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[p79] LETTER IX.

MY DEAR SIR,

I NOW proceed to examine the account which our author has given to the world of his defeat at Cowpens, but previous to this investigation it will be necessary to inquire, what degree of credit is due to his description of the advance to the field of battle. The traits of self-importance which it contains are too apparent to escape the notice of any reader; in his relation of circumstances antecedent to this disaster, [p80] he says, pages 211, and 212, that in a letter to Earl Cornwallis, "He represented the course to be taken, which fortunately corresponded with the scheme of the campaign: he mentioned the mode of proceeding to be employed against General Morgan: he proposed the same time, for the army and light troops to commence their march: he explained the point to be attained by the main body: and he declared, that it should be his endeavour to push the enemy into that quarter." How rapid was the advance of this gentleman to the summit of military knowledge!

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton landed in America in the year 1777, with the rank of Cornet of Dragoons, and in the beginning of January, 1781, we find him the primum mobile, the master spring which puts the whole machinery of the army in motion. It is a received maxim to listen with caution to the hero of his own story; but we are naturally prepossessed [p81] in favour of those who speak modestly of themselves, and honourably of others; my present object, however, is to consider how far our author has followed the line which he declares himself to have prescribed.

He says, page 220, "The distance between Wynnesborough and King's Mountain, or Wynnesborough and Little Broad River, which would have answered the same purpose, does not exceed sixty-five miles: Earl Cornwallis commenced his march on the 7th or 8th of January. It would be mortifying to describe the advantages that might have resulted from his Lordship's arrival at the concerted point, or to expatiate upon the calamities which were produced by this event.

The imputed censures in the above passage demand a dispassionate investigation. Let us admit, that the possession of King's [p82] Mountain was a point preconcerted between Earl Cornwallis and Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton; it shall also be granted, that the attainment of that eminence by the main body, was a measure well calculated to cut off Morgan's retreat; neither is it meant to be denied that Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton used means to overtake the American detachment which do him no discredit: but granting all that, it is contended, that the rapidity of his movements did not afford Earl Cornwallis time to arrive at the point above-mentioned; and it shall be demonstrated, that an allowance of additional time for that arrival, was entirely in the power of our author; and farther, that it would have been attended with many conspicuous advantages.

His mode of reasoning, in the present instance, is invidious in the extreme, with respect to the General, and equally contemptuous of the judgment of every officer in his army: it is a bold stroke of imposition [p83] even upon the common sense of mankind: because it will be readily granted, by every person, that a march of sixty-five miles may easily be made out in the course of ten days, he, therefore, eagerly takes advantage of the obvious fact, to support his uniform drift, of attempting to render the General reprehensible. And as his Lordship commenced his march on the 7th or 8th, if difficulties and obstacles, which our author artfully conceals, had not intervened, he might certainly have arrived at the place of destination by the 17th. But let us take a candid and impartial review of this matter, and it will clearly appear, that this censurer of his General's conduct had no right to expect the arrival of the army at King's Mountain, by the time which he specifies.

We have his own testimony, pages 219 and 248, of his having received due information that the army on the 14th had not got farther than Bull Run. [p84] This then is the point, both with respect to time and distance, from which we are to estimate the movements of the main body, as well as of the detachment; and hence are we to fix the criterion from which we are to derive our judgment of the subsequent conduct of both commanders.

The distance of Bull Run, where the General was on the 14th, from King's Mountain, is forty-five miles. Our author's position at the same period of time, was not more remote from the spot of his precipitate engagement with the enemy than thirty miles. This engagement took place on the morning of the 17th, before one hour of day light had passed. Instead therefore of an allowance of ten days, for a march of sixty-five miles, we now find, in fact, that the General had only two days to perform a march of forty-five miles; and it is but bare justice to point out the many obstacles which the army, on this occasion, had to surmount.

[p85] Both the ground through which his Lordship had to pass, and the weather, opposed all possibility of a quick progress. Every step of his march was obstructed by creeks and rivulets, all of which were swelled to a prodigious height, and many rendered quite unfordable, in consequence of a heavy fall of rain of several weeks; to these difficulties were also added, the incumbrance of a train of artillery, military stores, baggage, and all the other necessary appointments of an army. On the other hand, our author had only to lead on about a thousand light troops, in the best condition, and as little incumbered as possible; with these, as I can assuredly attest, by swimming horses and felling trees for bridges, means which were impracticable to his Lordship's army, he came up with the enemy much sooner than was expected.

I have now laid before you a simple and fair statement of the advance, as well [p86] of the army as of the detachment, previous to the unfortunate action at Cowpens, and furnished you with a clue by which you may unravel the windings and doublings of our author, in anxious quest of materials for censure of a General irreprehensible in every part of his conduct, during the whole of this march.

Our author's words, page 220, are, "Earl Cornwallis might have conceived, that by attending to the situation of the enemy, and of the country, and by covering his light troops, he would, in all probability, have alternately brought Generals Morgan and Green into his power by co-operative movements: he might also have concluded, that all his parties that were beaten in the country, if they had no corps to give them instant support or refuge, must be completely destroyed. Many instances of this nature occurred during the war. The fall of Ferguson was a recent and melancholy example: that catastrophe [p87] put a period to the first expedition into North Carolina, and the affair of the Cowpens overshadows the commencement of the second."

The real province of a historian is to relate facts; by this principle he should abide; whenever he deviates from it, and indulges a fanciful vein of conjecture concerning probable contingencies, if not totally divested of partiality, he is certain of misleading his readers. That our author was not aware of the force of this remark, is sufficiently evinced. His Lordship's attention to the situation of the enemy, of the country, and of his own detachments, has been, with respect to Ferguson, already pointed out. He neither advised the advance of that unfortunate partisan into the back settlements, nor was even apprised of it; having, therefore, no concern in the measure, he could not, in any justice, be responsible for its consequences, and it is the height of illiberality [p88] to throw reproach upon him on that account.

Of all men, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton should be the last to censure Earl Cornwallis for not destroying Morgan's force; as it will appear that the provision made for that service was perfectly sufficient; and though it can by no means be admitted that his Lordship could have manoeuvred so as to get General Green into his power after the defeat at Cowpens; it may, however, be affirmed, that if the troops lost on that occasion had escaped the misfortunate which befel them, and had been combined with the British force at the battle of Guildford, the victory must have been much more decisive; and General Green would probably have brought off as few of his army, as his predecessor in command, General Gates, did at Camden.

[p89] I will hazard an additional reflection: Had Earl Cornwallis not been deprived of his light troops, the blockade at York Town had never taken place; and the enemies of our country, in consequence of the signal successes which attended a Rodney and a Heathfield, would have sued for that peace, the terms of which they afterwards prescribed.

As the effect of the defeat at Cowpens was of so serious a nature, it becomes necessary to state the purpose for which Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was detached; to inquire how far the force placed under his command was adequate to the service it was sent to perform; to examine whether proper use was made of the advantages which occurred on the morning of the 17th of January, both before and during the action, and to trace to its very source, a fountain that overflowed with [p90] blood, and swept along its torrent destruction to the interests of Great Britain.

I am, &c.

[p91] LETTER X.

MY DEAR SIR,

THE defeat of the British detachment at Cowpens, which I informed you would be the subject of this letter, has been variously represented by different authors; it is a point, however, in which they all agree, that at a particular stage of the engagement the whole of the American infantry gave way, and, that the legion-cavalry, though three times the number of those of the enemy, contributed nothing to complete their confusion.

[p92] Ramsay states this action as follows, Volume II. page 196: "The British had two field-pieces, and the superiority of numbers in the proportion of five to four, and particularly of cavalry, in the proportion of three to one." And again, "General Morgan had obtained early intelligence of Tarleton's force and advances, and drew up his men in two lines. The whole of the southern militia, with one hundred and ninety from North Carolina, under Major M'Dowal, were put under the command of Colonel Pickens. These formed the first line, and were advanced a few hundred yards before the second, with orders to form on the right of the second when forced to retire. The second line consisted of the light infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Howard, and a small corps of Virginia militia riflemen. Lieutenant Colonel Washington, with his cavalry, and about forty-five militia men mounted and equipped with swords, under Lieutenant [p93] Colonel M'Call, were drawn up at some distance, in the rear of the whole." He farther says, "The American militia were obliged to retire, but were soon rallied by their officers. The British advanced rapidly, and engaged the second line, which, after a most obstinate conflict, was compelled to retreat to the cavalry."

