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MY LORD,

THE following letters were written at the request of a friend in the country, for the sole purpose of detecting error, and rendering [p ii] justice to many of the first characters in the British army.

The attention shewn by your Lordship to the officers wounded at the disastrous affair of Cowpens, among whom the author had the misfortune to be, contributed to impress him with the same exalted ideas of your humanity that he had before entertained of your military talents. To your Lordship's candour he submits his motive for engaging in this undertaking, and to your judgment the observations contained in the following sheets; convinced, that if they meet with your approbation, it will ensure that of [p iii] every officer who served during the late war in America -- ONE only excepted.

With all that respect and deference which powers of mind, no less than exalted birth claim, I have the honour to be,

My Lord,
      Your Lordship's
            Most obedient and
                  most humble servant,
                        RODERICK MACKENZIE.

King-street, St. James's-square,
November, 1787.

[p v] ADVERTISEMENT

STRUCK with the numerous incoherencies, misrepresentations, and contradictions, contained in the work which is the subject of the ensuing letters, the author had given way to the first emotion of his mind, and submitted to publick inspection several cursory remarks, through the medium of the Morning Post, under the signature of "An Officer on that Service." But now, that he has taken a fuller survey [p vi] of the subject, he considers himself at liberty to resume such of his former arguments as he may find conducive to the elucidation of facts in this publication.

ERRATA.

Page 93, for "so as to form in the line," read " so as to form with the line."

Page 153, for "pitiful recourse read "pitiful resource."

LETTER I.

MY DEAR SIR,

ANXIOUS to revive a correspondence which has ever afforded me the most cordial satisfaction, and emboldened by your indulgent opinion, inclination strongly impels me, however distrustful of my own talents, to comply with your request. Let me apprize you [p2] then, not to expect that elegant conciseness, which marks the diction of a fine writer. THE following letters contain only plain observations; but these are deduced from such stubborn facts, as will, it is hoped, fully impress your mind with conviction. In place of nervous description, accept remarks, which do not infringe the dictates of truth; and such, you will readily allow, are most congenial to the feelings of a generous heart.

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America, has been perused with an avidity proportionate to the ideas once formed of his military capacity. The very title strongly awakens curiosity; but when the first transports are allayed, when the storm of passion subsides, a succeeding calm leaves full scope to the judgment, to scrutinize the subject with the strictest impartiality, and by placing the design in its clearest point of view, enables us, [p3] on the most solid grounds, to confirm or reverse our first opinion.

This elaborate performance, though ingeniously worked up, abounds with misrepresentation and error; it does injustice to a number of respectable officers; wantons in reflecting unmerited disgrace on entire corps of the army, and is replete with palpable inconsistencies. When public opinion is thus misled by consummate artifice, it becomes necessary to detect the sophistry which produced the deception.

The work before us would have appeared with better grace, and juster title to general favour, if self-importance had been less predominant with the author; if the magnanimity and fall of many invaluable officers had been candidly recorded, and their names transmitted to posterity, as men conspicuous for having exerted themselves in the service of their country. All instances of military prowess should have been distinctly pointed [p4] out, in a performance calculated to attract public attention. When even the ablest artist is too partial to any particular figure in a landscape, an accurate and perspective view of its component parts, must fix the criterion for decision.

You know that I served on the campaigns which this gentleman describes; you have heard me bear testimony to his personal courage and activity; and you also know, that having quitted the army since the peace, I have nothing either to hope or fear from Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton on the one hand, or from the characters he traduces on the other. You will allow me, therefore, to be disinterested, and not actuated by any sinister intention. It is no reflection on a British soldier, that he does not possess the discriminating talents of a Hume, a Stewart, or a Gibbons, to colour his actions with that persuasive skill and polished diction, which are the satellites of true genius; but when he describes the progress of a war, and ventures to expatiate [p5] on the primary motives which influenced opposing commanders, we naturally expect, at least, observations founded on experience and judgment.

Without dwelling too much on punctilios, or making particular inquiry, whether a narrative of military events, evidently deficient in point of information, and frequently erroneous, can merit the dignified epithet of HISTORY, I shall consider this work, merely, as a journal of the war in the Southern provinces; and viewing it on this ground solely, it is impossible to avoid being struck with its partiality and incorrectness. Some facts have been withheld, and some mutilated; while others are raised to a pitch of importance, to which, if historical justice had been the author's object, they are by no means entitled. Prejudice and party spirit are also some of its most prominent features.

Nothing is more false than an opinion which once prevailed in the world, that [p6] the truth of an historical narrative, is in proportion to the nearness of the historian's life, to the times of the several transactions which he relates, and consequently, that every historian, cotemporary with the agents and actions which he describes, has the best chance of bringing out the truth: on the contrary, the springs of human actions, and especially of those which are governed by the intricate and secret motives of Princes and Privy councils, are not to be developed but by time, patience, labour, and mature discernment. The annuals of History will shew, that all sense of personal injury, and party resentment, must be obliterated from the mind, and men must recover themselves from the shocks which dissolved the bonds of society, before the springs of any revolution can be traced to their primary source, and before the true characters of the principal agents can be clearly delineated. For the truth of these observations, we need only have recourse to a comparison of the earliest and latest accounts of the reign of the [p7] unfortunate Mary Queen of Scots. In the former, factions, calumny, and ignorance, exhibited her as a beautiful demon; and it was only after the lapse of near two centuries, that writers of honour, discernment, and veracity¹, were enabled to penetrate the thick cloud of misrepresentation, and to place that much-injured Princess in the genuine light, which just and impartial history reflects.

The perusal of the following letters will discover, that our author was destitute of many qualifications effectial to his undertaking; and to supply these material defects, he appears to substitute a professional experience, so limited, as scarcely to exceed the duration of a butterfly's existence².

[p8] With respect to the charges exhibited against Earl Cornwallis, it is neither my province to enter into a full vindication of his Lordship's conduct, nor to inquire into the causes of those charges being brought forward, with an acrimony so strongly marked, at so late a period. Similar indulgence is however expected in investigating some accusations preferred against that nobleman, as when defending officers under his command. Indirect censures are frequently used against his Lordship; such wound more deeply than specifick attacks, because their poignancy is artfully concealed, and often produces a much more dangerous effect, than avowed and implacable resentment. To asperse his Lordship's military capacity, is insidious to a degree; and to condemn the measures which he pursued in America, at a time, when the unlimited confidence of his country has again singled him out for a trust of the highest importance, and placed him at such a distance³ [p9] from all possibility of defending himself, is truly ungenerous. It is equally unbecoming to point such unmerited censures, at so respectable a soldier, so invaluable a patron, and so sincere a friend.

