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The Federalist Papers


For the opposing views see the Anti-federalist papers


*** Quote * Context ***

Beginning on October 27, 1787 the Federalist Papers were first published in the New York press under the signature of "Publius". These papers are generally considered to be one of the most important contributions to political thought made in America. The essays appeared in bookform in 1788, with an introduction by Hamilton. Subsequently they were printed in manyeditions and translated to several languages. The pseudonym "Publius" was used by three man: Jay, Madison and Hamilton. Jay was responsible for only a few of the 85 articles. The papers were meant to be influential in the campaign for the adoption of the Constitution by New York State. But the authors not only discussed the issues of the constitution, but also many general problems of politics.

  • The Federalist 1
    General Introduction (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 2
    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (Jay)
  • The Federalist 3
    The Same Subject Continued (Jay) (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
  • The Federalist 4
    The Same Subject Continued (Jay) (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
  • The Federalist 5
    The Same Subject Continued (Jay) (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
  • The Federalist 6
    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 7
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
  • The Federalist 8
    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 9
    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 10
    The Same Subject Continued (Madison) (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
  • The Federalist 11
    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 12
    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 13
    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 14
    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered (M adison)
  • The Federalist 15
    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 16
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  • The Federalist 17
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  • The Federalist 18
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton and Madison) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  • The Federalist 19
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton and Madison) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  • The Federalist 20
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton and Madison) (The Insufficiency fo the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  • The Federalist 21
    Other Defects of the Present Confederation (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 22
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
  • The Federalist 23
    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 24
    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 25
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
  • The Federalist 26
    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 27
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
  • The Federalist 28
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
  • The Federalist 29
    Concerning the Militia (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 30
    Concerning the General Power of Taxation (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 31
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  • The Federalist 32
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  • The Federalist 33
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  • The Federalist 34
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  • The Federalist 35
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  • The Federalist 36
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  • The Federalist 37
    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government (Madison)
  • The Federalist 38
    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed (Madison)
  • The Federalist 39
    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles (Madison)
  • The Federalist 40
    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained (Madison)
  • The Federalist 41
    General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution (Madison)
  • The Federalist 42
    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (Madison)
  • The Federalist 43
    The Same Subject Continued(The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) (Madison)
  • The Federalist 44
    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States (Madison)
  • The Federalist 45
    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered (Madison)
  • The Federalist 46
    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared (Madison)
  • The Federalist 47
    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts (Madison)
  • The Federalist 48
    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other (Madison)
  • The Federalist 49
    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 50
    Periodical Appeals to the People Considered (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 51
    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 52
    The House of Representatives (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 53
    The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 54
    The Apportionment of Members Among the States (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 55
    The Total Number of the House of Representatives (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 56
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton or Madison)
    (The Total Number of t he House of Representatives)
  • The Federalist 57
    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of th e Many Considered in Connection with Representation (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 58
    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress o f Population Demands Considered (Madison)
  • The Federalist 59
    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (Hamilt on)
  • The Federalist 60
    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 61
    The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
  • The Federalist 62
    The Senate (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 63
    The Senate Continued (Hamilton or Madison)
  • The Federalist 64
    The Powers of the Senate (Jay)
  • The Federalist 65
    The Powers of the Senate Continued (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 66
    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Fur ther Considered (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 67
    The Executive Department (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 68
    The Mode of Electing the President (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 69
    The Real Character of the Executive (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 70a
    The Executive Department Further Considered (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 70b
    The Executive Department Further Considered (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 71
    The Duration in Office of the Executive (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 72
    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered ( Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 73
    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power (Hamilton )
  • The Federalist 74
    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 75
    The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 76
    The Appointing Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 77
    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 78
    The Judiciary Department (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 79
    The Judiciary Continued (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 80
    The Powers of the Judiciary (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 81
    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority (Ham ilton)
  • The Federalist 82
    The Judiciary Continued (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 83
    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 84
    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered (Hamilton)
  • The Federalist 85
    Concluding Remarks (Hamilton)

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