The Marquis de Chastellux, in his Travels in North America, accounts for this defeat thus: "General Morgan drew up his men in order of battle, in an open wood, and divided his riflemen upon the two wings, so as to form in the line a kind of tennaille, which collected the whole fire both directly and obliquely on the center of the English; but after the first discharge, he made so dangerous a movement, that had he commanded the best troops in the world, I should be at a loss to account for it. He ordered the whole line to wheel to the right, and after retreating [p94] thirty or forty paces, made them halt, and re-commence the fire." And again, "Whatever was the motive of this singular manoeuvre, the result of it was the defeat of Tarleton, whose troops gave way on all sides, without a possibility of rallying. Fatigued by a very long march, they were soon overtaken by the American militia."

The Annual Register for 1781 gives the following account: On the American militia giving way, "their second line having opened on the right and left, as well to lead the victors on, as to afford a clear passage to the fugitives, as soon as the former were far enough advanced, poured in a close and deadly fire on both sides, which took the most fatal effect." Our author is so materially concerned, as the principal agent in this scene of ruin, that an impartial account is not to be expected from him; his statement of his own conduct on that day, if authentick, would [p95] do honour to the immortal Frederick!

The Marquis's exposition of the cause of the defeat, in spite of his assertion, that it has the sanction of General Morgan, is flimsy and erroneous. The editor of the Annual Register has been deceived; consequently, of these several accounts, that given by Doctor Ramsay deserves most attention.

I was upon the detachment in question, and the narrative which I now offer has been submitted to the judgment of several respectable officers, who were also in this action, and it has met with their intire approbation.

Towards the latter end of December, 1780, Earl Cornwallis received intelligence, that General Morgan had advanced to the westward of the Broad River, with about one thousand men. Two-thirds of this force were militia, [p96] about one hundred of them cavalry, the rest continentals. His intention was to threaten Ninety Six, and to distress the western frontiers. To frustrate these designs, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was detached with the light and legion-infantry, the fusileers, the first battalion of the 71st regiment, about three hundred and fifty cavalry, two field-pieces, and an adequate proportion of men from the royal artillery; in all near a thousand strong. This corps, after a process of some days, arrived at the vicinity of Ninety Six, a post which was then commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Allen. An offer of a reinforcement from that garrison was made to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton. The offer was rejected; and the detachment, by fatiguing marches, attained the ground which Morgan had quitted a few hours before: This position was taken about ten o'clock in the evening of the 16th of January. The pursuit re-commenced by two o'clock the next morning, and was rapidly continued [p97] through marshes and broken grounds till day-light, when the enemy were discovered in front. Two of their videttes were taken soon after; these gave information that General Morgan had halted, and prepared for action; he had formed his troops as described by Ramsey, in an open wood, secured neither in front, flank, nor rear. Without the delay of a single moment, and in despite of extreme fatigue, the light-legion infantry and fusileers were ordered to form in line. Before this order was put in execution, and while Major Newmarsh, who commanded the latter corps, was posting his officers, the line, far from complete, was led to the attack by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton himself. The seventy-first regiment and cavalry, who had not as yet disentangled themselves from the brushwood with which Thickelle Creek abounds, were directed to form, and wait for orders. The military valour of British troops, when not entirely divested of the powers necessary to its exertion, was not to be [p98] resisted by an American militia. They gave way on all quarters, and were pursued to their continentals: the second line, now attacked, made a stout resistance. Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy. He cut his way through their line, but exposed to a heavy fire, and charged at the same time by the whole of Washington's dragoons, was compelled to retreat in confusion. The reserve, which as yet had no orders to move from its first position, and consequently remained near a mile distant, was not directed to advance. when the line felt "the advance of the seventy-first, all the infantry again moved on: the continentals and backwoods-men gave ground: the British rushed forwards: an order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge¹¹." This order, however, if such was then thought of, being either not delivered or disobeyed, [p99] they stood aloof, without availing themselves of the fairest opportunity of reaping the laurels which lay before them. The infantry were not in condition to overtake the fugitives; the latter had not marched thirty miles in the course of the last fortnight; the former, during that time, had been in motion day and night. A number, not less than two-thirds of the British infantry officers, had already fallen, and nearly the same proportion of privates; fatigue, however, enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss of blood. Morgan soon discovered that the legion-cavalry did not advance, and that the infantry, though well disposed, were unable to come up with his corps: he ordered Colonel Washington, with his dragoons, to cover his retreat, and to check the pursuit. He was obeyed; and the protection thus afforded, gave him an opportunity of rallying his scattered forces. They formed, renewed the attack, and charged in their turn. In disorder from the pursuit, unsupported by [p100] the cavalry, deprived of the assistance of the cannon, which in defiance of the utmost exertions of those who had them in charge, were not left behind, the advance of the British fell back, and communicated a panick to others, which soon became general: a total rout ensued. Two hundred and fifty horse which had not been engaged, fled through the woods with the utmost precipitation, bearing down such officers as opposed their flight: the cannon were soon seized by the Americans, the detachment from the train being either killed or wounded in their defence; and the infantry were easily overtaken, as the cause which had retarded the pursuit, had now an equal effect in impeding the retreat; dispirited on many accounts, they surrendered at discretion. Even at this late stage of the defeat, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, with no more than fifty horse, hesitated not to charge the whole of Washington's cavalry, though supported by the continentals; it was a small body of officers, [p101] and a detachment of the seventeenth regiment of dragoons, who presented themselves on this desperate occasion; the loss sustained was in proportion to the danger of the enterprise, and the whole body was repulsed.

Whether in actions of importance, or slight skirmishes, I every where can trace exaggerated accounts of this author's prowess. On his retreat after the above defeat, he says, page 218, "Another party of the Americans, who had seized upon the baggage of the British troops on the road from the late encampment, were dispersed." Earl Cornwallis, in his dispatches to the Commander in Chief, writes, that "Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton retook the baggage of the corps, and cut to pieces the detachment of the enemy who had taken possession of it; and after destroying what they could not conveniently bring off, retired with the remainder, unmolested, to Hamilton's Ford." And the Annual Register for 1781 says, [p102] that our author "had the fortune of retaking the baggage, the slender guard in whose custody it was left being cut to pieces." All these misrepresentations have originated from one and the same source; the fact however stands thus:

A detachment from each corps, under the command of Lieutenant Fraser of the 71st regiment (who was afterwards killed at York Town), had been left at some distance to guard the baggage; early intelligence of the defeat was conveyed to this officer by some friendly Americans; what part of the baggage could not be carried off he immediately destroyed, and with his men mounted on the waggon, and spare horses, he retreated to Earl Cornwallis unmolested; nor did he, on this occasion, see any of the American horse or foot, or of the party then under our author's directions. This was the only body of infantry that escaped, the rest were either killed or made prisoners. The dragoons joined the army in two separate divisions; [p103] one arrived in the neighbourhood of the British encampment upon the evening of the same day, at which time his Lordship had the mortification to learn the defeat of his detachment; the other, under Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, appeared next morning.

I am, &c.

[p104] LETTER XI.

MY DEAR SIR,

AS a circumstantial detail of the action at Cowpens was given to you in my last letter, observations upon the causes of that disaster shall be the subject of this.

You have already my opinion, that Earl Cornwallis is incapable of wilful misrepresentation; leaving then to the judgment of others, the propriety of producing [p105] a confidential letter¹², written by his Lordship in the goodness of his heart, evidently with design to console our author under a severe misfortune, and never meant for publication; I only contend, that this letter, is altogether inadequate to the purpose to which this journalist has converted it, that of transferring the blame from himself to the troops.

It has been before shewn, that the dispatches of Earl Cornwallis, with respect to the action at Blackstocks, had bestowed a laurel on Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, which should have adorned the [p106] brows of General Sumpter, but then, as now, his Lordship drew his information from a corrupted fountain. That the "unqualified decision" of that nobleman in favour of our author, in regard to the action of Cowpens, was made "without any opportunity of personal observation," has been happily noticed by others¹³. It is a transcript of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's report, and therefore, like the evidence of a man in his own cause, totally inadmissible.

Our author, through the whole of his narrative, seems to have had Julius Cæsar in view; but Cæsar's mind was above any occasion for recourse to vanity, ostentation, or detraction. It was his pride to bestow due praise on deserving officers, while this journalist distinguishes himself by lavishing reproaches directly on his General, and obliquely on others who had the misfortune of serving under his [p107] command. As an individual on this detachment, credit may be given me for an acquaintance with every circumstance which is here described. If to be disinterested is necessary for the investigation of truth, I come so far qualified for this task. Unconnected with party, devoid of spleen, and too unimportant to be affected by general reflections on collective bodies of military men, candour and impartiality may be allowed me -- But to proceed.