Trusting to your candour and judgment, I submit the following STRICTURES on this work to your consideration, and have no doubt but you will coincide with me in opinion, that nothing can compensate for want of veracity in an historian, and that the blandishments of diction are but wretched substitutes for the language of truth.

With every sentiment of friendship,
      I am
            Your most faithful
                  And obedient servant.

[p10] LETTER II

MY DEAR SIR,

YOU are now furnished with my general sentiments, respecting the performance before us; the merits and demerits of its positions and conclusions, next claim our attention.

The important display of political knowledge, affected in the exordium, is, doubtless, intended to shew the author's superior judgment and information. He would be thought as great in the cabinet as in the field. He appears familiar with [p11] the designs of foreign powers, and treats Lord North's administration, in conducting the American war, with great freedom⁴. For my part, I am unacquainted with the arcana imperii; the deep discernment of a Machiavel is not, however, wanted to detact the extreme absurdity of the following conclusions. After disclaiming farther political disquisition, he reasons thus, pages 2 and 3:

"In the autumn of the year 1779, Congress was considerably advanced in credit and power by the military combination in Georgia. The appearance of the French, although the attack upon Savannah was not crowned with success, reanimated the expiring vigour of the desponding Americans, and confirmed the attachment of the unsteady."

The combination to which our author [p12] alludes, is conceived to mean, that of the French army under the Count de Estaign, with the Americans commanded by General Lincoln, in the month of September 1779. The Count sailed from Cape François, in the island of Hispaniola, with a formidable armament, and landed in Georgia at the head of five thousand regular troops, and an adequate train of artillery. He was soon joined by, perhaps, an equal number of Americans. This united force was repulsed and totally routed, by less than three thousand soldiers and seamen, before the unfinished works of Savannah. It is therefore highly inconsistent to infer, that the cause of America could have derived support from such disaster and disgrace.

The author's positions being admitted, we must believe that the gallant Tawse fell, and Prevost, Maitland, Glazier, Cruger, Hamilton and Moncreif fought, in vain; and from such conclusions we are to learn, that the brilliant success of [p13] his Majesty's arms tended only to aggrandize his enemies. Doctor Ramsay was at that time, and probably now is, a delegate to the Continental Congress. He has published a work, entitled, "An History of the Revolution of South Carolina." I by no means subscribe to all his conclusions, but in the present instance, he, from his situation, must have been a competent judge of the state of American affairs, and in what manner they were affected by this catastrophe. The Doctor says, Vol. II. page 42, "The siege being raised, the Continental troops retreated over the river Savannah. The depression of spirits succeeded, much increased by the preceding elevation. The Georgian exiles, who had arrived from all quarters to re-possess themselves of their estates, were a second time obliged to abandon their country, and seek refuge among strangers. The currency depreciated much faster than ever, and the most gloomy apprehensions respecting the Southern [p14] states generally took possession of the minds of the people." -- And again, page 46, "The repulse at Savannah, on the 9th of the preceding October, impressed the inhabitants with high ideas of the power of Britain."

Divest yourself now of prejudice in favour of either of these gentlemen, and then decide whether the power and credit of Congress could possibly derive support, or the expiring vigour of the Americans, reanimation, from the overthrow of their friends and allies. But I forbear farther remarks on the first five pages of this work, which are entitled to peculiar delicacy; for, upon examination of the whole performance, it will be found, that he seldom suffers an equal number of succeeding ones to pass, without exhibiting himself, as the principal figure in the fore-ground of the picture.

The author, in reasoning on some subsequent operations of the American army, [p15] is as unfortunate as in his preceding remark. He says, pages 13 and 14, "The body of regular troops, destined for this service (the protection of Charlestown), though assisted by the militia and inhabitants, was scarcely adequate to the defence of such extensive fortifications, and could have been more usefully employed in the field, where judicious operations, assisted by the resources to be found in the country, and by the approaching heat of the season, would have protected the greatest part of the fertile province of South Carolina, would have soon over-balanced the present superiority of the British forces, and would effectually have prevented the co-operation of the Royal navy and army. General Washington adopted this line of action, when he abandoned New-York Island for the Jersies."

The misfortunes of General Lincoln, who commanded at Charlestown, certainly [p16] entitle him to some tenderness from a generous observer of his actions. He undertook the defence of that place, by the direction of those in whose service he was engaged, nor did his mode of conducting it do him any discredit. The Congress was so attentive to the safety of this important garrison, that they proposed the remarkable expedient of arming the slaves; and the legislature of South Carolina invested Mr. Rutledge with the unlimited powers of a Dictator, to give energy to his government, upon this extraordinary emergency⁵. Of the political propriety of maintaining this post, the Americans must have been more proper judges than our author, whose reasoning upon the subject appears extremely erroneous. It cannot by any means be admitted, that six thousand American troops, indifferently disciplined, should in any situation be able to counteract the measures of a British force, [p17] consisting of ten thousand; and to affect that a few regiments, the weak state of which is acknowledged by himself, would have actually prevented the co-operation of the Royal navy and army, is an absurdity hitherto unparalleled. Whatever the faults of the American General might have been, it is obvious that his army, by quitting the only garrison, and principal sea-port in the province, and by retiring into the interior country, could not have retarded the above-mentioned co-operation. Such a measure, instead of dividing, would have enabled the British to concentrate their force.

The author's illustration is equally erroneous with his position. General Washington garrisoned the fortress which bore his name upon New-York Island, with three thousand troops under General Magaw; he furnished it with magazines, and forty-one pieces of cannon of different calibers, besides howitzers. The [p18] place was summoned in vain, and then attacked by General Kniphausen, Earl Percy, General Mathew, and Colonel Stirling, at the head of four separate divisions of the British army. The assailants had near four hundred men killed and wounded, and the fortress was not reduced, until Earl Percy carried one of the outworks by assault, Colonel Stirling another, and until Kniphausen, having advanced close to the parapet, was prepared to enter Sword in hand⁶. When these circumstances are considered, it will appear, that General Washington did not abandon New-York Island for the Jersies, from motives of policy, as this author asserts, but of necessity.

