Sir Henry Clinton's Observations on Earl Cornwallis's Answer [2/2]

Clinton's Observations on Cornwallis's Answer

[continued]

[p50] P A R T V.

CONTAINING
EXTRACTS
FROM THE
Correspondence; between his Lordship's second Move into North Carolina,
and his Arrival at Wilmington.

Sir,
I am just honoured with your letter of the 13th ult. I have written several letters in the course of last month, to give your Excellency an account of the state of the provinces of South Carolina and Georgia, and of the military transactions. I fear they are all still at Charles-town, as no opportunity has offered of transmitting them to New-York. The present addition to the naval [p51] force in this quarter, will, I hope, enable me; or, if I am too distant, Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, to transmit reports more frequently.

The difficulties I have had to struggle with, have not been occasioned by the opposite army. They always keep at a considerable distance, and disappear on our approach.

But the constant incursions of Refugees, North Carolinians, and Back-Mountain-men, and the perpetual risings in the different parts of this province; the invariable successes of all these parties against our militia, keep the whole country in continual alarm, and renders the assistance of regular troops every where necessary. Your Excellency will judge of this by the disposition of the troops, which I have the honour to enclose to you.

I shall begin my march to-morrow, (having been delayed a few days by a diversion made by the enemy towards Ninety-six) and propose keeping on the West of Catawba for a considerable distance. I shall then proceed to pass that river, and the Yadkin. Events alone can decide the future steps. I shall take every opportunity of communicating with Brigadier-general Arnold.

Sir,
I arrived here some days ago, with the Guards, the regiment of Bose, and Yagers; I went to Wynnesborough to see Earl Cornwallis. He moves to-day, and I march to-morrow with the above troops and North-Carolina regiment. I meet his Lordship about seventy miles from hence.

My Lord,
Your Lordship may probably hear, that the army and navy in the Chesapeak are blocked up by a superior French naval force to that under Captain Symonds. The first account I had of it [p53] was from General Arnold, dated February 14, and I sent it immediately to the Admiral at Gardiner's-bay. A day or two afterwards I had it confirmed, that they were part of the fleet from Rhode-island, which I have heard since sailed from thence on the 9th ult. Notwithstanding which I greatly fear he has not sent a naval force to relieve them. Washington has detached some New-England troops under La Fayette and Howe that way.

If so much time is given, I cannot answer for consequences. Portsmouth is safe at this season against any attack from the Suffolk side, but not so from a landing in any of the bays to the Southward of Elizabeth-river.

I have much to lament that the Admiral did not think it advisable to send there at first, as Brigadier-general Arnold's move in favour of your Lordship's operations will have been stopped. -- And if the Admiral delays it too long, I shall dread still more fatal consequences.

I have troops already embarked in a great proportion to that of the enemy, but to send them under two frigates only, before the Chesapeak is our own, is to sacrifice the troops and their convoy.

[p54] I enclose your Lordship all the news I have been able to collect. ----- has, I think, quitted Congress, and put them at defiance. -- Your Lordship will see his plan by the newspaper of the 28th of February, said to be genuine. Discontent runs high in Connecticut. In short, my Lord, there seems little wanting to give a mortal stab to rebellion but a proper reinforcement and a superiority at sea for the next campaign; without which, any enterprize depending on water movements must certainly run great risk. Should the troops already embarked for the Chesapeak proceed, and, when there, be able to undertake any operation in addition to what Brigadier-general Arnold proposes, I am confident it will be done. Major-general Phillips will command this expedition.

Till Colonel Bruce arrives, I am uncertain what reinforcements are intended for this army. The minister has, however, assured me, that every possible exertion will be made.

I shall tremble for our post at Portsmouth, should the enemy's reinforcement arrive in that neighbourhood before the force, which I now flatter myself the Admiral will order a sufficient convoy for, arrives.

I have received a letter from General Arnold, dated the 25th ult. wherein he tells me, that the French left him on the 19th.

And in another letter, of the 27th, he says, he has not the least doubt of defending his post against the force of the country and two thousand French troops, until a reinforcement can arrive from New-York. And that he proposed to send five hundred men, under Colonel Dundas, up James-river, to make a diversion in favour of your Lordship.

The Admiral informs me of the return of the French ships to Rhode-island, and of their having taken the Romulus, and carried her into that place. But as the Admiral, in his letter of the 4th, seems to think, that the whole, or at least a great part of the French fleet sailed for the Chesapeak on the 27th ult. and that he was at that time ready to sail, I flatter myself he is either gone there, or has sent a sufficient force to clear the Chesapeak. The troops under General Phillips have been embarked for some time, and are now at the Hook waiting for the Admiral, or a message from him. General Phillips commands, and I am sure you know his inclinations are to [p56] co-operate with your Lordship; and you will therefore be pleased to take him under your orders, until you hear farther from me.

NOTE: The book (or at least the copy I can access) is missing pp57-60. Page 56 only has a few lines of text on it, suggesting that p57 is the beginning of a new section, but the section numbering is continuous in the pages I have. I'm looking for another copy (preferrably from a different printing) to check against.

The line of works begun, which are necessary for the defence of this place, your Excellency will observe (by the plan inclosed) are very extensive, and from the situation of it, cannot be contracted. The engineer's opinion of them, and the number of men necessary for their defence, against a superior force, I do myself the honour to inclose. Lieutenant-colonels Dundas and Simcoe, are clearly of opinion with me, that three thousand men are necessary for their defence. We have all been greatly deceived in the extent and nature of the ground. There are many places in the river much easier defended with half the number of men. From the sketch of the place your Excellency will judge whether our opinion is well founded or not.

This province and North Carolina, are collecting the militia, undoubtedly with a view to pay us a visit. Their numbers, from the best information I can obtain, are four thousand or five thousand. At present I can hardly imagine they will attack this post, though the works are of no manner of service to us; and all our force cannot complete them in three months: I therefore think it my duty to request a reinforcement of at least two thousand men, which would render the post permanent and secure against [p62] any force the country could bring, as detachments could always be made (leaving the garrison secure) to disperse the militia, whenever it was found they were collecting; and the advantages of transportation, which we may derive from light boats (of which I propose to build fifty) would enable us to move with double the celerity, that the militia could do with every exertion.