The first error in judgment to be imputed to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, on the morning of the 17th of January, 1781, is not halting his troops before he engaged the enemy. Had he done so, it was evident that the following advantages would have been the result of his conduct. General Morgan's force and situation might have been distinctly viewed, under cover of a very superior cavalry; the British infantry, fatigued with rapid marches, day and night, for [p108] some time past, as has been already observed, might have had rest and refreshment; a detachment from the several corps left with the baggage, together with batt-men, and officers servants, would have had time to come up, and join in the action. The artillery all this time might have been playing on the enemy's front, or either flank, without risque of insult; the commandants of regiments, Majors M'Arthur and Newmarsh, officers who held commissions long before our author was born, and who had reputations to this day unimpeached, might have been consulted, and, not to dwell on the enumeration of all the advantages which would have accrued from so judicious a delay, time would have been given for the approach of Earl Cornwallis to the preconcerted point, for the unattainment of which he has been so much and so unjustly censured.

The second error was, the un-officer-like impetuosity of directing the line to [p109] advance before it was properly formed, and before the reserve had taken its ground; in consequence of which, as might have been expected, the attack was premature, confused, and irregular.

The third error in this ruinous business, was the omission of giving discretional powers to that judicious veteran M'Arthur, to advance with the reserve, at the time that the front line was in pursuit of the militia, by which means the connection so necessary to troops engaged in the field was not preserved.

His fourth error was, ordering Captain Ogilvie, with a troop, consisting of no more than forty men, to charge, before an impression was made on the continentals, and before Washington's cavalry had been engaged.

The next, and the most destructive, for I will not pretend to follow him through all his errors, was in not bringing [p110] up a column of cavalry, and completing the rout, which, by his own acknowledgment, had commenced through the whole American invantry.

After what has been said, there may not, perhaps, be a better criterion to judge of the conduct of those corps, upon whom Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton has stamped the charge of "total misbehaviour," than by an examination of the state of discipline they were then under, of their general conduct upon every former occasion, and of the loss which they sustained on this.

The fusileers had served with credit in America from the commencement of the war, and under an excellent officer, General Clarke, had attained the summit of military discipline: they had at this time, out of nine officers who were in the action, five¹⁴ killed and wounded.

[p111] The first battalion of the 71st regiment, who had landed in Georgia in the year 1778, under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell, had established their reputation in the several operations in that province, at Stono Ferry, at the sieges of Savannah and Charlestown, and at the battle of Camden. Now, not inferior to the 7th regiment in discipline, they were led by an officer of great experience, who had come into the British service from the Scotch Dutch brigade: Out of sixteen officers¹⁵ which they had in the field, nine¹⁶ were killed and wounded.

[p112] The battalion of light infantry had signalised themselves separately on many occasions. The company of the 16th regiment was well known by its services in the army commanded by Major General Prevost; those of the seventy-first regiment were distinguished under Sir James Baird at the surprise of General Wayne in Pennsylvania, of Baylor's dragoons in New Jersey, at Briar Creek in Georgia, at the capture and subsequent defence of Savannah, at the battle near Camden under Earl Cornwallis; and even Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton did them justice at the defeat of Sumpter, just after the last mentioned action¹⁷.

The light infantry company of the Prince of Wales's American regiment, when but newly raised and indifferently disciplined, acquired reputation under General Tryon at Danbury; their only officer was here wounded¹⁸.

[p113] The infantry of the legion had seen much service, and had always behaved well: this our author will surely not deny.

The troop of the seventeenth regiment of dragoons, when ordered into action, displayed that gallantry with which they had stamped their character on every former occasion. They had here but two officers, both of whom were wounded, one mortally¹⁹. The detachment of artillery was totally annihilated.

Such were the troops whom this journalist has so severely stigmatised. Few corps, in any age or country, will be found to have bled more freely.

It is an established custom in armies for the commanding officer, whether victorious or vanquished, to account for the loss which he has sustained. In the [p114] present instance it requires no extraordinary sagacity to discover, that Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton had his own particular reasons for withholding such an account; and it is evident that had this loss of officers, to which that of the soldiers probably bore a near proportion, been faithfully published, the veracity of our author's account might have been justly called in question, and the cause of the defeat, instead of being left to a "perhaps," might have been reduced to a certainty.

In describing the particular incidents of this action, our journalist says, page 221, "The extreme extension of the files always exposed the British regiments and corps, and would, before this unfortunate affair, have been attended with detrimental effect, had not the multiplicity of lines with which they generally fought, rescued them from such imminent danger."

[p115] He still continues to furnish argument against himself; if his files were too extensive, why did he not contract them? for he says, in the same page, that "the disposition was planned with coolness, and executed without embarrassment." Any other mode of attack, or disposition, therefore, which he might have planned, would doubtless have been executed with equal promptitude. The latter part of this quotation is not less inconsistent. I would ask Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton in what action, during the campaigns of which he treats, did the multiplicity of lines rescue the British troops from imminent danger? and on what occasion did their front line, or any part thereof, give [way?] I believe it will be found that it fell to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton alone to lead the troops of Britain into a situation, from which they could be driven by an equal, or even by double or treble their number.

[p116] When Earl Cornwallis fought the memorable battle near Camden, his force, considerably under two thousand men, was opposed by upwards of six thousand. At Guildford, his Lordship, with not one third the number of his enemy, obtained a glorious victory over General Greene, the best commander in the American service; and Lord Rawdon upon Hobkirk's-Hill, routed the same General, who had now added experience to his other talents, and this, though his numbers compared with his enemy, did not bear the last mentioned proportion. Many other proofs could be brought of the fallacy of our author's reasoning, but these which have been adduced will, I trust, sufficiently shew the impossibility of forming a multiplicity of lines, with so manifest an inferiority of numbers; nay, I venture to affirm, that the disparity of force at Cowpens was smaller than it had been in any engagement during the southern campaigns, consequently, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton [p117] had it in his power to engage with greater advantages than occurred either previous to his defeat or since.

Ramsay has well observed, Volume II. page 203, "Whilst Lord Cornwallis was anticipating, in imagination, a rich harvest of glory, from a rapid succession of victories, he received the intelligence, no less unwelcome than unexpected, of the complete overthrow of the detachment led by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton. So contemptible, from their conduct at Camden, was his Lordship's opinion of the American militia -- so unlimited was his confidence in the courage and abilities of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, that, of all improbable events, none seemed to him more improbable, than that an inferior force, two-thirds militia, should gain such a decisive advantage over his favourite hero."

I have now done with the action at [p118] Cowpens, and on this occasion confess that I am not without my feelings as an individual for so wanton an attack on characters and entire corps, whose conduct had been, till then, unsullied. There is not an officer who survived that disastrous day, who is not far beyond the reach of slander and detraction; and with respect to the dead, I leave to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton all the satisfaction which he can enjoy, from reflecting that he led a number of brave men to destruction, and then used every effort in his power to damn their fame with posterity.

I am, &c.

[p119] LETTER XII.

MY DEAR SIR,

MY inability to follow Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton in his accounts of the progress of the British army through North Carolina and Virginia, is, unfortunately for me, of a nature²⁰ which precludes the necessity of apology. However, were I warranted to judge of minute particulars from his statement of important matters, I would say, [p120] that similar misrepresentations appear to pervade his whole work. The following instances will corroborate this assertion.

On the 26th of April, 1781, the Royal army commenced its march northwards from Wilmington. Our journalist says, page 284, "At this period, Major General Leslie's health being greatly impaired by the climate, his physicians advised his return to a colder latitude than the Carolinas and Virginia; upon which he prepared to embark for New York." And page 292, he says, "About this time (being one month afterwards) the arrival of a reinforcement from New York for the Chesapeak army, was announced to Earl Cornwallis: the Commander in Chief had dispatched General Leslie, whose health had benefited by the sea air on the late voyage, and who was always zealous for the publick service, with the seventeenth and forty-third regiments, [p121] and two battalions of Anspach, into Virginia, upon receiving news of the march from Wilmington."

From these passages it must be inferred, that General Leslie embarked at Wilmington -- arrived at New York -- received orders from the Commander in Chief to proceed to the Chesapeak with a reinforcement -- had been benefited by the sea air -- landed in Virginia -- and the whole of this in the course of one month. An attentive reader will see, page 343, a letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Byrd's Plantation in Virginia, May 26, 1781, in which his Lordship's words are, "The arrival of the reinforcement has made me easy about Portsmouth for the present. I have sent General Leslie thither with the seventeenth regiment, and the two battalions of Anspach, keeping the forty-third with the army." As these circumstances so glaringly contradict each other; it is from the most [p122] careful inquiry, and the best information that I am enabled to declare, that General Leslie's health, however bad, prevented him not from a zealous performance of his duty, as second in command, during the whole of this very fatiguing march; nor was he all that time nearer to the sea than Wilmington, and in general upwards of one hundred miles from it, though so much benefited by the visionary voyage which our author represents him to have made.

