Sir Henry Clinton's Observations on Earl Cornwallis's Answer [1/2]

SIR HENRY CLINTON'S
OBSERVATIONS
ON
EARL CORNWALLIS'S
ANSWER.

---------------------------------------

PRICE TWO SHILLINGS AND SIX-PENCE.

OBSERVATIONS
ON
SOME PARTS
OF THE
ANSWER
OF
EARL CORNWALLIS
TO
SIR HENRY CLINTON'S
NARRATIVE.

BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B.
--------
TO WHICH IS ADDED
AN APPENDIX;
CONTAINING
EXTRACTS OF LETTERS AND OTHER PAPERS,
TO WHICH REFERENCE IS NECESSARY.

------

LONDON:
printed for J. DEBRETT, (Successor to Mr. ALMON,)
opposite BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.
M.DCCL.XXXIII.

[p1] OBSERVATIONS
ON
Some Parts of Earl Cornwallis's Answer
TO
Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative.
BY
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B.

When I published a Narrative of my conduct during the period of my command in North America, which comprehends the campaign of 1781, I was in hopes I had said every thing that was requisite to explain the motives of my own actions, and to convince [p2] every unprejudiced person, that certain positions respecting them, advanced in Lord Cornwallis's letter to me of the 20th of October, had no foundation. But it gives me extreme concern to observe, that his Lordship's seeming to avow nearly the same sentiments in his Introduction to the late publication, styled, an Answer to that Narrative, lays me under the necessity of troubling the public again upon a subject, which they are probably tired of; and I sincerely wished to have done with. I hope, therefore, it may not be judged improper to request their attention to the following Observations on some of the opinions and assertions therein stated. Which (to be as concise as possible) I shall take according to the order in which they occur; -- adding only, in an Appendix, the copies of such extracts from my correspondence, and other papers, as appear necessary.

I find upon enquiry that the four letters were omitted to be sent to the Secretary of State, which Lord Cornwallis mentions to have been wanting when the papers relating to this business were laid before the House of Lords. But the reasons for his Lordship's [p3] march from Cross-creek to Wilmington, and from thence into Virginia (stated in the first of them) had been before given in his letters of the 23d and 24th of April, to the secretary of State, General Phillips, and myself; and these stand the first of those letters from his Lordship's correspondence, read before the House of Lords; the other three letters had been inserted in a pamphlet containing extracts from our correspondence, handed about at the time of the enquiry; and one of those pamphlets had been presented, by my order, to Lord Townshend, as a man of honour, and a friend to both parties, previous (I believe) to his noticing this omission to the House; and all the four missing letters were soon after published in the Parliamentary Register, along with those which had been read to the Lords. So that Lord Cornwallis could not well have sustained any injury by that omission. This, however, cannot be said to have been the case with mine of the 30th of November, and 2d of December to his Lordship, and of the 6th of December to the American Minister; which were with-held, whilst Lord Cornwallis's letters of the 20th of October, and 2d [p4] of December (to which they were answers) were suffered to operate, for a long time, upon the minds of the public, to my prejudice.

My letters of the 30th of November and 2d of December, were in Lord Cornwallis's possession, when his friend, Lord Townshend, moved for those of his Lordship, which he judged necessary to explain his conduct. The public will judge, whether mine were not, at least, equally so, to explain mine; and whether, on finding that the Secretary of State had omitted to produce them to the Lords, Lord Cornwallis ought not to have desired Lord Townshend to have moved for them. I declare, I would have done so, had I been in his Lordship's place.

The four other letters, taken notice of by Lord Cornwallis, were certainly not delivered to him before November; because the three first, having been committed to the charge of General Leslie, (who was in a manner embarked for the Chesapeak, from the beginning of August to the arrival of the French fleet) could not have been transmitted to his Lordship sooner; and the last (the substance of which, however, had been previously communicated [p5] in the presence of a council of war, for his Lordship's information to Major Cockran, who joined him on the 9th of October) being send by an advice boat, did not reach the Chesapeak before his surrender. But whoever will take the trouble of perusing those letters, will perceive that his Lordship's conduct (in the then state of matters) could not have been influenced by an earlier receipt of them.

Every man of sensibility must lament that Lord Cornwallis has so indiscreetly availed himself of the liberty, he supposed was given him, by the late change in American measures. For as my secret and most private letter to General Phillips, dated April 30, contained nothing necessary for his Lordship's justification; the publishing it was highly impolitic at least, not to say more -- for reasons too obvious to need explanation.

No person can be more ready than I am to admit the difficulties Lord Cornwallis had to struggle with; and I shall always acknowledge that I expected success (notwithstanding) from his Lordship's abilities. I left his Lordship in the Carolinas, with every power, civil and military, which I could give him, to carry on [p6] such operations as he should judge most likely to complete their reduction. Where I had hopes of success, I studiously sought to approve without reserve. And, as long as I imagined his Lordship to be in sufficient force, and in other respects prepared and competent to give the experiment of supporting our friends in North Carolina, a fair and solid trial, I certainly approved. But after the unfortunate day of Cowpens, which diminished his Lordship's acting army nearly one fourth; and after he thought proper to destroy great part of his waggons, proviant train, &c. (whereby he was reduced, I fear, to something too like a Tartar move); had it then been possible for him to have consulted me, he would have found that, could I have even consented to his persisting in his march into that province, that consent must have totally rested upon the high opinion I entertained of his Lordship's exertions, and not on any other flattering prospect I had of success.

Major Ferguson's misfortune was one of those untoward circumstances, which Lord Cornwallis says, occured during the four months succeeding the battle of Camden. His [p7] Lordship, immediately after the complete victory he there obtained, ordered our friends in North Carolina, to arm and intercept the beaten army of General Gates; promising them at the same time, that he would march directly to the borders of that province in their support. About this time Major Ferguson was detached to a distance from his Lordship, with a body of militia (without being supported by regular troops) under an idea that he could make them fight; notwithstanding his Lordship had informed me, some little time before, that it was contrary to the experience of the army, as well as of Major Ferguson himself. The consequence was, that the Major and his whole corps were unfortunately massacred. Lord Cornwallis was, immediately upon hearing of this event, obliged to quit the borders of North Carolina, and leave our friends there at the mercy of an inveterate enemy, whose power became irresistible by this necessary retreat. This fatal catastrophe, moreover, lost his Lordship the whole militia of Ninety-six, amounting to four thousand men, and even threw South Carolina into a state of confusion and rebellion.

[p8] How nearly the force I left with Lord Cornwallis in the Southern district, and what I afterwards sent to him, might have been adequate or not to the success expected from it, I shall not now examine. It was all I could possibly spare. But for the satisfaction of the public, I shall give at the end of the Appendix, a view of the force first left with his Lordship, of what was sent to him afterwards, and of what was finally under his Lordship's orders throughout the whole extent of his command; -- to contrast with which, I shall add also another view of the force left under my own immediate orders at New York, at different periods; giving at the same time as near a calculation as I can make from the intelligence received, of the number of regular troops which the enemy had opposed to each of us. I beg leave likewise to mention, that before I sailed from Charles-town, I offered to Lord Cornwallis all he wished, all he wanted, of every sort; and that his Lordship expressed himself to be perfectly satisfied with the troops he had, and wished for no more, as will appear from the letters annexed. What the exact strength of the corps under his Lordship's immediate command may have been at any given [p9] period, I cannot ascertain, as I had not regular returns of them; but his Lordship did not make any complaint to me of the smallness of his force when he commenced his move into North Carolina; and I always thought it to be full as large as I had rated it at.

I cannot judge of the assurances of co-operation which Lord Cornwallis may have received from our friends in North Carolina, but from his Lordship's report; and his Lordship best knows, whether he received any after the effects of Major Ferguson's misfortune were known. But his Lordship cannot forget that our friends, who had risen by his order, were left exposed to ruin by his retreat, and numbers of them actually massacred. I am therefore at a loss to guess what may have been his Lordship's reasons for being surprized that they failed to join him after the victory at Guildford; as such effort of loyalty could scarcely be expected from them after their past sufferings, when they saw his Lordship's army so greatly reduced after the action, and so scantily supplied with provisions; which, without doubt was very far short of that solid support which they had been encouraged to expect from his [p10] Lordship's promises. And indeed his Lordship might have supposed that these were their sentiments from what followed, as described by himself. "Many of the inhabitants rode into camp, shook me by the hand, said they were glad to see us, and to hear we had beat Greene, and then rode home again;" -- no doubt with aching hearts, from the melancholy scene his Lordship's camp "encumbered with a long train of sick and wounded," exhibited to their view.

But as this attempt (such as it was) had failed, surely Lord Cornwallis's next object should have been, to secure South Carolina: and this appears to have been his Lordship's own opinion when he wrote his letter to General Leslie of the 12th of December, 1780: -- "We will then give our friends in North-Carolina a fair trial. If they behave like men, it may be of the greatest advantage to the affairs of Britain. If they are as ---- as our friends to the southward, we must leave them to their fate, and secure what we have got." Had I not consequently every reason to expect his Lordship would have done so? To what purpose then did his Lordship [p11] march to Wilmington from Cross-creek, as he was so much nearer Camden and South Carolina? Or, even when at Wilmington, (as he could not but be apprehensive for the safety of South Carolina, from General Green's march into that province; -- and even for Charles-town,¹ ["]whose old works were in part levelled, to make way for new ones, which were not yet constructed; and whose garrison was inadequate to oppose any force of consequence;" which material information it is presumed Colonel Balfour could not have failed communicating to his Lordship as well as to Lord Rawdon,) why did not his Lordship retire to Charles-town by the route of Lockwood's folly and the Waggamaw? Which, it is the opinion of many others as well as mine, was practicable. For gallies might have secured him the passage of that river, and we then held the post of George-town upon its banks: it was, moreover, early in the month of April, long before the droughts set in, and it may therefore be presumed there was not much danger of the mills wanting water, as his lordship seems to [p12] have apprehended. Had his Lordship fortunately done so, South Carolina would have been saved, and the fatal catastrophe which afterwards happened to his army in the Chesapeak avoided. Lord Cornwallis in answer to this says, "that he decided to march into Virginia, as the safest and most effectual means of employing the small corps under his command. For the force in South Carolina was in his opinion sufficient, when collected, to secure what was valuable to us in that province." But his Lordship's letter to General Phillips, of the 24th of April, (written a day or two before he moved) so far from representing this march as a safe one, describes it as most perilous. And if there was a possibility that his Lordship's return to South Carolina (even by sea) might prevent any material part of that province or Georgia from falling into the enemy's hands, (as many of the posts there did, notwithstanding his Lordship's opinion of the sufficiency of the force to secure them,) it may be presumed, that his Lordship's march into Virginia was not the most effectual means of employing the corps under his command, as the event has but too well proved to our cost. Lord Cornwallis [p13] gives likewise another reason for this move. He says, "he was influenced by having just received an account from Charles-town of the arrival of a frigate with dispatches from me. The substance of which then transmitted to him was, that General Phillips had been detached to the Chesapeak, and put under his orders. Which induced him to hope that solid operations might be adopted in that quarter." I shall therefore take the liberty of saying a few words on this passage, which appears to me very necessary to be explained.

