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[p73] "With all due respect for the character of Earl Cornwallis, as being much above any suspicion of wilful intention to mislead, I must, however, take the liberty to say, that his Lordship's testimony, in the present case, is entirely out of the question. The General detaches Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton on an expedition a considerable distance from the army, and receives a report from him of a victory. Upon this report he founds his official dispatches; and our author is for some time hailed as victor from Wynnesborough to Camden, from Camden to Charlestown, from Charlestown to New York, and from thence to London; at Liverpool bonfires are lighted up in honour of their favourite hero. After several years have elapsed, he still presents the world with [p74] his claim to victory. He goes further, and with a truly curious address, holds forth the dispatches of Earl Cornwallis, though entirely founded on his own reports, as vouchers for the veracity of his assertions."
This specious, but insiduous assertion, might lead astray such peruses of the Strictures as made no part of Earl Cornwallis's army. It relates to a matter of infinite delicacy to the feelings of an officer, and is craftily made the ground work of the most odious censure on Tarleton's history. I will however take upon me to contradict the assertion; but not (like the Strictures) without confuting what I contradict; not without the support and demonstration of time, place, and circumstances. To you, gentlemen of the army, I submit the accuracy of the facts I shall [p75] state, and the integrity and validity of my proofs.
Roderick M'Kenzie, or myself, on the following points, must stand convicted of the most glaring unpardonable misrepresentation. He pretends that all the credit Tarleton has gained, was founded on his own statement of his own actions; on his own official letters to Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis, which furnished the materials of the reports of Those Generals to Government. I am now, gentlemen, going to demonstrate, that this indelicate imputation has no foundation whatever, but in the bold assertion of the Stricturist. I shall maintain the well earned reputation of my friend, by a detail of actions, distances, and situations, and prove to you plainly, that both those Generals had it in their power to inform themselves of the most minute particulars of the transactions they [p76] applauded, by other evidence than Tarleton's letters. I appeal to you, as to gentleman awake to every professional feeling. I make no apology for dwelling upon this topic. It is the grand foundation on which our Stricturist builds his satire; his sarcasms, and invectives against Tarleton, I have no argument to encounter. But even his sneers, on an occasion so interesting not only to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, but to Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis, whose characters are equally attacked, should undergo a most accurate and minute investigation, I shall, therefore, recapitulate a few of the actions in which Tarleton either commanded, or was principally concerned.
The affair of Monk's Corner, where my gallant, most intimate, and much lamented friends, Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson, and Major Cocheran, were jointly concerned [p77] with Tarleton, was carried on under the command of Colonel Webster. That officer's report to the head quarters was formed upon his own immediate inspection; and the engagement happened so near to our army, that both Generals Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis must have been minutely acquainted with its just merits.
The scene of action, where Tarleton defeated the American cavalry under Colonels Lee, Washington, and White, at Lenoos Ferry, was so contiguous to Earl Cornwallis's camp, that Tarleton moved from camp on the morning of the action. A party of our light infantry had been taken by the enemy; Tarleton flew to their relief, rescued them, destroyed totally the American cavalry, and returned the same night to Earl Cornwallis.
[p78] Tarleton's written report of the action, in which he so completely defeated General Sumpter, near Camden, was not drawn up until he had rejoined the army with his whole corps; Earl Cornwallis, therefore, could not be in want of other, and what the Stricturist would insinuate to be better, authority than Tarleton's report of himself, to justify the praises which his Lordship bestowed upon Tarleton on that occasion, in the presence, and with the concurrence of the whole army.
In like manner, though the business of Blackstocks happened at some distance from the Camp, yet Earl Cornwallis had the means of obtaining whatever information he might judge necessary from the wounded officers, and from those who escorted them to his camp, and cannot be suspected of having formed his official dispatches on the influence [p79] solely of Tarleton's own report of the action.
And even after the unfortunate affair of the Cow Pens, many officers who escaped capture, arrived that same day at Earl Cornwallis's camp, and were interrogated by the noble Earl on the subject of the defeat, before ever Tarleton had made his appearance, or had even written to Earl Cornwallis. -- Tarleton did not arrive till the next day.
This enumeration of facts, gentlemen of the army, cannot be contradicted. I have shewn you, that Earl Cornwallis had it in his power to investigate and did, in fact, investigate the material points, as it was his duty to do, all affecting the real and intrinsic merits of Tarleton's conduct in these gallant actions. I trust you will concur with me in the sentiments I have expressed, concerning this indelicate, but vain attack upon Tarleton's fame, by attempting [p80] to trace its existence to his vanity, instead of his military merits and atchievements. Finally, gentlemen of the army, I leave it to your knowledge of the honour and integrity of the noble Earl, and to your own candour, feeling, and judgment, to decide whether that noble General was a likely man to hold out to the admiration of the world, and to recommend to the protection of his king and country, any officer who was not entitled by his services to so honourable a distinction.
As to Tarleton's falling back, or shifting his ground, after the action of Blackstock's Hill, I appeal to you, gentlemen, whether, in the present instance, it would not have been both unmilitary and dangerous, to have encamped all night on a spot of ground so well known to the enemy. -- An enterprizing officer might have ruined Tarleton by a night attack. The material circumstance [p81] is not contested. Sumpter moved off that very night over the Tyger River, in order to avoid Tarleton's attack on the next day. Here, gentlemen, I beg leave to submit one decisive question to your superior judgment: -- Had Sumpter obtained any advantage, as Roderick M'Kenzie wishes the world to believe, would he not have pursued Tarleton, at least, till he had driven him back on the remainder of his corps that were coming up with the cannon? The truth is, that one single hour more of daylight would have ruined Sumpter. The loss Tarleton sustained certainly was heavy, but it proceeded from his not being in force. Perhaps it would have been more prudent had Tarleton, in the past instance, fallen back on his reserve, without risking an action with part of his force.