The country people have not come in, in numbers, as I expected; the necessity of General Leslie's removing from this place, after their being assured of his intention to remain here, has impressed them with the idea that we shall do the same; which is not easily effaced, as they have many of them suffered severely since his departure. I have not with certainty been informed where he is at present -- Reports, which are contradictory, say at Cape Fear; others that he is at Charles-town; and some say at neither. I know not what opinion to form; neither have I heard from Lord Cornwallis, but by reports, which say he is at or near Camden -- No opportunity has yet presented of writing to either of these gentlemen -- but I am of opinion our diversion at Richmond will operate much in his favour, as I am informed the militia and light-horse, sent to reinforce the rebel army, under Greene, have been ordered to return.

My Lord,
I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of a letter I have lately received from Brigadier-general Arnold, by which you will perceive that with scarcely one thousand men (for several of his transports, that had been separated on the voyage, had not then rejoined him) he penetrated to Richmond, the capital of Virginia, and has rendered important service, by destroying a valuable foundry, a considerable quantity of public stores, cannon, &c. &c. Indeed the whole of his operations upon the occasion appear to have been conducted in a manner which strongly marks his character of a very active and good officer -- and I sincerely hope, that this important stroke will essentially aid your Lordship's operations.

Sir,
I was favoured with your letters, dated the 25th and 31st January, and 2d and 5th February, by the Halifax sloop of war, on the 16th ultimo.

Captain Amherst of the sixtieth regiment, who is so obliging to charge himself with my dispatches for Lord Cornwallis, will deliver them to your care.

No time has been lost in repairing the old, and erecting new works here, in which the negroes have been very serviceable, but none are yet complete. Repairing barracks, foraging, and patrolling with large parties, have engrossed the time of a great part of the troops. One hundred men are posted at the great bridge.

Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, with near four hundred men, are in Princess Anne county; scouring the country of several parties, and arranging matters with the country people.

[p65] The enemy are at Suffolk, with two thousand five hundred, or three thousand men; they threaten an attack upon us, but I cannot suppose them capable of so much temerity. We are prepared for them at all points, and I believe nothing will induce them to attack us, but the hope of succeeding in a surprise, and despair of keeping their tattered force together, through want of provisions, and the necessity of their ploughing their lands, to prevent a famine the ensuing year.

After my dispatches were closed (which were intended to go by the General Monk) three French ships, one a sixty-four, the other two frigates, arrived from Rhode Island, and anchored in Lynhaven Bay. On the 14th instant they arrived in Hampton road, and remained there until the 19th, when they left the Capes, and are said to be now cruizing to the southward of them.

Before the arrival of the French ships, the enemy's force did not exceed two thousand five hundred men, at Suffolk and in the vicinity, which was greatly [p66] augmented soon after their arrival. On the 18th they came down in force, near our lines, and surprised a picquet of six men; but soon retired. Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe with four hundred men being in Princess Anne county, I did not think it prudent to leave our works to attack them.

I have very good intelligence that the rebels at Suffolk have been informed by express from General Greene, that on the 16th or 18th instant, my Lord Cornwallis crossed the Dan river, sixty miles above Halifax, and one hundred and twelve from Petersburgh, with one thousand cavalry and four thousand infantry, and was on the march for Petersburgh. Generals Greene and Morgan, with three thousand or four thousand men, chiefly militia, were retiring before him; in consequence of which a considerable part of their troops, have been detached to join General Greene. I have not been able to ascertain the number of troops remaining at Suffolk and in the vicinity; I expect to do it in a day or two, in which time every possible effort shall be made to complete our works in such a manner, that a considerable detachment may be made to proceed up the James river, with some ships to co-operate with Lord Cornwallis; and if he should have reached the river, to furnish him with such supplies of provisions, &c. as we can spare, and his troops be most in need of.

Appearances at Rhode Island give me reason to suppose that the ships seen last Wednesday were the avant garde from that place. Should they pay you a visit from Rhode Island, you may rest assured every attention will be paid to your situation, and that our movements will be regulated by theirs.

I am afraid Tarleton's affair is too true; but I have reason notwithstanding to believe Lord Cornwallis is far advanced in Carolina.

I have not the least doubt that every possible attention will be paid to our situation. We are under no apprehensions at present from the force of the country; and if the French should detach from Rhode Island to this place, I have not the least doubt of defending it against the force of the country and two thousand French troops, until a reinforcement can arrive from New York.

[p68] To-morrow I intend embarking some stores, and the next day about five hundred troops under the orders of Lieutenant-colonel Dundas, to proceed up the James river, to make a diversion in favour of my Lord Cornwallis.

Sir,
I suppose of course that the admiral, who knew your situation on the 21st, and heard at the same time, that the sixty-four and two frigates were from Rhode Island, has detached to your relief; -- lest he should not, I have repeatedly pressed him to do it since.

The French fleet has not yet sailed from Rhode Island; if it does, encumbered with troops, the admiral will of course follow without incumbrance; and, when he has fixed them, it will be time enough to send troops. In case a fleet should appear under French colours, do not be alarmed, as I shall advise the admiral to send in that manner, to deceive the enemy.

There is information of from twelve to fourteen hundred troops being at Brunswick the 27th of February, on their way to the southward. These it is our business to watch.

[p69] The troops which are all ready embarked, are detained till I receive certain advice that the French ships are removed from the Chesapeak, there being nothing here but frigates to convoy them.

I have received a letter this day from the admiral, dated the 4th: he has given me no positive information of the movements of the French; he will send a ship to observe their situation in Rhode Island, and will proceed accordingly. Should he call here, the troops will in all probability sail with him; if he does not, I shall send them as soon as I know the way to the Chesapeak is clear.

Sir,
You will be pleased to proceed with the troops embarked under your command, to Chesapeak Bay; and there form a junction as soon as possible with brigadier-general Arnold, whom, and the corps with him, you will take under your orders.

When you shall have formed your junction with Brigadier general Arnold, if you find that General acting under the orders of Earl Cornwallis, you will of course endeavour to fulfil those orders. If this [p70] should not be the case; after receiving every information respecting his probable situation, you will make such movements with the corps (then under your orders), as can be made consistent with the security of the post on Elizabeth river, or you shall think will most effectually assist his Lordship's operations; by destroying or taking any magazines, the enemy may have on James river, or at Petersburg, on the Appamatox.

The object of co-operation with Lord Cornwallis, being fulfilled, you are at liberty to carry on such desultory expeditions for the purpose of destroying the enemy's public stores and magazines in any part of the Chesapeak as you shall judge proper.