When false inferences like these, supported by erroneous illustrations, appear in the front of a performance, we listen with caution to the sequel, which indeed [p19] is the more necessary, when it is considered, that official dispatches and private letters are adduced as vouchers, though these were written under impressions from erroneous reports, founded on misrepresentations by our author himself; the consequence of which has been, that whole garrisons have fired vollies, bells have run, and bonfires have been raised, to commemorate advantages which never existed.

Be assured that I am,
Yours, &c.

[p20] LETTER III.

MY DEAR SIR,

MY last was principally levelled at the erroneous statement of the consequences which resulted from the succesful defence of Savannah, and the effect which our author says an early evacuation of Charlestown by General Lincoln would have produced. The advance of the British to that garrison, its reduction, with some subsequent operations, have been described in his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton's dispatches, with an accuracy which supersedes the [p21] necessity of the very imperfect account published by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton.

It is generally admitted, that the love of fame is, or ought to be, the ruling passion of every soldier; and, perhaps, it has in a greater or lesser degree, had a manifest influence in impelling this order of men to glorious actions, from a Leonidas at Thermopylae, to our immortal Wolfe at the heights of Abraham. Of this the Corsican Chief PAOLI, when defending his native island from the attacks of a mercenary republick, appeared truly sensible. "He devised an excellent method of promoting bravery among his countrymen. He wrote a circular letter to the priests of every parish in the island, desiring a list to be made out of all those who had fallen in battle. No institution was better contrived; it might be adopted by every nation, as it would give double courage to soldiers, who would have their fame [p22] preserved, and at the same time leave to their relatives the valuable legacy of a claim to the kindness of the state⁷." In addition to this first principle, it certainly affords a melancholy satisfaction, to find in the page of history, that justice is done to the memory of the dead; it mingles sympathy with the tears of the widow and orphan; it may encourage future soldiers to emulate the actions of their predecessors, whose lives may have been sacrificed in the service of their country; it also gives to the relations of these brave men, that claim to the kindness of the state, which the Corsican historian has described. Liberal minds only are influenced by these exalted maxims; but let us consider the light in which they have been viewed, by the journalist of the Southern American campaigns.

[p23] Describing the attack of the legion-infantry, when they mistook the corps under the command of Major Ferguson for enemies, pages 7 and 8, he entirely neglects to mention the wounds which that active officer received, though these were attended by a peculiarity of circumstances, that long furnished the whole army with a melancholy topick of conversation. The Major had signalized himself in a conspicuous manner at Brandywine; his right arm had been so much shattered in that action, as to be for ever after rendered useless; this misfortune, however, did not deprive him of his talents for vigorous exertion: he rendered himself master of the sword with his left. On the present occasion he defended himself against three soldiers, who opposed him with fixed bayonets, but receiving a wound in his only arm, he was on the point of falling, when Major Cochran, fortunately recognizing his voice, the mistake was cleared up, and his invaluable life was for this time preserved.

[p24] Our author is equally remiss in his account of the loss sustained by the accident which befel the magazine in Charlestown, page 23, as he has totally omitted to mention the deaths of Lieutenant Gordon of the royal artillery, and Lieutenant Macleod of the 42d regiment, who, as well as Captain Collins, perished in that explosion.

An action which a detachment from the garrison of Ninety Six had with an American corps, upon the 19th of August, 1780, would certainly have excited the attention of a correct historian.

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's forte as an author, seems to be compilation; he might therefore have given the American account of this affair, either from Ramsay, or from the Scots Magazine of December, 1780; but as it has entirely escaped his attention, you may depend upon the following statement, as it comes from unquestionable authority.

[p25] The Americans, under Colonels Williams, Shelby, and Clarke, were strongly posted on the Western banks of the Enoree; their numbers have not been precisely ascertained, probably five hundred. The detachment of British troops, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Innes, consisted of a light infantry company of the New-Jersey volunteers, a captain's command of Delancy's, and about one hundred men of the South Carolina regiment mounted. The troops passed the river, the infantry drove the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and the horse, though but lately raised, and indifferently disciplined, behaved with great gallantry; but in the moment of victory, the commandant, Major Fraser, Captain Campbell, Lieutenants Chew and Camp, five out of the seven officers present, were wounded by a volley from the Americans. The British troops, consequently unable to avail themselves of the advantages which now offered, were conducted by Captain Kerr to the Eastern [p26] side of the river, where they remained till reinforced by Lieutenant Colonel Cruger.

In our author's description of the action at Hanging Rock, the partiality which he entertains for his own corps is evident; the gallantry of officers, and of a detachment with which he was not immediately connected, is consigned to oblivion. This assertion is justified by his silence on the loss of Lieutenant Brown of the North Carolinians, who fell in a desperate charge, which the crisis of the action rendered inevitable; and besides him, not less than seventy men of the same regiment were killed and wounded, of which, however, no mention is made, as it would appear a participatioon of the credit ascribed to the legion.

From too great attention to his own exploits, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton pays not that decent regard to those of others, which historical truth indispensably [p27] requires. He has not recorded the fall of several officers at the siege of Augusta; and the whole of those who displayed such distinguished bravery in the defence of Ninety Six, are, without exception, passed over in silence. Of the former of these sieges, he appears to know little indeed; and of the latter, though one of the most brilliant affairs which occurred during the war, he seems to the full as ignorant, as he possibly may be of those of Candia or Rhodes.

Exclusive of those already mentioned, the death of Captains Kelly and Hewlet, the wounds of Captain Nisbet and Robinson, of Lieutenants Toriano, Cowel, Mackay, Robinson, and others, certainly merited attention; and his neglect, in not particularising the officers who were sacrificed immediately under his own eye at Cowpens, is still more unpardonable.

In page 505, he asserts, "Two officers, with forty dragoons and their horses, [p28] were all taken without a blow;" but the fact is, that Lieutenant Sutherland of the South Carolina dragoons, one of the officers thus censured, being on a foraging party, fell in with a considerable corps of the enemy's cavalry, and defended himself, when attacked, with a degree of valour, bordering on excess; he was so desperately wounded in this rencounter, that the infantry, who had now advanced to his support, left him on the field for dead. This gentleman, however, still lives, though his recovery is held by the medical faculty, as an event next to a prodigy. So far was he from not exchanging blows with the superior force by which he was attacked, that a considerable portion of his scull was found to have been cut out with a sabre, the manifest proof of which is displayed by the perception of the movements of the brain, upon an application of the hand: he is now in Nova Scotia, and our author probably conceived that he might hazard such a reflection upon his conduct, [p29] as he has made upon that of other absent officers, without the risque of contradiction.

