of their arms and their numbers. I therefore cannot discover, that they shew I thought at different periods more or less favourably of it, but as I was warranted to do by matter of fact, and the intelligence I received.
To give a full and satisfactory answer to your Lordship's letter of the 27th July, will perhaps take up more time than you or I can well spare. But, as your Lordship appears to be greatly affected by the contents of my letters of the 8th and 11th ultimo, I think it a duty I owe to your feelings and my own, to say something in explanation of them. I must therefore beg your Lordship's patience, while I state the substance of my correspondence with General Phillips and yourself, concerning the stations to be held, and operations to be carried on in Chesapeak, &c. which, I presume, will at least prove, that I spared no pains to explain my desires to your Lordship, though I have, perhaps, unhappily failed in making them understood.
My instructions to General Phillips, as quoted by your Lordship, gave him a power to take possession of York Town, or Old Point Comfort, as a station for large ships, if the Admiral should disapprove [p243] of Portsmouth, and require one. In my letters to that General Officer, of 24th of March and 11th of April, I desired his opinion respecting the post of Portsmouth, and such others as he proposed to establish on James River; with their importance considered, either as assisting your Lordship's operations, or connected with those of the navy: and, after having received that opinion, I told him, "that Portsmouth was by no means my choice;" and left him at liberty to change it if he saw proper. And the substance of the conversations with him, as extracted by your Lordship, go more fully into the advantage of a naval station, pointing particularly to the one at York -- being led to the consideration of its utility by the French having, two winters ago, sheltered their ships under works thrown up there. And, as I have already mentioned to your Lordship, General Arnold has since told me, that from the description given him of it by Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, he judged 2000 men would be ample for its defence.
From hence, my Lord, I presume it will appear, that I very early entertained thoughts of a station in Chesapeak for large ships; and I referred your Lordship, in my letter of the 29th May, to my correspondence, &c. with General Phillips, in your possession, for my ideas on that and other operations which I had in view -- leaving you at liberty, however, to follow them or your own, as you judged [p244] best for the King's service. Having therefore, afterwards seen by your Lordship's dispatches of the 26th of May, that you had considered the papers referred to; and that, though you did not think it expedient to attend to Mr. Alexander's proposal, and the expedition against the stores at Philadelphia, you had the same objections to Portsmouth which had been before stated, and was inclined to think well of York as a proper harbour and place of arms; I naturally concluded that your Lordship had entirely concurred with me, not only as to the propriety of laying hold of a naval station somewhere on the Williamsburg Neck, but as to the place. And I of course supposed, that your Lordship would set about establishing yourself there immediately on your return from Richmond, which I expected would be in three or four days after the date of your letter. Wherefore, imagining you were considerably advanced in your works (for I had no letters afterwards from your Lordship until the one you honoured me with of the 30th June) I ventured to solicit you for a part of your force to assist me in the operations I proposed carrying on in this quarter during the summer months -- when those of the Chesapeak must have probably ceased. And in doing this, as I was totally in the dark with respect to what was then doing in the Chesapeak, I endeavoured, as much as lay in my power, to avoid all possibility of interrupting the moves you might be engaged in, or any object [p245] you might have in view -- as will, I doubt not, be manifest from the following extracts from my letters to your Lordship, which I beg leave to submit once more to your consideration.
May 29th. -- "I would rather content myself with ever so bare a defensive (until there was an appearance of serious operation against me) than cramp yours in the least."
June 8th. -- "You will see by Fayette's letter, you have little more opposed to you, &c. -- Your Lordship can therefore certainly spare 2000, and the sooner they come the better, &c. Had it been possible for your Lordship to have let me know your views and intentions, I should not now be at a loss to judge of the force you might want for your operations. Ignorant, therefore, as I am of them, I can only trust, that as your Lordship will see by the enclosed intercepted letters, my call for a reinforcement is not a wanton one; you will send me what you can spare as soon as may be expedient. For, should your Lordship be engaged in a move of such importance as to require the employment of your whole force, I would by no means wish to starve or obstruct it. But in that case, would rather endeavour to wait a little longer, until my occasions grow more urgent, or your situation admits of your detaching. Of which, however, I request to be informed with all possible dispatch."
[p246] N.B. This letter was written immediately after I had known the enemy's designs of attacking this place; and should therefore be considered as thoroughly descriptive of the nature of my wishes for a reinforcement.