If the admiral's disapproving of Portsmouth, and requiring a fortified station for large ships in the Chesapeak, should propose York Town, or Old Point Comfort, if possession of either can be acquired and maintained without great risk, or loss, you are at liberty to take possession thereof. But if the objections are such as you think forcible, you must, after stating those objections, decline it, till solid operation take place in the Chesapeak.

Concerning your return to this place, you will receive either my orders, or Lord Cornwallis's, as circumstances may make necessary.

It is probable that when the objects of this expedition are fulfilled, and you have strengthened the present works, and added such others as you shall think [p71] necessary, you may return to this place. In which case you must bring with you, Brigadier-general Arnold, the light infantry, Colonel Robinson's corps, or the seventy-sixth; and if it should be possible, the Queen's rangers. The moment you have communicated with Lord Cornwallis, and heard from his Lordship, you are to consider yourself as under his Lordship's orders, until he, or you shall hear further from me.

On the 6th I received information that Lord Cornwallis had not penetrated further than the Dan or Roanoke river, and that, in consequence of the mis-information (sent to the rebel army, by express, as mentioned in my last) being contradicted, their detachment had returned to their army at Suffolk, as well as Mr. Gregory, to the north-west bridge -- Their force at the former place three thousand, at the latter five hundred. On this change of affairs the troops under the orders of Lieutenant-colonel Dundas, who were designed up the James river, were countermanded.

[p72] The enemy within two days have moved with their force, said to be upwards of three thousand men to Pricket mills, twelve miles from this place, and threaten an attack upon us. I have every reason to believe they have collected their force to co-operate with the French ships and troops, which they hourly expect from Rhode Island.

The French fleet sailed from Rhode-island on or about the 8th instant, intending a co-operation with Mr. Washington, to attack you. I followed them on the 10th, and came up with them on the 16th: an action ensued of about an hour and a half, when they fled off with their whole squadron.

I shall put to sea again immediately with the squadron, and endeavour to bring them to a second action. Should I be unable to do so, I shall return with the squadron to New York, which must be exposed in my absence, and I must withdraw the ships that are now with you.

The fleet containing the troops under my orders, arrived off the Chesapeak yesterday, when Captain Hudson gave the Orpheus liberty to make sail and carry me into this bay, where we knew by intelligence from frigates we met at sea, that Admiral Arbuthnot was with his fleet.

Our fleet sailed from the Hook on Tuesday the 20th instant, and with variable winds, and good weather, is arrived; and now beating up to the rendezvous at Hampton, with hopes, not a certainty, of getting there this evening.

With respect to intelligence, it is not in my power to give you any at a certainty. I hear that at York the rebels have been and are fortifying, and that there are heavy cannon there.

I believe that Lord Cornwallis has finished his campaign, and if report says true, very handsomely, by taking all Greene's cannon, and recovering [p74] the greatest part of his own men who had been made prisoners by Mr. Greene. If that should be the case, and Lord Cornwallis should not want any co-operation to assist him, and you see no prospect of striking an important stroke elsewhere, I shall probably request you and General Arnold to return to me with such troops as I have already named in my instructions. But all this will depend on the information I shall receive from you, and your opinion, respecting the post of Portsmouth, and such others as you propose to establish on James river, with their importance, considered, either as assisting Lord Cornwallis's operations, or connected with those of the navy.

You will probably hear from Lord Cornwallis before you determine on any attempt at a distance from him. I wish much to know what force he can spare from the troops under his Lordship's immediate orders; for till I do, it is impossible to fix any plan. Three complete regiments will, I hope, arrive at Charles-town, in the course of a few days, if Captain Elphinston should think it too early in the season to come directly here; and three more are hourly expected from the West Indies; both which divisions will of course join me.

The French certainly expect an early reinforcement. If it comes from Europe, we must, I think, hear from thence long before it arrives; if from the Havannah, copper-bottomed sloops or frigates, which [p75] the admiral will doubtless have on the look-out, will announce their arrival, and give you time to determine, what in that case, is best to be done.

And here, I take the liberty of hinting to you, that (from the appearance on the map when you have once obtained a naval force in Curratuck and Albemarle sounds, by holding the bridges of Pequimans and Pasquotank rivers, you secure a short passage across the Albemarle sound, and communication with Lord Cornwallis; or, by destroying the bridges on those rivers, you prevent the enemy's approach by the bridge at Northwest-landing.

I have from the moment of my landing here, pursued the first object of your Excellency's instructions: "The security of the post upon Elizabeth river, near the mouth of James river."

And your Excellency may be assured, I shall use every means to attain this very material purpose, so necessary, and which alone can enable me, with four thousand militia in our front and near us, to pursue the second part of your instructions: "A move in [p76] force upon the enemy's communications between Virginia and North Carolina, at Petersburgh, in assistance to Lord Cornwallis." And I shall do this the moment it may be possible, consistent with the security of the post on Elizabeth river.

It is unlucky for us, that we know so little of Lord Cornwallis, in favour of whom, and his operations we are directed by your Excellency to exert our utmost attention. I shall do all in my power to assist and co-operate with his Lordship, and shall from inclination, as well as in obedience to your Excellency's instructions, do all I can to effect this most desirable end.

I apprehend from various rebel accounts that Lord Cornwallis, although he kept the field, has suffered very much after the action of the 15th ultimo, and to be fortifying to the west of the Haw river, near Guildford, which seems a good position, having that river in front of the communication quite down to Cross-Creek and Cape Fear.

Should his Lordship want support, he must in course draw it from Charles-town to Cape Fear river, by directing Lord Rawdon to abandon the frontier, and keep only a garrison in Charles-town.

I embrace your idea, Sir, that should La Fayette remain at Annapolis, which must proceed from the enemy's fear of being attacked in Maryland, it will be possible to carry him Annapolis and Baltimore; and if you will send me the British grenadiers and [p77] forty-second regiment, I will, with almost certain hopes of success, go upon the attempt; and will make an expedition in Virginia at the same instant, as shall effectually prevent any support from thence to Maryland.

I come now to the particulars of this post, and as it is not possible in so short a time, to go through the proper form of a regular report of the commanding engineer, who came with me, I will, until that can be done, very freely offer my opinion that it has not been, I should imagine, properly explained to your Excellency, by Generals Matthews and Leslie. The object of the post, from its situation, respecting James river and the Chesapeak, with its connection with the waters to and in Albemarle sound, and the consequent connections it may have with any army in the Carolinas, are subjects I do not think myself at liberty to touch upon. I mean to confine myself merely to the locality of the post itself; and under that description, I declare, I think the present situation not calculated for a post of force, or for one for a small number of troops. In the first idea, I think three points should be taken, as at Mill Point and Norfolk positively; the third must depend on more examination of the Elizabeth river, than I have yet been able to give. These points taken would mutually assist the navy stationed here, which might lay within, and be protected; and one point forced, a retreat is left by the other two: and your Excellency [p78] will immediately observe, that it must require a large force indeed, to attack the three points at once.