The dispatches his Lordship alludes to, were my letters to his Lordship of the 2d, 5th, and 8th, of March, with a copy of my instructions to General Phillips. Captain Amherst; of the Sixtieth regiment, having charged himself with those of Lord Cornwallis, and other dispatches for Colonel Balfour, sailed from New-York on the 20th of March, in a merchant ship, called the Jupiter. And as Colonel Balfour acknowledged the receipt of them all, in his letter to me of the 7th of April, it is presumable they were delivered to him on or before that day. This letter was brought to [p14] me by his Majesty's ship Amphitrite; which, having in her way called at Cape Fear, brought me a letter likewise from Lord Cornwallis, at Wilmington, dated the 10th of April. It is therefore to be lamented, that neither the dispatches themselves, nor the substance of them, had been transmitted to his Lordship by that ship. The Speedy packet too, which was sent from Charles-town soon after the Amphitrite, with letters to me of the 20th of April, called likewise in her way at Cape Fear, and brought me letters from his Lordship of the 22d, 23d, and 24th of April; but I am concerned to observe, that safe opportunity of conveying my dispatches to his Lordship was also missed. Although Lord Cornwallis, in his letter to the American minister of the 23d April, and in his introduction, intimates that the substance of those dispatches was sent to him on the 22d April; I should, notwithstanding, suppose, that what was sent to his Lordship as such must have been improperly stated. For by having recourse to the dispatches at large, it will be seen, that so far from inducing his Lordship to hope that solid operation might be adopted in Virginia, [p15] (as he intimates the substance of them did) it is presumed, they would on the contrary have convinced him, that I had not even an idea of the fort (which, indeed, his Lordship might have already judged from my letter of 6th November) and therefore, instead of influencing his Lordship's move into that province, they might have most probably prevented it. But when the Public have read my letters to Lord Cornwallis of the 2d, 5th, and 8th of March, and my instructions to General Phillips, they will be competent to judge in what manner they were most likely to influence his Lordship, had he received them, or even the substance of them, before he commenced his march into Virginia, as I think his Lordship might have perceived by the instructions that Generals Phillips and Arnold, with part of the Chesapeak corps, were to be drawn back to New-York for a particular service, after a certain time; -- and by the letters, that a considerable French armament was sailed from Rhode-island to the Chesapeak. It is consequently presumable, that in the first instance his Lordship would not have marched into Virginia, lest he should interfere [p16] with my plans; and that in the other he would have been equally cautious of doing so, lest he should hazard the destruction of his own corps, should the troops in Chesapeak happen at the time to be invested at Portsmouth, which from those letters would appear very probable to be the case.

I will frankly own that I ever disapproved of an attempt to conquer Virginia before the Carolinas were absolutely restored. However, when I saw that Lord Cornwallis had forced himself upon me in that province, I left him at liberty to act there as he judged best, as may appear by my letter to his Lordship of the 29th of May, which was the first I had an opportunity of writing to him after my knowledge of his arrival at Petersburg, or of his intentions of coming there.

Although Lord Cornwallis thought proper to decline engaging in the plan of operations which I had proposed to him in case he had none of his own; I am at a loss to guess what may be his motives for saying, "I did not seem inclined to take more share in the responsibility than barely to recommend it;" and indeed I cannot think his Lordship was really serious [p17] in suggesting an insinuation so apparently groundless. For it is manifest that my letter to General Phillips of the 30th of April (published by Lord Cornwallis) conveys to him and General Arnold the most explicit instructions for carrying those operations into execution; and it can scarcely be doubted, that those instructions were equally explicit to his Lordship, the moment the command of that army devolved upon him. Besides, though it may be admitted that I only barely recommended the move, in my letters on the subject to his Lordship (because it had been hitherto usual for me to leave him to his own discretion) yet I am persuaded a reference to my correspondence (as published by Lord Cornwallis and myself) will shew that those recommendations were sufficiently explicit to fix responsibility upon me, had his Lordship adopted my plan, and afterwards failed.

Lord Cornwallis is pleased to say, "that he informed me he should repair to Williamsburg, about the time when he should receive my answer, in order to be in readiness to execute my commands; and that he should employ the intermediate space in destroying [p18] such of the enemy's stories and magazines as might be within his reach." -- The letter which is thus explained was dated the 26th of May, at Byrd's, a little more than twenty miles from Richmond, which is fifty from Williamsburg, and is expressed in the following words: "I shall now proceed to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond, and with my light troops to destroy any magazines or stores in the neighbourhood, which may have been collected either for his use or for General Greene's army. From thence I purpose to move to the Neck at Williamsbourg, which is represented as healthy, and keep myself unengaged from operations which might interfere with your plan for the campaign, until I have the satisfaction of hearing from you. I hope I shall then have an opportunity to receive better information than has hitherto been in my power to procure relative to a proper harbour and place of arms. At present I am inclined to think well of York. The objections to Portsmouth are, that it cannot be made strong without an army to defend it, that it is remarkably unhealthy, and can give no protection to a ship of the line." From [p19] the foregoing letter I naturally concluded, that, as soon as his Lordship had finished the service he was gone on, (which I did not imagine would have taken up above six or seven days at most) he would endeavour to obtain information respecting a proper harbour and place of arms; and having found it, that he was actually employed in establishing a post there. For, not having received any letter from his Lordship between the 26th of May and 30th of June, I was totally ignorant of his having changed his design, (as described in his letter of the first date) and gone across the country towards Fredericksbourg, by Hanover Court-house; an operation which took his Lordship a complete month before he reached Williamsburg. But had his Lordship fortunately explained to me his instructions in that letter in the same manner he has now explained his letter, I should have seen that his Lordship had no idea of establishing a post on the Williamsburg Neck: and, when I found he had no plan of his own, would of course have sent early and explicit orders for that purpose, either to his Lordship, or in his absence to General Leslie, whereby much time might have been saved, [p20] and the fatal catastrophe that followed -- at least retarded, by his Lordship being in a better state of defence than that in which the enemy found him. For, though from his Lordship's letter to me of the 22d of August,² I had every reason to suppose that a proper survey of the ground had been taken, and a judicious plan fixed on for fortifying it; I very much fear that nothing material was done until after the arrival of the French fleet on the 29th of August, as the engineer has since given me to understand (when I asked him for his survey) that he did not take one. There appears, therefore, to have been a misapprehension somewhere respecting this matter, as well as the number of intrenching tools; which, though computed by his Lordship³ to [p21] be only about four hundred when he began to work on the York side, I find by his engineer's reports, in my possession, to have been 992⁴ on the 23d of August, the day on which (it is presumed from the letter before quoted) he began to break ground.

Lord Cornwallis is also pleased to say, "Whoever reads the correspondence will see, that since Sir H. Clinton had declared positively in his first, and in several subsequent dispatches against the plan for reducing Virginia, no explicit alternative was left to me, between complying with the requisition (contained in his letters of the 11th and 15th of June) of such troops as I could spare from a healthy defensive station, or engaging in operations in the Upper Chesapeak." But this conclusion does not, I presume necessarily follow; for though it is admitted that the whole of my correspondence with the American Minister and Lord Cornwallis uniformly declare my sentiments, of the impracticability of reducing Virginia by an operation solely there, without the good-will and aid of the inhabitants, -- and of the bad policy [p22] of the measure from the unhealthiness of the climate; and I was equally uniform in expressing to his Lordship my wishes, that he would adopt my ideas of the move to the Delaware Neck, &c. against which there were none of those objections. Yet, when I found that his Lordship was averse to engage in the operations concerted with General Phillips, and that he concurred with that officer respecting the propriety of changing the post of Portsmouth for one more healthy and defensible, I gave my consent to the change proposed, and referred his Lordship to my correspondence with General Phillips for my opinions thereon. His Lordship might have therefore judged that I expected he would immediately carry into execution this part of my plan, especially as his Lordship might have recollected that he told me in the letter before quoted, "That he hoped, when he got to the Williamsburg Neck, he should have an opportunity to receive better information than had hitherto been in his power to procure, relative to a proper harbour and place of arms." Wherefore, as his Lordship was left at liberty by my letters of the 11th and [p23] 15th of June, to detain all the troops, if he had not finished the operations he was engaged in: and as his Lordship had not completed his measures relative to a proper harbour and place of arms, which appears from his letter to have been one of the operations he proposed engaging in; it may be fairly concluded that an explicit alternative was left him. For the letter of the 11th of June explicitly recommends to his Lordship the taking a healthy defensive station wherever he chose on the Williamsburg Neck; and only calls for what troops he could spare from its ample defence and other purposes mentioned, after it was taken. And as his Lordship had not yet taken that station, the troops were without doubt to be detained; -- because in that case only my letter requested them to be sent; but though his Lordship might possibly have understood the letter differently at the time, we may at least suppose that, as it referred him to other letters of the 29th of May and 8th of June, for a further explanation of my wishes, and these letters had not then been received by his Lordship, he had very sufficient reason to suspend at least his intention of crossing James River, until [p24] he either received them or heard again from New-York. Lord Cornwallis endeavours to invalidate this reasoning by saying, "that the choice of a healthy station was controlled by other material considerations, particularly the imminent danger of New-York, and the important effects expected from the expedition against Philadelphia." His Lordship will, however, forgive me if I cannot discover from whence those considerations arose; as my letters of the 11th and 15th of June (which were the only letters he had⁵ then received) do not describe New-York to be in any sort of danger, and his Lordship by his answer to those letters seemed of opinion, that the project against Philadelphia was then become inexpedient. I am therefore sorry to be under the necessity of repeating, that it is my opinion, his Lordship totally mis[c]onceived all my orders and intentions respecting this business, when he judged they warranted his passing James River and retiring to Portsmouth; -- which I could not possibly suspect his Lordship would make choice of as a healthy defensible station, [p25] after he had just told me in his letter of the 26th of May, "that it was remarkably unhealthy, and (though fortified) required an army to defend it." But our correspondence is now before the public, and they will judge whether my orders authorized his Lordship to do so, and whether consequently six weeks at least were not lost in securing a place of arms, which we both seemed to concur in opinion was necessary. With respect to his Lordship's saying, "It will be seen by the correspondence that the Commander-in-chief's opinion of the indispensible necessity of a harbour for line of battle ships only appears in his letter of the 11th of July, after he had been acquainted that the troops intended for the expedition against Philadelphia would be soon ready to sail," (thereby intimating that it was a new idea just then started) I presume it may be easily made appear from the same correspondence, that so far from being a new idea, the taking a station for large ships was one of the earliest and principal objects recommended to General Phillips's consideration and enquiry.⁶ And I think it may be inferred, [p26] from his Lordship's objecting to Portsmouth, in the letter of the 26th of May, "because it could not give protection to a ship of the line," that he regarded it as such, and consequently went in search of a naval station as standing in that general officer's place, it being apparently from that letter one of the principal reasons which induced his Lordship to go to the Williamsburg Neck.

