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Concluding Remarks
To the People of the State of New York:
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the
convention to the act which organizes the government of this State
holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to
the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are
the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the
omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision
respecting the liberty of the press. These and several others which
have been noted in the course of our inquiries are as much
chargeable on the existing constitution of this State, as on the one
proposed for the Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to
consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he
finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there
be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the
zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention among us, who
profess to be the devoted admirers of the government under which
they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan,
for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or
perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican government, to liberty
and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under
consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the
preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and
insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single
States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders
and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the
diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the
dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the
prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not
fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited
situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of
government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of
titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition
of those practices on the part of the State governments which have
undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted
mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have
occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned
to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust
at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I
gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be
conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and
have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to
disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been
not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents
of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the
liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought
against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton
and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who
feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual
changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and
the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible
men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations
which have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the
public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all
honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have
occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I
did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a
struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has
in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been
neither often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of
these papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily
vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has
not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary
to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer
these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience
and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober
dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can
give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay,
constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society,
to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no
particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or
prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his
posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him
beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the
object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of
the community, but the very existence of the nation; and let him
remember that a majority of America has already given its sanction
to the plan which he is to approve or reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the
arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and
that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has
been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our
political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior
to any the revolution has produced.
Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has
not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small
triumph to its enemies. ``Why,'' say they, ``should we adopt an
imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is
irrevocably established?'' This may be plausible enough, but it is
only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of
these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been
stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically
defective, and that without material alterations the rights and the
interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This,
as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the
concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of
the measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment,
that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is,
upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and
circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as
promises every species of security which a reasonable people can
desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme
of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national
affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive
experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never
expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the
deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a
compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good sense
and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed. The
compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common
bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as
many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection
spring from such materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately
published in this city,[1] are unanswerable to show the utter
improbability of assembling a new convention, under circumstances in
any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late
convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the
arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an
extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of
every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light
in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered,
and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot
resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this
aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it
will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments
to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the
present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and
must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete
establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the
concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the
Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as
it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine
States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine[2] in
favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption
of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must
inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which
thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their
interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see,
in any body of men charged with its original formation, very
different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of
those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority
on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute
the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and
arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in
such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and
hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and
casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The
degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the
number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established,
would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly.
There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in
relation to any other point no giving nor taking. The will of the
requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue.
And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united
in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must
infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison
between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of
establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it
has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of
the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any
portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my
own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments
which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be
applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of
its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight
in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight
in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing
thirteen States at any rate, independent of calculations upon an
ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion
constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit
of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their
constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which
proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation is
futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States
concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article
of the plan, the Congres will be obliged ``on the application of the
legislatures of two thirds of the States which at present amount to
nine, to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be
valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution,
when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or
by conventions in three fourths thereof.'' The words of this
article are peremptory. The Congress ``shall call a convention.''
Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body.
And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to
a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed
to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in
amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room
to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are
merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people.
We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to
erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am
myself deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those
rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test
of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the
same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must
agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct
road to their own object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of
the Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to
the truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid
and ingenious: ``To balance a large state or society, says he,
whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so
great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is
able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The
judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide
their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of
inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall
into in their first trials and experiments.''[3] These judicious
reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers
of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against
hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States
from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious
demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but
from time and experience. It may be in me a defect of political
fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal
tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer
continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A nation,
without a national government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.
The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by
the voluntary ocnsent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to the
completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can
reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have,
in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States,
and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground,
to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new
attempts, because I know that powerful individuals, in this and in
other States, are enemies to a general national government in every
possible shape.
Publius.
Notes:
Hamilton From McLean's Edition, New York.
ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers,
announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for
discussion two points: ``the analogy of the proposed government to
your own State constitution,'' and ``the additional security which
its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and
to property.'' But these heads have been so fully anticipated and
exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be
possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form,
what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the
question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.