Should it be required by your Excellency merely to keep a post here, without intending more than a station, I think Mill Point, where the old fort stood, well calculated for such a purpose; and it would require not more than a strong battalion equal to six hundred effective rank and file to be the garrison.

In both instances the Chesapeak must be secure, for even allowing every exertion of defence against a fleet, it would be difficult to preserve the river under the first idea of an extensive plan. Under the latter, I consider it scarcely to be done. Old Point Comfort shall be explored, as it seems a point which a small force might defend, and the shipping have scope to act in, and by trying various methods of winds and tides, would be able possibly to escape from even a superior naval force; whereas, once blocked up in Elizabeth river, the ships must at last fall with the post.

I come now to the Norfolk and Princess Ann counties, where we cannot much depend for assistance. They are timorous, cautious, at best, but half friends, and perhaps some, if not many, concealed enemies. Supposing them perfectly ours, we should not be able to arm more than five or six hundred men, who would become a charge to us while we remained, and being left, would be undone. At present, they act a sort [p79] of saving game, but are of no use to us. Upon the whole, Sir, it may be perceived that I lean in favour of a small post, where the army can assist the navy, and the latter have a chance of escaping, supposing a superior force to arrive in the bay; and where the post can be maintained with five or six hundred men, for some time, even perhaps till some reinforcement naval and land might be sent to raise a siege.

Dear Sir,
I need not say how important success in the Highlands would be. I beg you will without loss of time, consult General Arnold upon the subject. I beg I may have his project, and your opinion, as well as his, respecting it, as soon as possible. When I have considered it, and if I determine to undertake it, I will send for him; and if operation should be at a stand in the Chesapeak at the time, I will request you also to be of the party; the proportion of artillery I desired you to make, will of course be ready.

[p80] P.S. If General Arnold does not think it expedient at this time to attempt it, which however, I should be sorry for, perhaps a combined move between us against Philadelphia, may take place. You, by landing at the head of Elk; I, at Newcastle, or Chester; -- if the first, General Arnold must let me have his plan as soon as possible, and be ready to follow it himself, or may bring it, if you can spare him.

In addition to what I have said in those letters (April 5) I scarce need mention, that I am persuaded you will not delay to make such movements in favour of Lord Cornwallis as you judge best, with the force you have left after garrisoning the different works at Portsmouth; which after reading the report of your engineer, I flatter myself will be perfectly secure with six or eight hundred men. In that case you will be at liberty to act with the remainder, being as good troops as any in this country, in such operations as you shall judge most conducive to assist those of his Lordship.

I am free to declare Portsmouth to be a bad post, its locality not calculated for defence, the collateral points necessary to be taken up so many, that altogether it would require so great a number of troops as no general officer I imagine would venture to propose to the Commander-in-Chief to leave here for mere defence ----- A spot might be found, I apprehend, for a post for five hundred men, should it be necessary to have one in Elizabeth River.

The face of affairs seems changed, and the Carolinas, like all America, are lost in rebellion. My letters of the 15th, 16th, and yesterday, will go now in the Amphitrite, for I stopped the express boat last night. -- I have nothing farther to add, than that I conceive Lord Cornwallis will not have it in his power to bring with him many troops, it will depend on your Excellency from his Lordship's [p82] letters, and from those of Brigadier-general Arnold and me, whether you shall think it proper to have an operation in force in Chesapeak -- if yes, the troops here are too few -- if no, too many.

I hope to hear from your Excellency directly, and perhaps it may not be so well to trust such a serious dispatch, as your next, Sir, will probably be, to an unarmed vessel, but that a frigate will be sent.

The operations I had proposed against Williamsburg, shall take place to-morrow morning, but I think it my duty to call a council of war, circumstanced as Lord Cornwallis is, to judge whether an attempt on Petersburg may now be proper.

Sir,
I am honoured with your letters of the 2d of January, and 19th of last month; as also with one of the 14th ult. by your Excellency's directions, from Captain Smith.

As Lord Cornwallis is in the greatest want of every supply, I have sent him to Cape Fear what can be procured here, and as he will have many [p83] calls on the Hospital, in consequence of the late marches and action, I have taken care to furnish a supply of officers and stores to that department at Wilmington; and shall by that way forward to his Lordship your Excellency's dispatches, whenever an occasion offers.

[p84] P A R T VI.

CONTAINING
EXTRACTS
FROM THE
Correspondence; between Lord Cornwallis's arrival at Wilmington,
and his entering Virginia.

Sir,
I am just informed that I have a chance of sending a few lines to New York by the Amphitrite. but as it depends upon my being expeditious, I cannot attempt to give your Excellency a particular account of the winter's campaign, or the battle of Guildford.

[p85] I am very anxious to receive your Excellency's commands, being as yet totally in the dark as to the intended operations of the summer. I cannot help expressing my wishes that the Chesapeak may become the seat of war, even (if necessary) at the expence of abandoning New-York. -- Until Virginia is in a manner subdued, our hold of the Carolinas must be difficult, if not precarious. The rivers in Virginia are advantageous to an invading army; but North Carolina is, of all the provinces of America, the most difficult to attack (unless material assistance could be got from the inhabitants, the contrary of which I have sufficiently experienced) on account of its great extent, of the numberless rivers and creeks, and the total want of interior navigation.

My Lord,
Captain Biggs of his Majesty's ship Amphitrite, who arrived here the 22d, has delivered to me your Lordship's two letters from Wilmington of the 10th instant, informing me of your having obtained a complete victory over the rebel General Greene, near Guildford, on the 15th ult. On which occasion [p86] I beg leave to offer your Lordship my most hearty congratulations, and to request you will present my thanks to Major-general Leslie, Brigadier O'Hara, and Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, for the great assistance you received from them, and to the officers and men under your command, for their great exertions on the march through Carolina, and their persevering intrepidity in action.

