Cornwallis's Answer to the Narrative of Clinton [4/7]

Sir,
I have consented to the request of Brigadier-general Arnold to go to New York; he conceives that your Excellency wishes him to attend you there, and his present indisposition renders him unequal to the fatigue of service. He will represent the horrid enormities which are committed by our privateers in [p80] Chesapeak Bay; and I must join my earnest wish, that some remedy may be applied to an evil which is a [illegible] very prejudicial to his Majesty's service.

I have the honour to be, &c.
CORNWALLIS.

N U M B E R II.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Byrd's Plantation, North of James River, 26th of May, 1781.

Sir,
The reinforcement is safely arrived in James River, and I opened all your dispatches to poor Phillips, marked On his Majesty's service.

I hope that your Excellency has received my letters from Wilmington, and one of the 20th from Petersburgh; as the latter went by an uncertain conveyance, I send a duplicate of it.

The arrival of the reinforcement has made me easy about Portsmouth for the present. I have sent General Leslie thither with the seventeenth regiment and the two battalions of Anspach, keeping the forty-third regiment with the army. I shall now proceed to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond, and with my light troops to destroy any magazines or stores in the neighbourhood which may have been collected [p81] either for his use or for General Greene's army. From thence I purpose to move to the Neck at Williamsburgh, which is represented as healthy, and where some subsistence may be procured, and keep myself unengaged from operations which might interfere with your plan for the campaign, until I have the satisfaction of hearing from you. I hope I shall then have an opportunity to receive better information than has hitherto been in my power to procure, relative to a proper harbour and place of arms. At present I am inclined to think well of York. The objections to Portsmouth are, that it cannot be made strong without an army to defend it, that it is remarkably unhealthy, and can give no protection to a ship of the line. Wayne has not yet joined La Fayette; nor can I positively learn where he is, nor what is his force. Greene's cavalry are said to be coming this way; but I have no certain accounts of it.

Your Excellency desires Generals Phillips and Arnold to give you their opinions relative to Mr. Alexander's proposal. As General Arnold goes to New York by the first safe conveyance, you will have an opportunity of hearing his sentiments in person.

Experience has made me less sanguine, and more arrangements seem to me necessary for so important an expedition than appear to occur to General Arnold.

[p82] Mr. Alexander's conversations bear too strong a resemblance to those of the emissaries from North Carolina to give me much confidence; and, from the experience I have had, and the dangers I have undergone, one maxim appears to me to be absolutely necessary for the safe and honourable conduct of this war, which is, that we should have as few posts as possible, and that wherever the King's troops are, they should be in respectable force. By the vigorous exertions of the present governors of America, large bodies of men are soon collected; and I have too often observed, that when a storm threatens our friends disappear.

In regard to taking possession of Philadelphia by an incursion, (even if practicable,) without an intention of keeping or burning it, (neither of which appear to be adviseable,) I should apprehend it would do more harm than good to the cause of Britain.

I shall take the liberty of repeating, that, if offensive war is intended, Virginia appears to me to be the only province in which it can be carried on, and in which there is a stake. But to reduce the province, and keep possession of the country, a considerable army would be necessary; for, with a small force, the business would probably terminate unfavourably, though the beginning might be successful. In case it is thought expedient, and a proper army for the attempt can be formed, I hope your Excellency will do me [p83] the justice to believe, that I neither wish nor expect to have the command of it, leaving you at New York on the defensive. Such sentiments are so far from my heart, that I can with great truth assure you, that few things could give me greater pleasure than being relieved by your presence from a situation of so much anxiety and responsibility.

By my letter of the 20th, your Excellency will observe, that, instead of thinking it possible to do anything in North Carolina, I am of opinion that it is doubtful whether we can keep the posts in the back part of South Carolina; and I believe I have stated, in former letters, the infinite difficulty of protecting a frontier of three hundred miles against a persevering enemy, in a country where we have no water communication, and where few of the inhabitants are active or useful friends.

In enumerating the corps employed in the Southern District, your Excellency will recollect that they are all very weak, and that some of the British as well as Provincial regiments retain nothing but the name.

Our weakness at Guildford was not owing to any detachment, unless that with the baggage; but to our losses by action, sickness, &c. during the winter's campaign.

I saw with concern that you thought Lieutenant-colonel Balfour had acted injudiciously in sending home some transports. That business has, I apprehend, been misrepresented by persons interested in [p84] retaining rotten vessels in the service of Government. The circumstances I do not now perfectly recollect, but I believe you will find that the ships sent home were either victuallers, which the Treasury desired in the strongest manner, or transports which were so exceedingly bad that they could never have gone out with safety, after a stay of three months in Charles-town harbour. Whatever was done in it was with my approbation at the time, appearing evidently for the good of the service: I, therefore, think it my duty to exculpate Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, whom I have found, on all occasions, a most zealous, intelligent, and deserving officer.

Colonel Robinson's corps is so weak, and deserts so fast, that at the recommendation of General Arnold, I have consented that it shall return in the transports to New-York.

I have the honour to be, &c.
CORNWALLIS.

[p85] N U M B E R III.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated March 14, 1781, half past Two.

[Received at Petersburge by Earl Cornwallis, May 20.]

Dear Phillips,
By the enclosed from the Admiral you will see that the want of intelligence has again lost us a fair opportunity of giving "a mortal blow." I hope, however, he will still overtake them before they reach Chesapeak; they sailed in a snow storm on Wednesday, and I fear he was not out of Gardiner's Bay till Saturday. He was, however, left pursuing on the 11th, with all his coppers and a fair wind. I think, if he does not overtake them at sea, they will not risk an action in Lynhaven-bay, and will therefore proceed with their whole fleet to York, as I told the Admiral they would, and there, perhaps, lay; and I had almost said fascinate the Admiral till another fleet arrives; if from Europe, it ought not to come without a hint from thence; from the West Indies it will not probably come unaccompanied by our friend Sir George. 'Tis possible it only means to see the transports off the Chesapeak, and then proceed to the West-Indies with the fleet of men of war; 'tis possible, also, that the whole is gone to the [p86] West-Indies, for it is a bold move to evacuate Rhode-island, and proceed to the Chesapeak so encumbered, liable to be followed by an unencumbered superior copper fleet. God send our old Admiral success! I depend on early information from you, and shall prepare for every possible event. -- Recollect that we have not a single transport till you send some. With every wish for your health and success,

Believe me, &c.
H. CLINTON.

The schooner shall attend you, though we can ill spare her. As often as possible communicate by these vessels; they make their passage better than the frigates.

P.S. I have received your letters.

In addition to what I have written above, pray observe me well in what I am saying.

I think, if the French are gone to Chesapeak, they will shelter themselves in York-River. -- The Admiral will immediately hold his usual language -- that he waits for the army. That from South-Carolina cannot come, as Colonel Balfour has very injudiciously sent home the transports. -- I cannot move a man till you send back transports; but, if he proposes any thing to you, he must first declare in writing positively what he thinks his fleet will do, or [p87] at least attempt, before you can decide; and then, after consulting your officers, let me know your opinion what can be done, and what land force it will require to do it. If all agree that they will be unattackable in that station, it must be blocked, and then we must do our best to assist Lord Cornwallis's operations, or carry on desultory operations in the Chesapeak till some other plan can be settled; but all must be settled in formal council.

N U M B E R IV.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, March 24, 1781.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 20.]

Dear Sir, I believe that Lord Cornwallis has finished his campaign, and, if report says true, very handsomely, by taking all Greene's cannon, and recovering the greatest part of his own men who had been made prisoners by Mr. Greene. -- If that should be the case, and Lord Cornwallis does not want any co-operation to assist him, and you see no prospect of striking an important stroke elsewhere, I shall probably request you and General Arnold to return to me, with such troops as I have already named in my [p88] instructions. But all this will depend on the information I shall receive from you, and your opinion respecting the post at Portsmouth, and such others as you propose to establish on James River, with their importance considered, either as assisting Lord Cornwallis's operations, or connected with those of the navy.

When you return, you will be pleased to bring with you a small proportion of howitzes, mortars, cohorns, &c. so placed in the vessel in which they are embarked, as to be ready to land directly, as it is very likely we may proceed upon some operation immediately on your arrival.

I believe Fayette is intrenched at Annapolis, and that his corps does not now exceed nine hundred men, though he started with thirteen hundred. You may possibly attempt him in earnest: -- he will, at all events, serve as a mask to your return to us.

You will probably hear from Lord Cornwallis before you determine on any attempt at a distance from him. -- I wish much to know what troops he thinks he can spare from the troops under his Lordship's immediate orders; for, till I do, 'tis impossible to fix any plan. -- Three complete regiments will, I hope, arrive at Charles-town in the course of a few days, if Captain Elphinston should think it too early in the season to come directly here; and three more are hourly expected from the West-Indies, both which divisions will, of course, join me.

[p89] The French certainly expect an early reinforcement; if it comes from Europe, we must, I think, hear from thence long before it arrives: if from the Havannah, copper-bottomed sloops or frigates, which the Admiral will doubtless have on the look out, will announce their arrival, and give you time to determine what, in that case, will be best to be done. -- And here I take the liberty of hinting to you, that (from the appearance on the map) when you have once obtained a naval force in Curratuck and Albemarle Sounds, by holding the bridges of Pequimans and Pasquotank rivers, you secure a short passage across the Albemarle-sound, and communication with Lord Cornwallis; or, by destroying the bridges on those rivers, you prevent the enemy's approach by the bridge at North West landing.