Lord Cornwallis says, "Hampton-road was recommended by that order; but as it was upon examination found totally unfit for the purpose desired, every person can judge whether the order did not then in its spirit become positive to occupy York and Gloucester." To enable every person therefore to judge whether it did or not, I shall beg leave to transcribe the words of the order. "I request that your Lordship will without loss of time examine Old Point Comfort, and fortify it. But if it should be your Lordship's opinion that Old Point Comfort cannot be held without having possession of York, for in this case Gloucester may perhaps be not so material) and that the whole cannot be done with less than seven thousand men, you are at full liberty to detain all the [p27] troops now in Chesapeak, which I believe amount to somewhat more than that number. Which very liberal concession will, I am persuaded, convince your Lordship of the high estimation in which I hold a naval station in Chesapeak." If nothing else had been said to Lord Cornwallis or General Phillips, upon the subject of a naval station, but what this order contains; there could not in my humble opinion be a doubt, that his Lordship was not at liberty to take any other than Old Point Comfort, -- except he should be of opinion that York was necessary to cover it, in which case he might take York also; and as the two posts might probably require more troops than were intended to be left in Chesapeak, his Lordship was at liberty to detain the whole for fortifying and garrisoning them. I dare say Lord Cornwallis saw the order in this point of view; -- but judging that Old Point Comfort was totally unfit for the purpose desired, he had recourse to the instructions and letters to General Phillips in his possession, to see whether they would authorise him to reject it, and look out for another. And discovering that my instructions to that General officer gave him leave, "in [p28] case the Admiral disapproving Portsmouth should require a fortified station for large ships in Chesapeak, and should propose York town or Old Point Comfort, to take possession thereof, if possession of either could be acquired and maintained without great risk or loss;" his Lordship conceived he should act according to the spirit of my orders, by taking York and Gloucester. I am however humbly of opinion, that admitting the propriety of his Lordship's consulting other papers besides the order immediately before him, the order (even as explained by the instructions) did not become positive to occupy York and Gloucester. For it does not appear that the instructions authorised either General Phillips or his Lordship to occupy York or Old Point Comfort, unless they should have been proposed by the Admiral for a naval station. But the post of York and Gloucester never having been proposed by the Admiral either to his Lordship or me for a naval station, as Old Point Comfort was, but only barely mentioned to his Lordship by the Admiral, as likely to command one of the principal rivers if it could be secured; and it at last appearing by the letter of 20th October, to have been his [p29] Lordship's opinion that it was incapable of being so; it may be presumed that his Lordship did not act conformable to either the spirit or letter of the order in taking it, -- and consequently that his doing so was entirely of his own motive and choice. But, being probably aware of this conclusion, his Lordship says, "as the harbour was the indispensible object, he took York, being the only one in Chesapeak that he knew of." In which (no doubt) his Lordship would have been perfectly justifiable if the objections to it were not such as he thought forcible." But it appears from his Lordship's letter of the 20th of October, that the objections to that post were such as he thought forcible. It may therefore be a matter of some surprise, that, as his Lordship thought proper to avail himself of the latitude of choice he supposed given him by the instructions to General Phillips, it did not occur to him that the same instructions directed him to "decline taking either York or Old Point Comfort, if his objections were such as he thought forcible." And as Lord Cornwallis never stated his objections to the post of York either to the Admiral or me, as those instructions directed him to do, if he had any; it may be [p30] asserted that his Lordship alone is answerable for whatever impropriety there may have been in taking the post of York and Gloucester; as it is I presume, clear from the foregoing reasoning, that, having under the sanction of the instructions to General Phillips, declined taking possession of Old Point Comfort (which his Lordship was positively directed to occupy by the order of the 11th of July,) his Lordship had the same authority for declining to take York or any other naval station, "could they not be acquired and maintained without great risk or loss, and so well and so soon fortified as to be rendered hors d'insulte before the enemy could move a force, &c. against them;"⁷ which his Lordship's letter of the 20th of October intimates to be his opinion the post of York could not be from the disadvantageous nature of the .

Having represented to the minister for the American department the danger of operations in Chesapeak without a covering fleet; and having been in consequence promised that I should have it; and being told by Admiral [p31] Hood upon his arrival that he had brought me a sufficient one; I gave Lord Cornwallis of course all the hopes I could, and "certainly promised to succour him in person, by moving into Chesapeak with four thousand troops," the instant the Admiral should inform me the passage to him was open, or would undertake to convoy me. But as his Lordship did not receive these hopes (such as they are) before the 16th of September; (for I must still persist in declaring that I never gave his Lordship assurances of the exertions of the navy before my letter to him of the 24th of September, which he received on the 29th -- as asserted in his Lordship's letter of the 20th of October)[.] Surely his Lordship's hopes of succour must have been but small between the 29th of August and that period, when he knew there was an enemy's fleet of thirty-six sail of the line blocking him up, and a formidable army collecting to invest him, "in an intrenched camp, subject in most places to enfilade, and the ground in general disadvantageous;" -- without knowing of more than seven sail of the line on our side, and consequently having in the intermediate space no very great prospect of relief.

[p32] His Lordship says, "that, as I did not give him the smallest particle of discretionary power different from holding the posts he occupied; it would not have been justifiable in him, either to abandon by the evacuation of York a considerabl[e] quantity of artillery, the ships of war, transports, provisions, stores, and hospitals; or, by venturing an action without the most manifest advantage, to run the risk of precipitating the loss of them." To this, I shall only observe, that it will appear from the correspondence, that his Lordship's discretionary powers were unlimited from the first moment of his taking charge of a separate command; and it will I believe be admitted, that his Lordship acted in most cases as if he considered them as such. And though I may not condemn his Lordship for not attacking the Marquis de la Fayette, before his junction with Monsieur St. Simon (when he had, as I understand, only two thousand regular continental troops); or for not attempting to prevent that junction; or for not attacking them when Joined; and endeavouring to escape with part of his army to the southward, between the 29th of August and the [p33] 16th of September; -- as such measures must have altogether depended on is Lordship's own feelings, of which no man can speak but himself. Yet it was natural to suppose, that the General officer, who had but a few months before (at the risk of engaging his Commander in Chief in operations, for which he could not be prepared; and perhaps at the risk of losing a valuable province under his immediate protection) decided upon a move with part of his army into Virginia, "for urgent reasons, being influenced thereto (he says) by the substance of a dispatch, (he heard was coming to him,) without waiting to receive it, though it might have been expected in a few hours:-- I say, it was natural to suppose, that the General officer who had done this, might have judged it equally expedient to decide upon retiring back again without waiting to receive special discretionary powers from his Commander in Chief, if he judged there was a great probability of his losing every thing should he remain. Which, if it was so, I am bold to say, was a reason far more urgent for his endeavouring to save part of his army by any means in his power, than any his Lordship [p34] could suppose he had for quitting the Carolinas at the time he marched into Virginia.

There remains little more necessary in reply to Lord Cornwallis's introduction, but to observe, that the army and its followers in Virginia had been so increased in consequence of his Lordship's move into that province; that it would have been impracticable to withdraw them by water (As his Lordship is pleased to suggest) for want of transports, even if the American minister had not directed me to support his Lordship there, and a pressing contingency had required it. And I must take the liberty to say, that the sending his Lordship's corps back to South Carolina by land, would have been a most absurd idea for me to adopt after the opinions I had given of the risks it ran in its former march by that route.

I shall now beg leave to conclude with an opinion, which I presume is deducible from the foregoing (I trust candid) review of circumstances. Which is, that Lord Cornwallis's conduct and opinions, if they were not the immediate causes, may be adjudged to have at least contributed to bring on the fatal catastrophe [p35] which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.

[p1] APPENDIX.⁸

P A R T I.

CONTAINING
EXTRACTS
FROM THE
Correspondence with Earl Cornwallis, respecting the Force left with his Lordship,
and the Instructions given him upon his taking the Command of the Southern District.