The disparity of numbers between your Lordship's force and that of the enemy opposed to you, appears to be very great; and I confess I am at some loss to guess how your Lordship came to be reduced before the action to one thousand three hundred and sixty infantry, -- as by the distribution sent to me in your letter of the 6th of January, I am to suppose it was your intention to take with you the regiments mentioned in the margin;⁴ which (notwithstanding the loss of the seventy-first and legion, in the unfortunate affair of the Cowpens) I should imagine must have amounted to considerably above three thousand, exclusive of cavalry and militia.

Before I was favoured with your Lordship's letters, the rebel account of the battle of Guildford had led [p87] me indeed to hope that its consequences would have been more decisive; and that Green would have repassed the Roanoke, and left your Lordship at liberty to pursue the objects of your move into North Carolina. Under the persuasion therefore that you would soon be able to finish your arrangements for the security of the Carolinas, I submitted to you in my letter of the 13th instant (a duplicate of which I have the honour to inclose) the propriety in that case of your going in a frigate to Chesapeak, and directing such corps to follow you thither as you judged could be best spared. But as it is now probable that your Lordship's presence in Carolina cannot be so soon dispensed with, I make no doubt but you will think it right to communicate to Major-general Phillips, without delay, the plan of your future operations in that quarter, together with your opinion how the Chesapeak army can best direct theirs to assist them. That general officer has already under his orders three thousand five hundred men, and I shall send him one thousand seven hundred more, which are now embarked, and will sail whenever the Admiral is ready. With these, my Lord, which are rank and file fit for duty, and great part of them taken from the elite of my army, General Phillips is directed by his instructions to act in favour of your Lordship to the best of his own judgment, until he receives your orders; and afterwards in such manner as you [p88] may please to command him, &c. -- But I shall be sorry to find your Lordship continue in the opinion that our hold of the Carolinas must be difficult, if not precarious, until Virginia is in a manner subdued; as that is an event which I fear would require a considerable space of time to accomplish; and as far as I can judge, it might be not quite so expedient at this advanced season of the year to enter into a long operation in that climate. This, however will greatly depend upon circumstances, of which your Lordship and General Phillips may probably be better judges hereafter.

With regard to the operations of the summer, which your Lordship is anxious to receive my directions about, you cannot but be sensible that they must in a great measure depend on your Lordship's successes in Carolina, the certainty and numbers of the expected reinforcement from Europe, and likewise your Lordship's sending back to me the corps I had spared to you under Major-general Leslie (which Lord Rawdon in his letter of the 31st of October told me you could return in the spring) for until I am informed of the particulars of your Lordship's march through North Carolina, the effective strength of your moving army, your plan of operations for carrying those objects you had or may have in view into execution, as well by the corps acting under your immediate orders, as those acting in co-operation under Major-general Phillips, it must be obviously [p89] impossible for me to determine finally upon a plan of operations for the campaign.

I was indeed in great hopes that your successes in North Carolina would have been such as to have put it in my power to avail myself of a large portion of your Lordship's army, the whole Chesapeak corps, and the reinforcements from Europe, for this campaign's operations to the northward of Carolina; but I observe with concern from your Lordship's letter, that so far from being in a condition to spare me any part of your present force, you are of opinion that part of the European reinforcement will be indispensibly necessary to enable you to act offensively, or even to maintain yourself in the upper parts of the country.

Had I known what your Lordship's further offensive measures were intended to be for the remaining part of the season, I might now have given an opinion upon them, as well as on the probable co-operation of the corps in Chesapeak; without having which it will be scarcely possible for me to form any. For as I said before, I fear no solid operation can be carried on to the northward of Chesapeak, before those to the southward of it are entirely at an end, either from success or the season; and my letter to your Lordship of the 6th of November will have informed you what were my ideas of the operations proper to be pursued in Chesapeak, and my expectations from them, had circumstances admitted of my [p90] pursuing the plan to its full extent. But I must now defer the fixing ultimately on a plan for the campaign, until I am made acquainted with the final success of your Lordship's operations, your prospects and sentiments, and I can judge what force I can collect for such measures as I can then determine upon.

Sir,
I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that by the letters from Lord Rawdon of the 12th, 13th, and 15th instant, there is the fullest information, that General Greene with his army is advancing into this province, and that his light troops have actually passed the Pedee. The object of this movement there is every reason to believe is Camden, [p91] which at present is but weak, Lord Rawdon having detached Lieutenant-colonel Watson, with two battalions from that post; so that in the end it may be expedient for combining our force, to relinquish every thing on the other side Santee -- a measure, however, which your Excellency may be assured will not be taken but in case of the utmost necessity.

As this movement of Greene's may considerably change Lord Cornwallis's views, (who is now at Wilmington) I have judged it fit to lay before your Excellency as soon as possible this intelligence, which is likewise forwarded to Lord Cornwallis by an express boat.

Lieutenant-colonel Balfour was so good as to meet me at Nelson's. He took this measure that he might represent his circumstances to me. He stated that the revolt was universal, that from the little reason to apprehend this serious invasion,⁵ the old works of Charles-town had been in part levelled, to [p92] make way for new ones, which were not yet constructed; that its garrison was inadequate to oppose any force of consequence, and that the defection of the town's people shewed itself in a thousand instances. I agree with him in the conclusion to be drawn from thence, that any misfortune happening to my corps might entail the loss of the province.

My Lord,
I yesterday received an express by a small vessel from Charles-town, informing me that a frigate was there, but not then able to get over the bar, with dispatches from Sir Henry Clinton, notifying to me that Major-general Phillips had been detached into the Chesapeak with a considerable force, with instructions to co-operate with this army, and to put himself under my orders. This express likewise brought me the disagreeable accounts that the upper posts of South Carolina were in the most imminent danger, from an alarming spirit of revolt among many of the people, and by a movement of General Greene's army.

[p93] Although the expresses which I sent from Cross Creek, to inform Lord Rawdon of the necessity I was under of coming to this place, and to warn him of the possibility of such an attempt of the enemy, had all miscarried; yet his Lordship was lucky enough to be apprized of General Greene's approach, at least six days before he could possibly reach Camden; and I am therefore still induced to hope, from my opinion of his Lordship's abilities and the precautions taken by him and Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, that we shall not be so unfortunate as to lose any considerable corps.