To the names already specified, those of many American Loyalists might have been added; men, whose integrity was incorruptible, undismayed in the hour of danger, who sacrificed their private interest to publick good, and who, though they knew that the internal peace of their families was destroyed, by the ravages of relentless war, fought and bled with manly spirit; maintained their allegiance to their latest moments, and evinced a probity of mind under every reverse of fortune, which must endear them to posterity. Such names, a gentleman who undertook to write a History of the Southern Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, should have known, and such merit he ought to have recorded. But let us follow our author to his own atchievements, where no charge of omission can possibly be brought against him. [p30] Page 17, "with five horses killed and wounded." Page 20, "The British dragons lost two men and four horses in the action, but returning to Lord Cornwallis's camp the same evening, upwards of twenty horses expired with fatigue." Page 30, "And thirty-one horses killed and wounded." Page 115, "And twenty horses were killed and wounded." Page 180, "With thirty horses killed and wounded." Page 226, "And twenty horses fell." Page 287, "Three men wounded, and a few horses killed and wounded."

From such anxiety in our author not to omit recording the smallest loss sustained by his own corps, this reflection naturally occurs, that the fall of HORSES, in actions wherein he was concerned, is entitled to a preferable attention in his work, to OFFICERS of equal, perhaps superior, merit to himself, who suffered upon other occasions!!!

[p31] You will keep this trait continually in view, as we follow him through his campaigns; it is a distinguishing one, and will enable you to form a proper judgment of matters which would otherwise appear inexplicable.

I am, &c.

[p32] LETTER IV.

MY DEAR SIR,

IN support of the maxim contained in the close of my last letter, I proceed to shew, that, through this performance, the author, in general, either appears as his own panegyrist and hero of his tale, or as the detractor and censor of the conduct of others; his mole-hills are raised into mountains, while the most splendid actions of those who came nearest to the summit of perfection, are either depreciated by avowed censure, oblique insinuation, or entirely [p33] passed over in silence. Even a Lord Rawdon escapes not the acrimony of his pen! Accordingly, in his relation of circumstances which occurred during this nobleman's encampment at Lynch's Creek, he observes, page 99, "The hospital, the baggage, the provisions, the ammunition, and the stores, remained under a weak guard at Camden. General Gates advanced to the Creek opposite to the British camp, and skirmishes ensued between the advanced parties of the two armies. The American commander discovered that Lord Rawdon's position was strong, and he declined an attack; but he had not sufficient penetration to conceive, that by a forced march up the Creek he could have passed Lord Rawdon's flank, and reached Camden, which would have been an easy conquest, and a fatal blow to the British." and page 109, "The first misconception imputable to General Gates, was the not breaking in upon the British communications as [p34] soon as he arrived near Lynch's Creek. The move up the Creek, and from thence to Camden, was practicable and easy before the King's troops were concentered at that place; or he might, without the smallest difficulty, have occupied a strong position on Saunders's Creek, five miles from Camden, before Earl Cornwallis joined the Royal forces."

The most strongly marked features in the military character of Lord Rawdon, are, a singular talent for enterpize, and acute discernment, and unremitting vigilance. The army under his command lay for several days within one mile of General Gates's encampment, and directly between him and Camden, the protection of which place, was the great and immediate object of his Lordship's attention, and to accomplish which, he shewed no disinclination to come to an action. Thus situated, and so determined, it is ridiculous to suppose that he would have [p35] suffered the American army to pass on either flank, or by any means to possess themselves of Camden, which was then the only depot of the British army in that part of the country. The inconsistency of these insinuations have been exposed, even by gentlemen, who, though unacquainted with local situations, justly conclude, "That it must suppose a supineness in Lord Rawdon, by no means consistent with his abilities and military talents⁸." But to put the matter beyond a doubt, here, as usual, our author furnishes a decided argument in contradiction to his own assertions. Page 101, he tells us, "A patrole, sent by General Gates to Rugely's Mills on the 12th, occasioned a report that the American commander was moving to his right. The situation of the British hospital and magazine, and the present distance of the army, pointed out to Lord Rawdon the propriety of falling back from [p36] Lynch's Creek, and of concentrating his force near Camden. The move was accordingly made." If then, as the author himself acknowledges, even a patrole of the enemy failed not to excite the attention of Lord Rawdon, was it to be supposed that the movement of a whole army would escape his vigilance and circumspection?

Our author, in arraigning the penetration of General Gates, is rather unfortunate; his animadversions unluckily falling upon an officer who had, before that, proved to all mankind, that he neither wanted inclination nor ability to be a principal instrument of the ruin of the British interest in America⁹. From his known character there is not left a shadow of doubt, that if the measures [p37] suggested by this author had been the most proper, they would not have been neglected.

While one slender thread runs through the whole labyrinth of this incoherent performance, influencing its author in every assertion, and while he never quits the idea of raising himself, and sinking the other officers of the British army in the estimation of his readers; to render this scheme more complete, he extends his animadversions to the commanders of the enemy, attributing to their misconduct the most brilliant achievements of the best British officers, and imputing to want of ability in the latter, every misfortune which befel them. But the whole execution is accompanied with such a wavering inconsistency, and displays such a feebleness of judgment throughout, as to justify the application to his case of the words of a celebrated poet:

[p38] --"He now to sense, now nonsense leaning,
Means not, but blunders round about a meaning."

And he has left us to lament, with Ganganelli, that there are some authors, who in their attempts to rise into the uncommon, have fallen into the absurd.

The following passages are selected to shew the self-importance which pervades this work. Page 7, "Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton requested the use of some of the Quarter Master General's boats." Page 27, "Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, on this occasion, was desired to collect all the dragoons he could find in Charlestown." Page 103, "Upon application from Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, he (Earl Cornwallis) ordered all the horses of the army, belonging both to regiments and departments, to be assembled: the best were selected for [p39] the service of the cavalry, and, upon the proprietors receiving payment, they were delivered up to the British legion. These active preparations diffused animation and vigour throughout the army. On the 15th, the principal part of the King's troops had orders to be in readiness to march: in the afternoon Earl Cornwallis desired Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, &c."