His zeal for the cause in which he was engaged, the confidence he reposed in his few gallant soldiers, and his own ardent [p82] desire to meet the enemy, would, I doubt not, in your opinion, gentlemen, more than excuse an occasional indiscretion. But let it be remembered, that Tarleton's conduct, in the present occurrence, was justified by reasons of expediency: the only possible means by which Tarleton could bring Sumpter to action was, by giving him this advantage. In any other circumstance, Sumpter would not have risked an engagement: Tarleton, in that case, must have continued the pursuit, and might never have come up with him,10 or might have [p83] been forced to engage him on worse terms.
Let me now submit the whole of this affair, briefly, faithfully, and respectfully, gentlemen of the army, to your deliberate and candid judgment.
Sumpter seeing Tarleton not in force, began the attack; was repulsed; immediately the 63d gallantly advanced; but being opposed by a great superiority of numbers, their situation was found dangerous. To extricate them, Tarleton ordered a part of his cavalry to charge; this point was accomplished, but at so late an hour of the day, that the charge was performed, when all but dark. Night immediately separated the contending parties. Thus, gentlemen, in honour do I believe, that in five lines I have given the true, candid, and liberal account of the action at Blackstocks, upon which Mr. M'Kenzie [p84] has been written some pages. The 63d did not consist of above seventy or eighty men; these few, with about 160 of our cavalry, were opposed to General Sumpter's whole force. Sumpter moved off -- Tarleton took a fresh position that night, contiguous to the field of battle; in my humble opinion, judiciously, (for reasons I have already given,) and was joined by the remainder of his corps. Let us consider this in a general military point of view: I have ever understood, from the best military writers, that the advantageous consequences which may follow and undecided action, may entitle it to greater praise than might be due even to a momentary victory. It must be allowed that, by this action with Sumpter, Tarleton cleared that country of a numerous and lawless banditti, (for they can bear no other name,) by forcing Sumpter to retreat over the Tyger River; which is [p85] a fact. It must therefore be allowed surely, that the object which Tarleton wished to attain, was acquired. Upon the whole, gentlemen, I presume to hope; that I have confuted the insinuations of the Stricturist, without placing the laurels on the head of Tarleton that ought to adorn the brow of Sumpter. With respect to the men in buckram, Tarleton was forced to take his account from the people of the country. Sumpter was badly wounded; Colonel Thomas was killed in the first attack, his body left on our ground, and the arms taken from it, are now in London.
The Stricturist informs us, that Ramsay, in his history of the American war, does not mention the loss of the American Colonels at Blackstocks. Any author who can daringly assert so base a falsehood, as that only twelve Americans fell in the action of Cow Pens, has totally forfeited all claim [p86] to belief in his report of that, or any other actions.
Tarleton, after stating that Sumpter perceiving him not to be in force, began the attack, proceeds with his account in the following words: --
"The ardour of the 63d carried them too far, and exposed them to a considerable fire from the buildings and the mountain. Though the undertaking appeared hazardous, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton determined to charge the enemy's center with a column of dragoons, in order to cover the 63d, whose situation was now become dangerous. The attack was conducted with great celerity, and was attended with immediate success. -- The cavalry soon reached the houses, and broke the Americans, who, from that instant, began to disperse: the 63d immediately rallied, and darkness put an [p87] end to the engagement. A pursuit across a river, with a few troops of cavalry, and a small body of infantry, was not advisable in the night; a position was therefore taken adjoining to the field of battle, to wait the arrival of the light and legion infantry."
"Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton landed in America in the year 1777; with the rank of Cornet of Dragoons; and in the beginning of January, 1781, we find him the primum mobile, the master spring which puts the whole machinery of the army in motion."
Here, sir, you have deprived Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton of a considerable share of merit, which he acquired in a most active campaign in the Jersies and Pennsylvania; for Colonel Tarleton came to America in [p88] the year 1776. That distinguished officer, Sir William Erskine, quickly perceived the abilities11 and gallantry of this young officer, and appointed him his Major of Brigade, and to the whole cavalry.
"Leaving then to the judgment of others, the propriety of producing a confidential letter, written by his Lordship in the goodness of his heart, evidently with a design to console our author under a severe misfortune, and never meant for publication. I only content, that this [p89] letter is altogether inadequate to the purpose to which this Journalist has converted it, -- that of transferring the blame from himself to the troops."
I have not the audacity, gentlemen, to tread in the steps of the Stricturist, to substitute assertion for argument, and to contradict him, as he does Tarleton, without producing the shadow of a reason, or manifesting any attention to facts.
Look only at the date of Earl Cornwallis's letter to Tarleton; -- between the date of that letter from the noble Earl, and his unfortunate action, you will find an intermediate space of thirteen days. In that internal, the noble Earl had sufficient time to confer with as many officers as he pleased, and to attain as much information as was necessary to form his judgment upon the subject; and that he had time for enquiry, is not more evident, than it is notorious, [p90] that he did in fact enquire before he approved. But, in honest truth, is it likely that, without the most minute enquiries into the particulars of that action, the noble Earl should refuse to grant Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton a court of enquiry on his conduct, which Tarleton so earnestly requested,12 and anxiously demanded? I may safely leave it to your own breasts to determine, whether an officer of the high and [p91] unimpeached integrity and honour of the noble Earl, ought to be accused, or even suspected, of throwing an unmerited censure on so many hundreds as were concerned on that fatal day, merely to console one single individual under a misfortune? No, gentlemen, that letter13 was given to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton publicly and avowedly as the real and deliberate opinion of the noble Earl upon the action; it was intended as an honourable testimony to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, that he had not forfeited the esteem of his General, by his conduct on that unfortunate day.