Upon those hints I request your opinion, in cypher, as soon as possible. -- In the mean time I shall prepare for what may probably be your determination, after talking with Brigadier-general Arnold.

I beg you will be so good to forward the enclosed to Lieutenant-colonel Moncrief by the first opportunity to Charles-town, and that you will bring Mr. Fyers, of the corps of engineers, with you, when you return to this place.

I have the honour to be &c.
H. CLINTON.

[p90] P.S. Pray send Brigadier-general Arnold here by the first good opportunity, if you should not have particular occasion for his services.

N U M B E R V.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major General Phillips, dated New-York, April 11, 1781.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis, at Petersburg, May 24.]

Your letter of the 3d instant, by Captain Chads, which I am this day favoured with, makes me apprehensive lest you may have misconceived my intentions with regard to the order in which I wished that the different objects recommended to you in my instructions should be attended to; and that your having in consequence proposed to commence with strengthening the works at Portsmouth, may occasion some delay of the operations desired to favour those of Lord Cornwallis, whose situation after the action of the 15th ult. might not only derive the greatest advantage from, but indeed might possibly be so critical as even to require a timely exertion of the troops under your command.

You will, therefore, have the goodness to forgive me, if I request you to recollect, that at the time those instructions were drawn up, General Arnold was partly invested by a considerable body of militia, [p91] and threatened with an attack from the French armament from Rhode-island, and Fayette's corps then on their march to Virginia, which naturally pointed out the security of him, the troops under his orders, and the posts on Elizabeth-river, as the principal object of your expedition; which words were certainly intended to mean no more than relieving them from their supposed danger, by either forming a junction with General Arnold, or taking such measures against the enemies opposed to him as might most effectually enable you to throw into his lines an immediate supply of provisions and men; for how could I imagine that the post at Portsmouth, which General Arnold had but just informed me, in his letter of the 27th of February, he could defend against the force of the country, and two thousand French troops, until a reinforcement arrived from hence, would require additional works for its security, after you had joined him with so considerable a reinforcement, or was acting against the rebel stations in its neighbourhood? And I could not but suppose that you yourself comprehended what I intended to be the first object of my instructions, when you tell me in your letter, by Serjeant Coulter, that the proposed consultation would go, "in the first instance to the security of this post, and in the next to the fulfilling the first object of your Excellency's instructions." Which, (excuse me for repeating it) has been invariably in all my instructions to the [p92] General officers sent to the Chesapeak, operation in favour of Lord Cornwallis. But, if you will have the goodness to read those I gave you once more, I am sure you will perceive that what I have said about strengthening the present works on Elizabeth-river, and adding such others as you shall think necessary, is placed subsequent in order to most of the other objects recommended to you, and they were of course designed to have been taken into consideration after those had been accomplished, and you were upon the point of returning to me with part of your present force.

I am always happy to receive your opinions respecting the different operations of the war in this country, particularly those immediately connected with your own station. I, therefore, of course, shall pay every attention to what you say about the post at Portsmouth, and feel myself greatly obliged to you for the trouble you have taken to investigate its good and bad properties. My ideas of a post on Elizabeth-river have continued uniformly the same since I first took a view of it, having always considered it merely as a station to protect the King's ships, which might occasionally sail from thence to cruize in the waters of the Chesapeak, and command its entrance. I, therefore, only wished to have there such a number of troops as might be sufficient for its defence, and which, being occasionally reinforced, as circumstances should require and our abilities admit, might act offensively in distressing and embarrassing the [p93] measures of the enemy in its neighbourhood. -- For, God forbid I should think of burying the elite of my army in Nansemond and Princess Anne! these ideas I communicated to the General officers I sent on that service, and they each adopted such as appeared to them best calculated to answer the intended purpose. My own opinion indeed was that we should possess a close work at Mill Point, (which Fyers fortified by my order in 1776, as he will remember,) another at Norfolk, and a third somewhere on the opposite side of the river: but as I had been there only for a very short time, I could not of course but be influenced by the representations of the General officers and Engineers on the spot, who had more time, and better opportunity to examine all the different positions on that river. General Leslie therefore having informed me that he had, with the unanimous suffrage of the sea and land officers on the expedition, made choice of Portsmouth, (which probably he did with a view of putting our friends of Princess Anne, &c. under cover and protection, but, by your account, a small house, I fear, will be sufficient for them all,) and his Engineer, Captain Sutherland, having in consequence began a work there, which he was of opinion could in a few days be in a state to be perfectly secure with a small garrison; I was induced to recommend to General Arnold the occupying the same ground: and though I must do the justice to that General officer to acknowledge that he gave me, [p94] in his letter of the 23d of January, a very different representation of the post at Portsmouth, from the one given me by Major-general Leslie; circumstances became so critical at the time I received it, in consequence of the French preparations at Rhode-Island, and the numerous militia who were collecting in Virginia and North Carolina, that I thought it an improper time to change the station, because good or bad, such as it was, it must for the present be defended. I accordingly thought it right to defer, to some more proper occasion, the writing to General Arnold on the subject; and I was afterwards happy to find by his letter to me of the 27th of February, that his works there were in such forwardness; and that he was even preparing to send up James River, and expedition of five hundred men. All these circumstances considered, I was led to suppose that the post at Portsmouth, was now rendered an eligible one by the manner in which it was fortified. However, as I intimated before, it is by no means a position of my choice, and if you and General Arnold have such good reasons to condemn it, it may be right to return to our original object, a station to protect the King's ships, which is capable of being maintained by a garrison of about five or six hundred men; and if Mill-Point will answer these purposes without Norfolk, and the corresponding station on the opposite side of the river, I can have no objection; but leave it [p95] to you to act as you judge best for the King's service.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

N U M B E R VI.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, April 26th, 1781.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis, at Petersburg, May 24.]

Dear Sir,
Your letters of the 15th, 16th, 18th, and 19th instant, were delivered to me on the 22d by Captain Biggs of his Majesty's ship Amphitrite. And I should have now entered largely into, and given a detail answer (agreeable to your desire) to the several subjects thereof, if I had not from the purport of Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 10th, and yours of the 19th, judged it to be unnecessary at present to give either you or myself that trouble.

What you say in your letter of the 15th instant, respecting the post at Portsmouth, and the choice of another somewhere else on Elizabeth River, you will find fully answered in mine to you of the 11th which accompanies this: for (though written above a fortnight since) I had no safe opportunity before the present of sending it to you.

[p96] Lord Cornwallis's arrival at Wilmington has considerably changed the complexion of our affairs to the southward, and all operations to the northward must probably give place to those in favour of his Lordship, which at present appear to require our more immediate attention. I know nothing of his Lordship's situation but what I have learnt from his letter to me of the 10th, which you have read, and as I have the strongest reason to believe that he had above three thousand men (exclusive of cavalry and militia) when he entered North Carolina, I am totally at a loss to conjecture how his numbers came to be reduced before the day of action to one thousand three hundred and sixty infantry, except by supposing (as you have done) that he had previously weakened his army by detachments. Of this however, I shall probably be informed when I receive the copy of his Lordship's letter to the Minister; and I shall most likely be at the same time informed what prospects he may still have of arming the numerous friends we were taught to expect his finding in the districts he has visited in his march to, and retreat from, Guildford; without whose assistance we shall, I fear, hold those provinces by a very precarious tenure.

I had great hopes before I received Lord Cornwallis's letter, that his Lordship would have been in a condition to have spared a considerable part of his army from Carolina for the operations in Chesapeak, [p97] but you will observe from it that, instead of sending any part of his present force thither, he proposes to detain a part of the reinforcement coming from Europe for his more southern operations, even though they should be defensive. I shall therefore take the opinions of the General officers near me upon the present state of our affairs, and I propose afterwards to send you such a further detachment from this army as we may judge can be done with tolerable security to this post, at least while we remain superior at sea.

With so large a force as you will then have, I flatter myself that you will be able to make the most effectual exertions either directly or indirectly in Lord Cornwallis's favour, as far as your efforts on the shores of the Chesapeak can co-operate with what he may be doing in Carolina. What these, however, may be, you, as being upon the spot, must certainly be the best judge, until you either hear further from or see his Lordship.

In yours and Brigadier General Arnold's joint letter, you mention that from one thousand six hundred to two thousand more men, would enable you to take a post in force at Petersburg; from whence you might break up Mr. Greene's communications with Virginia, and in co-operation with Lord Cornwallis, probably disperse the Rebel army. And that you could moreover, with this increased strength, attempt Fayette's corps, Baltimore, and Annapolis, with great [p98] probability of success, and finally attempt Philadelphia, and take post in the lower counties of Delaware, for which you apprehend your force would then be sufficient.

The security of the two Carolinas is certainly an object of the greatest importance, and should at all events be first attended to. Success also against any considerable corps of the enemy, which may be collected any where within reach, and the taking or destroying their public stores, magazines, &c. are undoubtedly very important advantages. But there is in my humble opinion still another operation, which if successful would be most solidly decisive in its consequences, and is therefore well worth our consideration. It is the trying the same experiment (which has hitherto unfortunately not succeeded to the southward) in other districts, which have been represented as most friendly to the King's interests. Virginia has been in general looked upon as universally hostile; Maryland has not been as yet tried, but is supposed to be not quite so much so: but the inhabitants of Pennsylvania on both sides of the Susquehannah, York, Lancaster, Chester, and the Peninsula between Chesapeak and Delaware, are represented to me to be friendly. There or thereabouts, I think this experiment should now be tried, but it cannot be done fairly until we have a force sufficient not only to go there, but to retain a respectable hold of the country afterwards, should it [p99] be judged necessary. I wish that our numbers were competent to the occupying two corresponding stations at Baltimore and Elk river. Agreeable to what I mentioned to you in the conversations we have had together on this subject, to which that you may be able on occasion to refer, I have committed the substance of them to writing, and send them to you inclosed. This I should have done sooner, had I had a safe opportunity before. I have now the greater reason to be convinced that the opinions I then gave you were right, from a conversation I have since had with a very intelligent friend of ours from the country, known to Colonel Simcoe, who goes to you by this opportunity, and will be able to give you the fullest information thereon.