Such effusions of vanity as these have a very disgusting effect. To other officers, from a General of such high birth and length of service, it was sufficient to be commanded, but this gentleman must be desired and requested to do what was merely his duty.

It is well known that the publick service required Earl Cornwallis to mount dragoons by the expedient just mentioned; and, that the British government is too just to deprive its subjects of private property without an equivalent, I readily [p40] admit, but that the proprietors have received payment for these horses, is denied. A number of officers, now in this kingdom, are in possession of receipts passed on this occasion by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, which remain to this hour undischarged; many of these gentlemen are reduced to the scanty pittance of half-pay, and it would afford them must satisfaction to know through what channel they are to make application for payment.

I am, &c.

[p41] LETTER V.

MY DEAR SIR,

I NEXT call your attention to some circumstances previous to the fall of Ferguson. Our author insinuates that Earl Cornwallis might have foreseen and guarded against this misfortune. The charge is more than disingenuous, and merits a pointed refutation. In pursuing the investigation, the strength and movements of the army, the situation of the partisan, the extraordinary exertions of an enemy, from a quarter totally unexpected, [p42] and the principles upon which our author reasons, must all be considered.

The British General commenced his first invasion of North Carolina about the 20th of September, 1780, having previously determined to march through the Waxhaws, and to make Charlottetown a place of arms. This measure has been indecently arraigned, but the arguments adduced in support of the accusation, are evidently ill-founded: they shall be examined in their proper place. It will appear, by quotations from his work, that the author has exaggerated the force of Earl Cornwallis. He misstates the movements of troops, and, by a natural consequence, has drawn false inferences from erroneous principles. He says, page 158, "Earl Cornwallis, with the principal column of the army, composed of the 7th, 23d, 33d, and 71st regiments of infantry, the volunteers of Ireland, Hamilton's Corps, Bryan's [p43] Refugees, four pieces of cannon, about fifty waggons, and a detachment of cavalry, marched by Hanging Rock, towards the Catawba settlement; whilst the body of the British dragoons, and the light and legion infantry, with a three pounder, crossed the Wateree, and moved up the East side of the river, under Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton. The scarcity of forage in the district of Waxhaws was the principal reason for this temporary separation." The army which his Lordship commanded upon this occasion did not exceed fifteen hundred regulars, and, probably, about half that number of attendant militia. Colonel John Hamilton, a gentleman of independent fortune from North Carolina, who had in the rise of the late momentous controversy attached himself to the British interest, had now more than completed his battalion, originally intended to consist of five hundred men. However desirous Lord Cornwallis might be to avail himself of the assistance of [p44] Colonel Hamilton at this juncture, the present situation of affairs in South Carolina required his presence at Camden, he was therefore left with his regiment to garrison that post, nor did a single soldier belonging to it appear in his Lordship's camp, from his departure in September, until after his return from Charlottetown, and the taking post at Wynnesborough in November following; nay, the General was so fully convinced of their being required at the station they were left to defend, that, on the delivery of a quantity of stores, escorted by them to the army, their immediate return was ordered. Thus an increase of more than five hundred regulars is made to his Lordship's force.

The second part of this quotation, which extends to a movement of the corps under the command of our author, is not less erroneous, and the mis-statement is heightened by circumstances peculiarly aggravating. He says, page 168, [p45] "A movement on the West of the Catawba, towards Tryon county, would have been better calculated either to cover the frontier of South Carolina, or to protect detachments from the army." The author must surely have drank deep of Lethe's waters to have so soon forgotten his own route on this occasion, nay, a reference to his map would have convinced him of his mistake. The only body of troops detached at this time, was that under the command of Colonel Ferguson. To support this division, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, with about seven hundred men, upwards of three hundred of which were cavalry, crossed the Wateree a few miles above Camden, and advanced upon the West side of that river, immediately between the Royal army and Ferguson's corps. The assertion, therefore, that "He moved up the East side of the river," is a mis-statement of the fact, and calculated to produce conclusions remote from the truth.

[p46] The last part of this quotation is next to be considered: "The scarcity of forage in the district of the Waxhaws, was the principal reason for this temporary separation." As Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton seems resolved not to admit that the movement of his own corps could have the effect here pointed out, he should have assigned a weightier reason for such a separation. In fact, he is no less unfortunate in this, than in the two former assertions in the quotation before us. Far from being reduced to a scanty pittance of forage in the district of Waxhaws, after the army had remained there some weeks, a quantity might have been collected within five miles of their encampment, sufficient to supply their wants for several months. This reasoning is drawn from observations formed upon the spot, and though I am unable to produce official vouchers in justification, the proof may be safely rested with the officers who served in that army, and who were eye-witnesses [p47] of the extensive resources of the country.

Whenever I open this work, I either find an unexceptionable character attacked, a respectable one indirectly aspersed, or a display of atchievements by the author, or his corps, of which I had no idea previous to its publication. Thus, on taking possession of Charlottetown, he says, page 159, "An ambuscade was apprehended by the light troops, who moved forward for some time with great circumspection: a charge of cavalry, under Major Hanger, dissipated this ill-grounded jealousy, and totally dispersed the militia."

That a charge was ordered is readily admitted; that the Major was wounded in attempting to lead the dragoons to this charge, is well known; but no entreaties of his, no exertions of their officers, could, upon this occasion, induce the legion cavalry to approach the American [p48] militia. They retreated without fulfilling the intention of the General. He therefore, much dissatisfied, ordered the light and legion infantry to dislodge the enemy, which they immediately effected.

It is worthy of observation, that this journalist should so singularly misrepresent a variety of plain facts, and at the same time overlook, or pretend ignorance of others, that were obvious to the whole army.

He says, page 167, "The King's troops left Charlottetown on the evening of the 14th, to march to the Catawba Ford: owing to the badness of the road, the ignorance of the guides, the darkness of the night, and some other unknown cause, the British rear guard destroyed, or left behind, near twenty waggons."