Your lordship has already with you (in the field) two thousand five hundred and forty two rank and file; but if you have the least reason to suppose the enemy likely to be in great number, you shall be reinforced with the forty-second, the light infantry, and any other corps you choose. As your move is important, it must not be stinted. -- I will give you all you wish of every sort. -- [p2] Let me know what it is as soon as possible. In the mean time, I shall order the light infantry and forty-second regiment to prepare; depending upon it, that as soon as you can spare them, you will return them to me; for all operations to the Northward must be cramped without them. If you choose to keep the 17th dragoons, you are heartily welcome to them during this move.

Sir,
Lieutenant Colonel Webster arrived this morning, and informed me of the message which you sent by him, relative to reinforcing the corps under my command. The service on which I am going, is undoubtedly of the most important nature, and in my opinion, without some success in the back country, our success at Charles-town would but little promote the real interests of Great-Britain. But at the same time it is as necessary that your situation to the Northward should be respectable. It would be with great regret that I should see you leave behind any part of that corps destined for your first embarkation. The garrison, [p3] then, of Charles-town and Sullivan's island, will consist of three British regiments, -- two of them very weak, -- and two Hessian, and one weak Provincial, the latter of which, perhaps, will be sent to Fort Moultrie. This garrison will have the charge of two thousand five hundred prisoners. The corps at present under my command is, in my opinion, fully equal to the purpose intended by it, unless some considerable reinforcement of Continentals should come from the Northward. I have not yet heard that fact ascertained, by any intelligence which has come to my knowledge. If troops are on their march, and not very near, your embarkation given out publicly for the Chesapeak will probably stop them. I think, therefore, Sir, if you please, with proper deference and submission to your opinion, that the business may be settled in the following manner: If no certain intelligence arrives before you are ready to sail, of a considerable corps of the Continental troops being far advanced, that the disposition should then remain the same which you mentioned when I had the honour of seeing you. If such intelligence should arrive before that time, I should then wish to be joined by five or six hundred men, either British or Hessian, and submit it to your judgment on the spot, from whence they could be best supplied. I think, in all events, Lieutenant-colonel Balfour's expedition should go on immediately, as the season [p4] of the year makes it necessary that he should lose no time. The more pains that can be taken to establish the belief of your going to Virginia, the greater will be the probability of stopping their reinforcement.

Sir,
I received, very early this morning, the favour of your letter by Lieutenant-colonel Innes, to which the letter I had the honour of sending to you yesterday, by Major Dansey, will serve as an answer. I can only add, that I have received no intelligence whatever of reinforcements coming to the enemy from the Northward, or of their being in force in this province.

----- The light infantry and forty-second regiment march this evening to Goose-creek, and thence to Monk's corner, where they will remain at your Lordship's call, in readiness either to join you, or to return and embark, as shall have become expedient.

Every jealousy has been and will be given on my part, as a blind to our real intentions.

And now, my Lord, having entered into every thing that occurs to me as necessary to be thought on at present, I heartily wish success to your important move. I cannot doubt your having it, for as much as I agree with you, that success at Charles-town, unless followed in the back country, will be of little avail; so much, I am persuaded, that the taking that place in the advantageous manner we have done it, insures the reduction of this and the next province, if the temper of our friends in those districts is such as it has always been represented to us.

THE march of the light infantry and 42d to Monk's-corner will be of use to those corps, and will help to spread alarm through the country; but from what I hear, I do not believe that there can be any necessity for detaining any part of the first embarkation a moment after the ships are ready for them.

We shall probably leave this in a day or two. -- I dare not be so sanguine as to suppose that your business will be compleated in time for us to meet before I sail; and as our communication will become precarious, I think it necessary to give your Lordship outlines of my intentions, where your Lordship is likely to bear a part. Your Lordship knows it was part of my plan to have gone into Chesapeak-bay; but I am apprehensive the information which the Admiral and I received, may make it necessary for him to assemble his fleet at New-York, [p7] -- in which case I shall go there likewise. When your Lordship has finished your campaign, you will be better able to judge what is necessary to be done to secure South and recover North Carolina. Perhaps it may be necessary to send the gallies and some troops into Cape Fear, to awe the lower counties, by far the most hostile of that province, and to prevent the conveyance of succours by inland navigation, the only communication that will probably remain with the northern parts of North Carolina and Virginia. Should your Lordship so far succeed in both provinces, as to be satisfied they are safe from any attack during the approaching season, after leaving a sufficient force in garrison, and such other posts as you think necessary, and such troops by way of moving corps as you shall think sufficient, added to such provincial and militia corps as you shall judge proper to raise; I should wish you to assist in operations which will certainly be carried on in the Chespeak, as soon as we are relieved from our apprehension of a superior fleet, and the season will admit of it in that climate. This may happen, perhaps, about September, or, if not, early in October. I am clear this should not be attempted without a great naval force; -- I am not so clear there should be a great land force. I therefore propose that your Lordship, with what you can spare at the time from your important post, (which is always to be considered as the principal object) may meet the Admiral, [p8] who will bring with him such additional force as I can spare into the Chesapeak. I should recommend in the first place, that one or two armed ships, vigilants, should be prepared, and that as many gallies as can go to sea may likewise accompany you from hence. Our first object will probably be the taking post at Norfolk or Suffolk, or near the Hampton Road, and then proceeding up the Chesapeak to Baltimore. I shall not presume to say any thing by way of instruction to your Lordship, except in articles where you wish it; and if you will do me the honour to inform me of your wishes by the first safe opportunity, I shall pay every attention to them upon that subject, or any other. The Admiral assures me that there will be ships enough left for convoy, ready by the 24th of June. Your Lordship will be the best judge what use can be made of them. Correspondence may, and I hope will, be kept up by the cruizers, which the Admiral and officer stationed here will have, but if you find it necessary, you will be so good to press or hire armed vessels.

Upon my departure from hence, you will be pleased to take command of the troops mentioned in [p9] the inclosed return, and of all other troops now here, or that may arrive in my absence. Your Lordship will make such change in the position of them, as you may judge most conducive to his Majesty's service, for the defence of this important post, and its dependencies. At the same time, it is by no means my intention to prevent your acting offensively, in case an opportunity should offer, consistent with the security of this place, which is always to be regarded as a primary object.

All provision and military stores of any denomination now here, or which may hereafter arrive, are submitted to your Lordship's orders, together with every power you may find necessary to enforce in my absence, for the promotion of the King's service.

My Lord,
I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the names of several inhabitants of the town, who signed an address, the copy of which Brigadier-general Paterson will send you. Inclosed is a copy of the answer the Admiral proposed sending until I represented to him that the subscribers were unknown [p10] to us as to their several characters; that the superintendant was not with us to be consulted; that the permitting exportation amounted to opening the port, which we were not empowered to do; and that I would, reluctantly, at the hour of my departure, change, within your Lordship's command, the conditions of so many persons, without knowing their merits. I also considered that property, in the late troubles, might have been very unwarrantably acquired, and that exportation realized it to the present possessors.

In consequence, the inclosed answer was substituted, bettering their present condition, and opening the prospect of trade, and the restoration of civil government.

To this, my Lord, I have to add, in the Admiral's and my own name, that you are empowered still farther to indulge men who exhibit proofs of a sincere return to their duty, by admitting them to any greater degree of liberty, to the fullest enjoyment of their property, and to the permission, in particular cases, of shipping it, when the officer commanding the King's ships shall furnish convoy; all which advantages I will ratify either as Commissioner or Commander-in-chief.

[p11] P A R T II.

CONTAINING
Copies and Extracts from Letters, relative to the entire Submission of South Carolina,
and the progressive Operations proposed in Consequence, for the Reduction of North Carolina.

---- The submission of General Williamson at Ninety-Six, whose capitulation I enclose with Captain Paris's letter; and the dispersion of a party of rebels, who had assembled at an Iron-work on the north west border of the province, by a detachment of dragoons and militia, from Lieutenant-colonel Turnbull, put an end to all resistance in South Carolina.

The force of the enemy in North Carolina consists of about one hundred militia at Cross-Creek, under General Caswell; four or five hundred militia, at or near Salisbury, under General Rutherford; and three hundred Virginians in that neighbourhood, under one Porterfield.

---- returned with information that he saw two thousand Maryland and Delaware troops at Hillsborough under Major-general De Calbe. Other accounts corresponded with his. But I have since heard that the greatest part of the last have returned to Virginia.

After having thus fully stated the present situation of the two Carolinas, I shall now take the liberty of giving my opinion, with respect to the practicability and the probable effort of farther operations in this quarter, and my own intentions, if not otherwise directed by your Excellency. I think, that with the force at present under my command (except there should be a considerable foreign interference) I can leave South Carolina in security, and march about the beginning of September, with a body of troops, into the back part of North Carolina, with the greatest probability of reducing that province to its duty. And if this be accomplished, I am of opinion, that (besides the advantage of possessing so valuable a province) [p13] it would prove an effectual barrier for South Carolina and Georgia; and could be kept, with the assistance of our friends there, by as few troops as would be wanted on the borders of this province, if North Carolina should remain in the hands of our enemies. Consequently, if your excellency should continue to think it expedient to employ part of the troops at present in this province, in operations in the Chesapeak, there will be as many to spare, as if we did not possess North Carolina. If I am not honoured with different directions from your Excellency before that time, I shall take my measures for beginning the execution of the above plan about the latter end of August, or beginning of September, and shall apply to the officer commanding his Majesty's ships for some co-operation, by Cape Fear, which at present would be burthensome to the navy, and not of much importance to the service.

I have the satisfaction to assure your Excellency, that the numbers and dispositions of our militia, equal my most sanguine expectations. But still I must confess, that their want of subordination and [p14] confidence in themselves, will make a considerable regular force always necessary for the defence of the province, until North Carolina is perfectly reduced. It will be needless to attempt to take any considerable number of the South Carolina militia with us, when we advance. They can only be looked upon as light troops, and we shall find friends enough in the next province of the same quality; and we must not undertake to supply too many useless mouths.