[p92] At that time Tarleton never dreamt of publishing a history of the Southern Campaigns; but he always thought himself at liberty to publish a letter, which, in its own nature, was public.
Let any candid, liberal, and disinterested officer suggest any other purpose for which the noble Earl could have given Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton that letter, but for the purpose of a public vindication of his conduct.
Had Tarleton never produced this letter, after having been refused an examination by a court martial, his character and conduct might, indeed, have been exposed to attacks, not more sinister, but far more formidable than those of our Stricturist.
Had I been present14 at that unfortunate affair, (Cow Pens,) I should not hesitate [p93] one instant to declare my sentiments most fully to the whole world; but not having been an eye witness, I am obliged to bury in my own breast many particulars that I am strongly inclined to believe.
From my situation in the province of South Carolina, at that time (being at Camden), I had an opportunity of obtaining every information relative to that unfortunate action, by daily, nay hourly, conversing with various officers who had been present at that action, many of whom were uninfluenced by prejudice or party, and who, from their military abilities and well known honour, were incapable of misrepresenting the real facts, for various reasons [p94] which I need not here enumerate. Interested as the world may well imagine me to have been, both on the defeat of my friend, and a corps I belonged to, I was most particularly induced to attempt to make myself master of the subject. I have given unwearied attention to every officer's account of that action, and have continued to seek for further information even to this hour. Without being too presumptuous, I think I may declare, that I am as fully master of that subject as it is possible for any one to be who was not actually present.
I shall now proceed, by stating a few extracts from different authors, and then reply to the errors in judgment imputed to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, by Roderick M'Kenzie.
The Marquis de Chastellux, whom our Stricturist brings first on the carpet, after censuring General Morgan for a manoeuvre [p95] he caused his troops to make during the action, concludes his remarks with the following words; -- Strictures, page 94. -- "Whatever was the motive of this singular manoeuvre of General Morgan, the result of it was the defeat of Tarleton, whose troops gave way on all sides without the possibility of rallying." -- Our Stricturist next produces the account from the Annual Register of 1781. He then begins his own remarks in the following words -- Strictures, page 95 -- "The Marquis's (de Chastellux) exposition of the cause of the defeat, in spite of his assertions of the defeat, in spite of his assertions that it has the sanction of General Morgan, is flimsy and erroneous. The editor of the Annual Register has been deceived; consequently, of these several accounts, that given by Doctor Ramsay deserves most attention." Pray, gentlemen of the army, why is the Marquis de Chastellux's exposition, sanctioned by General [p96] Morgan, who commanded against Tarleton, to be deemed flimsey and erroneous? And why is a notorious and avowedly rebellious writer (Dr. Ramsay) to be credited in preference to the Annual Register, or any other periodical writer? Is no person except our Stricturist, and his favourite author (Ramsay), to be credited? But let his evidence be produced -- Vide Strictures, page 117 -- "Of all improbable events, none seemed to him (Earl Cornwallis) more improbable, than that an inferior force, two thirds militia, should gain such a decisive advantage over his favourite hero." Thus says Ramsay; and in my humble opinion, not much in favour of the British. Let the Stricturist make the most of this declaration of his favourite author. If either Earl Cornwallis's, or Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's, dispatches or letters have thrown censure on any particular [p97] corps employed that day, I am far from imagining that he will be thought to have removed it by the authorities he has quoted. Without confuting a single allegation in the accounts of that action, as given either by the noble Earl, or Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, he ventures to accuse Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton of four errors in judgment, which, with your permission, gentlemen of the army, we will separately investigate.
"The first error in judgment to be imputed to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, on the morning of the 17th of January, 1781, is, the not halting his troops before he engaged the enemy. Had he done so, it was evident that the following advantages would have been the result of his conduct: -- General Morgan's force and situation might have been distinctly viewed, under cover of a very superior [p98] cavalry; the British infantry, fatigued with rapid marches, day and night, for some time past, as has been already observed, might have had rest and refreshment; a detatchment from the several corps left with the baggage, together with batt-men, and officers' servants, would have had time to come up, and join in the action. The artillery all this time might have been playing on the enemy's front, or either flank, without risque of insult; the commandants of regiments, Majors M'Arthur and Newmarsh, officer who held commissions long before our author was born, and who had reputations to this day unimpeached, might have been consulted; and, not to dwell on the enumeration of all the advantages which would have accrued from so judicious a delay, time would have been given for the approach of Earl [p99] Cornwallis to the preconcerted point, for the unattainment of which he has been so much and so unjustly censured."