Before the departure of Earl Cornwallis from Wilmington, it is well known that various opinions had been formed of the measures the most proper to be adopted by the army; the opinion of many was in favour of the plan of following General Greene to South Carolina; the advice of others, which succeeded, was to march to Virginia; among the latter Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton does not wish to be classed²¹. The event [p123] of the march proving unfortunate, he either means to extricate himself from blame in advising it, or cannot resist his usual practice of censure. General report, however, says, that he actually recommended the movement of the army which then took place, and expressed his disapprobation of a return to South Carolina, by declaring, that his Lordship might as well order the throats of his horses to be cut, as adopt that measure. I would ask this journalist a plain question; did he not say to an officer on the route to Virginia, at a time when circumstances appeared particularly favourable, "that this march was a child of his own, and that he gloried in it?" This conversation he held with an officer²² of equal rank with himself, who by his zeal, courage, and activity, rendered the most effectial services in the Southern provinces, though too modest to become the herald of his own actions. If the above [p124] question cannot be answered in the negative, the reflections of this author on causes, after the effects are known, will appear as impotent, as his other attacks on the character of a nobleman, which will be venerated whilst a British soldier exists.

Leaving the further investigation of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's journal of the operations of the army under Earl Cornwallis to others, I proceed to make some observations upon his Appendix.

You was early in possession of my opinion, that the performance before us is deficient in every essential requisite to an history, and totally undeserving of that name. The longer I have continued to examine it, the stronger is my conviction of the truth of this opinion, and that the better founded will his judgment be, who may consider it as an incorrect and partial journal of military events, in which [p125] the author himself, directly or indirectly, had always some concern. But its claim to being esteemed an History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America, is more truly ridiculous, than that to an History of the World, if, according to a certain author, he had defined the world to be a circle of a given diameter, himself the center, and if, not intirely taken up with the contemplation of his own excellencies, he had really given an impartial and accurate detail of all the actions of all the beings, who moved, for a certain time, around his orbit.

Though it certainly did not require the abilities of a Tacitus, or a Livy, to comprehend and describe the operations of the British and American armies, in four adjacent provinces for two years, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, however, has shewn himself intirely unequal to the task. Always confined to the single point [p126] of relating events in his own neighbourhood, he has sometimes intirely omitted accounts of serious actions, gallant defences, and important operations in other places²³; and at the end of his book he gives, in his usual manner of description, the "elegant campaign" of 1781 in South Carolina, under the accommodating title of an APPENDIX.

The campaign was conducted by Lord Rawdon in every respect to his honour, and described in the official letters of that nobleman with admirable precision. When the declining state of his Lordship's health obliged him to relinquish the command of the army, its subsequent operations were circumstantially narrated by Colonels Steuart and Balfour.

[p127] A very large proportion of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's work is mere compilation. Take from his Appendix three letters from Lord Rawdon, one from Colonel Steuart, and one from Colonel Balfour, which had already been published in this country; separate also from it three letters from General Greene, and one from General Marion, likewise formerly published, and you will find an Appendix calculated "to render the work complete²⁴," reduced to a skeleton. Further, detach extracts from the Remembrancer and Annual Register, and this boasted completion of a work so ostentatious, and that promises so much, will, in consequence of such dismemberment, vanish into vapour. After all, so long as he confines himself to the simple transcription of these official letters, it is out of his power to mislead; but whenever he ventures to connect them, and adopts the errors of periodical publications, he is altogether himself.

[p128] The epithet of an "untried²⁵ enemy" is neither applicable to Lord Rawdon, nor to the troops which he commanded, as both his Lordship and a great part of his army had been in the action near Camden with Earl Cornwallis, and on many other services.

His information is extremely defective as to the reduction of Augusta. He has done little more than transcribe some of the summonses and answers. He neither points out the formidable state of the American army, nor relates the variety of stratagems that the brave Lieutenant Colonel Brown employed in its defence. As usual with this writer, the friends of the officers who fell are furnished with no record of their death²⁶.

[p129] No justice is done to the gallantry of Lieutenant M'Kay, who commanded at Fort Watson; -- the bravery displayed in its defence, and his wounds are alike unnoticed.

Of the defence of Ninety Six by Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, which I before observed was one of the most brilliant events of the war in that country, this author appears extremely ignorant; and the few circumstances of which he takes any notice are erroneous throughout.

A detail of the defence of that place, written by an officer²⁷ upon whose veracity I can rely, accompanies this letter, as also an account of the reduction of the island of New Providence. It is unnecessary to assure you, that the gentleman who furnished me with this detail was upon the spot, as it wears authenticity [p130] upon the face of it; and yet, from the diametrical opposition of his account, to many particulars of that of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, if any credit could be given to the latter, you would be tempted to doubt of the actual presence of the former in this transaction.

Of the nature of the fortifications, the readers of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's journal are left intirely in the dark, as he no where mentions whether they were regular or irregular, strong or weak, extensive or compact. They might have been, for any thing he says to the contrary, a tremendous citadel, an insignificant redoubt, or a simple entrenchment. The enemy and the besieged might have been either provided with heavy cannon, or the contrary.

His assertion in page 497, that "the American artillery had failed in their effect," is destitute of foundation. The account of this siege already mentioned, [p131] shews that the work upon the left, which preserved a communication with the water, was rendered untenable by the artillery of the besiegers. It was abandoned by us, and taken possession of by them on the 17th of June. But our journalist has fallen into this egregious mistake, by not having, to use his own language, "penetration enough to discover²⁸," that the letter of Lord Rawdon, of the 5th of June, page 479, could not convey any information of the execution done by the cannon of the enemy for fourteen days subsequent to its date.

Page 485 he says, that "the works were completed." This was so far from being the fact, that on the morning of the 21st of May, when the enemy had broke ground, the works were unfinished, and the platforms of the Star in no condition to receive guns.

[p132] In page 497, he proves to demonstration how miserable his information had been. According to him the attack was made "upon the 19th of June, before day;" and afterwards he says, General Greene put an end to the assault "by calling off the remainder before daylight." The truth however is, that the Americans assaulted the Star upon the 18th of June at noon.

As usual with this journalist, no notice whatever is taken of the officers who bled upon that occasion. Had he commanded at Ninety Six, in all human probability volumes would have been written upon the prowess then exhibited, and monodies on the loss even of his horses. But the gallantry of Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, and of his garrison, will be remembered with admiration, when these effusions of vanity "shall be carried down the stream of oblivion."

[p133] Nothing can be more unfortunate than this author in his extracts. If errors creep into a periodical print, he is sure to adopt them. Page 496, he assigns, as one of General Greene's motives for declining to engage the Royal army, upon their march to the relief of Ninety Six, his understanding that the British troops were "fresh." Now, that the editor of an Annual Register might fall into such a mistake is by no means extraordinary; but an assertion of this nature from Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, who must have been acquainted with situations and distances in that country, is not to be excused.

The greatest part of the army which Lord Rawdon commanded at that time, had on the 10th of May evacuated Camden, from which time to the 6th of June, they had been in continual motion, from Camden to Nelson's Ferry, to the junction of the roads from Congaree to M'Cord's Ferry, to the Ewtaws and to Monk's [p134] Corner. The other part of this army was the flank companies of three regiments just landed from Ireland. The whole moved upon the 7th of June, and made out a march of one hundred and eighty miles in the hottest weather, through a deserted and most sultry country, in thirteen days. These troops were then, in every respect, in a situation the reverse of being fresh. Though this had not been quite evident, the journalist himself, page 486, shews that "Lord Rawdon pressed his march with all the rapidity which the excessive heat of the weather would permit." And in page 498, he describes the troops which he before pronounced fresh, "spent with fatigue and overcome with heat." Thus does a visionary journalist detail his curious conjectures, and then, with a fatality which never forsakes him, contradict himself.

In this Appendix he appears with a peculiar ill grace; he cannot even [p135] pretend to the smallest participation in the transactions which he describes; while in the foregoing part of his work the name of TARLETON is constantly exhibited, like the talisman of a necromancer, possessing a charm which enhances the glory of victory, and palliates the disgrace of defeat.

In reading the work of the American historian, we cannot help admiring the laudable ambition which he discovers in describing the atchievements of his countrymen, and the elegant elegiac style in which he laments the loss of those who fell²⁹. But when his zeal betrays him into unmerited censures on Colonels Balfour, Moncreif, and other British officers; when he would persuade us that one hundred and eleven British soldiers were captured by three Americans, and that the brother of an English Duke solicited a commission in the service of Congress; [p136] we are compelled to deplore such a mixture of alloy with shining abilities.

He has engaged my esteem for having done no more than justice to Ferguson, and no less than justice to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton; his sentiments of the former are already in your possession, and with respect to the latter, read and judge³⁰.

"Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton had hitherto acquired distinguished reputation, but he was greatly indebted for his military fame to good fortune and accident. In all his previous engagements he either had the advantage of surprising an incautious enemy -- of attacking them when panick-struck after recent defeats -- or of being opposed to undisciplined militia. He had gathered no laurels by hard fighting against an equal force; his repulse on this occasion [p137] (Cowpens) did more essential injury to the British interest, than was compensated by all his victories. Tarleton's defeat was the first link, in a grand chain of causes, which finally drew down ruin, both in North and South Carolina, on the Royal interest."

I am, &c.

[p138 is blank.]

[p139] SIEGE
OF
NINETY SIX

NOTWITHSTANDING the brilliant victory obtained by a corps of his Majesty's toops, led by the Right Honourable Lord Rawdon, over the American army, commanded by General Greene, on the 25th of April, 1781, at Hobkirk's Hill, the disaffection of the inhabitants of South Carolina, a perfidious people, whose allegiance to the British [p140] government neither promises could bind nor oaths secure³¹, became so general, [p141] that it was necessary for his Lordship to abandon Camden, and march towards the sea coast, for the purpose of receiving expected reinforcements, covering the lower country, and for the protection of even Charlestown itself. In performance of this resolution, the Royal army fell back to Nelson's Ferry, and Lord Rawdon dispatched repeated expresses to Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, then commanding at Ninety Six, a post upon the Western frontiers of the province, with directions to withdraw his garrison, join that the Augusta, on the confines of Georgia, at about sixty miles distance, and, taking the command of the whole, act as occasion might require; but none of these orders having reached Ninety Six, in consequence of the constant interception of his Lordship's dispatches, as also of those of Colonel Balfour, Lieutenant Colonel Cruger remained intirely ignorant of the situation of the army commanded by Lord Rawdon; nor had he any other advice of the action near Camden, and the subsequent [p142] evacuation of that place, but from an American officer who was made prisoner.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CRUGER being, from unavoidable necessity, thus left to himself, very reasonably concluded, that a large corps, if not the whole of the American army would assail him, and in this conjucture began to put the works of the place in the best possible state of defence.

The village of Ninety Six derives its name from being that number of miles from the town of Keewee, in the country of the Cherokees; its houses, which were intirely of wood, were comprised within a stockade. The commandant immediately set the whole garrison, both officers and men, to work, to throw up a bank, parapet high, around this stockade, and to strengthen it with an abbatis. Upon the left of the village was a ravine, through which ran a rivulet, that supplied the [p143] place with water. The county prison was fortified, and commanded the ravine upon one side, and a stockade on the left covered it on the other; but the only part of these works which deserved the name of regular, was upon the right. This was planned some time before, by Lieutenant Haldane of the engineers, Aid de Camp to Earl Cornwallis; it consisted of sixteen salient and re-entering angles, with a dry ditch, fraise and abbatis, and was called the STAR.

The indefatigable industry of the garrison, animated by the example of the commandant, had, on this occasion, erected block houses in the village, made caponiers³², by which one part of the works communicated with the other, and had thrown up traverses, to prevent the execution [p144] of shells and ricochet shot, which was to be apprehended.

The garrison consisted of about one hundred and fifty men of the first battalion of Delancey's, with two hundred of the second battalion of New Jersey Volunteers. These crops having been raised in the year 1776, were well disciplined, and, from the active services in which they had been engaged, ever since their first landing in Georgia, had become equal to any troops. To these were added about two hundred loyal militia, under Colonel King. Motives of policy, as well as humanity, induced Lieutenant Colonel Cruger to advise the latter to quit the garrison, and, as they were provided with good horses, to effect their retreat, either to Charlestown or to Georgia, for he apprehended, that in case of a long siege, their numbers might cause a want of provisions; and he knew, that no capitulation, for securing to those unfortunate men the rights of war, observed [p145] by civilised nations, could be depended upon; but these Loyalists, though in a manner fighting with halters around their necks, were not to be dismayed; they turned their horses into the woods, made a point of remaining with the garrison and abiding by its fate.

One hundred and fifty regulars, with fifty militia men, were selected to occupy the STAR, and the commandant manifested his usual judgment in committing the defence of this important place to MAJOR GREEN of Delancey's. Having placed a Captain's party and some militia in the stockade upon the left, a subaltern's guard in the prison, and having assigned proper divisions to the several block houses, Lieutenant Colonel Cruger reserved the remainder of the troops under his own immediate command in the village.

As there were only three three-pounders, a very small quantity of ammunition [p146] for these guns, and but one matross in the garrison, the want of artillery was severely felt. Some of the soldiers of the two battalions, who had served as matrosses at the siege of Savannah, were again attached to the cannon, but the deficiency of ammunition was irremediable.

Still, after the utmost efforts of the troops, when the advanced corps of the enemy appeared, upon the 21st of May, the works were far from being finished, even the platforms in the Star were not in a condition to receive guns.

The whole American army, amounting to upwards of four thousand men, with a respectable park of field artillery, encamped in a wood within cannon shot of the village. Flushed with success from the reduction of a number of the British posts, they, with a contemptuousness to the garrison of Ninety Six, to this day unexplained, in the night between the [p147] 21st and 22d threw up two works, at no greater distance than seventy paces from the Star. General Greene did not even condescend to summon the place. Whether he meant to assault and reduce it by a coup de main, or designed these works for places of arms, is another point as yet undetermined. It can hardly be conceived that his engineer, Kosinsco, a foreign adventurer, whom they created a Count of Poland, would break ground, and begin a sap, within so small a distance of a regular fortification, if he had intended its reduction by the common mode of approaches.

By eleven o'clock in the morning of the 22d of May, the platform in the salient angle of the Star, nearest to the Americans, was completed, and mounted with guns, to fire en barbet. These, with incessant platoons of musquetry, played on the works constructed by the enemy the preceding night, under cover of which, thirty men, marching in Indian-file, [p148] entered them, and put every man they could reach to the bayonet. This party was immediately followed by another of the loyal militia, who, in an instant, levelled those works, and loaded a number of negroes with the entrenching tools of the Americans. Though General Greene put his whole army in motion to support the advanced corps, they were intirely routed before he could effect his design. The handful of brave men that performed this service, retired into the Star, without any loss, excepting that of the officer who led them, Lieutenant Roney. He was mortally wounded, and died the following night, much esteemed, and justly lamented.

From such a check, the American commander began to entertain a respectable idea of the troops with whom he had to contend. On the night of the 23d the Americans again broke ground, but at the distance of four hundred paces from the Star, and behind a ravine. [p149] They here began two saps; erected block batteries to cover them, and appointed two brigades for their support. Sorties by small parties were made during the night, to interrupt the enemy, and retard their approaches. These were occasionally continued for the rest of the siege, notwithstanding which, by incessant labour, and the numbers employed, the besiegers had completed a second parallel by the 3d of June, when, for the first time, they beat the chamade, and their Adjutant General advanced with a flag of truce, desiring to speak to the commandant. Lieutenant Stelle, the officer on duty, who met him, observed, that it was unusual for commanding officers to receive and answer flags of truce in person, but that if he had any thing to communicate to Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, it should be forwarded. The American officer then produced a paper, signed by himself, setting forth, with the highest eulogiums, the invincible gallantry of their troops; enumerating their recent [p150] conquests "within the Congaree, the Wateree, and the Santee³³;" declaring that the garrison had every thing to hope from their generosity, and to fear from their resentment; making the commandant personally responsible for a fruitless resistance, and demanding an immediate and unconditional surrender to the army of the United State of America. He farther protested, that this summons should not be repeated, nor any flag of truce hereafter received, without it conveyed the preliminary proposals for a capitulation.

The commandant directed an officer to inform the person who brought this extraordinary paper, that, Ninety Six was committed to his charge, and that both duty and inclination pointed to the propriety of defending it to the last extremity. [p151] he added, that the promises and threats of General Greene were alike indifferent to him.

The truce therefore ceased; the enemy immediately opened four batteries; commanced a heavy cross fire, which enfiladed some of the works, and continued this cannonade at intervals for several days, at the same time pushing a sap against the Star, and advancing batteries. One of these constructed of fascines and gabions, at no greater distance than thirty-five paces from the abbatis, was elevated forty feet from the earth; upon it a number or riflemen were stationed, who, as they overlooked the British works, did great execution. The garrison crowned their parapet with sand-bags, leaving apertures through which the Loyal militia fired their rifles with good effect. African arrows³⁴ were thrown by the [p152] besiegers on the roofs of the British barracks to set them on fire, but this design was immediately counteracted by Lieut. Col. Cruger; who directed all the buildings to be unroofed, an order which, though it exposed both officers and men to the bad effects of the night air, so pernicious in this climate, was obeyed with an alacrity that nothing but their confidence in him could inspire.

With the intention to burn the rifle battery of the assailants, attempts were made to heat shot, but these were frustrated for want of furnaces; the besieged therefore in the Star, being no longer able to continue with the cannon on the platforms in the day time, they were dismounted, and used only in the night.