Sir,
I received by Major England, your letters of the 14th and 15th of July; and am very glad to find by the latter, that you do not place much dependance on receiving troops from hence.

My letter of the 14th, by the Halifax, will have convinced you of the impossibility of weakening the force in this province; and every thing which has happened since that time, tends more strongly to confirm it. The general state of things in the two provinces of North and South Carolina, is not very materially altered since my letters of the 14th and 15th of last month were written. Frequent [p15] skirmishes, with various Success, have happened in the Country between the Catawba-river and Broad-river. The militia of the district about Tiger and Ennoree rivers, was formed by us under a Colonel Floyd; Colonel Neale, the rebel colonel, had fled; but Lieutenant-colonel Lisle, who had been Paroled to the islands, exchanged, on his arrival in Charlestown, his parole for a certificate of his being a good subject, returned to the country, and carried off the whole battalion to join General Sumpter, at Catawba. We have not, however, on the whole, lost ground in that part of the country. Turnbull was attacked at Rocky-mount, by Sumpter, with about twelve hundred men, militia and refugees, from this province, whom he repulsed with great loss. We had on our part an officer killed, and one wounded, and about ten or twelve men killed and wounded. Colonel Turnbull's conduct was very meritorious. The affair of Captain Huck turned out of less consequence than it appeared at first; the Captain and three men of the legion were killed, and seven men of the New-York volunteers taken.

On the eastern part of the province, we have been more unfortunate. By this time the reports industriously propagated in this province, of a large army coming from the northward had very much intimidated our friends, encouraged our enemies, and determined the wavering against us; to which [p16] our not advancing and acting offensively likewise contributed.

The whole country between Pedée and Santée has ever since been in an absolute state of rebellion; every friend of Government has been carried off, and his plantation destroyed; and detachments of the enemy have appeared on the Santée, and threatened our stores and convoys on that river. I have not heard that they have as yet made any attempt on them; and I hope, by this time, the steps I have taken will secure them. This unfortunate business, if it should have no worse consequences, will shake the confidence of our friends in this province, and make our situation very uneasy until we can advance. The wheat harvest in North Carolina is now over, but the weather is still excessively hot, and notwithstanding our utmost exertions, a great part of the rum, salt, clothing, and necessaries for the soldiers, and the arms for the Provincials and ammunition for the troops, are not far advanced on their way to Camden. However, if no material interruption happens, this business will be nearly accomplished in a fortnight or three weeks. It may be doubted by some, whether the invasion of North Carolina may be a prudent measure; but I am convinced it is a necessary one, and that if we do not attack that province, we must give up both South Carolina and Georgia, and retire within the walls of Charles-town. Our assurances of attachment [p17] from our poor distressed friends in North Carolina are as strong as ever, and the patience and fortitude with which those unhappy people bear the most oppressive and cruel tyranny, that ever was exercised over any country, deserve our greatest admiration. The Highlanders have offered to form a regiment as soon as we enter the country, and have desired that Governor Martin may be their chief. I have consented with the rank of Lieutenant-colonel commandant; the men[,] they assure us, are already engaged.

An early diversion in my favour in Chesapeak Bay, will be of the greatest and most important advantage to my operations. I most earnestly hope that the Admiral will be able to spare a convoy for that purpose.

I propose taking the following Corps with me into North Carolina, twenty-third, thirty-third, sixty-third, seventy-first, volunteers of Ireland, Hamilton's, Harrison's, new-raised, legion cavalry, and infantry, North Carolina refugees. I intend to leave on the frontiers, from Pedée to Waxhaw (to awe the disaffected, who, I am sorry to say, are still very numerous in that country, and to prevent any insurrection in our rear) the New York volunteers, and Brown's corps, and some of the militia of the Camden district, who are commanded by Colonel Rugeley, a very active and spirited man. I shall place Ferguson's corps and some militia of the Ninety-six district, [p18] which Colonel Balfour assures me are got into very tolerable order, owing to the great assiduity of Ferguson, on the borders of Tryon county, with directions for him to advance with a part of them into the mountains, and secure the left of our march. Lieutenant-colonel Cruger, who commands at Ninety-six, will have his own corps, Innes's, and the remainder of the militia of that district, to preserve that frontier, which requires great attention, and where there are many disaffected, and many constantly in arms. Allen's corps, and for a time, the Florida rangers, are stationed at Augusta, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Allen.

---- I have already explained the measures I have taken for establishing a government, and securing this country by means of a militia. I have likewise paid as much attention as possible to the civil and commercial matters. The principal objects of my attention will appear in the five proclamations, which I have issued, and which I have the honour of enclosing to Your Excellency.

[p19] P A R T III.

CONTAINING
EXTRACTS
FROM THE
Correspondence with Earl Cornwallis,
respecting the Events which occurred between the Battle of Camden and Major Ferguson's Defeat.

I have not yet heard any accounts from North Carolina; but I hope that our friends will immediately take arms, as I have directed them to do. The diversion in the Chesapeak will be of the utmost importance. The troops here have gained reputation, but they have lost numbers; and there can be no doubt but the enemy will use every effort to repel an attack, which, if successful, must end in their losing all the Southern Colonies.

I have likewise to observe, that if a general exchange should take place, the enemy's prisoners should, in my opinion, be delivered at the same place as ours are sent to.

[p20] It is difficult to form a plan of operations, which must depend so much on circumstances. But it at present appears to me that I should endeavour to get as soon as possible to Hillsborough, and there assemble and try to arrange the friends who are inclined to arm in our favour; and endeavour to form a very large magazine for the winter, of flour and meal from the country; and of rum, salt, &c. from Cross-creek, which I understand to be about eighty miles carriage. But all this will depend on the operations which your Excellency may think proper to pursue in the Chesapeak, which appears to me next to the security of New-York, to be one of the most important objects of the war. I can only repeat what I have often had the honour of saying to you, that wherever you may think my presence can be most conducive to the good of his Majesty's service, thither I am at all times ready and willing to go.

In the district of ninety-six, by far the most populous and powerful of the province, Lieutenant-colonel Balfour by his great attention and diligence, and by the active assistance of Major Ferguson, who was appointed Inspector-general of militia of this province by Sir Henry Clinton, had formed seven battalions of militia, consisting of above four thousand men, and entirely composed of persons well-affected [p21] to the British government; which were so regulated that they could with ease furnish fifteen hundred men at a short notice, for the defence of the frontier, or any other home service. But I must take this opportunity of observing, that this militia can be of little use for distant operations, as they will not stir without a horse, and on that account your Lordship will easily conceive the impossibility of keeping a number of them together without destroying the country.

On the morning of the 17th I dispatched proper people into North-Carolina, with directions to our friends there to take arms and assemble immediately; and to seize the most violent people and all military stores and magazines belonging to the rebels, and to intercept all stragglers from the routed army. And I have promised to march without loss of time to their support. Some necessary supplies for the army are now on their way from Charles-town; and I hope that their arrival will enable me to move in a few days.

I hope to be able to move my first division in eight or nine days into North Carolina by Charlotte-town [p22] and Salisbury; the second will follow in about ten days after, with convalescents and Stores. I shall leave the New York volunteers and Innes's corps to take care of this place until the sick and stores can be removed. Our sickness at present is rather at a stand, the recoveries nearly keeping pace with the falling down. I dread the convalescents not being able to march; but it is very tempting to try it, as a move of forty or fifty miles would put us into a much better climate.

Ferguson is to move into Tryon County with some militia, whom he says he is sure he can depend upon for doing their duty and fighting well; but I am sorry to say that his own experience as well as that of every other officer is against him.

I most sincerely hope that nothing can happen to prevent your Excellency's intended diversion in the Chesapeak. If unfortunately any unforeseen cause should make it impossible, I should hope that you will see the absolute necessity of adding some force to the Carolinas.

I have always thought operation in the Chesapeak of the greatest importance, and have often mentioned to Admiral Arbuthnot the necessity of making a diversion in your Lordship's favour in that [p23] quarter; but have not been able till now to obtain a convoy for this purpose.

Your Lordship will receive inclosed a sketch of the instructions I intend to give to Major-general Leslie, who will command the expedition; which will give a general idea of the design of the move. But if your Lordship should wish any particular co-operation from that armament, General Leslie will of course consider himself under your Lordship's orders, and pay every obedience thereto.

I have the honour to inclose the copy of a letter I wrote to Lord George Germain, and of his Lordship's answer, respecting the option Lord Rawdon had made in favour of his provincial rank. And I am happy in having it in my power to communicate to his Lordship the King's pleasure that he should still retain his rank of Lieutenant-colonel in the line, which I beg leave to take this opportunity of doing through your Lordship.

My Lord,
Lord Rawdon, in consequence of his Majesty's order signified to me by your Lordship, has resigned his commission of Lieutenant-colonel in the army, and made choice of that of Colonel of Provincials.

[p24] In justice to his Lordship, as well as to the King's service, I must observe that the expences Lord Rawdon has been at, and the distinguished zeal he has shewn in forming the corps under his command, render him worthy of much commendation, and make the alternative put to him a very mortifying one; whilst on the other hand, the volunteers of Ireland, bereft of a chief of his Lordship's rank in life, and attention to the service, would probably have lost much of their strength and discipline.

Perhaps his Majesty may be graciously pleased to consider his Lordship in the light of an officer, who, for the good of his service and the preservation of a serviceable corps, to which he felt a kind of parental attachment, has offered to relinquish rank essential to his future hopes as a soldier; and may, in consequence, restore to him his brevet of Lieutenant-colonel in the army.

