[ Previous ] [ Next ]

A significant element in how the British campaigns in America were conducted was the ever-changing personality conflicts among the top British generals. Sir Thomas Gage and Sir William Howe didn't agree on how to put down the rebellion. Sir William and Sir Henry Clinton didn't agree on how to put down the rebellion. Sir Henry and the Earl Cornwallis didn't agree... period. In fact, by the time they arrived at Charleston in 1780, their relationship was already so dysfunctional that Clinton immediately gave Cornwallis a detached command as much to get him out of sight -- if not out of mind -- as for any pressing military reason.¹

Then there was the matter of Yorktown. Cornwallis blamed his defeat on Clinton's bad orders and failure to arrive as promised with reinforcements. (With justification.) In return, Clinton blamed Cornwallis for tangled reasons that made more sense to him, no doubt, than they did to the contemporary public or subsequent historians. (Again, with at least some justification.) History may have judged Cornwallis to hold less blame than Clinton, but it is far from a simple, black-and-white breakdown. There was plenty of blame to go around, but how much of it is deserved by whom is a matter of long debate. In their own scholarly way, the modern biographers of the two men are as caught up in the controversy as were the generals' contemporaries. (Check out Cornwallis: The American Adventure and Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton and the War of Independence for two vastly different analyses of the same events and motives. Each book makes a strong case for why its subject is in the "right" and his opponent in the "wrong."²)

Not surprisingly, the finger-pointing didn't end with the surrender. The generals from America went home to a country, government and King who were looking for a scapegoat to take the blame for the unfortunate outcome of the war. Cornwallis arrived in London before Clinton, and he was by far the better diplomat of the pair. He managed to salvage his career from the mess and go on to greater things. Sir Henry had fewer friends in high places, a prickly personality, a rather tenuous grip on reality, and the disadvantage of being stuck in New York for several additional months while Cornwallis was in London, schmoozing his way back into favor. In other words, he was tailor-made to be a scapegoat. He was to spend the remainder of his life trying stubbornly, with little to no success, to vindicate himself from the stigma of having lost the American colonies.³

Sir Henry's need for absolution sparked off the "Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy," a war of pamphlets, books and letters which began during the latter days of the war and flared up off and on until Clinton's death in 1795. Clinton fired off the opening round of the conflict only a few months after the Yorktown surrender with the publication of a pamphlet entitled Correspondence between His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. and Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis. In fact, copies of the pamphlet beat Cornwallis home to England, and in response, the Earl asked for a Parliamentary investigation to clear his name. The matter was opened early in 1782, but went into limbo when the presiding government fell a month or so later.⁴

Clinton arrived home in England the middle of the year, and in January of 1783, he published The Narrative Of Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Relative To His Conduct During Part Of His Command Of The King's Troops In North America Particularly To That Which Respects The Unfortunate Issue Of The Campaign In 1781: With An Appendix, Containing Copies And Extracts Of Those Parts Of His Correspondence With Lord George Germain, Earl Cornwallis, Rear Admiral Graves, &c. Which Are Referred To Therein. The booklet was meant to prove that the failure of the campaign was in no way his fault. It didn't convince much of anybody.

Within months, Cornwallis riposted with An Answer To That Part Of The Narrative Of Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Which Relates To The Conduct Of Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis During The Campaign In North America In The Year 1781. Considerably thicker than Clinton's booklet, it consisted of a sixteen page introduction which threw the responsibility right back in his rival's lap, followed by an extensive catalog of their correspondence. In passing, the Earl threw some responsibility in Tarleton's lap as well, with his opening comment about Cowpens: "The disaster of the 17th of January cannot be imputed to any defect in my conduct, as the detachment was certainly superior to the force against which it was sent, and put under the command of an officer of experience and tried abilities."⁵

Sir Henry came back promptly with Observations on Some Parts of the Answer of Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative.

Subordinates in both camps (and a horde of anonymous neutrals) also flung themselves into the fray. Sir Henry's narrative drew a particularly vicious riposte from the Cornwallis faction under the title A Reply to Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative Wherein his Numerous Errors are Pointed Out and the Conduct of Lord Cornwallis Fully Vindicated from All Aspersion. The anonymous author called himself "Themistocles," and the tone of the pamphlet can be measured by this comment from one of the transitions: "Having, in the correction of your charges against Lord Cornwallis, necessarily rendered your Narrative, Sir Henry, almost one entire blot, I would consider it an unmanly triumph, to proceed immediately to another score."⁶

Proceed he did, of course, and the debate continued for the next decade. As late as 1792-4, Cornwallis's friend and former commissary officer, Charles Stedman, published The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, to which Sir Henry responded with Observations on Mr. Stedman's History of the American War.