The truth is, gentlemen, that Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton did halt the troops for near half an hour, and made them throw of their knapsacks and blankets to render them lighter for action. It is equally true, that the troops did not receive all the rest and refreshment which our Stricturist wished them. They were not ordered to stack their arms before an enemy who was already formed in battle array; nor did they commence cooking their camp kettles under the protection of a cannonade; a fashion of feasting which I acknowledge, would have had the recommendation of novelty. I have the most perfect respect for Majors M'Arthur and Newmarsh; most particularly for the former, with whom I ever lived on service upon the strictest footing of friendship. [p100] Consulting them perhaps might have been of use; though, in my humble opinion, (to borrow an idea from the Stricturist's cannonading dinner,) too many cooks generally spoil the broth. Earl Cornwallis judged Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton to be sufficiently qualified for this business. He had commanded often times with distinguished perseverance and success, in at least as arduous situations15 as that of the unfortunate 17th of January. The idea of a cannonade that should have given Earl Cornwallis time to arrive at the scene of action, (to use the Stricturist's own words,) is an absurdity hitherto unparalleled. The [p101] army being near thirty miles distant, marching at the rate of four miles an hour, they could not have arrived under seven hours. This, in my opinion, would have been a devilish long cannonade indeed; and tho' the Stricturist remarks, that during this time the British might have rested and refreshed themselves, we are not to suppose that the Americans would have gone to sleep. Really, gentlemen, throughout this first criticism upon the action of the Cow Pens, the Stricturist is so incomprehensible in any military sense, and shews himself so destitute of military knowledge, that I cannot treat it seriously.
"The second error was, the un-officer like impetuosity of directing the line to advance before it was properly formed, and before the reserve had taken its ground; in consequence of which, as [p102] might have been expected, the attack was premature, confused, and irregular."
While Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was reconnoitering the enemy on his right, a scattering fire commenced by some recruits of the 7th, who had but newly joined their regiment, and seen no service. This unsteady behaviour he silenced to the utmost of his power, and then led the line to action. In your description of the action -- Strictures, page 97, you say: -- "The light legion infantry and fuzileers were ordered to form a line. Before this order was put in execution, and while Major Newmarsh, who commanded the latter corps, was posting his officers, the line, far from complete, was led to the attack by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton himself." The idea of posting officers I am at a loss to comprehend; such an expression was never before used in any military production, [p103] nor was such a practice ever adopted in the field.
Every officer, when a regiment is ordered to form, of course knows his proper station without being posted.16 Again, in the same page, Strictures 97, you say: -- "The 71st regiment and cavalry, who had not as yet disentangled themselves from the brush wood with which Thickelle Creek abounds, were directed to form, and wait for orders." And in the following page, Strictures 98, thus you inform us; "The reserve, which as yet had no orders to move from its first position, and consequently remained near a mile distant, was now directed to advance. When the line felt the advance of the [p104] 71st, all the infantry again moved on; the Continentals and backwoods-men gave ground; the British rushed forward."
First, sir, I will be so free as to tell you, that the action was fought very near two miles from Thickelle Creek, in an open pine barren, and not one single bush on the field of battle to entangle the troops, as you are pleased to assert.
Secondly, sir, I will take upon me to maintain, that the 71st were not one mile in the rear, as you absurdly relate; they were not three hundred yards distant; they were equally concerned in this affair with the rest of the line. They moved up; and when moving up to form in line with the rest of the troops, whether from their not taking ground enough, or from some other circumstance, their right flank brushed the left flank of the 7th regiment, and intermixed one with the other. Major M'Arthur, [p105] who commanded them, will not deny this fact. This, I hope, gentlemen of the army, is a plain proof they could not have been a mile distant. The whole front line might have been destroyed before they could have moved to that distant. Finally, sir, I must now inform the public, that you have acknowledged to officers that have conversed with you on these two subjects, since the publication of your Strictures, that you have mistated those facts.
You complain of the want of cannon and cavalry to support our troops. General Morgan had no cannon in the field to induce his troops to rally; so far the British were upon equal terms with him. And although the main body of the cavalry (in a most unaccountable manner) fled, your own account has proved there was a sufficient force of cavalry left in the field to repulse Washington's horse, although they were [p106] supported by their Continentals -- Vide Strictures, page 100. -- "Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, with no more than fifty horse, hesitated not to charge the whole of Washington's cavalry, though supported by the Continentals; it was a small body of officers, and a detatchment of the 17th dragoons who presented themselves on this desperate occasion; the loss sustained was in proportion to the danger of the enterprize, and the whole body was repulsed.
"The third error in this ruinous business, was the omission of giving discretional powers to that judicious veteran M'Arthur, to advance with the reserve, at the time that the front line was in pursuit of the militia; by which means the connection, so necessary to troops engaged in the field, was not preserved."
It may be proper, in every action, to give certain discretionary powers to experienced [p107] officers. In the present instance, the arrangements made, as I have just shewn, by Colonel Tarleton himself, rendered such a power less necessary; but with or without discretionary powers, communicated in express terms, I have too high an opinion both of the courage and judgment of Major M'Arthur, to imagine that, commanding the reserve, he would remain three-quarters of a mile in the rear. -- he might as well have been in England as in such a situation. In a word, the fact was not as you related it -- He was not three hundred yards in the rear. But I shall dwell no longer on this subject, as I believe your own confessions, subsequent to your publication, are on my side. You have acknowledged your misstatement in this instance, as well as in your description of the nature of the ground on which the action was fought, to officers who are ready to attest your confession.
[p108] The rest of this third error in judgment, imputed by you to Tarleton, has been sufficiently expatiated on in the remark on your second accusation.
"His fourth error was, ordering Captain Ogilvie, with a troop consisting of no more than forty men, to charge, before any impression was made on the Continentals, and before Washington's cavalry had been engaged."
Although I should sincerely have regretted the loss of Captain Ogilvie, not only as one of my most intimate friends, but as a distinguished and gallant officer, yet, had he, together with his whole troop, been massacred and annihilated to a man, this partial misfortune could not have lost the day.
"The next, and the most destructive (for I will not pretend to follow him through all his errors) was in not bringing up a column of cavalry, and in completing the rout; which, by his own account, had commenced through the whole American infantry."