You will find by my separate letter of yesterday, that it is not his Majesty's intention to confine you to so strict an observance of the general rule of no officers being permitted to hold commissions in a regular and provincial corps at the same time, as to [p25] prevent you from deviating from it in extraordinary cases; and that your having done so in favour of Majors Simcoe and Tarleton, was approved by his Majesty. I also informed you, that the general rule was not meant to affect the brevet rank of officers. It is therefore a great concern to me to find Lord Rawdon had resigned his rank of Lieutenant-colonel in the army, when he made his option of Colonel of the Provincials. The King is fully sensible of his Lordship's merit, and of the great advantage which the corps under his command has derived from his Lordship's attention to it; and is well pleased his Lordship has chosen to continue at the head of it. But his Majesty commands me to signify to you his royal pleasure, that you do immediately acquaint his Lordship, that he still retains his rank of Lieutenant-colonel in the army.

Sir,
You will be pleased to proceed with the troops embarked under your command to Chesapeak Bay; and upon your arrival at that place, you will pursue such measures as you shall judge most likely to answer the purpose of this expedition; the principal object of which is to make a diversion in favour of Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis, who by the time you arrive there will probably be acting in the back parts of North Carolina. The information you shall procure [p26] on the spot after your arrival at your destined port, will point out to you the properest method of accomplishing this. But from that which I have received here, I should judge it best to proceed up James River as high as possible, in order to seize or destroy any magazines the enemy may have at Petersburg, Richmond, or any of the places adjacent; and finally, to establish a post on Elizabeth River. But this, as well as the direction of every other operation, is submitted to Earl Cornwallis, with whom you are a soon as possible to communicate, and afterwards to follow all such orders and directions you shall from time to time receive from his Lordship.

Your Lordship can judge of the strength of this part of the army, by that under your own orders; and will agree with me that it is scarcely possible for me to detach a greater force from it, or of our being able to make such efforts in Chesapeak Bay, as are now almost become necessary. However, when I know your Lordship's success in North Carolina, and your determination respecting a post on Elizabeth River, I will then consider what additional force I can spare. If your Lordship determines to withdraw that post, I shall in that case think your present force, including General Leslie's, quite sufficient.

[p27] By the copy of instructions last sent, and those now forwarded to General Leslie, your Lordship will perceive I mean that you should take the command of the whole. If my wishes are fulfilled, they are, that you may establish a post at Hillsborough, feed it from Cross Creek, and be able to keep that of Portsmouth. A few troops will do it, and carry on desultory expeditions in Chesapeak, till more solid operations can take place; -- of which I fear there is no prospect, without we are considerably reinforced. The moment I know your Lordship's determination to keep a post at Portsmouth, I will, as I said before, consider what additional force I can spare. Once assured of our remaining superior at sea, I might possibly send two thousand more for this winter's operations.

Operations in Chesapeak are but of two sorts. Solid operation with a fighting army, to call forth our friends and support them; or a post, such as Portsmouth, carrying on desultory expeditions; stopping up in a great measure the Chesapeak; and by commanding James River, prevent the enemy from forming any considerable depots upon it, or moving in any force to the southward of it. Such, my Lord, are the advantages I expect from a station at Portsmouth; and I wish it may appear to you in the same light.

Sir,
Having already put you under the orders of [p28] Lord Cornwallis, who must of course be the best judge of operations to the southward, it may be needless to say any thing more. But lest you should not receive any orders from his Lordship, or obtain certain intelligence relative to him; or have reason to suppose you can better assist his operations by a diversion made nearer him; I think it necessary to give you some hints respecting Cape Fear River, and how far the acting upon that river may operate. Should Lord Cornwallis have passed the Yadkin, and be advanced towards Hillsborough, I think you cannot act any where so well as on James River, approaching sometimes towards the Roanoke, but not passing that river without orders from Lord Cornwallis. If you have every reason to believe that his Lordship meets with opposition at his passage of the Yadkin, I think a move on Cape Fear River will operate effectually. I have had much conversation with General O'Hara on this subject. I have given him every information respecting that move; and I trust after consulting him you will act in the best manner possible to fulfill the object of all your instructions -- a diversion in favour of Lord Cornwallis. That you may be the better judge of his plan, I send you copies of such of his letters, which give any hints towards it.

You will of course cautiously avoid inrolling any of the militia of Princess Anne or elsewhere, without you determine to establish a post. Those, however, who voluntarily join you must be taken care of.

If nothing material happens to obstruct my plan of operations, I mean, as soon as Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton can be removed, to proceed with the twenty-third, thirty-third, volunteers of Ireland, and Legion, to Charlotte-town, and leave the seventy-first here until the sick can be brought on to us. I then mean to make some redoubts and establish a fixed post at that place, and give the command of it to Major Wimys [i.e. Wemyss], whose regiment is so totally demolished by sickness, that it will not be fit for actual service for some months. To that place I shall bring up all the sick from Camden, who have any chance of being serviceable before Christmas, and trust to opportunities for their joining the army.

The post at Charlotte-town will be a great security to all this frontier of South-Carolina, which, even if we were possessed of the greatest part of North Carolina, would be liable to be infested by parties, who have retired with their effects over the mountains, and mean to take every opportunity of carrying on a predatory war, and it will, I hope, prevent insurrections in this country, which is very disaffected. I then think of moving on my principal force to Salisbury, which will open this country sufficiently for us to see what assistance we may really expect from our friends in North-Carolina; and will give us a [p30] free communication with the Highlanders, on whom my greatest dependence is placed.

My Lord,
I had the honour to inform your lordship in my letter of the 21st of August, that I had dispatched proper people into North-Carolina to exhort our friends in that province to take arms, to seize military stores, and magazines of the enemy, and to intercept all stragglers of the routed army.

Some parties of our friends, who had embodied themselves near the Pedée, disarmed several of the enemy's stragglers. But the leading persons of the Loyalists were so undecided in their councils, that they lost the critical time of availing themselves of our success; and even suffered General Gates to pass to Hillsborough with a guard of six men only. They continue however to give me the strongest assurances of support, when His Majesty's troops shall have penetrated into the interior parts of the province. The patience and fortitude with which they endure the most cruel torments, and suffer the most violent oppressions that a country ever laboured under, convince me that they are sincere, at least as far as their affection, to the cause of Great-Britain.

[p31] P A R T IV.

CONTAINING
EXTRACTS
FROM THE
Correspondence with Earl Cornwallis,
&c. from Major Ferguson's Misfortune to his Lordship's second Move into North Carolina.

Sir,
This instant Lieutenant Gratton, of the sixty-fourth, is arrived express from Charles-town, in his Majesty's ship Iris, with a letter from Lord Rawdon, Lord Cornwallis being a little indisposed.

I enclose your Excellency a copy of the contents. I called on Commodore Gayton, and Brigadier-general Howard, for their opinion how we should act. We all agree to go to Cape Fear as soon as possible. Very sorry it is necessary; but my orders from your [p32] Excellency is to co-operate and act with his Lordship to the utmost of my power.

Sir,
Lord Cornwallis not being sufficiently recovered from a severe fever which lately attacked him to be able to write to you, his Lordship has desired that I should have the honour of communicating with you upon the subject of the present service. The Commander in Chief has transmitted to Lord Cornwallis a copy of the instructions under which you are to act. At the time when Petersburgh was suggested as an adviseable point for a diversion, which might co-operate with our intended efforts for the reduction of North Carolina, it was imagined that the tranquility of South Carolina was assured; and the repeated assurances which were sent to us by the Loyalists in North Carolina, gave us reason to hope, that their number and their zeal would not only facilitate the restoration of His Majesty's government in that province, but might also supply a force for more extensive operations. Events unfortunately have not answered to these flattering promises. The [p33] appearance of General Gates's army unveiled to us a fund of disaffection in this province, of which we could have formed no idea; and even the dispersion of that force did not extinguish the ferment which the hope of its support had raised. This hour the majority of the inhabitants of that tract between the Pedée and the Santée are in arms against us; and when we last heard from Charles-town, they were in possession of George-town, from which they had dislodged our militia.

It was hoped that the rising which was expected of our friends in North Carolina might awe that district into quiet; therefore, after giving them a little chastisement, by making the seventh regiment take that route on its way to the army, Lord Cornwallis advanced to Charlotteburg.

Major Ferguson, with about eight hundred militia collected from the neighbourhood of Ninety-six, had previously marched into Tryon county to protect our friends, who were supposed to be numerous there; and it was intended, that he should cross the Cattawba river, and endeavour to preserve tranquility in the rear of the army. A numerous army now appeared on the frontiers, drawn from Nolachucki, and other settlements beyond the mountains, whose very names had been unknown to us. A body of these, joined by the inhabitants of the ceded lands in Georgia, made a sudden and violent attack upon Augusta. The post was gallantly defended by Lieutenant-colonel [p34] Brown, till he was relieved by the activity of Lieutenant-colonel Cruger: but Major Ferguson, by endeavouring to intercept the enemy in their retreat, unfortunately gave time for fresh bodies of men to pass the mountains, and to unite into a corps far superior to that which he commanded. They came upon with him, and after a sharp action entirely defeated him. Ferguson was killed, and all his party either slain or taken.

By the enemy's having secured all the passes on the Catawba, Lord Cornwallis (who was waiting at Charlotteburg for a convoy of stores) received but confused accounts of the affair for some time: but at length the truth reached him; and the delay, equally with the precautions the enemy had taken to keep their victory from his knowledge, gave Lord Cornwallis great reason to fear for the safety of Ninety-six. To secure that district was indispensible for the security of the rest of the province; and Lord Cornwallis saw no means of effecting it, but by passing the Cattawba river with his army; for it was so weakened by sickness, that it would not bear detachment.

After much fatigue on the march, occasioned by violent rains, we passed the river three days ago. We then received the first intelligence, respecting the different posts in this province, which had reached us for near three weeks; every express from Camden having been waylaid, and some of them murdered by the inhabitants. -- Ninety-six is safe: the corps [p35] which defeated Ferguson having, in consequence of our movement, crossed the Cattawba, and joined Smallwood on the Yadkin.