It is totally immaterial to the present purpose, whether our author's unacquaintance [p49] with this loss was real or pretended. The cause, however, was known by every individual in that army. The guide at this time employed was a Doctor M------, a Presbyterian fanatick from Glasgow, the ambiguity of whose faith did not escape the discernment of the General. Under this distrust he was given in charge to a corporal and two dragoons of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's corps. The Doctor was too shrewd for his guards, and finding that they had no suspicion of his real design, he led the army, in a dark and rainy night, through thick woods, briars, deep ravines, marshes, and creeks scarcely fordable. After such a progress of six hours, the General grew impatient, the alarmed guide eluded the vigilance of the dragoons, and escaped unobserved. Left in such a situation, any army, where not one of the individuals which composed it knew where they were, might be well contented to come off with a loss so trifling as that of a few waggons.

[p50] As the author is so diffuse in his censures of the conduct of Earl Cornwallis, the farther consideration of this shall be the subject of my next.

I am, &c.

[p51] LETTER VI.

MY DEAR SIR,

THE object of my last letter was to point out some erroneous statements of the measures adopted by Earl Cornwallis for the conquest of North Carolina. The arguments of our author on that head require farther consideration. He says, page 168, "It was now evident, beyond contradiction, that the British General had not adopted the most eligible plan for the invasion of North Carolina. The route by Charlottetown, through the most [p52] hostile quarter of the province, on many accounts, was not advisable. Its distance likewise from Ferguson allowed the enemy to direct their attention and force against that officer, which ultimately proved his destruction. A movement on the West side of the Catawba, towards Tryon county, would have been better calculated either to cover the frontier of South Carolina, or to protect detachments from the army. Another operation might also have been attempted, which, in all probability, would have had a beneficial effect. Considering the force of the King's troops at this period, a march to Cross-Creek would have been the most rational manoeuvre that could have been adopted."

This is a novel species of reasoning. To strike at the principal force of the enemy, is undoubtedly the quickest, and most certain method of ensuring success. While the British General possessed Charlottetown, [p53] he overawed the surrounding districts; his route thither through the Waxhaws was judiciously chosen; that powerful and inveterate settlement was soon crushed, and his advance through the heart of the provinces afforded him an opportunity of attending to the extremities, as it was equally calculated to protect the frontiers of South Carolina, and the Loyalists at Cross-Creek.

In Polk's Mill alone, twenty-five thousand pounds weight of flour was captured; additional supplies could also have been procured from the Waxhaws, from the mills in the neighbourhood, and the adjacent plantations in great abundance. The author is condescending enough to admit, pages 159 and 160, that "Charlottetown afforded some conveniencies, blended with great disadvantages. The mills in its neighbourhood were supposed of sufficient consequence to render it, for the present, an eligible position, and, in future, a necessary post when [p54] the army advanced: but (he further says) the aptness of its intermediate situation between Camden and Salisbury, and the quantity of its mills, did not counterbalance its defects. The town and environs abounded with inveterate enemies; the plantations in the neighbourhood were small and uncultivated; the roads narrow, and crossed in every direction; and the whole face of the country covered with close and thick woods."

Many of the above remarks are inadmissible. No disastrous event, inferior to that which befel Ferguson, could possibly have given effect to the exertions of the inhabitants inimical to the British government around Charlottetown; their whole force, though directed against a detachment consisting of thirty men, under the command of Lieutenant Guyon of the 23d regiment, was repulsed with disgrace. The roads in every direction from that place to Camden, to Salisbury, [p55] to Tryon county, are perfectly good, and surpassed by none on the continent of America. The soil is fertile and productive, and few counties, so far from the sea-coast, are better cultivated and cleared of timber.

My ideas of the geography of the county present conclusions diametrically opposite to those of our author. I am at a loss to comprehend his meaning, when he says, that a march towards Tryon county would have been better calculated to protect detachments from the army, and, nearly in the same instant, points out a move to Cross-Creek to be the most rational manoeuvre that could have been adopted. If, on the one hand, he would convey this sense, that the army should have been divided, and employed on two different expeditions, the answer is obvious, that their force was by no means adequate to so hazardous an undertaking. Should he, on the other, content, that a movement either to Tryon county, or [p56] to Cross-Creek, would have produced the same effect, I aver, that these directions differ nearly as far as East does from West; consequently if Cross-Creek became the object of attention, the Western frontier would have been exposed, and if the army advanced by Tryon county, the Loyalists at Cross-Creek must have been sacrificed. If the reasoning of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton can be allowed, the greatest contradictions in military operations may be reconciled, and solecism may be an exploded term in our language. In fact, officers less honoured with the confidence of Earl Cornwallis than our author, well knew that his Lordship intended to approach Cross-Creek after being joined by Ferguson, and after establishing a post at Charlottetown. Indeed, this will appear by a letter, which our journalist has taken from the Remembrancer. Earl Cornwallis to Colonel Ferguson: "As soon as I have consumed the provisions in this settlement, I shall [p57] march with as much expedition as possible to Cross-Creek."¹⁰

As several very extraordinary circumstances, and such as no human foresight could guard against, contributed to Ferguson's melancholy catastrophe, it will be requisite to submit them to your inspection. They could scarcely be unknown to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, but as they would have militated against his arguments, had they been candidly stated, they were artfully suppressed, as their developement would have materially affected the reputation of his performance.

Ferguson had directions to advance on the left flank of the main army. His force consisted of about one hundred and fifty men from the provincial corps, in whom perfect confidence might on all occasions be placed, and from one to two thousand militia, a fluctuating body, [p58] whose numbers could not be depended upon, as they increased, or diminished, with the report of the day. With these he proceeded when the army began its march. At this juncture, direct intelligence of the defeat of Clarke before Augusta, and of his retreat to North Carolina, through the back country, was conveyed to the unfortunate Ferguson. A spirit of enterprize with which few are gifted, a zeal peculiar to great minds, an affection for his prince, and a pure sense of true patriotism, probably impelled him to exceed the strict injuctions imposed on him by the General on the present occasion. He determined to strike at Clarke, and with this intention advanced towards Tryon county. A swarm of backwoods-men, who had originally different objects in view, were easily prevailed upon to unite their force. The wild and fierce inhabitants of Kentucky, and other settlements westward of the Allegany mountains, under the Colonels Campbell and Boone, and those of Holston, [p59] Powel's Valley, Berkley, Bottetourt, Augusta and Fincastle, under the Colonels Cleveland, Shelby, Sevier, Williams, Brandon and Lacey, assembled suddenly and silently. Each man was well mounted, and furnished with a rifle and some provisions: no incumbrance of waggons, no publick departments, impeded the movements of these hardy mountaineers. The division from beyond the mountains advanced, with intention to seize upon a quantity of presents which they understood were but slightly guarded at Augusta, and which were, about that time, to have been distributed among a body of Creek and Cherokee Indians assembled at that place: the other division intended, at least, to obstruct the advance of the British army towards their settlements. The rough reception which Clarke had met with from Colonel Brown, induced him to magnify the force at Augusta in such lively colours, as totally to stop any proceedings against that post; and a supposed superiority caused them to decline [p60] direct opposition to Earl Cornwallis. They therefore selected fifteen hundred picked men, and having marched these on fleet horses, they by rapid marches soon came up with the gallant Ferguson. Having thus accounted for the unexpected combination of force by which he was destroyed, I shall reserve his conduct in the action at King's Mountain for another letter.