Two separate times Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton send for the cavalry to advance; but, regardless of his orders, and their own honour, they went off the field without engaging. Be this known to the world. -- Their most sanguine friends can never speak one word in behalf of their conduct on that day. They did not advance. But, gentlemen, why is Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton to be condemned for their misconduct? This accusation of the Stricturist's, is the heighth of injustice and malevolence. If [p110] they were determined not to advance, how could he compel them to do it? It is well known, that in personal gallantry, Tarleton shewed them a most brilliant example on that occasion. -- He stood almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy, with hopes either of rallying his own men, or not surviving their disgrace. Exertions were used, and most vigourous ones, to enforce obedience to the orders, of the gallant commander: some officers went so far as to cut down several of their men, in order to stop the flight. The conduct of the cavalry was most astonishing; for they certainly had served well, and with distinction, before that day; they had often charged when exposed to a heavy fire.
I need not be diffident in giving my opinion of the disposition Tarleton made of his troops that day, when it is sanctioned by the opinion of so distinguished an [p111] officer as Earl Cornwallis. Vide extract from Earl Cornwallis's letter to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, Strictures, page 105, and in Tarleton's History, page 252, "your disposition was unexceptionable."
But setting aside the noble Earl's opinion for a moment only, I will ask any man, who claims a share of military knowledge, if it were possible for any officer to have drawn up his forces in a more military and advantageous order? He was opposed to a numerous enemy, in an open pine-barren, with no natural strength to protect his flanks; the militia and backwoods-men, from their loose manner of fighting, were in a situation to out flank him. -- His force consisted of the light and legion infantry, the 7th regiment, the 71st, and a body of near three hundred horse. The light infantry, legion infantry, and 7th regiment, were drawn up in front, [p112] with a squadron of cavalry to protect each flank -- a most military substitute to supply the want of a natural defence. The 71st regiment, and the remainder of the cavalry, were in reserve. I will boldly assert, that it was not possible to dispose of his troops more judiciously.
The means Tarleton used to bring the enemy to action, would do honour to any officer. The unwearied attention and perseverance he shewed to oblige them to fight, must ever do him credit; and even defies the rancour and malevolence of Roderick M'Kenzie, who in this point is forced to admit his merit.
Earl Cornwallis pays the highest tribute of praise to Tarleton, for his vigourous exertions in compelling the enemy to halt and engage. Vide extract from Earl Cornwallis's letter to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, Strictures, page 105. "The means [p113] you used to bring the enemy to action were able and masterly, and will ever do you honour."
Your account of the action at Cow Pens, was confessedly written with an intent to vindicate the conduct of the troops, and to impute the whole blame and misfortune of that day to several errors in judgment committed by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton; yet in your own account of that business, you furnish proofs against yourself; as for instance, vide page 100: -- "The advance of the British fell back, and communicated a panick to others, which soon became general." Is not this passage, in plain English, as follows: -- "The advance of the British fled, and were soon accompanied by the rest of the line, who fled likewise, but never rallied?" To construe this as good behaviour in the troops, I find a very difficult task; but your opinion [p114] and mine may, perhaps differ on this subject.
Your account allows also, that the British had once gained the victory, but did not chuse to keep it: -- you aver even that the enemy fled in all quarters. Vide Strictures, page 98: -- "The Continental and back-woods men gave ground, and the British rushed forward." Strictures, page 99, "They (the cavalry) stood aloof, without availing themselves of the fairest opportunity of reaping the laurels which lay before them; -- the infantry were not in a condition to overtake the fugitives." Again in Strictures, page 99, "General Morgan ordered Colonel Washington, with his dragoons, to cover his retreat, and to check the pursuit."
In pages 98 and 99 of your Strictures, you acknowledge the Americans were beaten, and flying, but rallied; and, in page [p115] 100, you allow "The British, in their turn, fled, but never rallied."
I must confess, I cannot myself find out where, in your description of this action, you have confuted Earl Cornwallis's opinion of the conduct of the troops, and Tarleton; and therefore, until you give me very different arguments to bring me over to your opinion, I shall adopt the noble Earl's. You meant well, sir; but a bad advocate employed in a cause, does more harm than good. That is exactly your case; for your own description of the action, intentionally meant to vindicate, condemns the very cause you wish to defend.
You inform us, that your account of the action has been submitted to the judgment of several respectable officers who were in this action, and that it has met with their entire approbation. I hope I shall [p116] not incur the displeasure of those officers, when, with the most perfect respect, I inform them, they have sanctioned an account, replete with erroneous statements of facts,17 and glaring absurdities.18
After all you have written -- after various quotations from different authors -- after having charged Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton with four particular errors in judgment -- you cannot deny this plain fact: The Americans, both militia and Continentals, [p117] fled, but rallied, and renewed the engagement; when the British, in their turn, fled, but never rallied. It is certain, the British had once gained the victory, but did not keep it: your own, and every other account, agree in this point.
In two instances you reprobate Doctor Ramsay's conduct, and reproach him with the baseness of charging the brother of an English Duke with a desire to receive a commission from Congress, and justly stigmatize him for his arrogance in daring to censure the honourable and distinguished character of a Montcrief; but yet you are happy in quoting every passing from that notorious author, that you imagine may tend to degrade Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, or detract from his military fame. I have honourably related, according to the best information I have been able to obtain, the various conduct of the different [p118] corps; and having justly censured those who deserve censure, I cannot, sir, permit the regiment to which you belonged to, (the 71st), to retreat unnoticed. I trust, the army, to whom I address my discourse, will allow them an equal share with the rest of the line, both in the merits and demerits of that day; though you wish to make the world believe, by your description of that unfortunate affair, that they had no share in the action until all the other infantry were totally beaten. I tell the world positively, sir, they were engaged (vide page 104); and although the utmost exertions were used by their officers, they, with the rest of the line, fled. Though I know full well the Highlanders are a gallant and bold race, please, sir, to recollect, they are but men.