[p153] On the 8th of June, the garrison had the mortification to see that of Augusta marched by them prisoners of war. Though the gallantry displayed by Lieutenant Colonel Brown in its defence, would have excited admiration in a generous foe, Colonel Lee, by whom they were taken, enjoyed the gratification of a little mind in exhibiting them before Ninety Six, with a British standard reversed, drums beating and fifes playing, to ridicule their situation. This pitiful recourse had an effect quite contrary to that which it was intended to produce. The soldiers were easily convinced by their officers, that death was preferable to captivity with such an enemy. Having enjoyed this triumph, Colonel Lee, with his corps called the legion, next sat down to reduce the stockade upon the left, which preserved a communication with the water; his approaches, however, commenced at a respectful distance, and his advances by sap were conducted with extreme caution, while the operations of [p154] General Greene were directed against the Star.

On the evening of the 9th of June, in the apprehension that something extraordinary was carrying on in the enemy's works, two sallies, with strong parties, were made. One of these entering their trenches upon the right, and penetrating to a battery of four guns, were prevented from destroying them for want of spikes and hammers. They here discovered the mount of a mine, designed to be carried under a curtain of the Star, upon springing of which the breach was to be entered by the American army, sword in hand. The other division that marched upon the left fell in with the covering party of the besiegers, a number of whom were put to the bayonet, and the officer who commanded them brought in prisoner. Both divisions returned to the garrison with little loss, though it was impossible for that of the enemy not to have been considerable. Never did [p155] luckless wight receive a more inglorious wound, upon any occasion, than Count Kozinsco did on this -- it was in that part which Hudibras has constituted the seat of honour, and was given just as this engineer was examining the mine which he had projected!

Colonel Lee continued his approaches to the stockade upon the left, before which his corps suffered greatly. On the 12th of June, in a paroxysm of temerity and folly, he directed a serjeant and six men, at eleven o'clock in the forenoon, to advance with lighted combustibles, and set fire to the abbatis of the work which he had invested. Not one of them returned to upbraid him with his rashness, and he was the first to solicit a truce to bury the bodies of the men he had so scandalously sacrificed. Having now redoubled his efforts, and mounted a number of cannon, which followed him from Augusta, he completely enfiladed this work, by a triangular [p156] fire, and by the 17th of June rendered it untenable. It was evacuated in the night without loss, and taken possession of by the enemy.

The sufferings of the garrison were now extreme. With infinite labour a well was dug in the Star, but water was not to be obtained, and the only means of precuring this necessary element in a torrid climate in the month of June, was to send out naked negroes, who brought a scanty supply from within pistol shot of the American pickets, their bodies not being distinguishable in the night from the fallen trees, with which the place abounded.

Far from despondence in this extremity, Lieutenant Colonel Cruger encouraged the troops, in the hope of relief from the arrival of an army, before the enemy, though already advanced in their third parallel, could possibly reach the ditch. From the treatment of their fellow [p157] soldiers captured at Augusta, he painted to them, in the strongest colours, the mortifying consequences of a surrender; but, if they continued their defence, he had not the least doubt of their having the honour of brightening the future prospects of the Royal army in those provinces.

Whilst the commandant was using these endeavours, an American Loyalist, in open day, under the fire of the enemy, rode through their pickets, and delivered a verbal message from Lord Rawdon, "That he had passed Orangeburg, and was in full march to raise the siege." The name of RAWDON inflamed every breast with additional vigour; they declared they would wait patiently for the assailants, and meet them even in the ditch. How well they kept their word the transactions of the 18th will shew.

[p158] On the morning of this day the third parallel of the besiegers was completed; they turned the abbatis, drew out the pickets, and brought forward two trenches within six feet of the ditch of the Star. General Greene, well informed of the advance of Lord Rawdon, and knowing that the garrison was equally apprised of it, determined upon a general assault, which he commenced at noon.

Their forlorn hopes, in two divisions, made a lodgement in the ditch, and were followed by strong parties with grappling hooks to draw down the sandbags, and tools to reduce the parapet. The riflemen, posted upon their elevated battery, picked off every British soldier that appeared, while the Virginian and Maryland lines fire by platoons from their trenches. The right flank of the enemy was exposed to the fire of a three-pounder, as well as to that of the block houses in the village, and Major Green with the troops in the Star, waited [p159] with coolness to receive them on the parapet, with bayonets and spears³⁵. The attack continued, but the main body of the Americans could not be brought forward to the assault; they were contented with supporting the parties in the ditch, by an incessant fire from the lines. At length the garrison became impatient. Two parties under Captain Campbell of the New Jersey Volunteers, and Captain French of Delancey's, issued from the sally port in the rear of the Star, they entered the ditch, divided their men, and advanced, pushing their bayonets till they met each other. This was an effort of gallantry that the Americans could not have expected. General Greene, from one of the advanced batteries, with astonishment beheld two [p160] parties, consisting only of thirty men each, sallying into a ditch, charging and carrying every thing before them, though exposed to the fire of a whole army. It was an exertion of officers leading troops, ardent in the cause of their sovereign, and steeled with the remembrance of injuries which they and their connections had so often received from the subverters of law and good government. The Americans covered their shame in the trenches, nor was it till the next day that they recollected themselves so far as to ask permission to bury their dead; the groans also of their wounded assailed their ears, and called aloud for that relief which ought to have been much earlier administered.

General Greene raised the siege upon the evening of the 19th, and on the morning of the 21st the army under Lord Rawdon made its appearance. His Lordship brought with him the flank [p161] companies of three³⁶ regiments, which had landed from Europe so late as the third of the same month, and thus reinforced, he had made the most rapid marches over a desert country, in the hottest weather, for the relief of the garrison. This, however, did not prevent his Lordship from an immediate pursuit of the enemy. He followed them over the Saluda, as far as the banks of the Enoree, but they had so much the start of him, and their flight was so precipitate, as to leave no possibility of being overtaken.

The hardships under which this little garrison had laboured were severe in the extreme. The defence of a place so weak and ill provided, for upwards of thirty days, with no more than three hundred and fifty regulars, and two hundred militia, against an army well appointed, in high spirits, and in possession [p162] of every advantage that the situation could admit, was not to be effected without the utmost patience, vigilance, and vigorous exertion. Before the appearance of the Americans, Lieutenant Colonel Cruger had used every means in his power to augment his magazine of provisions; but the salting of beef and pork, which were the only articles, Indian corn excepted, that could be procured, was rendered almost ineffectual both by the season and climate. the climate was that of latitude 32-degrees N -- the season approaching the summer solstice. In spite therefore of all precaution, the provisions in one degree or other became putrid. Yet even this, at least, towards the latter end of the siege, was much less distressing than the want of water.

It would be presumption in me, nay, it would require the abilities of an able writer, to appropriate to each officer concerned in this defence, the degree of praise due to his merit, and yet, after the account [p163] just now given, it would be unpardonable to pass them over in silence.

The foresight, precaution, bravery, and in every respect good conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, have obtained that general admiration which they deserved. The speech of General Sir George Howard³⁷ does no more than justice to the distingujished merit of Major Green, and it would afford peculiar pleasure to every individual of this garrison into whose hands that part of parliamentary history may fall. The officers in the Star did not lose one of the many opportunities which occurred to signalise themselves. Lieutenant Barreté, of the 23d regiment, acted as engineer with great zeal. In one word, every officer received the warmest approbation of his conduct from Lord Rawdon and Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, [p164] nor did he aspire to a more honourable testimony of their merit.

Lieutenant Roney, of Delancey's, with three serjeants, and twenty-three rank and file, were killed. Captains French and Smith of Delancey's, Captain Barbarie and Lieut. Hatton, of the New Jersey Volunteers, with five serjeants and forty-nine rank and file, were wounded. The enemy acknowledged the loss of one Colonel, three Captains, five Lieutenants, and one hundred and fifty-seven privates, killed and wounded; but as their returns did not include the militia, who on this occasion bore the proportion of three of one to the troops in the pay of Congress, there can be no doubt but their loss amounted to treble that number in this memorable siege, -- a siege, which, however imperfectly known in Britain hitherto, will be remembered in America, whilst a vestige of the war in that country shall remain.

[Due to a numbering error, p165-166 do not exist]

[p167] RE-CAPTURE
OF
NEW-PROVIDENCE.

COLONEL ANDREW DEVAUX, who planned and executed the expedition which reduced the island of New-Providence, is a native of the province of South Carolina, and descended from a respectable Hugonet family of Brittany, which left that country upon the revocation of the edict of Nantz.