The Generals' catfight generated everything from anonymous letters to newspapers to self-published pamphlets. They offer a smorgasbörd of viewpoints from which generations of historians have gleaned ammunition to support their various hypotheses.

In 1787, Ban Tarleton jumped into the middle of this mess with both feet when he published his memoirs, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America. Part of the motivation for writing the book must have been money -- he was running close to the edge of financial ruin at the time -- but probably the greatest motive was personal exoneration. He had ties to each of the feuding generals, and had previously taken no active part in the controversy, but even so he had been catching considerable flak from it. As various booklets and pamphlets discussed the campaign, they invariably commented on the disastrous consequences of "Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's misfortune" that day at Cowpens.⁷

Bass sums up the situation succinctly:

As the controversialists continued to roll off the phrase "the unfortunate day of Cowpens," the impression grew stronger and stronger that on the 17th day of January, 1781, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton lost the battle that lost the campaign that lost the war that lost the American Colonies!⁸

Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Tarleton felt compelled to defend his reputation, but the publication of Campaigns dumped him squarely into Sir Henry's camp. His friendship with Cornwallis was already stressed by political division and Cornwallis's failure to secure him a military appointment (see the biography), and Campaigns is critical of some of the decisions Cornwallis during the Southern Campaign.

I doubt Tarleton intended to take sides so definitively. For nearly a decade he had managed to get along with both generals -- a claim which makes him virtually unique among the high-ranking officers who served in America -- and prior to publishing his memoirs, he took pains to contact Cornwallis, to inform the Earl of his intentions and secure permission to use parts of their correspondence. Politics had separated him from Cornwallis in the near term, but why would he have chosen to openly align himself with what was obviously the losing camp? It seems more probable that he simply got too caught up in telling his side of the story, imprudently allowed too many of frustrations with Cornwallis to make it onto paper, and generally failed to make allowances for the fact that the Earl was every bit as thin-skinned as Clinton when it came to personal criticism.⁹

Tarleton's commentary on the Earl's military decisions is milder than that of many subsequent historians. It might have provoked little response if Cornwallis had been a less sensitive soul or if the book had been published at a time when factional feelings were not already running high. As it was, Cornwallis (understandably) saw the book as a betrayal of his long-term patronage of the young officer -- in a letter to his brother, quoted in Bass, he characterized it as a "most malicious and false attack" -- and never forgave him. The Earl's friends and supporters changed from blackening his name with passing references to focusing on him as an open target. Stedman shredded him thoroughly a few years later, but the first and most direct attack came from an obscure subaltern of the 71st Regiment named Roderick Mackenzie (or M'Kenzie).¹⁰

Mackenzie's booklet, entitled Strictures On Lt. Col. Tarleton's History Of The Campaigns Of 1780 And 1781, In The Southern Provinces Of North America, Wherein Military Characters And Corps Are Vindicated From Injurious Aspersions, And Several Important Transactions Placed In Their Proper Point Of View, is astoundingly blunt in its character assassination. The reason for Mackenzie's vindictive hatred of Tarleton isn't hard to find. The battle at Cowpens cost the 71st Regiment its pride and a large portion of its first battalion. Many of the regiment's officers -- particularly the older ones, some of whom had been in the army since before Tarleton was born -- placed the entire blame for the disaster squarely on the shoulders of their young and relatively inexperienced commander.¹¹

In his dedication, Mackenzie describes himself as having been wounded and taken prisoner at Cowpens. Beyond that, there is little personal information to be found on him. He was commissioned an ensign in the 71st Regiment in December, 1779 -- he was junior ensign in the regiment when the 1780 Officer's list was printed -- so he was presumably a young man. In the opening section of Strictures, Mackenzie admits to having already vented his spleen at Tarleton in letters published in The Morning Post, which were signed "An Officer on that Service."¹²

I haven't tracked down MacKenzie's letters, but despite similarities in subject and penname, they cannot be the ones published by The Morning Chronicle in 1782, which are reprinted in Bass, p243-246 and signed "An Officer of the Army." Bass seems to make this assumption, but Mackenzie states that his letters were in response to the initial publication of Tarleton's memoirs (1787). Also, the 1782 letter-writer's claim to be "a military man, who has had the honour to serve his country fourteen years, in rank not inferior to yourself" and "an old soldier" would seem either to rule Mackenzie out as a suspect or mark him as a liar right out of the gate. These earlier assaults may well have come from another member of the 71st.