"To examine whether proper use was made of the advantages which occurred on the morning of the 17th of January, both before and during the action; and, to trace to its very source, a fountain that overflowed with blood, and swept along its torrent destruction to the interest of Great Britain."
Here indeed you rise into horror. -- "Fountains overflowing with blood! destruction! bloody torrents!" ghosts, hobgoblins, daemons, Tartarus, I imagine follow! I was terrified, and shut the book! Had I been aware that I should meet with such a bloody description of the fate we poor soldiers are doomed to suffer, I should have been afraid to open it. [p120]
"If to be disinterested is necessary to the investigation of truth, I come so far qualified for this task. Unconnected with party, devoid of spleen, and too unimportant to be affected by general reflections on collective bodies of military men -- candour and impartiality may be allowed me."
I cite this passage neither to laugh at it, nor treat it seriously. -- It carries its answer with it. Those who have read the preceding part of your Strictures, may possibly conceive, that intense application may have distracted your mind, and affected your understanding. After cramming one hundred and seven pages with abuse, malevolence, and scurrility, can you, in your sober senses, expect us to believe that your pen is guided by candour and impartiality? [p121] and that you are uninfluenced by interest, party, or spleen. -- Such an insult upon the common sense of the world would be too gross.
"He (Ramsay) has engaged my esteem for having done no more than justice to Ferguson, and no less than justice to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton. -- His sentiments of the former are already in your possession; and with respect to the latter -- read, and judge."
Whatever your favourite author (Ramsay) makes an attack upon any officer in the British army, excepting Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, you immediately reprobate him, and lament that "you are compelled to deplore such a mixture of alloy, with his shining abilities." Page 136.) But whenever you find any passage in [p122] this author tending to detract from Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's character as an officer, you adopt it with avidity, and give it all the aid of your own candid remarks.
Let us examine whether it be true, that the following passage, which you have transcribed in triumph from your congenial historian, "Does no less than justice to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton."
"Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton had hitherto acquired distinguished reputation; but he was greatly indebted for his military fame to good fortune and accident. In all his previous engagements he either had the advantage of surprising an incautious enemy -- of attacking them when panic-struck after recent defeats -- or of being opposed to undisciplined militia. He had gathered no laurels by hard fighting against an equal force; his repulse on this occasion (Cow Pens) [p123] did more essential injury to the British interest, than was compensated by all his victories. Tarleton's defeat was the first link in a grand chain of causes, which finally drew down ruin, both in North and South Carolina, on the Royal interest."
Out of the mouth of your own witness, I will judge both you and him! This unhappy quotation contains the antidote to its own venom, and establishes the military fame which it professes to depreciate. If you had consulted Lloyd (vide page 145 of his work) instead of Ramsay, you would have learned that victory is the result of action. "No army conquers merely by resisting: you may repel an enemy; but victory is the result of action."
You having studied in a different school, may naturally condemn Tarleton for the enterprize and perseverance which enabled [p124] him to surprize his enemy; for the celerity of his marches; for his instant decision; for that quickness, that rapidity of attack, which prevents an enemy from forming, and insures victory with inferior force; for every quality, in short, and for all the talents which constitute the very excellence and perfection of a partizan. Upon YOUR principles, it must be admitted, that the attack on the American cavalry at Lenoo's Ferry was extremely unmilitary. Neither was it civil to force Colonels Washington and Lee to save their lives by swimming the Santee river with their dinner in their mouths. It would certainly have been more polite in Tarleton to have offered them a boat. Had this affair happened in the winter season, it certainly would have been a most inhuman action; but the warmness of the weather in some measure palliated the incivility. The defeat of Sumpter, near Camden, [p125] was still more horrible! It was a barbarous and inhuman murder! Some of those poor devils were killed (with their spoons in their mouths, eating omminey,) before ever they could stand in their arms. There can be no excuse pleaded for such an act of cruelty. Besides, where was the bravery of surprizing and attacking that General so suddenly as not to give him time to put his coat on?19
But now, Sir, to be more serious; -- your favourite author (Ramsay) is as incorrect [p126] in his description of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's successes, as you are malevolent. Be pleased, Sir, to recollect the defeat of Colonel Beaufort, with a chosen body of Continentals, shortly after the surrender of Charlestown. Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton sent an officer to Colonel Beaufort, when he found he had approached him so close, that an action could not be avoided, to inform him, that if he chose to surrender his corps as prisoners of war, they should receive the same terms as their fellow soldiers that were captured in Charlestown. This Colonel Beaufort positively refused; halted, and formed his troops for action. Tarleton advanced, attacked the Americans, killed 90 on the spot; and every other individual of his whole corps was either wounded or taken prisoners, excepting the commanding officer and about seventeen or eighteen men, who mounted themselves [p127] on the waggon horses and escaped by flight. Surely, Sir, this cannot be construed a surprize or sudden attack, for Colonel Beaufort had above an hour's notice to form his troops and prepare for battle.
The numbers on each side were nearly equal, but rather in favour of the Americans.