In our present position we have received the first intimation of the expedition under your command. From the circumstances which I have detailed, we fear that we are too far asunder to render your co-operation very effectual. No force has presented itself to us, whose operation could have been thought serious against this army: but then we have little hopes of bringing the affair to the issue of an action. The enemy are mostly mounted militia, not to be overtaken by our infantry, nor to be safely pursued in this strong country by our cavalry. Our fear is, that instead of meeting us, they would slip by us into this province, were we to proceed far from it, and might again stimulate the disaffected to serious insurrection. This apprehension you will judge, Sir, must greatly circumscribe our efforts. Indeed, Lord Cornwallis cannot hope that he shall be able to undertake any thing upon such a scale, as either to aid you, or to benefit from you in our present situation. The Commander in Chief has signified to Lord Cornwallis, that his Lordship is at liberty to give you any direction for farther co-operation which may appear to him expedient. But his Excellency has complied so very fully and completely with Lord Cornwallis's request, by sending so powerful a force to make a diversion in the Chesapeak, that his Lordship fears [p36] he should require too much, were he to draw you into the immediate service of this district. His Lordship is likewise delicate on this point, because he does not know how far, by drawing you from the Chesapeak, he might interfere with any other purposes to which the Commander in Chief may have destined your troops. Under these circumstances, Lord Cornwallis thinks himself obliged to leave you at liberty to pursue whatever measures may appear to your judgment best for his Majesty's service, and most consonant with the wishes of the Commander in Chief. No time is specified to Lord Cornwallis as the limitation of your stay to the southward. Should your knowledge of Sir Henry Clinton's desires prompt you to make a trial upon North Carolina, Cape Fear river appears to us to be the only part where your efforts are at present likely to be effectual. A descent there would be the surest means of joining and arming the friends of government, as well as of co-operating with this army.

This, therefore, would naturally be the point to which Lord Cornwallis would bring you, did he conceive himself at liberty so absolutely to dispose of you. It must be remarked, however, that there are two difficulties in this plan; the first is, that the country from Cape Fear to Cross-creek (the Highland settlement) produces so little, it would be requisite in penetrating through it to carry your provisions with you; the second is, that no vessel larger [p33]¹⁹ than a frigate can pass the bar of Cape Fear harbour. Whatever you decide, Lord Cornwallis desires earnestly to hear from you as soon as possible.

'Tis uncertain yet what steps this army (if left to itself) must pursue; but it will be ready at least to act vigorously in aid of any plan which you may undertake. Lord Cornwallis begs that you will inform the Commander in Chief of our circumstances, and that you will have the goodness to mention how highly sensible his Lordship is to the very effectual manner in which his Excellency has endeavoured to ease the operations of his army. The measure must have been attended with the most favourable consequences, had not accidents, which no foresight could expect, so greatly altered the complexion of our affairs in this province.

Lord Cornwallis desires me to add how much satisfaction he should feel in having your assistance upon this service, did it promise more favourably for you. But should the intentions of the Commander in Chief have left you at liberty to make the attempt at Cape Fear, the success which would probably attend that essential service would be doubly pleasing to Lord Cornwallis, from the opportunity it would most likely give him of congratulating you in person. Allow me to add my hopes that the course of the service would put it in my power to assure you, personally, how much

Sir,
I have this morning received your dispatches, and by that dated the 7th instant, I observe your intention of quitting the Chesapeak; and at the requisition of Earl Cornwallis, made to you in a letter written by Lord Rawdon, that you propose going to Cape Fear River with the force under your command. I entirely approve of your having obeyed Earl Cornwallis's directions and desire on this subject, which I hope will be attended with every favourable advantage.

It is not necessary for me to enter upon the matter of your operations in the Chesapeak, as they will now cease.

The people in general seem sorry at our leaving this district, and I believe would have been happy to have remained quiet at home. It is a plentiful [p35] country all round our posts; from my first hearing of Ferguson's fate, I inwardly suspected what came to pass; therefore I never issued any proclamation of my own, nor did I encourage the people to take arms. Many blamed me for it, but now they think I acted right.

I left the works entire, and I still hope that you will be able to take up this ground; for it certainly is the key to the wealth of Virginia and Maryland. It is to be lamented we are so weak in ships of war, for there is a fleet of sixty sail expected hourly from the West Indies, besides the valuable ships or craft ready to sail from the Chesapeak.

Sir,
Lord Cornwallis having been so reduced by a severe fever, as to be still unable to write, he has desired that I should have the honour of addressing your Excellency in regard to our present situation. But few days have past since Lord Cornwallis received your Excellency's dispatch of the 20th of September. In consequence of it, his Lordship directed that I should immediately send a letter to meet Major-General Leslie in the Chesapeak; [p36] giving him the fullest information respecting our prospects, and the present temper of the country. I have the honour to inclose a copy of that letter. Something remains to be said in addition to it, of a nature which Earl Cornwallis judged inexpedient to unveil, excepting to your Excellency.

For some time after the arrival of his Majesty's troops at Camden, repeated messages were sent to head quarters, by the friends of government in North Carolina, expressing their impatience to rise and join the King's standard. The impossibility of subsisting that additional force at Camden, and the accounts which they themselves gave of the distressing scarcity of provisions in North Carolina, obliged Lord Cornwallis to entreat them to remain quiet, till the new crop might enable us to join them. In the mean time General Gates's army advanced. We were greatly surprise, and no less grieved, that no information whatever of its movements was conveyed to us by persons so deeply interested in the event as the North Carolina Loyalists. Upon the 16th of August that army was so entirely dispersed, that it was clear no number of them could for a considerable time be collected. Orders were therefore dispatched to our friends, stating that the hour, which they had so long pressed, was arrived; and exhorting them to stand forth immediately, and prevent the re-union of the scattered enemy. Instant support was in that case promised them. In the fullest confidence that this [p37] event was to take place, Lord Cornwallis ventured to press your Excellency for co-operation in the Chesapeak, hoping that the assistance of the North Carolinians might eventually furnish a force for yet farther efforts. Not a single man, however, attempted to improve the favourable moment, or obeyed that summons for which they had before been so impatient. It was hoped that our approach might get the better of their timidity; yet during a long period, whilst we were waiting at Charlotteburg for our stores and convalescents, they did not even furnish us with the least information respecting the force collecting against us. In short, Sir, we may have a powerful body of friends in North Carolina, -- and indeed we have cause to be convinced, that many of the inhabitants wish well to his Majesty's arms; but they have not given evidence enough either of their number or their activity, to justify the stake of this province, for the uncertain advantages that might attend immediate junction with them. There is reason to believe that such must have been the risk.

Whilst this army lay at Charlotteburg, George-Town was taken from the militia by the rebels; and the whole country to the east of the Santée, gave such proofs of general defection, that even the militia of the High Hills could not be prevailed upon to join a party of troops who were sent to protect our boats upon the river. The defeat of Major Ferguson, had so dispirited this part of the country, and [p38] indeed the loyal subjects were so wearied by the long continuance of the campaign, that Lieutenant-colonel Cruger, (commanding at Ninety-six) sent information to Earl Cornwallis, that the whole district had determined to submit as soon as the rebels should enter it. From these circumstances, from the consideration that delay does not extinguish our hopes in North Carolina; and from the long fatigue of the troops, which made it seriously requisite to give some refreshment to the army; Earl Cornwallis has resolved to remain for the present in a position which may secure the frontiers without separating his force. In this situation we shall be always ready for movement, whensoever opportunity shall recommend it, or circumstances require it. But the first care must be to put Camden and Ninety-six into a better state of defence, and to furnish them with ample stores and salt provisions. Earl Cornwallis foresees all the difficulties of a defensive war. Yet his Lordship thinks they cannot be weighed against the dangers which must have attended an obstinate adherence to his former plan. I am instructed by Earl Cornwallis to express, in the strongest terms, his Lordship's feelings, with regard to the very effectual measures which your Excellency had taken to forward his operations. His Lordship hopes that his fears of abusing your Excellency's goodness in that particular, may not have led him to neglect making use of a force intended by your [p39] Excellency to be employed by him. But as his Lordship knew not how far your Excellency might aim at other objects in the Chesapeak (to which point his Lordship's entreaty for co-operation was originally confined) he could not think of assuming the power to order Major-general Leslie to Cape Fear river; though he pointed out the utility of the measure, in case it should be conceived within the extent of your Excellency's purpose.

Lord Cornwallis farther desires me to say he feels infinitely obliged by the very flattering testimonies of approbation with which your Excellency has been pleased to honour his success on the 16th of August. He has signified your Excellency's thanks to the officers and men, who received them with grateful acknowledgement.

Sir,
By Lord Cornwallis's directions, I had the honour of writing to your Excellency on the 29th [p40] Instant, detailing to your Excellency the circumstances which had obliged Lord Cornwallis to relinquish the attempt of penetrating to Hillsborough; and inclosing the copy of a letter which his Lordship made me write to Major-general Leslie on that occasion.

On farther consideration his Lordship reflecting on the difficulties of a defensive war, and of the hopes which your Excellency would probably build of our success in this quarter, has thought it advisable not only to recommend more strongly to Major-general Leslie, a plan which may enable us to take an active part; but even to make it his request in case it should not be incompatible with your Excellency's farther arrangements.

Lord Cornwallis is particularly induced to invite Major-general Leslie to co-operation in the Cape Fear river, by the supposition that your Excellency may not want these troops during the winter: and they may join your Excellency in the spring, scarcely later than, should they on the approach of that season sail from any part of Chesapeak Bay.

If you come to Cape Fear, of which at present, I have little doubt, by the help of gallies and small craft, which will be sent from Charles-town, you will easily secure a water conveyance for your stores up to Cross Creek. I will on hearing of your arrival in Cape Fear river, instantly march with every thing that can be safely spared from this Province, which I am sorry to say is most exceedingly disaffected, to join you at Cross Creek. We will then give our friends in North Carolina, a fair trial. If they behave like men it may be of the greatest advantage to the affairs of Britain. If they are as __________ as our friends to the southward, we must leave them to their fate, and secure what we have got.

My Dear General,
I wrote you a few days ago by the Express sloop, and have only to repeat, that the safety of this province now is concerned in your getting as fast [p42] as possible near us. ------ Gates is advancing so we are told, to this province, and already near it.