Tarleton never responded to Mackenzie's attack, but the ever-faithful George Hanger threw himself into the arena with An Address to the Army; in reply to Strictures, by Roderick M'Kenzie, (Late Lieutenant in the 71st Regiment) on Tarleton's History of The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, which goes head-to-head with just about every point made in Strictures. Hanger posits that Mackenzie didn't write the booklet at all, but merely leant his name to some ghostwriter from among Cornwallis's supporters. This claim was based on the style of the newspaper letters, which Hanger thought indicative of a man with less education than the author of Strictures. Perhaps George also had private knowledge of the booklet's true authorship.¹³

Bass comments that the greatest accomplishment of An Address to the Army was to relieve the escalating tension of the situation:

Hanger's wit set the friends of the disputants chuckling. "Major Hanger's Work is exactly what was to be expected," observed the World. "It is frank and spirited -- very zealous for his friend -- often whimsical, but always sincere."

Then the World ended its notice of the controversy:

Hanger's new Book is worth your reading --
In authorship a new proceeding!
First, he reprints what has been seen:--
Then of his own you take a sup,
Strictures,--he proves, should not have been,
and then he -- stops the Strictures up!
Concluding, in the way of Hanger --
"My dear Mackenzie -- that's a Banger!"¹⁴

The merit of Mackenzie's attack and Hanger's riposte as history remains a matter of wide disagreement. The bulk of Mackenzie's booklet is wasted on pettiness and mudslinging. (Hanger's comment is that it is filled with "gross abuse which he has substituted in the place of conclusions from reason, facts, or argument.") In return, Hanger spends most of his time ridiculing Mackenzie. Here and there, each of them makes a valid point or tosses out some information that can be verified from other sources.¹⁵

Even though his interest in the documents focuses solely on their coverage of Cowpens, I think Lawrence Babits has produced the best evaluation: "The bitter exchange contains much incidental information explaining many minor details of the Cowpens fighting. This information is useful and valid not because it was part of the postwar controversy, but because it presents more general knowledge or explanation of the Cowpens battle."¹⁶

Documents of the Controversy:

Here is a list of the major books and pamphlets of the controversy. Several are available on this site, and those marked with can be found in The Campaign in Virginia, 1781 by Benjamin Franklin Stevens. (2 volumes, London, 1888.)

1. The Correspondence between His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B., and Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, published New York, 1781.
    
2. Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative. Published January, 1783, it went through six editions in 1783, and was reprinted in 1785. Lord Cornwallis received his copy on January 15, 1783. It was reviewed in The Monthly Review, January 1783; and Gentleman's Magazine, February 1783, p147.
    
3. A Reply to Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative, by "Themistocles." Published, 1783. The identity of Themistocles remains unknown, but he was also an active contributor to the letter columns of various newspapers. Reviewed in The Monthly Review, February, 1783.
    
4. Earl Cornwallis's Reply. Published in 1783. Reviewed in The Monthly Review, March, 1783, and Gentleman's Magazine, February, 1783, p155.
    
5. Sir Henry's Observations on Earl Cornwallis's Reply. Published, 1783. Reviewed in The Monthly Review, April, 1783 and Gentleman's Magazine, April, 1783, p334.
    
6. A Parting Word, anonymous. Published, 1783. In 1888, Benjamin Stevens stated that he had only been able to find a single surviving copy, in an American library.
    
7. Correspondence du Lord George Germain avec Les Généraux Clinton, Cornwallis et les Amiraux dans la Station de l'Amérique. Published, 1784, in Verseilles. This was taken from the papers laid before the House of Lords. Some documents were repressed in England, but someone managed to get into the archives and copy them down. They were translated and printed in France.
    
