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The Apportionment of Members Among the States
To the People of the State of New York:
It is not contended that the number of people in each
State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion
of those who are to represent the people of each State. The
establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes, will
probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this
case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the former
case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of
the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection.
In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of
which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a
very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule
as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the
States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the
practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general
sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with
the convention. All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said;
but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure
of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a
ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the
numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as
property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended
in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be
excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of
persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its
full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning
which may be offered on the opposite side. ``We subscribe to the
doctrine,'' might one of our Southern brethren observe, ``that
representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation
more immediately to property, and we join in the application of
this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the
fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no
respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that
they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our
laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as
property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for
a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and
in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and
chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the
slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed
with those irrational animals which fall under the legal
denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand,
in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all
others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in
being punishable himself for all violence committed against
others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a
member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation;
as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The
federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on
the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character
of persons and of property. This is in fact their true
character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws
under which they live; and it will not be denied, that these are
the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that
the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property,
that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and
it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore the rights which
have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an
equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. ``This
question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all
sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as
they are the only proper scale of representation. Would the
convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had
rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares
of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the
lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could
it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur
in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree as men,
when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in
the same light, when advantages were to be conferred? Might not
some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the
Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as
property a part of their human brethren, should themselves
contend, that the government to which all the States are to be
parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely
in the unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which
they complain? ``It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not
included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States
possessing them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the
votes of their masters. Upon what principle, then, ought they to
be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In
rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this
respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to
as the proper guide. ``This objection is repelled by a single
abservation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed
Constitution, that as the aggregate number of representatives
allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal
rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the
right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be
exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may
designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage
depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of
the States the difference is very material. In every State, a
certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by
the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census
by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives.
In this point of view the Southern States might retort the
complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the
convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of
particular States towards their own inhabitants; and
consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been
admitted into the census according to their full number, in like
manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other
States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A
rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by
those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that
equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the
slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the
compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted,
which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude
below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the
slave as divested of two fifths of the man. ``After all, may not
another ground be taken on which this article of the
Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have
hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to
persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea?
Government is instituted no less for protection of the property,
than of the persons, of individuals. The one as well as the
other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who
are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that
in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New
York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to
be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by that
part of the society which is most interested in this object of
government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not
prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands
with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be
paid to property in the choice of those hands. ``For another
reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the
people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the
comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like
individuals, an influence over each other, arising from superior
advantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen but a
single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and
consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very
frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his
choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights of
property are conveyed into the public representation. A State
possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable
that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the
choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will
the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any
other advantage in the federal legislature, over the
representatives of other States, than what may result from their
superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior
wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it
ought to be secured to them by a superior share of
representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect,
materially different from the existing Confederation, as well as
from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar
confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the
federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary
resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states,
though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an
unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of
these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed
Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the
necessary intervention of the individual States. They will depend
merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and
consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or
smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will
have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the
votes individually given in a State legislature, by the
representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have
each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any
difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the
personal character of the individual representative, rather than
from any regard to the extent of the district from which he
comes. ''Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the
Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it
may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the
whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of
representation which the convention have established. In one
respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation
and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy
of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily
depend, in a considerable degree on the disposition, if not on
the co-operation, of the States, it is of great importance that
the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell or to
reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of
representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have
an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to
decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would
prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will
have opposite interests, which will control and balance each
other, and produce the requisite impartiality.
Publius.
Hamilton
or Madison From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788.
THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives
relates to the appointment of its members to the several States
which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct
taxes.