April 30th. I expected that the Medea would have been sent to Lord Cornwallis, and that Captain Duncan would have been appointed by the Admiral to conduct the naval operations in the Chesapeak, for which he is particularly qualified from his knowledge of those waters, and his having had the management of that business in Lord Howe's command. But the Admiral has just wrote to me that he cannot possibly at present spare Captain Duncan, and that he has appointed Captain Hudson of the Richmond to carry my dispatches to Chesapeak and Cape Fear, and afterwards attend this service. My dispatches will therefore go in her under the charge of Lord Chewton, and as we both know Captain Hudson's [p100] great zeal to co-operate with the troops on all occasions, I hope every thing will go on under his direction perfectly to your satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

Inclosed in No. VI.

Substance of several Conversations had with Major-general Phillips, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak, before his Embarkation on his Expedition thither.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 24.]

Until I know Lord Cornwallis's success to the southward, and what force can be spared from the southern district for further operations, and until the reinforcements expected to this army arrive; such troops as are in the Chesapeak may be employed, first in assisting his Lordship's operations, and then in either establishing a permanent post near the entrance of that bay, (if the naval commander does not approve of the one in Elizabeth River,) where large ships as well as small may lie in security during any temporary superiority of the enemy's fleet; or if such a post cannot be found, in employing what remains of the season in carrying on desultory expeditions against such towns, stations, magazines, &c. as the enemy may have there, -- to convince those people more by what we can do, than what we [p101] really do, that they are in our power; and finally, in pursuing the same plan (supporting friends,) in a more northerly and healthy climate.

With regard to a station for the protection of the King's ships, I know of no place so proper as York Town, if it could be taken possession of, fortified, and garrisoned with one thousand men; -- as, by having one thousand more at a post somewhere in Elizabeth River, York and James Rivers would be ours, and our cruizers might command the waters of the Chesapeak. Troops might likewise be spared from these posts to carry on expeditions during the summer months, when probably nothing can be risked in that climate but water movements. But if the Heights of York and those on Gloucester side cannot be so well and so soon fortified as to render that post hors d'insult, before the enemy can move a force, &c. against it, it may not be adviseable to attempt it: in that case, something may possibly be done at Old Point Comfort to cover large ships lying in Hampton Road, (which is reckoned a good one, and not so liable to injury from gales at N.E. as that of York, particularly in winter.) If neither can be secured, we must content ourselves with keeping the Chesapeak, with frigates and other armed vessels, which will always find security, against a superior naval force, in Elizabeth River. As our operations in proper season may re-commence in the Upper James, perhaps a station might be found at [p102] the entrance of the narrows of that river that may be of use in future day, and held with a small force. James-town seems a proper spot for such a station; as does the place where the narrows and windings begin.

At a proper time of the year operations must still go northward -- either by a direct movement -- stationing your supplies in the navigable rivers which lie favourable for it -- in which you are, however, exposed to a temporary naval superiority of the enemy -- or by proceeding up the Chesapeak, if a force equal to the attempt can be collected; (for when it can, I should propose to take a station, threatening all the provinces bordering on Chesapeak with a desultory war;) prevent those provinces from being succoured; -- by menacing communications; and availing ourselves of a supposed numerous band of friends, who otherwise may be forced to arm against us. Had we a force sufficient for two movements, that would be best; -- four thousand men to proceed in transports up to Baltimore, taking a station within a certain distance of the Susquehannah, and having vessels always ready for a rapid move with part, or even the whole, to a corresponding station in the Eastern Neck; while a corps of ten thousand men, or more, (according to the force that can be brought against you,) occupies the Eastern Neck, and can, in its turn, succour the western corps. Whether the eastern corps acts alone, or in co-operation, it must [p103] be in very great force for reasons obvious. I do not know enough of this Neck to say what force, or whether any, can be placed in security. The most advanced station would certainly be the best, particularly at first, to enable our friends, who, we are told, are at Lancaster, Little York-town, and Chester, to join us. -- Iron Hill may perhaps be it; and as marshy creeks run up from Delaware and Chesapeak, the heads of which are not far asunder, many good posts may be found for corps of different strength; -- for while we command those bays, there can be no danger of operation against our flanks and rear; and if the enemy should be superior in one, he cannot be so in both: -- we should therefore have always a communication open. This corps should be very strong indeed, -- or there should be one acting in favour of it in Jersey. The preference must be given to that plan, against which Washington can bring the least force. He undoubtedly can bring a greater force into Jersey than any where, as the New England troops may be prevailed on to go there, -- and they cannot so easily be drawn into the Eastern Neck, or even over the Delaware. Besides, if Washington moves into Jersey, his meal and flour have both but a short portage; but once deprived of the eastern counties, his cattle in that case coming chiefly from New England, will increase his difficulty of subsistence; for as we may, under those circumstances, attempt to occupy King's Ferry, he will [p104] be reduced to the Detour. I therefore should prefer a single corps in the Eastern Neck, sufficient, however, for the purpose. As the French have added considerably to Washington's force, I do not think an army less than Sir William Howe had could be sufficient -- fifteen thousand men. but where are they to be found? My whole force, rank and file, fit for duty, is nearly twenty-four thousand. It is presumed Lord Cornwallis will be content with six thousand for the southward; two thousand we suppose in the Chesapeak -- twelve thousand are required for New York; -- there remains only four thousand for that operation. I did expect ten thousand men as an augmentation to my present army. -- Had they come, this project might have taken place; but I am now told, I am to expect only four thousand -- which will not be sufficient. -- However, once convinced that the French will not send reinforcement, and that we shall be permanently superior at sea, and have an active co-operating naval commander, -- I should be tempted to try: -- but until all this combines, I dare not: -- and if it is delayed too long, our friends in Pennsylvania may be forced from us, or cajoled.

If we could hold the Chesapeak by the posts on Elizabeth and York rivers, Oxford, and Port Penn, and the two Eastern on the sea-co[a]sts, and threaten our enemies of Virginia and Maryland, and protect our friends of all these countries, I think we should [p105] in that case leave the French little to induce them to support the war.

26th April. These however I give you merely as my opinions at the time we talked this on subject; -- and they will influence you, of course, no further, than as they correspond with your own now.

With respect to the number and disposition of friends in Pennsylvania, I am telling you more what I wish than what I expect to find; for we have been too often deceived by representations of sanguine friends.

H. CLINTON.

N U M B E R VII.
(Secret, and most private.)

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New York, 30th April, 1781.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg.]

Dear Phillips,
I cannot judge from Lord Cornwallis's letter, whether he proposes any further operations in the Carolinas -- what they may be -- and how far you can operate in his favour. If I was to give a private opinion from reading his letter -- I would say, I cannot conceive from it that he has any offensive object [p106] in view. He says, that North-Carolina is a country, in which it is impossible for an army to act or move without the assistance of friends: he does not seem to think we have any there -- nor do you. I shall give no opinion respecting that at present, or until I receive his Lordship's account of the state of the province, and of his winter campaign.

His Lordship tells me that he wants reinforcement. -- With nine British battalions, and detachments from seven more, (besides those from the Artillery and seventeenth Dragoons) -- five Hessian battalions, and a detachment of Yagers -- and eleven Provincial battalions, exclusive of the cavalry and infantry of the Legion, and the Provincial Light Infantry; -- I would ask, -- How can that be possible? And if it is, what hopes can I have of a force sufficient to undertake any solid operation?

To be brief -- If his Lordship proposes no operation to you soon, and you see none that will operate for him directly -- (that is, before the first of June,) -- I think the best indirect one in his favour will be, what you and General Arnold proposed to me in No. 10. of your joint letter of the 18th instant, beginning with the attempt on Philadelphia. The only risk you run is from a temporary superiority of the enemy at sea. -- Land and naval reinforcements from France are talked of -- If they come immediately from Europe, we must have some information of them, and they will, I hope, be followed; -- if from the West-Indies, [p107] I hope the same. It is however an important move, and ought (in my opinion) to be tried, even with some risk. If our friends are as numerous and hearty as Colonel Rankin represents them to be, with their assistance added to what you carry thither, you will be able to maintain yourself. But if, after having given the experiment a fair trial, you find it will not do; you may either retire to Portsmouth, or by transports and boats in Delaware pass to Jersey -- where, in all events, I must pick you up, by receiving you at, or near, Mount Holly. Give me timely notice of your intended move, and, if possible, I will follow you into Delaware with such a small reinforcement as I can at the time spare.

As my invitation to Lord Cornwallis to come to the Chesapeak was upon a supposition that every thing would be settled in the Carolinas, I do not think he will come; -- if however, he determines to do so as a visitor, he will get Barklay or some other to bring him, for the Admiral has this day only ordered a ship for the purpose -- and the one he has ordered cannot (I apprehend) get over the bar of Cape Fear.