The distance from hence to Camden, the want of forage and subsistence on the greatest part of the road, and the difficulty of passing the Pedee when opposed by an enemy, render it utterly impossible for me to give immediate assistance; and I apprehend a possibility of the utmost hazard to this little corps without the chance of a benefit in the attempt. For, if we are so unlucky as to suffer a severe blow in South Carolina, the spirit of revolt in that province would become very general, and the numerous rebels in this province be encouraged to be more than ever active and violent. This might enable General Greene to hem me in among the Great Rivers, and by cutting off our subsistence render our arms useless; and to remain here for transports to carry us off would be a work of time, would loose our cavalry, and be otherwise as ruinous and disgraceful [p94] to Britain as most events could be. I have therefore under so many embarrassing circumstances (but looking upon Charles-town as safe from any immediate attack of the rebels) resolved to take advantage of General Greene's having left the back part of Virginia open, and march immediately into that province, to attempt a junction with General Phillips.

I have more readily decided upon this measure, because if General Greene fails in the object of his march, his retreat will relieve South Carolina; and my force being very insufficient for offensive operations in this province, may be employed usefully in Virginia, in conjunction with the corps under the command of General Phillips.

Sir,
I have reflected very seriously on the subject of my attempt to march into Virginia, and have in consequence written a letter to Major-general Phillips, [p95] of which I have the honour to inclose a copy to your Excellency.

I have likewise directed Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to send transports and provisions to this port, in case I should find the junction with Major-general Phillips impracticable; and that I should have the mortification of seeing that there is no other method of conveying his Majesty's troops to South Carolina, without exposing them to the most evident danger of being lost.

Dear Phillips,
My situation here is very distressing, Greene took the advantage of my being obliged to come to this place, and has marched to South Carolina. My expresses to Lord Rawdon on my leaving Cross Creek, warning him of the possibility of such a movement, have all failed; mountaineers and militia have poured into the back part of that province, and I much fear that Lord Rawdon's posts will be so distance from [p96] each other, and his troops so scattered, as to put him in danger of being beat in detail; and that the worst of consequences may happen to most of the troops out of Charles-town.

By a direct move towards Camden I cannot get time enough to relieve Lord Rawdon, and should he have fallen, my army would be exposed to the utmost danger, from the great rivers I should have to pass, the exhausted state of the country, the numerous militia, the almost universal spirit of revolt which prevails in South Carolina, and the strength of Greene's army, whose continentals alone are at least as numerous as I am: and I could be of no use on my arrival at Charles-town, there being nothing at present to apprehend for that post. I shall therefore immediately march up the country by Duplin court house, pointing towards Hillsborough, in hopes to withdraw Greene. If that should not succeed, I should be much tempted to try to make a junction with you. The attempt is exceedingly hazardous, and many unforeseen difficulties may render it totally impracticable; so that you must not take any steps that may expose your army to the danger of being ruined. I shall march to the lowest ford of the Roanoke, which I am informed is about twenty miles above Taylor's ferry. Send every possible intelligence to me by the cypher I inclose, and make every movement in your power to facilitate our meeting (which must be somewhere near Petersburg) with safety to your own army. I [p97] mention the lowest ford, because in a hostile country, ferries cannot be depended upon; but if I should decide upon the measure of endeavouring to come to you, I shall try to surprise the boats at some of the ferries from Halifax, upwards, &c.

Sir,
In my letters of the 20th and 23d ultimo, I had the honour to inform your Excellency, that our post at Wright's bluff was invested by the enemy, and the apprehensions I was then under of Camden being in the same situation.

I am now to inform you that the former has since been surrendered. The circumstances which led to this cannot be more fully explained, or with more honour to himself than by Lieutenant Mackay's journal of the siege; which together with the articles of capitulation, I therefore inclose for your Excellency's inspection.

By to-morrow I am in hopes Lord Rawdon will be re-inforced by Lieutenant-colonel Watson, with his corps and the sixty-fourth regiment.

[p98] But notwithstanding Lord Rawdon's brilliant success, I must inform your Excellency, that the general state of the country is most distressing; that the enemies parties are every where; the communication by land with Savannah no longer exists; Colonel Brown is invested at Augusta; and Colonel Cruger in the most critical situation at Ninety Six, nearly confined to his works, and without any present command over that country. Indeed I should betray the duty I owe your Excellency, did I not represent the defection of this province so universal, that I know of no mode short of depopulation, to retain it. This spirit of revolt is in a great measure kept up by the many officers prisoners of war here; and I should therefore think it advisable to remove them, as well as to make the most striking examples of such, as having taken protection, snatch every occasion to rise in arms against us.

[p99] P A R T VII.

CONTAINING
EXTRACTS
FROM THE
Correspondence from his Lordship's entering Virginia, &c.

My Lord,
I had the honour of writing to your Lordship by Lord Chewton, who sailed from hence in the Richmond the 4th instant to join you at Wilmington. But your Lordship's departure from thence will have prevented his meeting you there, and I hope he has since then joined you in the Chesapeak.

[p100] When I first heard of your Lordship's retreat from Cross Creek to Wilmington, I confess that I was in hopes you had reason to consider Greene so totally hors de combat as to be perfectly at ease for Lord Rawdon's safety. And after your arrival at Wilmington, I flattered myself that if any change of circumstances should make it necessary, you could always have been able to march to the Walkamaw, where I imagined vessels might have passed you over to George-town. I cannot therefore conceal from your Lordship the apprehensions I felt on reading your letter to me on the 24th ultimo; wherein you informed me of the critical situation which you supposed the Carolinas to be in; and that you should probably attempt to effect a junction with Major general Phillips. Lord Rawdon's officer-like and spirited exertions, in taking advantage of Greene's having detached from his army, have indeed eased me of my apprehensions for the present. But in the disordered state of Carolina and Georgia, as represented to me by Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, I shall dread what may be the consequence of your Lordship's move; unless a reinforcement arrives very soon in South Carolina, and such instructions are sent to the officer commanding there, as may induce him to exert himself in restoring tranquility to that province at least. These, I make no doubt your Lordship has already sent to Lord Rawdon, and that every necessary measure for this purpose [p101] will be taken by your Lordship in consequence of them, should he remain in the command. --------

-------- Had it been possible for your Lordship, in your letter of the 10th ultimo, to have intimated the probability of your intention to form a junction with General Phillips, I certainly should have endeavoured to have stopped you ----- as I did then, as well as now, consider such a move as like to be dangerous to our interests in the southern colonies. And this, my Lord, was not my only fear. For I will be free to own that I was apprehensive for the corps under your Lordship's immediate orders, as well as for that under Lord Rawdon. And I should not have thought even the one under Major-general Phillips in safety at Petersburg, at least for so long a time, had I not fortunately on hearing of your being at Wilmington, sent another detachment from this army, to reinforce him.