Your favourite author (Ramsay) has harped very much on the defeats of Ferguson and Tarleton, at King's Mountain and Cow Pens; and attributes greatly the destruction of the British interest in the southern parts of America, to these events. Although the actions of King's Mountain, and Cow Pens, were severely felt at that instant of time, they were only partial misfortunes. I will be so bold as to assert, that these misfortunes did not in any degree contribute to the loss of America, nor could many such misfortunes have produced that calamity. Our [p128] ruin was completed by permitting a superior French fleet to ride triumphant on the American seas the autumn of 1781. That, and that only, ruined our cause in America, and disgracefully put an end to the war. -- There the nail was clinched! --
Wherever an opening is to be found for detraction, or reflections on Lieut. Col. Tarleton as an officer, Roderick M'Kenzie is sure to come forward, but as cautiously does he avoid touching on particular events to which the most envenomed pen must render a tribute of praise: as for instance, the action of Monk's-Corner; Lenor's-Ferry; Colonel Beauford's defeat in the upper parts of Carolina; and Sumpter's defeat near Camden. Not one single comment has this candid Stricturist made on either of these actions: though on Page 107 of his Strictures, he declares himself so disinterested, candid, and devoid of spleen; and impartial. You, Gentlemen [p129] of the Army, are well acquainted with their merits; so is Roderick M'Kenzie; but he cautiously avoids saying one single word on any of those gallant, conspicuous, and decisive actions, knowing they tend so much to the credit of Tarleton and his corps. But still our Stricturist assures us that he is impartial, candid, and devoid of spleen. I am not one of those credulous mortals who put faith in such professions of candour and impartiality. I would as soon believe that the Begums of Oude were coming from India to appear in behalf of their much injured friend, Mr. Hastings.
THE Stricturist is armed at all points against Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton; he reproaches him with a desire of appearing as great in the cabinet as in the field.
Yet surely he need not be jealous of Tarleton's literary merit, for having himself displayed such extensive knowledge and talents which he must have acquired from an intimacy with so many celebrated authors, one of whom he gives us a quotation from, almost in every page of his Strictures. His memory must have been very retentive, as we cannot imagine him to be so wanting in truth, merely to have made a pompous display of their names at second hand, and never to have perused them.
[p131] I cannot but remind him (at parting) of his most elaborate studies, and bring them all concisely to view, with his own words and quotations. And a very pretty little library he brings before us.
STRICTURES, page 4: The discriminating talents of a Hume, a Sewart, or a Gibbon, which are satellites of true genius. -- Page 7; Goodall, Tytler, Steward, and Whitaker; writers of honor, discernment, and veracity, who penetrated the thick cloud of misrepresentation, and placed that much injured Princess (Mary Queen of Scots) in the genuine light. -- Page 11: He professes himself well acquainted with the deep descernment of a Machiavel. -- Page 21 and 22; He sings the praises of a Leonidas at Thermopylae; the immortal Wolfe at the Heighths of Abraham; the Corsican Cheif, Paoli, and his historian Boswell. -- I beg pardon, I have like to have forgot the Parish Priests of Corsica. [p132] -- Page 27; He seems well informed of the History of Candia and Rhodes. -- Page 38; he laments with the celebrated Ganganelli. -- Page 125; he produces Tacitus and Livy. -- Page 135; by his introducing the talisman of a necromancer, we may with propriety suppose that he may possess some skill in the black art, and be a greater conjurer in that science than in the art of war. -- Page 142; Keewee and Cherokee, plainly evince that his geographical knowledge of America, extends even to the remote settlements of the Indians. -- Page 143, Muller's Elements of Fortication, are brought in evidence to his skill as an engineer. -- Page 147; Kokensco proves also, that he has some cursory connection with Poland; nor can he be wanting in philosophy, mathematics, or astronomy; and the situation both of the heavenly and earthly bodies. -- As in page 125, he is ostentatious [p133] of his knowledge of a certain author's description of the world.
"He now to sense, now nonsense, leaning,
"Means not, but blunders round about a meaning.
He here happily mixes the dulce with the utile. He shews a pretty taste for poetry; though it must be confessed that he is not equally fortunate in the application of these verses; which his readers, I believe, will think, might have been more properly addressed to his own compositions than to Tarleton's.
Nor shall Ramsay, the Annual Register, or the Scots Magazine, pass unnoticed in the catalogue of his studies; but as they do not carry with them such fine pompous names, I thought fit to place them last.
Was I to make known my own extensive knowledge of the celebrated histories of Jack the Giant-Killer, and the Mighty [p134] Tom Thumb, who was swallowed up by a cow, the world certainly would not render me the same tribute of praise on the improvement of my mind, as they must to him for such superior studies. But in my humble opinion, the one would be full as appropros to the American war as the other.
"Most learned young man! a second Daniel!" What a fun of knowledge has he treasured up in his capacious mind!
I beg leave to compliment him on the secret happiness and satisfaction he must enjoy from such extensive, profitable, and elaborate studies; and at the same time, console with myself, and avow my own inability and idleness; for, by heavens, I never read one fiftieth part, during my whole life, of such edifying productions.
But although our Stricturist has plainly proved his application and extensive knowledge as a historian, a philosopher, a poet, [p135] and a necromancer; which must tend ever greatly to his advantage. Permit me, Gentlemen of the Army, to ask you what have Hume, Gibbon, Stewart, Goodall, Tytler, Whitaker, Machiavel, Leonidas, Wolfe, Ganganelli, Mary Queen of Scots, Boswell, Paoli, and Parish Priests to do with the American war, or Tarleton's conduct as an officer?