Our Admiral is grown, if possible, more impracticable than ever. He swears to me that he knows nothing of his recall -- to others he says, he is going home immediately. If the next packet does not satisfy me in this particular, I shall probably retire and leave him to Lord Cornwallis's management. -- To whom it will be my advice to try the only experiment, [p108] that (in my opinion) can operate, if the one in Carolina has failed. -- As to Virginia, I know none which can reduce that province in one campaign. -- Though it is certainly a great exertion, the only one that appears to me is the above. If I stay it shall be tried. Without a co-operating naval Chief, the risk is doubly great: -- it would be sufficiently so with one. But if it succeeds, its consequences must be very decisive.

May 2d. The reinforcement is embarked, and fallen down to Staten Island, where they wait only the Admiral's pleasure for their proceeding to Chesapeak. Two days ago he offered to take them thither under the escort of his fleet -- to-day he writes to me, "that he thinks he cannot be justified in losing a moment to proceed off the Chesapeak; but if I think it of greater consequence to land the reinforcement of troops proposed to be sent there, than to intercept the enemy, he will take the transports with him -- otherwise, he shall certainly leave them behind, until it is known where the enemy's fleet is lodged, of which he will transmit the earliest information to me, and then appoint a convoy to bring them on." In answer, I have acknowledged the very great importance of intercepting the French fleet -- but that it is also of importance that this reinforcement should join you immediately, and leave to him (as being the best judge) the properest mode of accomplishing it with safety. -- Thus the matter rests.

[p109] May 3d. As I am (from the Admiral's strange conduct) doubtful when or whether the reinforcement will ever join you, I do not now send Colonel Rankin to you, as I at first proposed -- but I enclose his proposals. You will see by them that he is not much of an officer -- but he appears to be a plain, sensible man, worth attending to -- And Simcoe can explain a thousand things respecting him and his associates, which I cannot in a letter. As you seemed to think (before you received Lord Cornwallis's letter) that all direct operations in favour of his Lordship would cease by the end of May; should the expedition not sail from hence before the 20th inst. and I do not hear further from you, I will not send it: for, in that case, I think the experiment on the peninsula may be tried to more advantage up Delaware than round by Chesapeak: in which case I shall expect General Arnold and you, with such troops as you can spare, to meet me at the head of Elk or Bohemia, and form a junction. I can certainly spare more troops from hence for such a move than I can send to Chesapeak, for reasons obvious. Pray let me receive General Arnold's and your opinions upon Colonel Rankin's proposals as soon as possible. I confess I am not sanguine; but if the experiment can be tried without any other risk than from the enemy's superiority at sea, I should wish to do it. Therefore if General Arnold and you like it, I shall be reconciled to it, and it shall be tried, after I know your opinions [p110] on it, and the inclosed proposals -- and if you approve, about what time you think the attempt may take place. I am persuaded, that on application, Captain Hudson will give you a frigate for your dispatches. If we move up Delaware, Captain Duncan, (Lord Howe's Captain,) will conduct us. I have already talked to him on the subject, and he approves.

If Lord Cornwallis proposes any thing necessary for his operations, you of course must adopt it if you can, letting me know your thoughts thereon. But should his Lordship determine on a defensive in the Carolinas, he surely cannot want any of the European reinforcement, and will of course send it to you, and all such other as shall arrive. Thus reinforced, if after leaving a sufficient garrison in Elizabeth river, you can proceed to the peninsula; I think we shall be in force to give this a fair trial: and I may leave you in the command there, unless things should take a more favourable turn in the Carolinas, and Lord Cornwallis's presence there be no longer necessary; for, until they do, I should imagine he will not leave Carolina.

You will think me long-winded. But as safe opportunities are not frequent, I must make the best use I can of this. I refer you for more information to Lord Chewton, who is the bearer of my dispatches.

H. CLINTON.

[p111] N U M B E R VIII.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated May 11.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 24.]

Dear Phillips,
I was in hopes that the fleet would have sailed long since, but although the Admiral dates his letter the 10th, off Sandy Hook, I fear he is still within.

Report says that the French had not sailed from Rhode-Island a few days ago, they might, however, have sailed yesterday: the only news we have is a riot at Philadelphia, and all paper-money refused in payment; it works finely.

No news from Lord Cornwallis since his letter of the 10th of April.

Washington some days since called in Burgoyne; by a letter from him this day, that [?is/it] countermanded or suspended; their councils seem a little unsettled, -- it is reported and believed, that the French troops are to join Washington, and are now on their route.

I am, &c.
H. CLINTON.

Lord Chewton sailed three days since for Lord Cornwallis.

[p112] N U M B E R IX.

Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, June 15, 1781.

[Received June 26, 1781, from Ensign Amiel.]

My Lord,
As the Admiral has thought proper to stop the sailing of the convoy with stores, horse accoutrements, &c. (which has been for some days ready to sail to the Chesapeak) without assigning to me any reason for so doing, I delay not a moment to dispatch a runner to your Lordship, with a duplicate of my letter of the 11th instant, which was to go by that opportunity.

And as I am led to suppose (from your Lordship's letter of the 26th ult.) that you may not think it expedient to adopt the operations I had recommended in the Upper Chesapeak, and will by this time probably have finished those you were engaged in, I request you will immediately embark a part of the troops stated in the letter inclosed (beginning with the light infantry, &c.) and send them to me with all possible dispatch; for which purpose, Captain Hudson, or officer commanding the King's ships, will I presume, upon your Lordship's application appoint a proper convoy.

I shall likewise in proper time solicit the Admiral to send some more transports to the Chesapeak, in [p113] which your Lordship will please to send hither the remaining troops you judge can be spared from the defence of the posts you may occupy; as I do not think it advisable to leave more troops in that unhealthy climate at this season of the year than what are absolutely wanted for a defensive, and desultory water excursions.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

Duplicate inclosed in Number IX.

Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, June 11, 1781.

[Received the 26th of June from Ensign Amiel.]

My Lord,
I am honoured with your lordship's letter of the 26th ult. and as I am unwilling to detain the convoy, I shall not have time to write so fully to your Lordship as I would wish.

Respecting my opinions of stations in James and York rivers, I shall beg leave only to refer your lordship to my instructions to, and correspondence with, Generals Phillips and Arnold; together with the substance of my conversations with the former; which your Lordship will have found amongst General Phillips's [p114] papers, and to which I referred you in my last dispatch. I shall, therefore, of course, approve of any alteration your Lordship may think proper to make in those stations.

The detachments I have made from this army into Chesapeak, since General Leslie's expedition in October last, inclusive, have amounted to seven thousand seven hundred and twenty-four effectives; and at the time your Lordship made the junction with the corps there, there were under Major-general Phillips's orders five thousand three hundred and four; a force I should have hoped, would be sufficient of itself to have carried on operation in any of the southern provinces in America; where, as appears by the intercepted letters of Washington and La Fayette, they are in no situation to stand against even a division of that army.

I have no reason to suppose the Continentals under La Fayette can exceed one thousand; and I am told by Lieutenant-colonel Hill, of the ninth regiment, that about a fortnight ago, he met at Frederick-town, the Pennsylvania line, under Wayne, of about the same number, who were so discontented, that their officers were afraid to trust them with ammunition. This, however, may have since altered; and your Lordship may possibly have opposed to you, from fifteen hundred to two thousand Continentals, and (as La Fayette observes,) a small body of ill armed peasantry, full as spiritless as the militia [p115] of the southern provinces, and without any service.

Comparing, therefore, the force now under your Lordship in the Chesapeak, and that of the enemy opposed to you (and I think it clearly appears they have for the present, no intention of sending thither reinforcements,) I should have hoped you would have quite sufficient to carry on any operation in Virginia; should that have been advisable at this advanced season.

By the intercepted letters, inclosed to your Lordship in my last dispatch, you will observe, that I am threatened with a siege in this post. My present effective force is only ten thousand nine hundred and thirty-one. With respect to that the enemy may collect for such an object, it is probable they may amount to at least twenty thousand, besides reinforcement to the French, (which, from pretty good authority, I have reason to expect,) and the numerous militia of the five neighbouring provinces. Thus circumstanced, I am persuaded, your Lordship will be of opinion, that the sooner I concentrate my force the better. Therefore, (unless your Lordship, after the receipt of my letter of the 29th of May, and 8th inst. should incline to agree with me in opinion and judge it right to adopt my ideas respecting the move to Baltimore or the Delaware Neck, &c.) I beg leave to recommend it to you as soon as you have finished the active operations you may be now engaged in, to [p116] take a defensive station, in any healthy situation you choose, (be it at Williamsburg or York-town.) And I would wish in that case, that after reserving to yourself such troops as you may judge necessary for an ample defensive, and desultory movements by water, for the purpose of annoying the enemy's communications, destroying magazines, &c. the following corps may be sent to me in succession as you spare them.

Two battalions of Light Infantry.
Forty-third regiment.
Seventy-sixth or eightieth regiment.
Two battalions of Anspach.
Queen's Rangers, cavalry and infantry.
Remains of the detachment of 17th Light Dragoons;
and such proportion of Artillery as can be spared, particularly men.