I am persuaded your Lordship will have the goodness to excuse my saying thus much. But what is done cannot now be altered. And as your Lordship has thought proper to make this decision, I shall most gladly avail myself of your very able assistance, in carrying on such operations as you shall judge best in Virginia, until we are compelled, as I fear we must be, by the climate, to bring them more northward. Your Lordship will have been informed of my ideas respecting operations to the northward of the Carolinas, by my instructions to the different General officers [p102] detached to the Chesapeak, and the substance of some conversations with General Phillips on the subject, which I committed to writing, and sent to him with my last dispatch, with directions to communicate it to your Lordship. By these your Lordship will observe that my first object has been to co-operate with your measures. But your Lordship's situation at different periods made it necessary for me occasionally to vary my instructions to those General officers, according to circumstances. They were originally directed to assist your Lordship's operations in securing South and recovering North Carolina; their attention was afterwards pointed to the saving South Carolina.

And now, your Lordship may think it necessary to employ your force in recovering both or either of these provinces, by either a direct or indirect operation. With respect to the first your Lordship must be sole judge. With respect to the last you have my opinions. My opinions may however probably give way to yours should they differ from them, as they will have the advantage of being formed on the spot, and upon circumstances which at this distance I cannot of course judge of. I shall therefore leave them totally to your Lordship to decide upon, till you either hear from me or we meet.

I shall be happy to be able to ascertain the time when our reinforcements may arrive; but as I have received no letters from the minister of a later date [p103] than the 7th of February, I am at a loss to guess how soon we may expect them. As I had judged the force I sent to the Chesapeak fully sufficient for all operations there, even though we should extend them to the experiment (mentioned in the conversations referred to) at the western head of the Chesapeak, about Baltimore, &c. And your Lordship will perceive that it was General Phillips and Arnold's opinion they were sufficient for even that on the eastern, (which however might certainly require a greater force), it is possible that the additional corps your Lordship has brought with you may enable you to return something to me for this post. But I beg your Lordship will by no means consider this as a call -- for I should rather content myself with ever so bare a defensive, until there was an appearance of serious operation against me, than cramp your's in the least. But (as I said in a former letter) I trust to your Lordship's disinterestedness, that you will not require from me more troops than what are absolutely wanted; and that you will recollect a circumstance, which I am ever aware of, in carrying on operations in the Chesapeak; which is that they can be no longer secure than while we are superior at sea. That we shall remain so I most sincerely hope -- nor have I any reason to suspect we shall not; but at all events I may at least expect timely information will be sent me of the contrary being likely to happen. In which case I hope your Lordship may be able to place your army in [p104] a secure situation during such temporary inconvenience. For should it become permanent, I need not say what our prospects in this country are likely to be. The admiral being now off the Hook gives me an opportunity of communicating with him by letter, and I have in the most pressing terms requested his attention to the Chesapeak; having repeatedly told him, that should the enemy possess it even for forty-eight hours, your Lordship's operations there may be exposed to most imminent danger. General Robertson has also endeavoured to impress him with the same ideas. But until I have an answer in writing, I cannot be sure that he will, as I do, consider the Chesapeak as the first object. For he at present seems rather inclined to lead his fleet to open the port of Rhode-island, and to cruise to the northward of Nantucket for a fleet, which he has heard is coming from Europe with a small reinforcement to the French armament, and which I am of opinion is bound to Rhode-island. I have however taken every occasion to represent to him the necessity of hearty co-operation and communication. If they fail, I am determined it shall not be on my side.

Sir,
The arrival of the reinforcement has made me easy about Portsmouth for the present. I have sent General Leslie thither with the seventeenth regiment, and the two battalions of Anspach, keeping the forty-third regiment with the army.

I shall now proceed to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond, and with my light troops to destroy any magazines or stores in the neighbourhood, which may have been collected either for his use, or for General Greene's army. From thence I purpose to move to the neck at Williamsburg, which is represented as healthy, and where some subsistence may be procured; and keep myself unengaged from operations, which might interfere with your plan for the campaign, until I have the satisfaction of hearing from you. I hope I shall then have an opportunity to receive better information than has hitherto been in my power to procure, relative to a proper harbour and place of arms. At present I am inclined to thick well of York. The objections to Portsmouth are, that it cannot be made strong without an army to defend it; that it is remarkably unhealthy; and can [p106] give no protection to a ship of the line. Wayne has not yet joined La Fayette, nor can I positively learn where he is, or what is his force. Greene's cavalry are said to be coming this way; but I have no certain accounts of it.

Your Excellency desires Generals Phillips and Arnold to give you their opinions relative to Mr. ------'s proposal. As General Arnold goes to New-York by the first safe conveyance, you will have an opportunity of hearing his sentiments in person. Experience has made me less sanguine, and more arrangements seem to me necessary for so important an expedition than appears to occur to General Arnold.

Mr. -----'s conversations bear too great a resemblance to those of the emissaries from North Carolina, to give me much confidence; and from the experience I have had, and the dangers I have undergone, one maxim appears to me to be absolutely necessary for the safe and honourable conduct of this war; which is, that we should have as few posts as possible; and that wherever the King's troops are, they should be in respectable force. By the vigorous exertions of the present governors of America, large bodies of men are soon collect[e]d, and I have too often observed, that when a storm threatens, our friends disappear.

In regard to taking possession of Philadelphia by an incursion (even if practicable) without an intention [p107] of keeping or burning it, (neither of which appear to be advisable) I should apprehend it would do more harm than good to the cause of Britain.

I shall take the liberty of repeating, that if offensive war is intended, Virginia appears to me to be the only province in which it can be carried on; and in which there is a stake. But to reduce the province and keep possession of the country, a considerable army would be necessary; for with a small force, the business would probably terminate unfavourably, though the beginning might be successful. In case it is thought expedient, and a proper army for the attempt can be formed; I hope your Excellency will do me the justice to believe, that I neither wish nor expect to have the command of it, leaving you at New York on the defensive. Such sentiments are so far from my heart, that I can with great truth assure you, that few things could give me greater pleasure, than being relieved by your preference, from a situation of so much anxiety and responsibility.

By my letter of the 20th, your Excellency will observe, that instead of thinking it possible to do any thing in North Carolina, I am of opinion that it is doubtful whether we can keep the posts in the back parts of South Carolina. And I believe I have stated in former letters, the infinite difficulty of protecting a frontier of three hundred miles, against a persevering enemy, in a country where we have no water communication, [p108] and where few of the inhabitants are active or useful friends.