June 11th. -- "I shall of course approve of any alterations your Lordship may think proper to make with respect to the stations I proposed taking in York or James Rivers, &c." -- "Thus circumstanced, I am persuaded your Lordship will be of opinion, that the sooner I concentrate my force, the better. Therefore, (unless your Lordship, after the receipt of my letters of the 29th May and 8th inst. should incline to agree with me in opinion, and judge it right to adopt my ideas respecting the move to Baltimore, or the Delaware Neck;) I beg leave to recommend it to you, as soon as you have finished the active operations you may be now engaged in, to take a defensive station in any healthy situation you chuse (be it at Williamsburg or York Town:) and I would wish in that case," (that is, after you have secured such a station) "that after reserving to yourself such troops as you judge necessary for an ample defensive, and desultory movements by water, &c. the following corps may be sent me, in succession as you can spare them.
June 15th. "I delay not a moment to dispatch a runner with a duplicate of my letter of the 11th instant; and as I am led to suppose from your Lordship's [p247] letter of the 26th ultimo, that you may not think it expedient to adopt the operations I had recommended in the Upper Chesapeak, and will by this time probably have finished those you were engaged in," (in which surely the securing defensive stations is obviously implied) "I request you will immediately embark a part of the troops stated in the letter inclosed, (beginning with the Light Infantry) and send them to me with the greatest dispatch. I shall likewise in proper time solicit the Admiral to send some more transports to the Chesapeak; in which your Lordship will please to send hither the remaining troops you judge can be spared from the defence of the posts you may occupy; as I do not think it adviseable to leave more troops in that unhealthy climate at this season of the year, than what are absolutely wanted for a defensive and desultory water excursion."
June 19th. "I am, however, persuaded they will attempt the investiture of the place; I therefore heartily wish I was more in force, that I might be able to take advantage of any false movements they may make informing it." Should your Lordship have any solid operations to propose, or have approved of the one mentioned in my former letters, I shall not, as I have already told you, press you for the corps I wished to have sent me, at least for the present. But if in the approaching inclement season, your Lordship should not think it prudent to undertake [p248] operation with the troops you have, &c. I cannot but wish, for their sake, if I had no other motive, that you would send me as soon as possible what you can spare from a respectable defensive. And that your Lordship may better judge what I mean by a respectable defensive, it is necessary to inform you, that other intelligence (besides Monsieur Barras' letter) makes it highly probable that Monsieur De Grasse will visit this coast in the hurricane season, and bring with him troops as well as ships. But when he hears your Lordship has taken possession of York-river before him, &c. (which in other words certainly means your defensive is required to be more particularly respectable, as De Grasse is expected to come soon with a considerable armament to the Chesapeak, where he will probably seize a station for his large ships in York-river: but as it appears to be your Lordship's intention to take possession of that post, I think he will, upon hearing you have done so, relinquish the design, and join the force assembling against this place.) "In the hope that your Lordship will be able to spare me three thousand men, I have sent two thousand tons of transports, &c." But should your Lordship not be able to spare the whole, &c."
These letters, my Lord, are each a link of the same chain, and, collectively or separately, were intended to speak the same language. The simple and [p249] obvious meaning of which I humbly presume to be this.
I find your Lordship does not think it expedient to undertake the operations I proposed, and you have none of your own in contemplation; and it being probable you have made your arrangements for changing the post of Portsmouth, which you dislike, and have finished your defensive on the Williamsburg Neck, which we both approve of; I request that, of the seven thousand men, which (as far as I can judge without having lately received any returns) you have, you will reserve as many as you want for the most ample defensive, and desultory water expeditions; and then send me the rest according to the inclosed lists in succession as you can spare them.
It is true, indeed, that several of these letters were not received by your Lordship until some time after you received those of the 11th and 15th, owing to the unexpected[ly] tedious voyage of the Charon that carried them (and you must be sensible that it would have been imprudent in me to have risked duplicates of them by the boat, in which Ensign Amiel was dispatched.) But, if your Lordship will be pleased to recur to those you received by him, I am persuaded you will find that the letter of the 11th refers you to those of the 29th of May and 8th of June; which (it is expressly implied) you[r] Lordship was to read, before you executed the order contained in that of the 15th; and you not having received them [p250] would (I should suppose) have fully warranted, at least the suspension of your resolution of repassing James-river, until you had stated to me your situation, and heard again from me.
After this very candid and ample explanation, my Lord, I have only to assure you, that it was not my intention to pass the slightest censure on your Lordship's conduct, much less an unmerited or severe one. We are both amenable to the censure of a much higher tribunal, should either of us unhappily commit errors that deserve it: nor had I the smallest right to doubt your Lordship's readiness to comply with my desires, if you had understood them. The dispatch with which you prepared to execute what you thought my wish, and the alacrity you afterwards shewed, together with the ample manner in which you equipped the expedition I ordered, convince me you are inclined to do so. I had therefore only to lament, that your Lordship had mistaken my intentions, and to endeavour to obviate the inconvenience as speedily as possible. This perhaps, was done in more positive language than I had been accustomed to use to your Lordship; but I had no other object in view than to make myself clearly understood, which I am happy to find has been the case, and that my messenger was in time to prevent the consequences I apprehended.