Until the arrival of the expected reinforcements from Europe, it will be impossible for me to judge what future operations may be within my power, under my present circumstances. I heartily wish I was able to spare a second army, after leaving a sufficient defensive for this important post. But your Lordship will, I hope, excuse me, if I dissent from your opinion of the manner in which that army should be employed; for experience ought to convince us, that there is no possibility of re-establishing order in any rebellious [p117] province on this continent without the hearty assistance of numerous friends. These, my Lord, are not, I think, to be found in Virginia; nor dare I positively assert, that under our present circumstances they are to be found in great numbers any where else, or that their exertions when found will answer our expectations: but I believe there is a greater probability of finding them in Pennsylvania than in any, except the southern provinces. In these your Lordship has already made the experiment; it has there failed -- they are gone from us, and I fear are not to be recovered. The only one therefore now remaining is this; and if I continue in the command I am determined to give it a fair trial, whenever it can be done with propriety: I am not, however, likely to have a choice of operation at least for some time to come. Nor can I altogether agree with your Lordship, in thinking that a desultory move against Philadelphia would do more harm than good. There, my Lord, are collected their principal depots of stores for the campaign, an immense quantity of European and West-India commodities, and no inconsiderable supply of money, which their uninterrupted trade and cruisers have lately procured them; and from these funds they are now forming a bank by subscription, which, if it succeeds, may give fresh vigour to their cause. Could we therefore at this moment seize those important magazines, &c. overset their schemes, and break up their public credit, the favourable consequences [p118] resulting from such success are too obvious to need explanation. And all this, my Lord, I have no doubt might have been effected if our reinforcement had arrived in time, and the enemy had no prospect of receiving any without our either keeping or destroying Philadelphia; the latter of which is foreign from my inclination, and the former is certainly at present inadvisable.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

N U M B E R X.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Williamsburgh, June 30, 1781.¹

After passing James river at Westover, I moved to Hanover court-house, and crossed the South Anna; the Marquis de la Fayette marched to his left, keeping above at the distance of about twenty miles.

By pushing my light troops over the North Anna, I alarmed the enemy for Fredericksburgh, and for the junction with General Wayne, who was then marching through Maryland. From what I could learn of the present state of Hunter's iron manufactory, it did not appear of so much importance as the stores on the other side of the country, and it was [p119] impossible to prevent the junction between the Marquis and Wayne: I therefore took advantage of the Marquis's passing the Rhappahannock, and detached Lieutenant-colonels Simcoe and Tarleton to disturb the assembly then sitting at Charlotteville, and to destroy the stores there, at Old Albemarle court-house, and the Point of Fork; moving with the infantry to the mouth of Byrd creek, near the Point of Fork, to receive those detachments. Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton took some members of the assembly at Charlotteville, and destroyed there and on his return one thousand stand of good arms, some cloathing and other stores, and between four and five hundred barrels of powder, without opposition.

Baron Stuben, who commanded about eight hundred twelvemonths-men and militia, retired with great precipitation from the Point of Fork. Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, after using every exertion to attack his rear-guard, destroyed there and at places adjacent, about three thousand three hundred stand of arms, most of which unserviceable, but then under repair, some salt, harness, &c. and about one hundred and fifty barrels of powder. I then moved by Richmond, and arrived at Williamsburgh on the 25th instant, having, in addition to the articles already mentioned, destroyed on this expedition at different places above 2000 hogsheads of tobacco, and a great number of iron guns, and brought off four brass thirteen-inch mortars, five brass eight-inch [p120] howitzes, and four long brass nine-pounde[r]s, all French. We found near Hanover court-house, ten French brass twenty-four pounders, which we could not carry, and had not time or means to destroy farther than spiking, and throwing five or six of them into the Pamunkey; and we found at Williamsburgh a considerable quantity of shot and shells, which are embarked. General Wayne joined the Marquis about the middle of the month, as did Baron Stuben soon after; and their army has generally kept about twenty miles from us, without any material attempt by detachment, except in an attack on Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, on the 26th, as he was returning with his corps and the yagers from the destruction of some boats and stores on the Chickahomany. The enemy, though much superior in numbers, were repulsed with considerable loss, three officers and twenty-eight privates were made prisoners: the Rangers had three officers and thirty privates killed and wounded; Lieutenant Jones, who was killed, behaved with the greatest spirit, and is much lamented by Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe.

The morning after my arrival here I was honoured with your Excellency's dispatches of the 11th and 15th instant, delivered by Ensign Amiel. By them I find, that you think if an offensive army could be spared, it would not be advisable to employ it in this province. It is natural for every officer to turn his thoughts particularly to the part of the war in which [p121] he has been most employed; and as the security at least of South Carolina, if not the reduction of North Carolina, seemed to be generally expected from me, both in this country and in England, I thought myself called upon, after the experiment I had made had failed, to point out the only mode in my opinion of effecting it, and to declare, that until Virginia was to a degree subjected, we could not reduce North Carolina, or have any certain hold of the back country of South Carolina; the want of navigation rendering it impossible to maintain a sufficient army in either of those provinces at a considerable distance from the coast, and the men and riches of Virginia furnishing ample supplies to the rebel southern army. I will not say much in praise of the militia of the southern colonies; but the list of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them since last June, proves but too fatally that they are not wholly contemptible.

Your Excellency being charged with the weight of the whole American war, your opinions of course are less partial, and are directed to all its parts; to those opinions it is my duty implicitly to submit.

Being in the place of General Phillips, I thought myself called upon by you to give my opinion with all deference on Mr. Alexander's proposals, and the attempt upon Philadelphia. Having experienced much disappointment on that head, I own I would cautiously engage in measures depending materially for [p122] their success on the active assistance from the country, and I thought the attempt on Philadelphia would do more harm than good to the cause of Britain; because, supposing it practicable to get possession of the town, (which, besides other obstacles, if the redoubts are kept up, would not be easy) we could not hope to arrive without their having had sufficient warning of our approach to enable them to secure specie, and the greatest part of their valuable public stores, by means of their boats and shipping, which give them certain possession of the river from Mud Island upwards. The discriminating of the owners, and destroying any considerable quantity of West India goods, and other merchandize dispersed through a great town, without burning the whole together, would be a work of much time and labour. Our appearance there, without an intention to stay, might give false hopes to many friends, and occasion their ruin; and any unlucky accident on our retreat, might furnish matter for great triumph to our enemies. However, my opinion on that subject is, at present, of no great importance, as it appears, from your Excellency's dispatches, that, in the execution of those ideas, a co-operation was intended from your side, which now could not be depended upon, from the uncertainty of the permanency of our naval superiority, and your apprehensions of an intended serious attempt upon New York. I have, therefore, lost no time in taking measures for complying with [p123] the requisition contained in your dispatch of the 15th instant.

Upon viewing York, I was clearly of opinion, that it far exceeds our power, consistent with your plans, to make safe defensive posts there and at Gloucester, both of which would be necessary for the protection of shipping.

The state of the transports has not yet been reported to me, but I have ordered the few that are at Portsmouth to be got ready; and as soon as I past James River (for which purpose the boats are collecting), and can get a convoy, they shall be dispatched with as many troops as they will contain, and shall be followed by others as fast as you send transports to receive them. When I see Portsmouth, I shall give my opinion of the number of men necessary for its defence, or of any other post that may be thought more proper. But as magazines, &c. may be destroyed by occasional expeditions from New York, and there is little chance of being able to establish a post capable of giving effectual protection to ships of war, I submit it to your Excellency's consideration, whether it is worth while to hold a sickly defensive post in this Bay, which will always be exposed to a sudden French attack, and, which experience has now shewn, makes no diversion in favour of the southern army.

Tarleton was lucky enough to intercept an express with letters from Greene to La Fayette, of which [p124] the inclosed are copies. By them you will see General Greene's intention of coming to the northward, and that part of the reinforcements, destined for his army, was stopped in consequence of my arrival here. As soon as it is evident that our plan is nearly defensive here, there can be little doubt of his returning to the southward, and of the reinforcements proceeding to join his army.

I still continue in the most painful anxiety for the situation of South Carolina. Your Excellency will have received accounts of Lord Rawdon's proceedings previous to his arrival at Monk's Corner, and of his intended operations. My last account from him is in a note to Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, dated the 9th instant at Four Hole Bridge, and he was then in great hopes of being in time to save Cruger. I have ordered Colonel Gould to proceed, as soon as convoy could e procured, with the nineteenth and thirtieth regiments to New York, leaving the third regiment and the flank companies in South Carolina, till your pleasure is known. I named the flank companies, because they might be distant at the time of the arrival of the order, and as a corps capable of exertion is much wanted on that service.

Your Excellency well knows my opinion of a defensive war on the frontiers of South Carolina. From the state of Lord Rawdon's health, it is impossible that he can remain; for which reason, although the command in that quarter can only be attended [p125] with mortification and disappointment, yet, as I came to America with no other view than to endeavour to be useful to my country, and as I do not think it possible to render any service in a defensive situation here, I am willing to repair to Charles-town if you approve of it; and in the mean time, I shall do every thing in my power to arrange matters here till I have your answer.

Major Craig represented so strongly to Lord Rawdon his regret at leaving the distressed Loyalists in the neighbourhood of Wilmington, and his hopes of a considerable insurrection in the lower part of North Carolina, where the enemy have no force, that his Lordship gave him a conditional permission to postpone the evacuation of Wilmington; but I have not yet learned whether he has availed himself of it.

La Fayette's continentals, I believe, consist of about seventeen or eighteen hundred men, exclusive of some twelvemonth's men, collected by Steuben. He has received considerable reinforcements of mi[l]itia, and about eight hundred mountain rifle-men under Campbell. He keeps with his main body about eighteen or twenty miles from us; his advanced corps about ten or twelve; probably with an intention of insulting our rear guard when we pass James River. I hope, however, to put that out of his power, by crossing at James City Island; and if I can get a favourable opportunity of striking a blow at him without loss of time, I will certainly [p126] try it. I will likewise attempt water expeditions, if proper objects present themselves after my arrival at Portsmouth.

