Steve Weir: New Zealand's Master Gunner

With the Battle of El Alamein decided and the 8th Army's pursuit of the Afrika Korps in full swing, Weir's regiments reverted to command under their respective brigade groups as the New Zealand Division moved off on the afternoon of 4 November. The New Zealand Division (now augmented by the British 4 Light Armoured Brigade) passed numerous burned out vehicles, abandoned guns and columns of prisoners as they joined the pursuit. The next morning, Weir rode at the head of the column, witnessing several minor actions before the Division encountered a minefield and was forced to a halt. Any chance of cutting off the enemy was quickly dashed by a rainstorm at dawn that lasted for 24 hours. For Weir, it was immensely frustrating but nothing could be done. 'There we were, all the pursuit forces, bogged down unable to move more than five yards, our supply formations dried up again. And we could do literally nothing until the desert dried up again'. It was a further 24 hours after the rain stopped before the Division could again get under way.

For this initial phase of the pursuit, Weir was in command of the Divisional Reserve consisting of 4 Field Regiment, most of 14 Lt Anti-Aircraft Regiment, 34 Anti-Tank Battery and all but two companies of 27 (Machine-Gun) Battalion. Weir decided to personally reconnoitre the nearby Sollum Pass to see if his regiments could use this route but found the road had been blown at the summit. In the course of his reconnaissance, Weir discovered a solitary German soldier asleep at the wheel of a broken-down truck and promptly took him prisoner. It took a day for the New Zealand Division to traverse the Halfaya Pass before reaching Bardia and it paused to rest while other units of the 8th Army continued the pursuit. With its supply lines lengthening, the 8th Army's pursuit slowed and Rommel was able to form a defensive line at El Agheila from 24 November.

The pause at Bardia provided a chance for rest and maintenance for most of the Division for the remainder of November. On 4 December, the New Zealand Division then began a 350-mile move across Cyrenaica, initially to an assembly area near the front, east of El Agheila. While two British divisions assaulted the Agheila Line in a frontal attack, the New Zealand Division was to simultaneously drive behind the Axis positions to the area of Marble Arch, and entrap the enemy in the first of three left hook manoeuvres.

On 13 December the New Zealand Division set off on a difficult route for El Agheila but it was soon evident the enemy was withdrawing. An attempt by 6 Brigade to cut off the retreating Axis forces was unsuccessful when it was halted only two miles short of the coastal road at midnight on 15 December. 5 Brigade in the meantime remained in position 10 miles away and waited for the battle that would occur in the morning. Weir went ahead to reconnoitre the area towards the coast but realised that the guns were unable to begin registration in the dark and would have to do their best when daylight came. All through the night the enemy continued to retreat until dawn on 16 December when 5 Brigade began engaging the lines of retreating Axis vehicles. Weir's regiments were hindered by the lack of registration and poor communications. It was immensely frustrating and John Snadden recalled Weir swearing profusely when the fire orders could not be sent through. Hampered by inaccurate maps, the artillery scored very few hits. The enemy soon found the gap between the brigades and streamed through it to escape. Another left hook was attempted soon after when the Division tried to encircle the Axis rearguard at the old fort of Nofilia. By mid-day on 17 December, 5 Brigade was in action supported by 5 Field Regiment, but enemy shellfire and bad going forced the Brigade to halt before reaching the coastal road. The enemy retreated during the night and Nofilia was captured without a fight at dawn on 18 December.

The Division had travelled 500 miles since leaving Bardia and it rested at Nofilia over Christmas and the New Year. This break gave Weir an opportunity to re-calibrate the guns and continue the training of his regiments. The gunners practised firing both Stonks and the 'quick barrage', which Weir had devised during the 5 Indian Brigade attack at Alamein. The Stonk was finally formalised as a standard technique and Bombardier C.V. Gallagher of 6 Field Regiment (a former schoolteacher with an MSc in maths) designed a special template or protractor for use on the artillery board. This 'contained a hole which fitted over the Stonk centre point and from it the area on which the battery had to fire could at once be marked on the sheet of talc [clear adhesive] which covered the map. In a matter of seconds, given the point and bearing, the line and range of individual guns could be called out'. This protractor eliminated the need to physically draw the target areas on the map itself and reduced the preparation time needed to fire these concentrations.

On 9 January 1943 the New Zealand Division left Nofilia for Wadi Tamet, which was reached three days later. There the Division's senior officers attended a briefing by Montgomery who outlined his plan to capture Tripoli (Operation Fire-Eater) before its port could be destroyed. It was not known if Rommel would seriously defend Tripoli, or retire and make a stand in Tunisia instead. Fire-Eater involved a third left hook by the New Zealand Division round Beurat while 51 Highland Division would conduct a frontal assault.

After a day spent moving over difficult terrain, the Divisional Cavalry contacted the enemy at dawn on 15 January. The armoured cars quickly became bogged down under heavy shelling and Weir (travelling at the front of the Division) brought up two field batteries and a medium battery in support. It was late in the day though before they could get into action and Beurat was abandoned by the enemy shortly after. For future assaults, Weir formed a gun group from 4 and 6 Field Regiments, 211 Medium Battery, RA and most of two anti-tank batteries. This was to operate in direct support of the Divisional Cavalry and the attached British armour, under his own personal command.

Further enemy rearguards at Sedada and south of Azizia knocked out several tanks and made movement in the open extremely hazardous. At Azizia Weir and Freyberg went forward for a look on the crest of a knoll and had a narrow escape when four shells burst 'almost at their feet and caused them to scuttle down out of sight'. The NZ guns had little success engaging the 88s and for the rest of the day, the Division had little choice but to remain in cover and wait for darkness. Dawn on 23 January revealed that Azizia had also been abandoned during the night and it was learned soon after that Tripoli had fallen.

After passing through Azizia, most of the Division settled down to rest and reorganise in countryside about 12 miles south of Tripoli. The first of the Division's new 17-pounder anti-tank guns (Pheasants) arrived and courses were run to train the crews. Weir also planned a Divisional Artillery exercise near Azizia from 1-3 March, but things had barely begun when orders arrived to move the Division to Medenine in southern Tunisia for the final phase of the North African campaign.