8. Tarleton's Campaigns;
    
9. Mackenzie's Strictures;
    
10. Hanger's An Address to the Army
     
11. Charles Stedman's The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, published 1794.
     
12. Sir Henry Clinton's Observations on Mr. Stedman's History, published 1794.
     

Notes:

¹ One interesting analysis of how the interactions and limitations of individuals influenced the Southern Campaigns can be found in William B. Willcox, "The British Road to Yorktown: A Study in Divided Command," American Historical Review 52 (1946): 1-35. [ back ]

² Franklin and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American Adventure (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970) and William B. Willcox, Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton and the War of Independence (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1964). [ back ]

³ Even before he returned to England, Sir Henry set to work on a full history of the war which he intended to be his ultimate self-justification. He died before it was ready to go to press. Edited by William B. Willcox, it finally saw publication as The American Rebellion. Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of his Campaigns, 1775-82 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954). [ back ]

⁴ The chronology and background for this article are drawn from Robert D. Bass, The Green Dragoon; The Lives of Banastre Tarleton and Mary Robinson (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957), chapters 22-23 and Willcox, chapter 11, both of which cover the controversy in some detail. [ back ]

⁵ Charles, Earl Cornwallis, An Answer to that Part of the Narrative of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. which Relates to the Conduct of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis During the Campaign in North America in the Year 1781 (London: Printed for J. Debrett, 1783), p iv. The titles of these documents aren't quite as long as the documents themselves, but it's a near-run thing. [ back ]

⁶ Benjamin Franklin Stevens, The Campaign in Virginia, 1781, 2 vols. (London, 1888), 1:169. Stevens reprints the pamphlet in its entirety. [ back ]

⁷ Sir Henry Clinton, The Narrative of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Relative to his Conduct During Part of his Command of the King's Troops in North America, Particularly to that which Respects the Unfortunate Issue of the Campaign in 1781 (London : Printed for J. Debrett, 1783), p111. Clinton also paraphrases a letter he wrote to Cornwallis (March, 1781): "I am most exceedingly concerned, my Lord, at the very unfortunate affair of the 17th of January, (Cowpen's,) I confess I dread the consequences." And Cornwallis's reply quotes a letter to Lord George Germain, mentioning "The unfortunate affair of the 17th of January was a very unexpected and severe blow; for, besides reputation, our loss did not fall short of six hundred men." [ back ]

⁸ Bass, p247. [ back ]

⁹ The information that Tarleton contacted Cornwallis is from George Hanger, An Address to the Army; in Reply to Strictures, by Roderick M'Kenzie, (Late Lieutenant in the 71st Regiment) on Tarleton's History of The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, (London: James Ridgway, 1789), pp2-3. [ back ]

¹⁰ Cornwallis's letter is quoted in Bass, p258. Regular literary critics weren't necessarily enamored with the book, either. The Critical Review, in particular, panned it thoroughly. They had some justification. The prose in Campaigns is flat, spare and quite uninspired -- i.e., it is historically important but it isn't exactly a page turner. I would have to say that, as an author, Tarleton made an excellent cavalryman. Bass credits Mary Robinson with having a hand in the writing of it, but I've always thought its sparseness was the best argument for her non-participation as anything beyond a research assistant, transcriptionist (writing cannot have been easy for him, with his damaged hand) and perhaps a general nag to keep him working on the manuscript. [ back ]

¹¹ (I sometimes wonder if 18th Century writers were paid by the word and included the book's title in their word count. Of course this doesn't explain why self-published pamphlets also go for such mouthfuls on their title pages...) The hatred which the 71st carried for Tarleton after Cowpens was so intense that when the regiment's second battalion was assigned to his command later in the Virginia campaign, they petitioned Cornwallis to work under John Graves Simcoe instead. [ back ]

¹² A List of All the Officers of the Army: Viz. the General and Field Officers; the Officers of the Several Troops, Regiments, Independent Companies and Garrisons...in Great Britain (War Office, 1780), p145. [ back ]

¹³ Interestingly, Bass, p255, quotes a portion of a letter from General James Grant to Cornwallis wherein Grant makes the same claim about Campaigns: "Tarleton has advertised a History of the two last campaigns to the southward, to be immediately published; as far as I can learn he does not mean -- or rather the author to whom he lends his name does not mean -- to compliment[.]" Presumably he believed "the author to whom he lends his name" was Sir Henry Clinton. [ back ]

¹⁴ Bass, p260. [ back ]

¹⁵ Hanger, pvii. [ back ]

¹⁶ Lawrence E. Babits, A Devil of a Whipping, The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill, N.C. & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p207. [ back ]