I am, &c.

[p61] LETTER VII.

MY DEAR SIR,

THE forte of the unfortunate Major Ferguson was not retreat but perseverance. He halted upon King's Mountain, an advantageous ground, to receive his enemy; but as the last act of this gallant partisan has been so slightly passed over by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, we must have recourse to an American author, who has discovered no partiality for British characters, for a striking portrait of the intrepidity of that distinguished officer.

[p62] Ramsey, in describing this action, observes, Vol. II. pages 183 and 184, "The picquet soon gave way, and were pursued as they retired up the mountain to the main body. Colonel Ferguson, with the greatest bravery, ordered his men to charge. The Americans, commanded by Colonel Cleveland, followed his advice, and, having fired as long as they could with safety, they retired from the approaching bayonet. They had scarcely given way when the other detachment, commanded by Colonel Shelby, having completed the circuit of the mountain, opportunely arrived, and from an unexpected quarter poured in a well directed fire. Colonel Ferguson desisted from the pursuit, and engaged with his new adversaries. The British bayonet was again successful, and caused them also to fall back. By this time the party commanded by Colonel Campbell had ascended the mountain, and renewed the attack from that eminence. Colonel Ferguson, whose conduct [p63] was equal to his courage, presented a new front, and was again successful; but all his exertions were unavailing. At this moment the men who began the attack, no less obedient to the second request of their commander in returning to their posts, than they were to the first in securing themselves by a timely retreat, had rallied and renewed their fire. As often as one of the American parties were driven back, another returned to their station. Resistance on the part of Colonel Ferguson was in vain; but his unconquerable spirit refused to surrender. After having repulsed a succession of adversaries pouring in their fire from new directions, this distinguished officer received a mortal wound."

Thus fell Major Patrick Ferguson, a gentleman whose virtues and accomplishments were universally admired. In the commencement of the war, he lamented the destruction caused in the British army [p64] by the American marksmen, and exerted his genius in constructing a rifle, which loaded with greater celerity, and fired with superior exactitude to those in use with the enemy, thus counteracting them at their own weapons. While belonging to a regiment which occupied the peaceful garrison of Halifax in Nova-Scotia, he disdained inglorious ease, embarked for England, solicited and obtained the command of a corps which was entirely equipped upon his own principles. By his vigilance and activity in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, he acquired the confidence of the Commander in Chief, and improved it by subsequent services at Stony Point, and in several desultory descents upon the enemies coast. All these had the effect of equally distressing the Americans, and raising their ideas of British valour.

In the year 1780 he was appointed to a command formed of detachments selected from the Provincial corps, and [p65] embarked on the expedition which reduced Charlestown. His talent for enterprise attracted the notice of the whole army: military tacticks had been his early and favourite study; and his knowledge was drawn from the purest sources. To a distinguished capacity for planning the greatest designs, he added the ardour necessary to carry them into execution. He was therefore charged with the measure of supporting, and at the same time disciplining, the numerous bodies of Loyalists with which the interior districts of the Carolinas abounded; and it was in the prosecution of this trust that he met his fate upon King's Mountain, in the manner before related. In private life, his humanity and benevolence were conspicuous; his friendships were steady and sincere. In his professional capacity he thirsted after fame, and perished in its pursuit. Considered as a scholar, his genius was solid, his comprehension clear, and his erudition extensive. This serene fortitude which he evinced in his [p66] latest moments, strongly pourtrayed his military virtues.

In the account which Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton has given to the world of this action, he brings a charge, equally unjust and cruel, against Captain Depeister of the King's American regiment, upon whom the command devolved after the death of Colonel Ferguson. The charge is unjust, because it is without foundation; and cruel, because it strikes at the reputation of an officer now in Nova Scotia, and consequently incapable of confronting the accuser or the accusation. He says, page 165, "No effort was made after this event (the death of Ferguson) to resist the enemy's barbarity, or revenge the fall of their leader."

A periodical publication had conveyed a similar reflection upon Captain Depeister, while a prisoner to the Americans. Captain Taylor of the New Jersey Volunteers, [p67] and Lieutenant Allair of the Loyal American regiment, the only officers of Ferguson's detachment then in Charlestown, made affidavit, that the conduct of Captain Depeister, in the action in question, both before and after the death of Ferguson, was, in their opinion, in every respect proper, and such as either of them would have pursued, had they been similarly circumstanced. This affidavit was published in the Charlestown Gazette, and Ramsay confirms it, thus: "No chance of escape being left, and all prospect of successful resistance being at an end, the second in command sued for quarter."

I have now given you the opinions of two British officers who were in the action, corroborated by the relation of the American historian, and leave you to judge whether it would not have been more generous and candid in Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton to have governed his [p68] account by testimony so unequivocal, than to have followed the unfounded aspersions of an anonymous writer.

I am, &c.

[p69] LETTER VIII.

MY DEAR SIR,

MUCH has been said, by different authors, on the partiality with which actions in the Carolinas, have been reported, and by no less than official authority; the causes, however, which they have assigned for such misrepresentations, are equally, as themselves, remote from the truth; the general idea by which they were misled, is, that Earl Cornwallis was induced to make favourable [p70] reports, with the direct design of keeping up the spirits of the militia abroad, and giving vigour to the exertions of administration. While then it is granted, that much exultation has been displayed in celebrating victories which had no existence, it still remains certain, that the occasion of it was not design in the General, but the false colouring of the accounts which he received. Let us inquire how well this observation is founded.