My Lord,
I am honoured with your Lordship's letters of the 3d and 22d of September, by the Thames, which arrived here the 12th ultimo. And on the 5th instant I received by the Beaumont, those from Lord Rawdon, and Colonel Balfour, to General Leslie. Inclosed I send your Lordship a return of the force that embarked with him.

It was all I could spare, and I thought it fully adequate to the services required. My first instructions to General Leslie put that corps entirely subject to your Lordship's orders.

I did not, I confess, however suppose it would move to Cape Fear; but having afterwards too good reason to dread Ferguson's fate, I in a second instruction recommended that measure, as the only salutary one under the circumstances I apprehended Ferguson's defeat would place your Lordship. By a letter of Colonel Balfour's to General Leslie (without date) are these Expressions "I have only to repeat that the safety of this province now is concerned in your [p43] getting as fast as possible near us." I should be sorry to understand by this that the province is really in danger. Wishing however to give your Lordship's operations in North Carolina, every assistance in my power, though I can ill spare it, I have sent another expedition into the Chesapeak, under the orders of Brigadier-general Arnold, Lieutenant-colonels Dundas, and Simcoe. The force by land is not equal to that which sailed with General Leslie; but I am not without hopes it will operate most essentially in favour of your Lordship; either by striking at Gates's depot at Petersburg, which I have still reason to think is considerable; or finally by taking post at Portsmouth, which I have ever considered as very important, for reasons most obvious. If we take post there, fortify, and assemble the inhabitants; it ought not afterwards to be quitted; and therefore I cannot suppose your Lordship will wish to alter the disposition of this corps, without absolute necessity.

On the contrary I flatter myself, that should your success be such as your Lordship will, I hope, now have reason to expect, that you will reinforce that corps, and enable it to act offensively. When that is your intention, I am to request that the following corps may in their turn be considered for that service, viz. The troop of seventeenth dragoons, the yagers, the detachment of the seventeenth foot, and the provincial light infantry, &c. I need not tell your Lordship that these detachments have left [p44] me very bare indeed of troops; nor that Washington still continues very strong (at least 12000 men) that he has not detached a single man as yet to the southward, except Lee's cavalry (about two hundred and fifty). I need not tell you also that there are six thousand French already at Rhode Island -- but I must acquaint your Lordship that six complete regiments more are expected, under convoy of a number of capital ships. But whatever may have been the intention of the French in sending a reinforcement to this country. I think the season is now too far advanced to expect the last; and was I not clearly of that opinion I should scarcely dare detatch as I do. As I have always said, I think your Lordship's movement to the southward most important, and as I eve have done, so I will now give them all the assistance I can. It remains to be proved whether we have friends in North Carolina -- I am sure we had three years ago -- That experiment now will be fairly tried; if it succeeds, and we hold the entrance of the Chesapeak -- I think the rebels will scarcely risk another attempt upon those provinces.

Sir,
I am honoured with your letters of the 5th and 6th of last month. Lord Rawdon, during my illness, informed your Excellency, in his letters of the 28th and 31st of October, of the various causes which prevented my penetrating into North Carolina. I shall not trouble you with a recapitulation, except a few words about poor Major Ferguson. I had the honour to inform your Excellency that Major Ferguson had taken infinite pains with some of the militia of Ninety-six. He obtained my permission to make an incursion into Tryon county, while the sickness of my army prevented my moving. As he had only militia and the small remains of his own corps, without baggage or artillery, and as he promised to come back if he heard of any superior force, I thought he could do no harm, and might help to keep alive the spirit of our friends in North Carolina, which might be damped by the slowness of our motions. The event proved unfortunate, without any fault of Major Ferguson's. A numerous and unexpected enemy came from the mountains. As they had good horses, [p46] their movements were rapid. Major Ferguson was tempted to stay near the mountains longer than he intended, in hopes of cutting off Colonel Clarke on his return from Georgia. He was not aware that the enemy was so near him; and, in endeavouring to execute my orders of passing the Catawba, and joining me at Charlotte-town, he was attacked by a very superior force, and totally defeated on King's mountain.

Wynnesborough, my present position, is an healthy spot, well situated to protect the greatest part of the Northern frontier, and to assist Camden and Ninety-six. The militia of the latter, on which alone we could place the smallest dependence, was so totally dispirited by the defeat of Ferguson, that of the whole district we could with difficulty assemble one hundred; and even those, I am convinced, would not have made the smallest resistance if they had been attacked. I determined to remain at this place until an answer arrived from General Leslie, on which my plan for the winter was to depend; and to use every possible means of putting the province into a state of defence, which I found to be absolutely necessary, whether my campaign was offensive or defensive. Bad as the state of our affairs was on the Northern frontier, the Eastern part was much worse. Colonel Tynes, who commanded the militia of the High Hills of Santee, and who [p47] was posted on Black-river, was surprised and taken, and his men lost all their arms. Colonel Marion had so wrought on the minds of the people, partly by the terror of his threats and cruelty of his punishments; and partly by the promise of plunder, that there was scarce an inhabitant between the Santée and Pedée, that was not in arms against us. Some parties had even crossed the Santée, and carried terror to the gates of Charles-town. My first object was to reinstate matters in that quarter, without which Camden could receive no supplies. I therefore sent Tarleton, who pursued Marion for several days, obliged his corps to take to the swamps, and by convincing the inhabitants that there was a power superior to Marion, who could likewise reward and punish, so far checked the insurrection, that the greatest part of them have not dared to appear in arms against us since his expedition. ------

------- As it will be necessary to drive back the enemies army, and at the same time to maintain a superiority on both our flanks; and as I thought the co-operation of General Leslie, even at the distance of Cape-Fear river, would be attended with many difficulties, I have sent cruizers off the Frying-pan to bring him into Charles-town, and I hourly expect his arrival.

After everything that has happened, I will not presume to make your Excellency any sanguine [p48] promises. The force you have sent me is greater than I expected, and full as much as I think you could possibly spare, unless the enemy detached in force to the Southward. The utmost exertion of my abilities shall be used, to employ them to the best advantage.

Whenever our operations commence, your Excellency may depend on hearing from me as frequently as possible; and it is from events alone that any future plan can be proposed.

Sir,
I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that Major-general Leslie arrived with his whole fleet at Charles-town on the 14th of this month, with no other loss than the dragoon horses, and a great part of those for the Quarter-master general. The species of troops which compose the reinforcement are, exclusive of the Guards and regiment of Bose, exceedingly bad.²² I do not mean, [p49] by representing this to your Excellency, to insinuate, that you have not sent every assistance to me which you could with prudence and safety spare from New-York. From the account which your Excellency does me the honour to send me, of the situation and strength of General Washington's army, and the French force at Rhode-Island, I am convinced that you have done so. But I think it but justice to the troops serving in this district to state the fact, lest the services performed by the Southern army should appear inadequate to what might be expected from the numbers of which it may appear to consist. The fleet from New-York, with the recruits, arrived a few days before General Leslie. ------

Notes:

¹ [*] Vide Lord Rawdon's Letter to Lord Cornwallis, dated May 24, 1781. [ back ]

² [*] Extract.-- Letter from Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, dated York-Town, August 22, 1781.

"The engineer has finished his survey and examination of this place, and has proposed his plan for fortifying it; which, appearing judicious, I have approved of, and directed to be executed." [ back ]

³ [**] Extract.-- Letter from Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton dated York-Town, October 20, 1781.

"And our stock of intrenching tools, which did not much exceed four hundred, when we began to work in the latter end of August, was now much diminished." [ back ]

⁷ [*] Vide the instructions and substance of conversations with General Phillips; as quoted by Lord Cornwallis in his letter dated July 26, 1782. [ back ]

⁸ Editor's note: The page numbering resets at this point in the original. [ back ]

⁹ Editor's note: This extract also can be found in Tarleton's Campaigns, Chapter 1, Note K, pp76. [ back ]

¹⁰ Editor's note: This extract also can be found in Tarleton, Chapter 1, Note K, p77. [ back ]

¹¹ Editor's note: A more substantial extract can be found in Tarleton, Chapter 2, Note A, p117. [ back ]

¹² Editor's note: A full copy of this letter can be found in K.G. Davies, ed., Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783, 21 vols. (Dublin: Irish University Press, c1977-1982), 18:118. A different excerpt can be found in Tarleton, Chapter 2, Note B, p118. [ back ]

¹³ Editor's note: A full copy of this letter can be found in Walter Clark, ed., The State Records of North Carolina, 26 vols. (Goldsboro, North Carolina: Nash Brothers, 1886-1907), 15:258. A shorter excerpt can be found in Tarleton, Chapter 2, Note E, p126. [ back ]

¹⁴ Editor's note: A full copy of this letter can be found in Davies, 18:144. [ back ]

¹⁵ Editor's note: A full copy of this letter can be found in Tarleton, Chapter 2, Note F, p128. [ back ]

¹⁶ Editor's note: A full copy of this letter can be found in Clark, 15:276. [ back ]

¹⁷ Editor's note: A shorter excerpt can be found in Tarleton, Chapter 3, Note D, p191. [ back ]

¹⁸ Editor's note: A full copy of this letter can be found in Davies, 18:169. [ back ]

¹⁹ Editor's note: The error in page numbering (going from p36 back to p33) is in the original. [ back ]

²⁰ Editor's note: A shorter excerpt can be found in Tarleton, Chapter 4, Note A, p241. [ back ]

²¹ Editor's note: Although called a "copy" this is actually a long excerpt. The full letter can be found in Davies, Volume 18:244. A shorter excerpt can be found in Tarleton, Chapter 3, Note M, p203. [ back ]

²² [*] When his Lordship made this remark, he had not seen the troops. He must have, therefore, formed his opinion from the report of others. But in justice to the corps who are spoken so slightingly of, it is necessary [p49] to observe, that they have all behaved in such a manner as to merit the applauses of the officers commanding them, and one of them (Fannings) has obtained a British establishment. [ back ]