I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.
[p251] N U M B E R II.
Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, August 27th, 1781.
[Received from the Secretary at New-York, November 19th, 1781.]
My Lord,
I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter in cypher of the 17th instant, by the Swallow
dispatch boat, which arrived here the 23d. In answer to which, I must confess that I conceived
your letter of the 27th ultimo, gave me reason to suppose it was your intention to send me the
troops you could spare, as soon as you finished the evacuation of Portsmouth; and I was
impatient for their arrival for the reasons I have already communicated to you, as it is probable
they would have been of infinite use had they come in time. For on the arrival of the two
thousand five hundred raw German recruits which I mentioned in my last, and in the hope of
reinforcement from your Lordship, I had assembled my little army in such a manner as to be able
to avail myself of any opportunity which might be given me by the enemy, who had foraged
within six miles of my lines on the 17th. This small movement was made on the 18th, they fell
back on the 19th, and passed the Croton; afterwards crossed the
[p252]
Hudson at King's-ferry, and are now encamped in the neighbourhood of Chatham.
I cannot well ascertain Mr. Washington's real intentions by this move of his army; but it is possible he means for the present to suspend his offensive operations against this post, and to take a defensive station at the old post of Morris-town, from whence he may detach to the southward. On this account therefore, and because the season is approaching when operation may recommence in the Chesapeak, I request your Lordship will be pleased to keep with you all the troops you have there, and I shall send you such recruits, convalescents, &c. as can go by this sudden opportunity; which are all that I can at present spare; as this move of the enemy may be only a feint, and they may return to your former position, which they certainly will do, if De Grasse arrives. But towards the latter end of next month, when the effects of the equinox are over, (for I am persuaded the Admiral will not approve of any water movements till then) if this post should not be threatened, I propose to reinforce the Chesapeak army with all the troops which can possibly be spared consistently with the security of this important post.
General Leslie has been here some days, he will himself explain to your Lordship the cause of his coming. I was much concerned to find him in so bad a state of health on his arrival, but it is now much altered for the better; he embarks to-morrow [p253] to proceed to Chesapeak on his way to Charles-town.
If your Lordship from your knowledge of the state of South-Carolina, should be opinion that any troops may be spared from thence, I beg leave to suggest that the sooner you give orders for their joining you the better.
I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.
N U M B E R III.
Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis dated New-York, August 30th, 1781.
[Received from the secretary at New-York, November 19th, 1781.]
My Lord,
I am this moment honoured with your Lordship's dispatches of the 20th, 22d, and 24th instant,
which were delivered to me by Lieutenant-colonel Du Buy; and as my letters of the 2d and 27th,
have already spoken very fully to the subject they chiefly treat of, it becomes unnecessary for me
at present
[p254]
to give your Lordship any further trouble thereon.
General Leslie will have the honour to communicate to your Lordship my wishes respecting Carolina, as I have given him such instructions relative to the service in that quarter, as my present limited information enables me to do. However, as I cannot but suppose that the operations in Virginia and Carolina, will still have a considerable connection with each other, and that your Lordship, by applying to the officer commanding the King's ships, will have the same means of communication that I shall; I must request that you will still retain the direction of the southern district, until I can determine upon it, or shall find it expedient to comply with your Lordship's wishes, which I shall not fail to pay the earliest attention to. For your Lordship having hitherto had the entire management of the civil and military transactions in the Carolinas, and being in consequence better qualified than any other person to judge of what may be hereafter proper to be done there, it will be necessary I should receive your opinions upon them, before any change takes place, or I can frame definitive orders for General Leslie's guidance. Your Lordship will be therefore pleased in the mean time to make such additions to the instructions I have now given him as you shall find requisite.
[p255] I am concerned to find your Lordship under the necessity of employing so many troops in working on the fortification; having entertained hopes that you were supplied with a sufficient number of Negroes for that and other drudgeries.
Mr. Wier having informed me that the Commissary with your Lordship has received your orders to buy rum for the troops; I have the honour to acquaint you, that as there is a considerable quantity of that article in the stores here, a supply of it will be sent you from hence, which will of course come cheaper than any that may be purchased in Virginia.