With all due respect for the character of Earl Cornwallis, as being much above any suspicion of wilful intention to mislead, I must, however, take the liberty to say, that his Lordship's testimony, in the present case, is entirely out of the question. The General detaches Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton on an expedition a considerable distance from the army, and receives a report from him of a victory. Upon this report, he founds his official dispatches, and our author is for some [p71] time hailed as victor, from Wynnesborough to Camden, from Camden to Charlestown, from Charlestown to New-York, and from thence to London. At Liverpool, bonfires are lighted up in honour of their favourite hero. After several years have elapsed, he still presents the world with his claim to victory. He goes farther, and with a truly curious address holds forth the dispatches of Earl Cornwallis, though entirely founded on his own reports, as vouchers for the veracity of his assertions.

With some men of inventive genius, the sallies of imagination are so exuberant, as only to require frequent repetition to obtrude them on the mind for truths. We proceed to an examination of our author's account of the action at Blackstocks, on the 20th of November, 1780.

Pages 178 and 179, "The great road to the ford across the river passed [p72] through the center of the Americans, and close to the doors of houses where the main body was stationed. The whole position was visible, owing to the elevation of the ground, and this formidable appearance made Tarleton halt upon the opposite height, where he intended to remain quiet till his infantry and three-pounder arrived: to encourage the enemy to do the same, he dismounted the 63d to take post, and part of the cavalry to ease their horses. Sumpter observing this operation, ordered a body of four hundred Americans to advance, and attack the 63d in front, whilst another party approached the dragoons in flank. A heavy fire and sharp conflict ensued; the 63d charged with fixed bayonets, and drove the enemy back; and a troop of cavalry, under Lieutenant Skinner, bravely repulsed the detachment which threatened the flank. The ardour of the 63d carried them too far, and exposed them to a considerable [p73] fire from the buildings and the mountain. Though the undertaking appeared hazardous, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton determined to charge the enemy's center with a column of dragoons, in order to cover the 63d, whose situation was now become dangerous. The attack was conducted with great celerity, and was attended with immediate success. The cavalry soon reached the houses, and broke the Americans, who from that instant began to disperse: the 63d immediately rallied, and darkness put an end to the engagement. A pursuit across a river, with a few troops of cavalry, and a small body of infantry, was not advisable in the night; a position was therefore taken adjoining to the field of battle, to wait the arrival of the light and legion-infantry.

"An express was sent to acquaint Earl Cornwallis with the success of his troops." He farther observes, that [p74] "Three of the enemy's Colonels fell in the action."

Ramsay describes this affair in the following manner, Volume II. page 189: "On the 20th of the same month, General Sumpter was attacked at Blackstocks, near Tyger river, by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, at the head of a considerable party. The action was severe and obstinate. The killed and wounded of the British was considerable. Among the former were three officers, Major Money, Lieutenants Gibson and Cope. The Americans lost very few, but General Sumpter received a wound, which for several months interrupted his gallant enterprises on behalf of the state. And again, in recording the sense which Congress had of this action, we find, page 469, thanks given by them to Sumpter and his party in the general orders of their Southern American army, for "The repulse of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, [p75] and the British cavalry and infantry under his command, at Blackstocks, on Tyger river."

To the two distinct accounts now laid before you, I shall subjoin a third, which you will undoubtedly deem preferable to either, as it is collected from the concurrent testimony of several officers of veracity, who were actors in that engagement.

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, without waiting for the rest of his detachment, made a precipitate attack with one hundred and seventy dragoons, and eighty men of the 63d regiment, upon the enemy, under the command of General Sumpter, strongly posted on Blackstock Hill, and amounting to about five hundred. That part of the hill, to which the attack was directed, was nearly perpendicular, with a small rivulet, brush wood, and a railed fence in front. Their rear, and part of their right flank were secured [p76] by the river Tyger, and their left was covered by a large log barn, into which a considerable division of their force had been thrown, and from which, as the apertures between the logs served them for loop holes, they fired with security. British valour was conspicuous in this action; but no valour could surmount the obstacles and disadvantages that here stood in its way. The 63d was roughly handled; the commanding officer, two others, with one-third of their privates, fell. Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, observing their situation, charged with his cavalry; unable to dislodge the enemy, either from the log barn or the height upon his left, he was obliged to fall back. Lieutenant Skinner, attached to the cavalry, with a presence of mind ever useful in such emergencies, covered the retreat of the 63d. In this manner did the whole party continue to retire, till they formed a junction with their infantry, who were advancing to sustain them, leaving Sumpter in quiet possession of the [p77] field. This officer occupied the hill for several hours, but having received a bad wound, and knowing that the British would be reinforced before next morning, he thought it hazardous to wait. He accordingly retired, and taking his wounded men with him, crossed the rapid river Tyger, while the victorious Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton retreated some distance, Parthian like, conquering as he flew. The wounded of the British detachment were left to the mercy of the enemy, and it is but doing bare justice to General Sumpter, to declare, that the strictest humanity took place upon the present occasion; they were supplied with every comfort in his power.

You have been previously apprized, that the American historian, laudably, takes every opportunity to celebrate the actions, and record the death of those of his countrymen who fell in battle. He has, indeed, mentioned the wounds of General Sumpter, but is silent on the fall [p78] of the three Colonels described by our author. The real truth is, that the Americans being well sheltered, sustained very inconsiderable loss in the attack; and as for the three Colonels, they must certainly have been imaginary beings, "Men in buckram," created merely to grace the triumph of a victory, which the British army in Carolina were led to celebrate, amidst the contempt and derision of the inhabitants, who had much better information.

I am, &c.

Continue...

Notes:

¹ Goodall, Tytler, Steuart, and Whitaker. [ back ]

² Natural Historians relate, that this insect is, in the first period of its existence, a crawling grub; in the second, a fluttering useless fly; and that in the third -- it dies. [ back ]

³ Earl Cornwallis was, at the time that Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton published his History, and is at present, Governor General in India. [ back ]

⁴ Vide page 2. [ back ]

⁵ Vide Ramsay. [ back ]

⁶ Vide General Howe's Official Letter of the 30th of November, 1776. [ back ]

⁷ Boswel's Account of Corsica. [ back ]

⁸ Critical Review, May, 1787. [ back ]

⁹ General Gates had attained the rank of Major in the British service. Upon the commencement of the American war, he took an active part in the affairs of that country, and was the officer who captured an army at Saratoga. [ back ]

¹⁰ Vide page 192. [ back ]