I inclose a report made by Lieutenant Thomas Hagerly, who came with a Captain Fleming from Maryland to join us in North Carolina. I feel most sincerely for the sufferings of the unfortunate Loyalists; but being of opinion, that a detachment would not afford them substantial and permanent relief, I shall not venture such a step, unless your Excellency should think proper to direct it.

I have the honour to be, &c.
CORNWALLIS.

N U M B E R XI.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, June 28, 1781. [In Cypher.]²

[Received July 8, 1781.]

My Lord,
Having for very essential reasons come to a resolution of endeavouring by a rapid move to seize the stores, &c. collected at Philadelphia, and afterwards [p127] to bring the troops employed on that service to reinforce this post, I am to request, that if your Lordship has not already embarked the reinforcement I called for in my letters of the 8th, 11th, 15th, and 19th instant, and should not be engaged in some very important move, either of your own, or in consequence of my ideas respecting operation in the Upper-Chesapeak, you will be pleased, as soon as possible, to order an embarkation of the troops specified below,³ and of the stores, &c. &c. stated in the enclosed paper; -- or in as full a manner as your Lordship can with propriety comply; -- recollecting, that whatever may have been taken too great a proportion of, will be immediately returned to you the moment the expedition is over.

As it is possible that your Lordship may have sent Major-general Leslie to Charles-town, in consequence of what I said to you in my letter of the 29th ult. I have thought proper to appoint General Robertson to the command of the troops on this service, which I should not have judged necessary, could I have been certain of his being named by you to accompany the troops coming hither. Should that have been the case, your Lordship [p128] will be pleased, nevertheless, to direct him to proceed with the expedition.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

Inclosed in No. XI.

List of Cannon, Stores, &c. to be sent from Virginia.

ARTILLERY, &c.

Two eight-inch howitzes, light,
Two five and a half-inch ditto,
Two medium brass twelve-pounders,
Four brass six-pounders, field pieces,
Twelve waggons, without the bodies, for transporting boats, &c. &c.
A proportion of carcasses.

VESSELS.

The sloop Formidable,
Brigantine Spitfire,
Brigantine Rambler,
The prize-ship Tempest, if she can be unloaded and fitted without delaying the transports.

As many horses as are necessary for the artillery and waggons.

As many of the first twenty-four new boats as can be spared. -- Those with platforms, to have cannon mounted in them, and compleatly fitted, [p129] if it can be done without delaying the embarkation. -- The cannon to be brought in the transports, and the boats towed by them.

Lieutenant Sutherland, of the Engineers, with intrenching tools, &c. &c. for five hundred men.

N U M B E R XII.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Cobham, July 8, 1781.

[Pgs. 129-132. See Tarleton's Campaigns, Chapter 6, Note D, p399.]

[p132] N U M B E R XIII.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Suffolk, July 12, 1781.

Sir, I acknowledged in my letter of the 8th the receipt of your Excellency's dispatch of the 28th of June. I have since been honoured with that of [p133] the 1st, by the Orpheus, and of the duplicates of those of the 29th of May, 8th and 19th of June, by the Charon, the originals of which have miscarried.

I have only now to inform your Excellency, that every exertion shall be made to fit out the expedition in the compleatest manner without loss of time, and as by your letter to General Leslie you seem to wish that he should accompany it, I have sent him directions for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.
CORNWALLIS.

N U M B E R XIV.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, June 8th, 1781.

[Received July 12th, 1781, from Lieut. Colonel. M'Pherson.]

My Lord,
I inclose to your Lordship copies of some intercepted letters: by these your Lordship will see that we are threatened with a siege. The enemy have had bad information respecting my force; it is not, however, as your Lordship knows, what it ought to be. Your Lordship will see by Fayette's letter, that you have little more opposed to you [p134] than his corps and an unarmed militia; for, we are told here, that the Pennsylvania troops have revolted a second time, at York-town. Your Lordship can therefore certainly spare two thousand, and the sooner they come the better; without it should be your intention to adopt my ideas of a move to Baltimore or the Delaware Neck, and put yourself in nearer co-operation with us; but even in that case you can spare us something, I suppose.

I am naturally to expect reinforcement from Europe, but not having heard from thence since February, I can say nothing positive as to when it sailed. It is rumoured here (from what authority I cannot learn) that the three battalions from Corke are arrived at Charles-town, and that your Lordship has ordered them to Chesapeak. Should that have been the case, I have by this opportunity directed them not to disembark, but to join me here as soon as a convoy can be obtained for them; in the first place because I want them, and in the next, because it would be death to them to act in Chesapeak in July.

From all the letters I have seen, I am of opinion, if circumstances of provisions, stores, &c. turn out as they wish, that the enemy will certainly attack this post. As for men, for such an object as this (circumstanced as they suppose it to be) it cannot be doubted that they can raise a sufficient number. By a commissary of provision's intercepted letter, he [p135] now feeds (at West-point only) eight thousand, and they are coming in very fast. My dispatches for your Lordship, and the stores, &c. you sent for, have been waiting for a convoy these ten days. I hope it will sail immediately, but I dispatch this runner in the mean time, referring your Lordship to the bearer, Lieutenant Nairne, for particulars.

I request that the officer commanding at Portsmouth may have positive orders to dispatch a runner once a week while they last, whether he has any thing material to say or not. Every circumstance in the present situation of the corps of this army is of consequence to know. As your Lordship is now so near, it will be unnecessary for you to send your dispatches immediately to the Minister: you will therefore be so good to send them to me in future.

I am much in want of howitzes, &c. I think your Lordship can spare some; if so, I request they may be sent, and a good proportion of artillery men with them. Captain Fage of the Artillery, and Lieutenant Sutherland of the Engineers are to return here, as I particularly want them; and Lieutenant Fyers, if your Lordship can possibly spare him. I likewise request that your Lordship will send General Arnold to me.

I send by Lieutenant-colonel Macpherson a commission for Colonel Abercrombie to act as Brigadier-general until further orders; but I fear it will not be in my power to establish him in that rank, as I understand [p136] there are six older than him coming out. The commission will therefore be delivered to your Lordship, to use or not as you may see expedient. But at all events I imagine your Lordship will not think it necessary to give the commission to Colonel Abercrombie, whilst Major-general Leslie, or Brigadier-general Arnold, remain with you. I am persuaded that I need not say to your Lordship how necessary it is that I should be informed without delay of every change of position in your Lordship's army; and I am sure you will excuse me for observing that had it been possible upon the arrival of the last reinforcement from hence (which I am told joined you the day after the date of your letter of the 20th ult.) for your Lordship to have let me know your views and intentions, I should not now be at a loss to judge of the force you might want for your operations. Ignorant therefore as I am of them, I can only trust, that as your Lordship will see by the inclosed letters, my call for a reinforcement is not a wanton one, you will send me what you can spare as soon as it may be expedient; for should your Lordship be engaged in a move of such importance as to require the employment of your whole force, I would by no means wish to starve or obstruct it; but in that case would rather endeavour to wait a little longer, until my occasions grow more urgent, or your situation can admit of your detaching; of which, however, I request to be [p137] informed with all possible dispatch. But with respect to the European reinforcement, I must request, that should it arrive in the Chesapeak, it may be sent to me without delay, agreeable to the orders I have sent to the officer commanding at Portsmouth, and the requisition I make by this opportunity to Captain Hudson, or officer commanding the King's ships.

Should your Lordship not propose to send Major-general Leslie to command in South Carolina, I beg leave to mention that his assistance may probably be wanted here, if he can be spared from your army.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

N U M B E R XV.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated at New York, 19th of June, 1781.

[Received July 12, 1781, from Lieut. Col. M'Pherson.]

My Lord,
The intercepted letters, which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship with my dispatch of the 8th inst. will have informed you, that the French Admiral meant to escape with his fleet to Boston, from Rhode Island; (from whence it is probable they [p138] sailed the 15th inst. the wind being then fair;) and that it was proposed the French army should afterwards join such troops as Mr. Washington could assemble, for the purpose of making an attempt on this post.

I have often given it as my opinion to your Lordship, that for such an object as this, they certainly could raise numbers; but I very much doubt their being able to feed them. I am, however, persuaded, they will attempt the investiture of the place, I therefore heartily wish I was more in force, that I might be able to take advantage of any false movement they may make in forming it.

Should your Lordship have any solid operation in the Chesapeak to propose, or have approved of the one I mentioned in my former letters, I shall not, as I have already told you, press you for the corps I wished to have sent me, at least for the present. But if, in the approaching inclement season, your Lordship should not think it prudent to undertake operations with the troops you have, (and you may easily conceive I cannot possibly spare more,) I cannot but wish for their sake, if I had no other motive, that you would send me as soon as possible what you can spare from a respectable defensive. And that your Lordship may better judge what I mean by a respectable defensive, it is necessary to inform you, that other intelligence, besides Monsieur Barras' letter, makes [p139] it highly probable, that Monsieur de Grasse, will visit this coast in the hurricane season, and bring with him troops as well as ships. But, when he hears that your Lordship has taken possession of York river before him, I think it most likely he will come to Rhode Island; and, in that case, that their first efforts will be in this quarter. I am, however, under no great apprehensions, as Sir George Rodney seems to have the same suspicions of De Grasse's intention that we have, and will of course follow him hither. For I think our situation cannot become very critical, unless the enemy by having the command of the Sound, should possess themselves of Long Island; which can never be the case, whilst we are superior at sea.