In enumerating the corps employed in the southern district, your Excellency will recollect that they are all very weak; and that some of the British as well as Provincial regiments, retain nothing but the name. Our weakness at Guildford was not owing to any detachment, unless that with the baggage, but to losses by action, sickness, &c. during the winter's campaign.

Respecting my opinions of stations in James and York rivers, I shall beg leave only to refer your Lordship to my instructions to, and correspondence with, Generals Phillips and Arnold, together with the substance of my conversations with the former; which your Lordship will have found amongst General Phillips's papers, and to which I referred you in my last dispatch; I shall therefore of course approve of any alterations your Lordship may think proper to make in those stations.

[p109] The detachments I have made from this army into Chesapeak since General Leslie's expedition in October last, inclusive, have amounted to seven thousand seven hundred and twenty-four effectives; and at the time your Lordship made the junction with the corps there, there were under Major-general Phillips's orders, five thousand three hundred and four. A force, I should have hoped would be sufficient of itself to carry on any operations in any of the southern provinces in America.

------- comparing, therefore the force under your Lordship, and that of the enemy opposed to you (and I think it clearly appears they have, for the present, no intention of sending thither reinforcement) I should have hoped you would have quite sufficient to carry on any operation in Virginia -- should that have been advisable in this advanced season.

By the intercepted letters inclosed to your Lordship in my last dispatch, you will observe, that I am threatened with a siege in this post. My present effective force is only ten thousand nine hundred and thirty-one. With respect to what the enemy may collect for such an object, it is probable they may amount to at least twenty thousand; besides reinforcement to the French (which from pretty good authority, I have reason to expect) and the numerous militia of the five neighbouring provinces. [p110] Thus circumstanced, I am persuaded your Lordship will be of opinion, that the sooner I concentrate my force the better. Therefore, (unless your Lordship, after the receipt of my letters of the 29th of May and 8th inst. should incline to agree with me in opinion, and judge it right to adopt my ideas respecting the move to Baltimore, or the Delaware Neck, &c.) I beg leave to recommend it to you, as soon as you have finished the active operations you may be now engaged in, to take a defensive station in any healthy situation you choose (be it at Williamsburg or York town) and I would wish in that case, that after reserving to yourself such troops as you may judge necessary for an ample defensive, and desultory movements by water, for the purpose of annoying the enemy's communications, destroying magazines, &c. the following corps may be sent to me in succession, as you can spare them:

Two battalions of light infantry.
Forty-third regiment.
Seventy-sixth, or eightieth.
Two battalions of Anspach.
Queen's rangers, cavalry and infantry.
Remains of the detachment of the seventeenth light dragoons.

My Lord,
As the Admiral has thought proper to stop the sailing of the convoy with stores, horse, accoutrements, &c. (which has been for some days ready to sail to the Chesapeak) without assigning to me any reason for so doing, I delay not a moment to dispatch a runner to your Lordship with a duplicate of my letter of the 11th inst. which was to go by that opportunity. And as I am led to suppose from your Lordship's letter of the 26th ultimo, that you may not think it expedient to adopt the operations I had recommended in the Chesapeak, and will by this time probably have finished those you were engaged in; I request you will immediately embark a part of the troops, stated in the letter inclosed; beginning with the light infantry; and send them to me with all possible dispatch; for which purpose Captain Hudson, or officer commanding the king's ships, will, I presume, upon your Lordship's application appoint a proper convoy. I shall likewise, in proper time, solicit the admiral to send some more transports to the Chesapeak; in which your Lordship will please to send hither the remaining troops you judge can be spared from the defence of the posts you may occupy, as I do not think it adviseable to leave more [p112] troops in that unhealthy climate, at this season of the year, than what are absolutely wanted for a defensive, and desultory water excursions.

------- Being in the place of General Phillips, I thought myself called upon by you, to give my opinion, with all deference, on Mr. ------'s proposals, and the attempt upon Philadelphia. Having experienced much disappointment on that head, I own I would cautiously engage in measures, depending materially for their success, upon active assistance from the country. And I thought the attempt on Philadelphia would do more harm than good to the cause of Great Britain.

-------- However, my opinion on that subject is at present of no great importance, as it appears from your Excellency's dispatches, that in the execution of those ideas, a co-operation was intended from your side; which now could not be depended upon from the [p113] uncertainty of the permancy of our naval superiority, and your apprehensions of an intended serious attempt upon New York.

Spades and shovels --------------- 400
Pick-axes ----------------------------- 190
Felling-axes -------------------------- 210
Hand-hatchets ----------------------- 160
Wheel-barrows ------------------------ 32

N.B. This return formed from different returns signed by Lieutenant Sutherland, Lord Cornwallis's principal Engineer in the Chesapeak.

Notes:

¹ Editor's note: This letter also appears in Cornwallis's Reply p58. [ back ]

² Editor's note: This extract also appears in Cornwallis's Reply p61. [ back ]

³ Editor's note: A full copy of this letter can be found in K.G. Davies, ed., Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783, 21 vols. (Dublin: Irish University Press, c1977-1982), 20:107. [ back ]

⁴ [*] Brigade of guards.
Twenty-third.
Seventy-first, two battalions.
Jagers.
Regiment of Bose.
Light infantry seventy-first. Legion.
North Carolina regiment. [ back ]

⁵ [*] It is presumable that Colonel Balfour likewise communicated this material information to Lord Cornwallis. [ back ]

⁶ Editor's note: This letter can also be found in Tarleton, Chapter 5, Note H, p325. [ back ]

⁷ Editor's note: This letter can also be found in Tarleton, Chapter 5, Note I, p327. [ back ]

⁸ Editor's note: This letter can also be found in Tarleton, Chapter 5, Note L, p328. [ back ]

⁹ Editor's note: A full copy of this letter can be found in Cornwallis's Reply p67. [ back ]

¹⁰ Editor's note: A longer extract can be found in Davies, 20:147. A shorter extract will be found in Tarleton, Chapter 5, Note S, p343. [ back ]

¹¹ Editor's note: Also printed in Tarleton, Chapter 6, Note A, p395. [ back ]

¹² Editor's note: A longer extract can be found in Davies, 20:166. A different extract from the same letter appears in Tarleton, Chapter 6, Note B, p397. [ back ]