I hope your Lordship will find every thing you want sent you by this opportunity, except money, of which only ten thousand pounds can possibly be spared at present. But, a considerable sum being expected by the first fleet from England, I shall on its arrival send your Lordship a further supply.
Sir Samuel Hood arrived here from the Leeward-islands on the 28th, with fourteen sail of the line, three frigates and a fire ship; and has brought with him the fortieth and sixty-ninth regiments to reinforce this army: the latter of which continues to do duty on board the fleet. On the evening of the same day I received undoubted information that Monsieur Barras' fleet sailed from Rhode-island the morning of the 25th, their destination not known. Mr. Washington's force still remains in the neighbourhood [p256] of Chatham, and I do not hear that he has as yet detached to the southward.
I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.
P.S. September 1st. As your Lordship informs me in your letter of the 22d, that the works you have thought proper to construct at York, will not probably be finished before the expiration of six weeks, I am to suppose you will not think of commencing solid operations before that time. Therefore unless Mr. Washington should send a considerable part of his army to the southward, I shall not judge it necessary until then to detach thither. I should wish, however, in the mean time to be informed from your Lordship what number of troops you think will be required for the defence of your works, what force you will afterwards have to take the field with, and what you will want in addition; supposing that you should not have a greater force acting against you in Virginia, than what may be expected from the present appearances.
[p257] N U M B E R IV.
Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, October 14, 1781.
[Received from the Secretary at New-York, Nov. 29, 1781.]
My Lord,
I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 29th ult. on the 8th instant, and that of
the
3d on the 12th instant, and am happy to hear that mine of the 24th and 25th have reached
you.
At a council of war of the General Officers, held on the 10th instant, it was resolved I should submit the three following plans to your Lordship's consideration. They occurred to us as secondary objects only, (in case we should find it absolutely impracticable to go directly up to York; or, by landing at Monday's point, effect a junction with you by the Gloucester side) and be thereby obliged to try James river.
FIRST,
To land at Newport-News, and the troops to advance from thence on the James river road to some favourable position, in communication with that river, where we are to wait until we hear from your Lordship, or circumstances may make it proper for [p258] us to co-operate with you in effecting a junction of the two armies, which we at present think will be best done without your lines, in preference to an attempt of doing it within, for reasons we think obvious.
SECOND.
To attempt a junction with you by a combined move, -- we moving up James river to James town, and your Lordship up the York river to either Queen's creek or Cappahosick ferry, and effect the junction as near Williamsburg as we can; thereby putting ourselves in a situation to attack the enemy, should it be thought adviseable.
THIRD.
To save as great a part of your Lordship's corps as possible, by bringing them off to James town, and a naval force will be ready to protect them. This we think may be done by our giving jealousy to the enemy from Newport News or Mulberry island, whilst your Lordship moving up the river with as many troops as your boats will carry, or marching up the Gloucester side, crosses the river, and lands either at Queen's creek or Cappahosick, and makes the best of your way to James town.
The above is our opinion of what is best to be done in case we do not hear from your Lordship. But, should we receive other ideas from you, we shall of course be governed by them.
[p259] By this your Lordship will perceive, our wishes are to effect the junction first by York, -- next by Gloucester, -- and, in case either of those are absolutely impracticable, by the James river. -- First landing at Newport News, and taking a position ready to co-operate with your Lordship, in case you should recommend a combined effort to effect a junction that way; or to endeavour to effect it near Williamsburg, the two armies moving up the James and York rivers about the same time, we landing at James town, and your Lordship where you judge best; and when our junction is formed, bring on a general action with the enemy, should that on consultation be thought adviseable. But in case all these should fail, our last object will be to save as many of your Lordship's troops as we can, and leave the post at York afterwards to make the best terms they can for themselves.
The Torbay and Prince William having arrived on the 11th, our fleet at present consists of twenty-five sail of the line and two fifties, with a large number of frigates. They are now ready, and I expect we shall certainly sail in a day or two.
P. S. Oct. 15. -- Had the wind been fair to day, the fleet would have fallen down to the Hook, but I expect the whole will sail to-morrow.
[p260] P. S. By the duplicate, London, at the Hook, Oct. 18. -- The fleet is assembled, the troops embarked on board, and the whole will go to sea, if the wind continues fair, to-morrow morning, as the tide will not suit before. The Admiral and I intreat that we may receive all possible information from you and the Commodore, of your situation, and the exact position of the enemy's fleet, to meet us off cape Charles.
I was honoured with your Lordship's letter of the 11th on the 16th instant.
I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.
Original, forwarded by Captain Stapleton on the 15th. Duplicate by the Resolution whale-boat, Robertson.
THE END.
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