It grieves me much whenever I find a soldier disgrace his pen with indelicate abuse and vulgar wit; throughout our Stricturist's whole book, he is exposed to the reproach of gross personality against Colonel Tarleton; in one part he has no scruple to compare him to a butterfly -- vide Strictures, page 7. "He (Tarleton) appears to substitute a professional experience, so limited as scarcely to exceed the duration of a butterfly's existence." And, with the addition of the following [p136] elegant note, "Natural historians relate, that this insect is, in the first period of its existence, a crawling grub; in the second, a fluttering useless fly; and that in the third, it dies."
I surely may, in return, be allowed to present him with the opinion of a Huron of such productions, when confined in the Bastile with Gordon the Jansanist, who gives him several books to read, during their confinement; -- the story is Voltaire's, and none of mine, -- (vide the Sincere Huron, as translated from Voltaire.) "The good man had some little books of criticism, some of those periodical pamphlets wherein men, incapable of producing any thing themselves, blacken the productions of others; where a Vise insults a Racine, and a Fardit a Fenelon. The Huron ran over some of them.
[p137] 'I compare them to certain gnats, that lodge their eggs in the posteriors of the finest horses, which do not, however, prevent their running.'
The two philosophers scarce deigned to cast their eyes upon these excrements of literature.
For the great pains our Stricturist has taken to ridicule and abuse Colonel Tarleton, he really deserves some reward. If he should emigrate from hence to the East, I think a contract for opium and elephants would not over reward the labours of his pen; but should those torrid regions not be congenial to his constitution, what think you of his being made Purveyor to the Lions in the Tower?20 It is a good thing where he may be able to serve his friend Dr. Brown,21 by appointing him Head Keeper, a proper employment for such a shameless destructor of public or private fame, who should be banished the society of all human beings, and destined to live with savage beasts.
F I N I S.
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10 The crackers and militia in those parts of America are all mounted on horse-back, which renders it totally impossible to force them to an engagement with infantry only. When they chuse to fight, they dismount, and fasten their horses to the fences and rails; but if not very confident in the superiority of their numbers, they remain on horse-back, give their fire, and retreat, which renders it useless to attack them without cavalry: for though you repulse them, and drive them from the field, you never can improve the advantage, or do them any material detriment. [ back ]
11 Tarleton distinguished himself on many services in the Jersies and Pennsylvania; particularly in the attack on a stone house, commanded by Colonel Lee, and miraculously escaped with his life, having his horse wounded in three places, his helmet shot off his head, and shot through his light dragoon jacket. He also was at the taking of General Lee; commanded Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt's advanced guard, and contributed not a little to the taking of that officer. [ back ]
12 Vide Extract Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of 1780, and 1781, page 221 and 222. -- "Other circumstances, perhaps, contributed to so decisive a rout, which, of the military system admitted the same judicious regulations as the naval, a court martial would, perhaps, have disclosed. public trials of commanding officers, after unfortunate affairs, are as necessary to one service as the other, and might, in some instances, be highly beneficial to the military profession. Influenced by this idea, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, some days after the action, required Earl Cornwallis's approbation of his proceedings, or his leave to retire till enquiry could be instituted to investigate his conduct." [ back ]
13 Copy of a letter from Earl Cornwallis to Colonel Tarleton. -- "You have forfeited no part of my esteem, as an officer, by the unfortunate event of the action of the 17th; the means you used to bring the enemy to action were able and masterly, and must ever do you honour; your disposition was unexceptionable: the total misbehaviour of the troops could alone have deprived you of the glory which was so justly your due." [ back ]
14 When the army quitted Charlotte, I myself, with four or five other officers, sick of the yellow fever, were conveyed [p93] conveyed away in waggons. I was the only one that survived a week's march. From the inclemency of the season, and being frequently wetted by crossing rivers, I lost the use of my limbs for some months. [ back ]
15 Vide the description of Beauford's defeat, where Tarleton, with the British Legion alone, a new corps, and had not seen much service, (at that time,) attacked Beauford with a chosen body of Continentals, killed a number, and made prisoner the whole corps, excepting about seventeen or eighteen. [ back ]
16 The idea is equally new and curious; and could only have been brought to life by the fertile and military genius of Dr. Browne and Roderick M'Kenzie. [ back ]
17 Surely it must be allowed most erroneous to state, that the 71st were a mile in the rear, when they were not three hundred yards; and that the reserve were entangled in the rush-wood with which Thickelle Creek abounds, when the action was fought very near two miles from the Creek, on an open pine-barren, and not one single bush on the field of battle. [ back ]
18 Surely no person, after a moment's reflection, can suppose that a cannonade could have been kept up long enough to bring Earl Cornwallis, with the army, to that spot, from which he was thirty miles distant; nor can any man support so unmilitary an idea, as posting officers in action. [ back ]
19 An officer well known in India sent to Tippoo Saib, when at the head of one hundred thousand troops, requiting him to meet him (honourably) with one hundred men on each side. Tippoo, on receiving the challenge, said to a colonel in the Imperial service, who happened to be in his camp; "What would your master say to this?" The German officer, who probably possessed some of Tarleton's unmilitary ideas, perceived that Tippoo did not expect an answer. The magnanimity of Ramsay, Roderick M'Kenzie, and Dr. Brown, would doubtless have exhorted him to accept the challenge. [ back ]
20 This place is worth ^1000 per annum, and in the gift of the Constable of the Tower (Earl Cornwallis.) [ back ]
21 Although Dr. Brown died some time this winter, I have not deviated from the old adage "De mortuis nil nisi bonum." This book was written, and the greatest part printed last July. [ back ]
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