[p168] When the British army, under Major General Prevost, advanced to Charlestown, in the year 1779, Andrew Devaux, senior, and his son, then about eighteen years of age, joined it. The latter was soon particularly noticed by hat distinguished officer, Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable John Maitland. After the death of his patron, young Devaux accompanied the Royal army on its entrance into South Carolina the following year; and, by supplying guides and provisions, became of essential service. Having raised two independent troops of dragoons, he received from Earl Cornwallis the rank of Major of Provincials, and, soon after, the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel to the Grenville county militia. With these, and a number of volunteers, who placed themselves under his command, he made several successful incursions, and penetrated into the heart of the country; nor did he discontinue these exertions till after the contraction of the British lines to the vicinity of Charlestown, [p169] when the necessity for that kind of operation being at an end, his corps was disbanded.

This enterprising young man still found a mode to render himself useful. As the forces under Major General Leslie remained upon the defensive, Colonel Devaux, authorised by the Court of Vice-Admiralty, fitted out two armed vessels, and from his perfect acquaintance with the numerous inlets with which that coast is indented, he in several descents brought in quantities of fresh provisions and forage, which served equally to supply the garrison and distress the enemy.

In one of these expeditions he entered the inlet of Osebaugh in Georgia, landed and destroyed two gallies which were building for the Congress, together with their whole naval yard at Beaulie, though a large body of Americans was stationed within a few miles of that place. Upon another occasion he penetrated up Broad-River inlet, and, taking a circuitous route, [p170] surprised and made prisoners Brigadier General Harding, with eleven officers, and brought off a number of dragoon horses. He also landed on the island of Port Royal, which he took possession of, and delivered to a detachment of the King's troops sent to receive it; when these were withdrawn, which happened some time after, he, in a second descent, made Brigadier General Barnwell, his Aid-de-Camp, and a number of others, prisoners.

After the British army, in the month of December 1782, had abandoned the province of South Carolina, Colonel Devaux proceeded to the harbour of Saint Augustine in East Florida, the only port upon that part of the coast which remained occupied by a British garrison. Here, having gained intelligence of the supine and defenceless state of Don Galvez, the Spanish Governor of West Florida, and of the affection of the Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Cherokee Indians [p171] to the British interest, he mediated the design of attacking Pensacola; but as no assistance could be afforded him from East Florida, upon account of the continual inroads of the Americans cross the Altamaha, this intention was laid aside; and though the same reasons operated with equal force against another expedition, which he planned for the reduction of the island of New-Providence, he however carried it into execution.

It may be necessary to premise, that this is the principal in a chain of small islands, extending along the gulph of Florida, called BAHAMAS; that it had some time before been subjugated to the crown of Spain; that the possession of it is valuable in the time of war, from its affording an harbour for vessels, which may be employed, either to check the trade of the continent of America, of the islands of Cuba, and Hispaniola, or to intercept the Spanish flota from [p172] Vera-Cruz; and that it is also an object of attention in times of peace, appears, from the present appointment of a nobleman of distinction to its government³⁸.

After the capture of this island by the Spaniards, the British inhabitants who remained there, complained loudly of great oppression, in consequence of infractions of the capitulation. Many merchants had been deprived of their property, and their persons confined at the Havannah: others had fled to East Florida. Information communicated by the latter, gave Colonel Devaux reason to expect some aid from the inhabitants of the Bahamas; for the necessary equipment and support of such of those as might be disposed to join him, he provided arms, regimentals, and provisions. Seventy men, who had formerly served [p173] under him in the Carolinas, were again associated, and put on board six small vessels. "The little remnants of his shattered fortune, and all that he could raise on his credit, was embarked on this expedition³⁹." On the 30th of March, 1783, he sailed under the convoy of some private ships of war, the Preserverance of twenty-six guns, the Witby Warrior of sixteen guns; the former commanded by a Mr. Dow, the latter by a Mr. Wheeler; and two small armed vessels.

Four days after their departure they discovered two large ships to windward, standing towards them. A stout resistance might have been made, provided that the armed vessels of the fleet had formed a line of battle, but Colonel Devaux had the mortification to see the Preserverance and Witby Warrior, which was the only force that could now be [p174] depended upon, bearing away before the wind. His apprehensions, however, upon this occasion, were converted into an agreeable surprise, when he found that the strange ships, though under foreign colours, were two English letters of marque from Jamaica, homeward bound. After speaking with them he proceeded, and the next day the whole fleet rendezvoused at the Hole-in-the-Rock, in the bay of Abacco⁴⁰, with no other loss than that of a large boat, constructed for debarkation, which had foundered at sea.

As the whole success of the enterprise evidently depended upon taking every advantage which surprise and stratagem might present, guard-boats were immediately stationed at all the avenues leading towards the enemy. Colonel Devaux landed on Harbour Island, and detached to the island of Eluthera, with directions for recruiting, Captain [p175] Mackenzie, who had been particularly serviceable during the whole of this expedition. The exertions of this gentleman, with those of Captain Higgs of the Harbour-Island miltia, procured the addition of one hundred and seventy men; these were equipped with the arms and regimentals provided in Florida; and the cordial reception given by the Islanders, should the primary object of the expedition fail, ensured a safe retreat.

The total amount of the force thus increased, with the addition of what was obtained from the shipping, was three hundred men. Fifty fishing boats were also collected, for no other purpose than that of deceiving the enemy into an opinion, that the real number of troops was in proportion to the seeming preparation for their landing. To throw the recruits into divisions, and to give them an idea of regularity, at least in the essentials of loading and firing, two days were employed; so prepared, this [p176] little armament sailed, and on the night of the 9th of April, arrived at Egg Island, three leagues distant from Fort-Montague upon New-Providence, and about five from Fort-Nassau.

The first mentioned fort, mounted with thirteen nine-pounders, garrisoned by fifty men, under the command of the Spanish Lieutenant Governor, and supported by two heavy gallies, moored in the channel, completely covered the Eastern entrance of the harbour.

Dispositions for the attack, both of Fort-Montague and the gallies, were made on the 10th at day break; they were conducted in this manner: Major Taylor was detached with seventy men to board the gallies, while Colonel Devaux landed with one hundred and fifty men to attack the fort: he was, however, discovered by the Spanish centinels on the beating of the revellié. Boats were continually rowed to and from [p177] the shipping, while the advanced party of the corps which had landed, marched with fascines and sealing ladders, leaving large intervals between the divisions, and presenting a very extended front. All this was done for the purpose of impressing the enemy with an idea, that a whole army had arrived to reduce them. The deception succeeded; the Spaniards spiked the cannon, laid a train to the magazine, abandoned Fort-Montague, and filed off towards Fort-Nassau. The British pursued, and charged them with vivacity; the enemy left some men upon the ground, and retreated in great disorder. Colonel Devaux halted, entered the fort, and, by means of a prisoner whom he had taken, discovering that a match had been laid to the magazine, found he had come early enough to extinguish it. Three cheers from that part of his troops who were now in possession of the fort, were answered by the division under Major Taylor, who, [p178] at the same instant, had boarded the gallies.

After making some necessary arrangements, Colonel Devaux sent a summons to DON ANTONIO CLARACO SANZ, the Spanish Governor, acquainting him, that being invested both by sea and land, and that, as no hopes of a successful resistance was left, his only resource was an immediate surrender to the troops of his Brittanick Majesty. To this Don Antonio refused his assent; he at the same time intimated his wishes, that the British troops, desisting from further operations, should remain in quiet possession of the fort which they had taken, and its vicinity, until the twentieth day of the month, at which time he had reason to believe that hostilities would cease between the subjects of England and Spain.

Upon the thirtieth of March, when this armament sailed from East Florida, [p179] they had received no intelligence of a peace; the two letters of marque already mentioned, which had then just sailed from Jamaica, were equally ignorant of such an event, nor were three vessels from Philadelphia, which had been captured, in possession of any such information. From these facts, therefore, it was reasonable to conclude, that this account of Don Antonio was a subterfuge to save his garrison, for if, at that time, he had had authentick advice of an accommodation between the belligerent powers, he had only to produce a copy of the treaty, or the preliminary articles, and the farther operations of the assailants would of course have terminated. The true state of the matter, as it afterwards appeared, was, that hostilities were to cease in that quarter upon the ninth, instead of the twentieth of April, of which, however, both parties, at this time, had been equally ignorant.

[p180] After leaving a detachment in Fort Montague, the rest of the British forces took post upon the White-Grounds, within cannon shot of the Spanish lines, having driven in the party which occupied that place. In reconnoitring, landing cannon, training the recruits, and other services, two days were employed, under a random cannonade, and discharge of shells from the enemy's batteries.

Suspecting an intention in the British to possess themselves of Society Hill, which commanded his works, Don Antonio formed an ambuscade, with forty men, amongst the underwood which covered its summit. This was discovered, and the troops, making a detour of the hill, attacked the Spaniards, who, with the loss of two officers and six men, effected a retreat.

On the 13th of April the Governor requested an interview with the [p181] British Commander, and under the plausible pretence of guarding against depredation on private property, proposed a truce; but his real motive was to gain time.