What I said to your Lordship in my letter of the 8th inst. respecting the reinforcement from England, was only occasioned by a report prevailing here, that you had ordered them from Charles-town to the Chesapeak. But as it is now probable there is no real foundation for the report, it is unnecessary to trouble your Lordship again on the subject, as they will of course remain in South Carolina, should they arrive there. In the hope that your Lordship will be able to spare me three thousand men, I have sent two thousand tons of transports from hence; and what is wanting may be made up from those in Chesapeak. The corps I named in my letter of the 11th, will, I imagine, amount to nearly that number. [p140] But should your Lordship not be able to spare the whole, it is necessary to mention, that I expect the detachment of the seventeenth dragoons, as they happened to be placed last in the list. I likewise request, your Lordship will at the same time send me the twenty-four boats built by General Arnold, if you should have no particular call for them; as they will be useful here, and it is probable the ten, (which I understand are now building in the Chesapeak,) will be sufficient for your Lordship's purposes. But as your Lordship will be the best judge of this, you will send them or not, as you please.

I have at last had a personal conference with the Vice-admiral; and he has agreed, if he does not intercept the French fleet, to take his station between the Nantucket Shoals and Delaware, where his fleet is to cruise for the protection of this harbour, and our communication with the Chesapeak.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

[p141] N U M B E R XVI.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, July 1st, 1781.

[Received July 12, 1781, by the Orpheus.]

My Lord,
For reasons which I think it unnecessary to mention to you by this opportunity, I request, that whatever troops, &c. your Lordship may have embarked for this place, may sail forty-eight hours after the departure from the Chesapeak of the frigate which carries this letter, and which has orders to return whenever your Lordship signifies to the Captain of her, that the troops, &c. are all on board, and ready to proceed on the intended service.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

[p142] N U M B E R XVII.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Suffolk, 17th July, 1781.

Sir,
I am glad to hear from Portsmouth that the expedition is almost ready to sail; and having given General Leslie full powers relating to the equipment of it, I hope it will be to your satisfaction. I have detained six infantry boats and four horse boats for the service here, and have directed all the others to go, if they can be carried. The twenty-third Light Company has done duty for some time past with the Legion, which is not yet returned from an excursion to the upper part of the country; I have, therefore, in place of the twenty-third, sent the Light Company of the eightieth.

The enemy's army having come so low down the country, and we having, by the destruction of their craft, rendered it difficult for them to pass James river below Tuckahoe, and the militia of the upper counties of this side of the river being with them, I thought it a good opportunity to endeavour to destroy the magazines between James river and the Dan that are destined for the use of their southern army. I accordingly detached Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton with the Legion cavalry, and something [p143] upwards of one hundred mounted infantry, on the 9th instant, from Cobham, with orders to call, among other places, at Prince Edward and Bedford court houses, where I was informed their principal military stores had been collected. This will e a fatiguing expedition; but I shall be able to give them rest upon their return, as I see little appearance of cavalry being much wanted in this quarter for some time to come. In the mean time I shall remain at, or near, this place till he comes back, which I hope will be in a few days. I have detached Lieutenant-colonel Dundas with part of the eightieth, to destroy the shipping and stores at South Quay; and, if possible, I shall send a detachment to Edenton for the same purpose, before I fall back to Portsmouth.

Colonel Gould has not received my order for sending two of the late-arrived regiments to New-York, the express vessel with my dispatches having been taken by a rebel privateer. And as it appears by your Excellency's dispatch to me of the 19th of June, that you approve of the three regiments remaining in South Carolina, I have notified this to Colonel Gould by the Amphitrite, which retook the express vessel, and called here two days ago, in her way to Charles-town.

The variety of fatiguing services for which pioneers are constantly wanted, obliged me to augment the detachment with this army to a company of fifty [p144] men, and I appointed Lieutenant Brown of that corps Captain; and Mr. Jackson, a North-Carolina refugee, Lieutenant. Mr. Brown is an old officer of pioneers, and in his own line a man of uncommon merit.

The officers of the guards having repeatedly represented the very superior merit of Mr. Rush, their surgeon, and his unwearied and skilful attention to their numerous sick and wounded, I think it right to mention him to your Excellency, as a man highly worthy of a mark of favour.

I received your Excellency's letter, with the inclosures relating to the transports intended to be sent home by the Agent and Lieutenant-colonel Balfour. The resolution of sending all had been adopted after I left South Carolina, in consequence of the Minister's Circular Letter, and which, if executed, I should, no doubt, have disapproved of, being entirely of opinion with your Excellency, that it is with you to decide whether serviceable transports can be spared. But I am happy to find that Lieutenant-colonel Balfour returned to his first resolution, which I approved of, only dispatching victuallers and unserviceable transports, and which I hope before now has been explained to your Excellency's satisfaction.

It gave me great pleasure to learn from a Charles-town paper, lately brought in here, that General Greene had raised the siege of Ninety-six, after having been repulsed in an attempt to carry it by [p145] assault, and that Lord Rawdon had arrived there on the 20th ult. I have likewise been informed in this country that Greene was on his march on the 24th ult. towards Broad river.

I have the honour to be, &c.
CORNWALLIS.

N U M B E R XVIII.

Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated Head-Quarters, New-York, July 11th, 1781.

[In Cypher.]

[Received from Brig. Maj. Bowes, July 20th, at 1 A.M.]

[Pgs. 145-146. See Tarleton's Campaigns, Chapter 6, Note F, p404.]

[p146] N U M B E R XIX.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, July 15, 1781.

My Lord,
Until I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 8th instant, I had flattered myself, that upon re-considering the general purport of our correspondence, and General Phillips's papers in your possession, you would at least have waited for a line from me in answer to your letter of the 30th ult. before you finally determined upon so serious and mortifying a move as the re-passing James river, and retiring with your army to Portsmouth. And I was the more induced to hope that this would have been the case, as we both seemed to agree in our opinion of the propriety of taking a healthy station on the Neck, between York and James rivers, for the purpose of covering a proper harbour for our line-of-battle [p147] ships. And I am persuaded your Lordship will be sensible, that in all my letters I clearly leave you at full liberty to detain any part, or even the whole of the troops I solicited you to send me, should your Lordship have determined on any solid operation of your own in Virginia, or elsewhere; or should you have adopted the one I had recommended in the Upper Chesapeak; or even should you have judged their continuance with you necessary until the stations you might think proper to take were rendered respectably defensive.

Your letter of the 30th ult. in which your Lordship was pleased to intimate this intention, did not leave the Chesapeak before the 5th instant: and as soon as I consulted the Admiral at the Hook upon its contents, I lost no time in dispatching my answer to your Lordship, both by ship of war and one of my runners; but as I now find your Lordship has decided, I shall say no more upon the subject: and I sincerely congratulate you upon the success of your well concerted plan against the Marquis de la Fayette, hoping that amongst other good effects which may be expected from it, it will prevent his giving you disturbance in the execution of what I recommended to your Lordship in my letter of the 11th instant, a duplicate of which accompanies this. I likewise request your Lordship will be pleased to communicate to Lieutenant-colonels Dundas, Simcoe, and Tarleton (whom you have particularised, the [p148] first for his conduct and gallantry in the action of James-town, and the two others for their active services on your march through Virginia) and to all the other officers and soldiers under your command, the high sense I have of their spirit and good behaviour, for which I desire their acceptance of my thanks.

As your Lordship is again pleased to recall my serious attention to the question of the utility of a defensive post in Virginia, which you say cannot have the smallest influence on the war in Carolina, and which only gives us some acres of an unhealthy swamp, I must in answer beg leave again to repeat to your Lordship, that it never was my intention to continue a post on Elizabeth River any longer than until the commencement of solid operation in the Chesapeak, nor to have there more troops than what might be capable of defending a small work on that river; and that all the general officers who have commanded in the Chesapeak have had my consent to change that station for one more healthy, if they judged it proper to do so. To which I will moreover add, it ever has been, is, and ever will be, my firm and unalterable opinion, that it is of the first consequence to his Majesty's affairs on this continent, that we take possession of the Chesapeak, and that we do not afterwards relinquish it. I beg leave also, my Lord, to dissent from the opinion you have given me of a defensive post in Chesapeak, and that desultory expeditions there may be undertaken from New-York with as much ease and [p149] more safety; for I cannot but suppose, that a defensive station in the Chesapeak, with a corps of at least four thousand regular troops, for its protection and desultory water movements during the summer months, wherein land operation may be impracticable, would have the most beneficial effects on more distant districts, for the reasons I have already had the honour to give your Lordship. Nor do I recollect, that in any of my letters to your Lordship I have suggested an idea, that there was a probability of the enemy's having a naval superiority in these seas for any length of time, much less for so long a one as two or three months. But with respect to the unhealthiness of the station at Portsmouth, my letters to General Phillips on that subject, (wherein I say, God forbid I should wish to bury the elite of my army in Nansemond and Princess Anne) will satisfy your Lordship that we are both of one opinion.