Upon this occasion, the whole of the troops that were landed were drawn up under arms, so as to resemble a picket only. Drums, fifes, and bugle horns, with warlike Indian musick, were heard in several parts of the island, as if proceeding from different encampments, and two Cherokee and Choctaw Chiefs, as representatives of their respective tribes, were introduced to Don Antonio, for the purpose of alarming him with apprehensions, that two nations of savages were employed against him. A truce of twenty-four hours, to deliberate on proposals for surrender, was requested by the Governor. To this Colonel Devaux asserted, as it served to give his men rest after great fatigue, and to procure time for the arrival of one of his vessels, which [p182] had been on a cruize at the time of his departure, and which he was in hourly expectation of, with a reinforcement of forty men; but the Spaniards being discovered in the course of the night improving their fortifications, a message was therefore sent them, that they had violated the truce, and that it consequently ceased. They immediately commenced a heavy cannonade on Society Hill, and threw a number of shells in that direction, notwithstanding which the British troops, assisted by a party of negroes under Mr. Romer, with infinite labour, drew seven pieces of cannon up the hill, and mounted them in embrasures cut out of the solid rock.

The Spaniards made a sortie in the night, but were repulsed with loss. Upon the 14th, having withdrawn the whole of their force from Fort Nassau, and the other out-posts, they retired into the citadel, at the same time cutting the cables of four large gallies in the harbour, [p183] which consequently drifted upon the shore. On the 17th a morning gun was fired from the British batteries on the Hill, and Don Antonio was summoned for the last time to surrender. He immediately proposed terms, to which it was thought prudent to assent.

A Governor, Lieutenant Governor, thirty-six Majors, Captains and subalterns, with six hundred Spanish troops, were made prisoners. Upwards of one hundred pieces of cannon, mortars and howitzers, and a quantity of military stores, fell into the hands of the captors.

By the second article of the capitulation, the garrison was to be permitted to depart for Cuba, and the governor to Spain, but Colonel Devaux detained Don Antonio and five of the principal officers as hostages, till an equal number of British merchants, inhabitants of New-Providence, who, in violation of the former [p184] capitulation, were in dungeons in the Havannah, were liberated.

The troops took possession of the town and citadel of Nassau amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants, who addressed their deliverer in the most grateful terms, extolling that zeal for his Majesty's service, and compassion for the distressed inhabitants, which had prompted him, at his own private expence, to undertake an expedition for their relief, and paying him the highest encomiums on the bravery, vigilance and skill in military stratagem, by which it was effected.

Dispatches were immediately sent to the Commander in Chief of the King's forces in America, as also to the Governor of Jamaica, acquainting them with the reduction of the island of New-Providence, and submitting the future disposal of it to their direction. Both these officers declined interfering, and recommended waiting for instructions from [p185] England, the latter adding, "That he who was capable of reducing, was certainly equal to govern it." Colonel Devaux therefore proceeded to form the remaining Members of his Majesty's Council into a board of Police, for the administration of justice, and continued in the island until the month of September following, when he was complimented by the principal inhabitants, in an address, testifying their concern at his departure, and the lasting esteem his conduct had impressed upon them, pointing out his disinterestedness in declining all pecuniary emolument, and wishing him that approbation of a gracious sovereign, to which his merit entitled him.

Thus was the island of New-Providence conquered by the exertions of a young man, then under twenty-three years of age, and a Spanish garrison of six hundred regular troops, in strong works, provided with cannon and other means of defence, made prisoners by half that [p186] number of irregulars, deficient in discipline, and indifferently supplied with artillery, and the other requisites of a siege.

The motive of the expedition was generous and noble; -- the release of British subjects from foreign oppression, and the credit acquired, cannot be lessened by the circumstance of the conquest being made some days after hostilities were to cease in those seas, as all parties were alike ignorant of that regulation. The mode of conducting it would have reflected honour on any General; and it has been justly considered as "an enterprise, perhaps, without a parallel in the modern history of war."

F I N I S.

Continue to Hanger's riposte

Notes:

¹¹ Vide Tarleton's Campaigns, page 217. [ back ]

¹² Vide page 252. From Earl Cornwallis to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton. "You have forfeited no part of my esteem as an officer by the unfortunate event of the action of the 17th: The means you used to bring the enemy to action were able and masterly, and must ever do you honour. Your disposition was unexceptionable; the total misbehaviour of the troops could alone have deprived you of the glory which was so justly your due." [ back ]

¹³ Critical Review, May 1787. [ back ]

¹⁴ Killed: Captain Helyar, Lieutenant Marshal. Wounded: Major Newmarsh, Lieutenant Harling, Lieutenant L'Estrange. [ back ]

¹⁵ Light companies of the 1st and 2d 71st included. [ back ]

¹⁶ Lieutenants Macleod, Chisholm Killed. Lieutenants Grant, Mackintosh, Flint, Mackenzie, Sinclair, Forbes, Macleod Wounded. [ back ]

¹⁷ Vide pages 113 and 114. [ back ]

¹⁸ Lieut. Lindsay. [ back ]

¹⁹ Lieutenant Nettles. Cornet Patterson, mortally. [ back ]

²⁰ Wounds at Cowpens. [ back ]

²¹ Vide page 283 and 284. [ back ]

²² Colonel John Hamilton. [ back ]

²³ The actions fought by Colonel Innes on the Enoree, and Major Dunlap in Long Cane; the defence of Fort Golphin on the Savannah; the operations of Lieutenant Colonel Craig upon Cape Fear, and those of Lieutenant Colonel Small on the Santee, &c. [ back ]

²⁴ Vide page 459. [ back ]

²⁵ Vide page 459. [ back ]

²⁶ Lieutenants Simcoe and Camp, killed -- Lieutenant Hybert and others, wounded. [ back ]

²⁷ Lieut. Hatton, late of the New Jersey Volunteers, now of the twenty-third regiment. [ back ]

²⁸ Vide page 99. [ back ]

²⁹ Colonels Lawrens, Williams, Huger and others. [ back ]

³⁰ Vide Ramsey, Vol. II. Page 200. [ back ]

³¹ A particular instance of this occurred in the case of COLONEL ISAAC HAYNE. Upon the entrance of General Greene into South Carolina, Mr. Hayne accepted a commission in the American service in a secret manner, soon after which he came to Charletown, renewed his oath of allegiance to the King, and at his own request was appointed to the command of a corps of militia. When he had remained long enough in that garrison to obtain every possible intelligence, partly by persuasion, partly by force, he occasioned the revolt of the whole body which he commanded to the Americans. The first advice which our commanders received of this treachery, was the account of an expedition in which Mr. Hayne surprised a number of sick and wounded British soldiers, within two miles of Charlestown, where he was charged with committing some extraordinary acts of barbarity. He was immediately after taken in arms against that government which he had so recently sworn to support; a Court of Enquiry identified his person, and he was executed without further trial. The Americans complained loudly of this proceeding, as an infraction of the law of nations, affecting to forget that this line of conduct had been adopted by both armies during the war, and that they had executed the Adjutant General of the British army, upon the report of a Board of Officers only. The unhappy Mr. Hayne was said to be a good character in private life, but private virtues could not atone for publick vices. If amiable manners, and the possession of every accomplishment which adorns the officer and the gentleman, could have averted an ignominious death, the lamented ANDRÉ would not have expired upon a gibbet!

A late American writer, in attempting to palliate the violation of the second oath of allegiance, taken by Colonel Hayne, on the jesuitical principle of mental reservation, could not, seriously, mean a compliment either to his understanding or his integrity. [ back ]

³² "Passages ten or twelve feet wide, made from one work to another, covered on each side by a parapet terminating in a slope or glacis. // " Muller's Elements of Fortification". [ back ]

³³ The two first of these are only branches of the latter -- but a climax so pompous corresponded with the rest of the language of this summons. [ back ]

³⁴ These were arrows fitted to the bore of musquets from which they were discharged. They were entwined with flax, dipped in combustibles lighted, and armed at the end with a barbed spear. Captain M'Pherson of Delancey's had defended Fort Motte with admirable gallantry, but his barracks being set on fire by these arrows, he was compelled to surrender. [ back ]

³⁵ Spears resembling those used in boarding ships, had been made by the direction of this excellent officer; they were piled against the parapet, and the men were ordered, on discharging their musquets, to use the spears. [ back ]

³⁶ 3d, 19th, and 30th. [ back ]

³⁷ Vide the Debates in the House of Commons of the 27th of June 1783: the House in committee on the subject of Provincial half pay. [ back ]

³⁸ Earl of Dunmore. [ back ]

³⁹ Political Magazine, 1783. [ back ]

⁴⁰ Another of the Bahama Islands, about twenty leagues distant from Nassau. [ back ]