With regard to your Lordship's returning to Charles-town, for which you say you wait my approbation, though I allow your Lordship to be the best judge where your presence may be most required, yet, as I cannot conceive that offensive operation will be carried on in Carolina for some months, I must beg leave to recommend it to you to remain in Chesapeak, at least until the stations I have proposed are occupied and established, and your Lordship favours me with your opinion of the number of [p150] men you can afterwards spare from their defence until the first week in October; about which time it is my intention, as I have before told your Lordship, to recommence operation in the Chesapeak: but whether in Virginia, according to your Lordship's plan, or in the Upper Chesapeak, according to my own, I shall then determine. If in the first, I shall request the favour of your Lordship to conduct it, as you must be a better judge than I can, from the local knowledge you have acquired in your march through great part of the country, and your being from thence capable of judging how far it is connected with the southern provinces. If in the last, I shall probably assume the direction of it myself; and I shall in that case be glad to have your Lordship's assistance: but if you should prefer returning to Carolina, I shall after that no longer restrain your Lordship from following your inclinations.

Now, my Lord, I have only to repeat, what I have already said in all my letters, that you are at full liberty to employ all the troops under your immediate command in the Chesapeak, if you are of opinion they may be wanted for the defence of the stations you shall think proper to occupy, securing to us at least a healthy one, from whence we may start at the proper time for beginning operation, and for the carrying on in the interim such desultory water expeditions as you may think of any utility. I should, indeed, have hoped, that even in the season for active [p151] operation, seven thousand men would have been quite sufficient, considering the force which the enemy can bring against you; in this, however, your Lordship seems to think differently. Should nothing, therefore, happen to induce you to alter your opinion, or should any object cast up of importance enough to be undertaken at this inclement season, you are at liberty to keep the whole. But before you finally decide, I request your Lordship will recollect the very bare defensive I am reduced to in this post; whilst I have opposed to me Washington's army, which is already eight or ten thousand men, the French four thousand, besides the large reinforcements expected to them: and I scarce need mention to your Lordship, who is so well acquainted with their disposition, the effect which such an appearance will have on the numerous and warlike militia of the five neighbouring provinces.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

[p152] N U M B E R XX.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, July 26, 1781.

My Lord,
I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter, of the 17th instant, by Major Damer, who arrived here the 22d, and as it is possible that my dispatches of the 11th may not have reached you before the troops under General Leslie sailed from Portsmouth, and lest any change of arrangement your Lordship may have judged proper in consequence may be thereby prevented, I immediately dispatched a runner to cruize for the fleet off the Delaware, with orders for the troops, in that case, to return immediately to you, and wait your further commands; but if you had received my letters by Captain Stapleton before they sailed, and had, notwithstanding, directed them to proceed according to their original destination, they are ordered to come to the Hook to receive mine.

What I said to your Lordship in my letter of the 19th instant, respecting the continuance of the three European regiments in Carolina, was only on a supposition that your Lordship thought they would be wanted there; but as that appears not to be the case, [p153] from your having ordered two of them to join me, if you should still be of opinion, that they can be spared during the inactive summer months, I hope your Lordship will think proper to renew your order for their coming here, as I shall probably want them, as well as the troops you may be able to spare me from the Chesapeak, for such offensive or defensive operations as may offer in this quarter, until the season will admit of their acting in yours, where I propose collecting, in the beginning of October, all the force which can be spared from the different posts under my command. But if your Lordship wishes that Brigadier General Gould should command in Carolina upon the departure of Lord Rawdon, I shall have no objection to his remaining behind for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.
H. CLINTON.

N U M B E R XXI.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York-Town, Virginia, 20th August, 1781.

Sir,
I have been honoured with your Excellency's dispatches of the 15th and 26th ult.

[p154] I beg leave to assure your Excellency, that before I resolved to pass James River to enable me to comply with your requisition of troops, I had very maturely considered the general tenor of your dispatches to General Phillips, as well as those to me of the 11th and 15th of June, delivered on the 26th, by Ensign Amiel; and when I decided upon that measure, I sufficiently felt how mortifying it was to me, personally, and how much the reputation of his Majesty's arms would suffer by it in this province.

But your Excellency was pleased to give me to understand, in your dispatch of the 11th, that you wished to concentrate your force, being threatened with an attack at New York by General Washington with twenty thousand men at least, besides an expected French reinforcement, and the numerous militia of the five neighbouring provinces; and, in your dispatch of the 15th, supposing that I had not thought it expedient to engage in operations in the Upper Chesapeak, and that those I had undertaken in this province would be finished, you require that part of the troops, mentioned in a list contained in the former dispatch, should be embarked to be sent to New York with all possible dispatch; notifying to me, at the same time, that you would, in proper time, solicit the Admiral to send more transports to the Chesapeak; in which you desired that I would send the remaining troops that I judged could be spared from the defence of the posts that I might [p155] occupy, as you did not think it adviseable to leave more troops in this unhealthy climate, at this season of the year, than what were absolutely wanted for a defensive, and desultory water excursions.

My own operations being finished, and being of opinion, that, with the force under my command, and circumstanced as I was, in a variety of respects, it would have been highly inconsiderate in me, and dangerous for the King's service, to engage in operations in the Upper Chesapeak, I thought it incumbent upon me to take effectual measures to enable me to obey so explicit an order without loss of time. To this end, as I could not discover in your instructions to General Phillips, or in your paper containing the substance of private conversations with him, or in your dispatches to me, any earnestness for immediately securing a harbour for line of battle ships, I thought myself under the necessity of being contented with the post at Portsmouth, such as it was; for I did not imagine myself at liberty to exercise my discretionary power, by changing that post for another, which I knew would have required so great a part of the troops under my command for many weeks, for the purposes of covering, subsisting, and fortifying it, that any offensive or defensive plans of yours, which depended upon material reinforcement from hence, might thereby have been totally frustrated.

[p156] My resolution to pass James River was just executed when I received your dispatch of the 28th of June, ordering the expedition for the attempt upon Philadelphia. That order being likewise positive, unless I was engaged in any important move of my own, or in operations in the Upper Chesapeak, I felt a particular satisfaction that my decision on your first order had enabled me to comply so expeditiously with this; and I own, that instead of blame, I hoped to have merited approbation.

I was clearly convinced when I received those orders, and I cannot yet see any cause to alter my opinion, that having a sufficient force remaining for a defensive in the post that I had resolved to occupy, and for desultory water excursions, if I had detained the troops required and specified in your list, for any other reason than that of being engaged in an important move of my own, or in operations in the Upper Chesapeak and if in the mean time a misfortune had happened at New York, or you had been disappointed of any material object at Philadelphia, my conduct would have been highly and deservedly censured. But I acknowledge, I never apprehended, even although it might afterwards appear that the danger at New York was not imminent, nor the attempt upon Philadelphia expedient, that I should be subject to blame for passing James river; a step rendered indispensably necessary by an [p157] obedience of your orders, and for the safety of the troops remaining under my command.

Your Excellency, after mentioning your intention of recommencing operation in the Chesapeak about the beginning of October, is pleased to say, that you will then determine whether you will act in Virginia according to my plan, or in the Upper Chesapeak according to your own.

It is true, that it is my opinion, that while we keep a naval superiority, Virginia is, by its navigable rivers, extremely accessible; and that if we have force to accomplish it, the reduction of the province would be of great advantage to England, on account of the value of its trade, the blow that it would be to the rebels, and as it would contribute to the reduction and quiet of the Carolinas. But in my subordinate situation, being unacquainted with the instructions of administration, ignorant of the force at your command from other services, and without the power of making the necessary arrangements for execution, I can only offer my opinions for consideration; certainly not as plans. I am thoroughly sensible that plans, which essentially affect the general conduct of the war, can only come from your Excellency, as being in possession of the requisite materials for framing them, and of the power of arranging the means for their execution. But whatever plan you may think proper to adopt for operations in the Chesapeak, I shall be most sincerely [p158] concerned if your Excellency should be so circumstanced as not to be able to undertake the execution of it in person; for the event must be of great importance to our country, and not only the military operations would e best directed by your superior abilities, but your weight and authority as commissioner, might have the happiest effects in the civil and political regulation of the country, without which, military success would not be attended with solid consequences. However, if your Excellency should find it necessary to direct me to undertake the execution of any plan that may be fixed upon by you, I shall make the best use in my power of the force put under my command. But as my acting differently from your ideas or wishes, might, in many instances, be attended with great detriment to the King's service, I shall, if employed, hope to be honoured with explicit instructions from your Excellency on all points that will admit of them.

I shall, by the first opportunity, acquaint General Leslie, that if he can spare troops from the service in South Carolina, you wish them to be sent to New York. But being ignorant of the present state of affairs, and knowing well that, since the surrender of Charles-town, the seasons of the year have not occasioned military inactivity in that quarter, I cannot judge whether your Excellency may expect any reinforcement from thence.

[p159] As there appears to be little chance of co-operation from hence with the troops in that province, and as my communication with it is extremely precarious, I submit it to your Excellency's consideration, whether it would not be most expedient to transmit your commands, relating to the affairs of that country, directly to General Leslie.

I have the honour to be, &c.
CORNWALLIS.

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Notes:

¹ Editor's Note: Excerpted in Tarleton's Campaigns, Chapter 5, Note W, p348. [ back ]

² Editor's Note: Excerpted in Tarleton's Campaigns, Chapter 6, Note C, p398. [ back ]

³ ‡ Second battalion of light infantry; forty-third regiment; seventy-sixth or eightieth; two battalions of Anspach; Queen's rangers, cavalry and infantry; and such a proportion of artillery as can be spared, particularly men. [ back ]

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Cornwallis's Reply to Clinton's "Narrative"

[p79] CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K.B. COMMANDER IN CHIEF, AND Lieut. Gen. Earl Cornwallis.

Notes:

[p79] CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN
Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K.B.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
AND
Lieut. Gen. Earl Cornwallis.