Steve Weir: New Zealand's Master Gunner

The New Zealand Division reached Medenine at night on 2/3 March and 5 Brigade was immediately deployed for action south-west of the town, in anticipation of an Axis attack. Weir was tasked with preparing the defensive fire plan. With his staff, he allocated defensive fire targets and prepared 12 Stonks to 5 Brigade's immediate front. Every Stonk had a quick reference codename to enable all regiments within range to immediately engage the target area. The Stonks were also deepened to accommodate the fire of the medium artillery and some 3.7� heavy anti-aircraft guns in the ground fire role. To defend the neighbouring divisions, another nine Stonks were planned for the frontages of 7 Armoured Division and five for 51 Highland Division.

For the Stonks to achieve maximum effect, Weir planned for tactical surprise.

'I held the view after the fighting at Alamein that a good deal of our artillery fire was uncoordinated, that fire was opened prematurely causing early dispersion of what were likely to be good targets, that by opening fire prematurely we did not get such good killing as when the target was allowed to develop and come within range of maximum number of guns'.

To co-ordinate the fire of every available gun, Weir linked the New Zealand Artillery on a common means of communication with 7 Armoured, 51 Highland and 5 Army Group Royal Artillery (5 AGRA). This linkage also included the anti-tank guns of all three divisions.

Weir deployed most of his anti-tank guns in support of 5 Brigade but kept the still secret 17-pounders (deployed for the first time) well back to avoid their possible capture. Also incorporated into both the Stonks and the anti-tank defences were eight 3.7� anti-aircraft guns that were defending an airfield in the rear of the line. Weir had recently seen them demonstrated in the anti-tank role near Tripoli with impressive results. By 3 March, the anti-tank defences were already so strong that Weir told Freyberg 'he had so many anti-tank guns he was having difficulty in siting them'.

The expected attack by Rommel finally occurred at 0600 hours on 6 March. Axis infantry and columns of tanks advanced in three main groups against the length of the 8th Army's front. The attack was soon foundering in the face of the 600 anti-tank guns and massed artillery of the 8th Army, which had been forewarned by Ultra and was ready in wait. There was no direct attack on 5 Brigade's front during the morning but Weir's regiments were quickly in action firing Stonks as soon as the enemy entered the pre-prepared zones. The largest of these occurred at 1757 hours when the artillery of the New Zealand Division, 7th Armoured, 5 AGRA and the airfield guns brought down a massive concentration upon about 1000 infantry and some tanks in the vicinity of Point 270. Observers described the effect as devastating, and Weir, when he later inspected the ground, found the 'shell holes rarely more than six yards [apart]'. By nightfall, Rommel's final offensive in North Africa had been repulsed and the Axis forces withdrew to the safety of the Mareth Line. The Afrika Korps never again launched a major offensive against the 8th Army in North Africa.

Medenine was a textbook example of the effective use of massed artillery and anti-tank guns, deployed in depth to defeat an enemy attack. The guns were so effective that the only Allied tanks that took part in the battle were a squadron of the 7th Armoured Division, which plugged a gap briefly created by the German armour. Weir regarded Medenine as 'a brilliant one day battle in which the fire technique of 2 NZ Divisional Artillery exercised a dominating influence over the battlefield'. It was also a vindication of the use of an AGRA to maximise the use of artillery under a single commander on a common means of control. Weir's only error was his decision to deploy his 17-pounders so far to the rear. They were too distant from the action and never got to fire.

Montgomery now prepared to assault the Mareth Line; a formidable line of defences built by the French across southern Tunisia to resist the Italian forces in Tripolitania. His plan (Operation Pugilist) was for XXX Corps to lead a main effort frontal assault on the Mareth Line near the coast, while the New Zealanders made a left hook through the interior around the Matmata Hills to Tebaga Gap and Gabes. The aim of this manoeuvre was to tie up enemy reserves in the Mareth Line's rear and prevent the Axis forces from concentrating against XXX Corps in the south. The New Zealand Division was now New Zealand Corps totalling 29,000 men including 151 tanks, a British armoured car regiment and a Free French contingent, all under Freyberg's command.

On 11 March, the first elements of New Zealand Corps set off secretly for the assembly area about 40 miles to the south. Weir followed three days later with the Divisional Reserve, riding in a large new armoured command vehicle that his headquarters had recently obtained. After several days of preparations concealed under camouflage, the New Zealanders set off on 19 March over very rough going, encountering minefields in some places. The next day the New Zealand Corps rendezvoused with the Free French and by nightfall, Tebaga Gap lay within reach just on the horizon.

The Axis defences of the Gap were centred on an old Roman wall in front of the dominant Point 201 feature with minefields laid in the approaches. On the morning of 21 March, the King's Dragoon Guards and Divisional Cavalry edged forward towards the Gap and reconnoitred the Axis lines, under cover of an Allied bombing raid. The New Zealand Artillery was soon in action, aided by some trig lists found in Tripoli after its capture. The advance though, was stalled by late afternoon and 6 Brigade was brought forward during the night. At 2200 hours 6 Brigade attacked, supported by the artillery, which was allocated only 60 rounds per gun. The barrage was a thin one but the infantry attack was still successful and Point 201 was taken after two hours of fighting. Freyberg, however, hesitated and failed to follow up the assault with 8th Armoured Brigade via two gaps that had been cleared through the minefields. The opportunity for driving through to Gabes was consequently missed and the Axis forces consolidated their line.

Montgomery in the meantime launched Pugilist on 20 March with the attack on the Mareth Line by XXX Corps. The assault was initially successful but a German counter-attack at night on 22/23 March succeeded in throwing back the bridgehead and 50 Division was forced to retire. With this reverse in the south, Montgomery decided to transfer his main effort to the left hook instead and sent X Corps (the Headquarters and 1st Armoured Division) under Horrocks to join the New Zealanders and take command. X Corps arrived at Tebaga two days later on 24 March.

The plan to break out of the Gap to Gabes and El Hamma (Operation Supercharge II) was jointly devised by Freyberg and Horrocks. A necessary preliminary to the attack was the capture of the high ground overlooking the start line, which was accomplished by 26 Battalion early on 26 March, supported by artillery concentrations from 4 and 6 Field Regiments, and a medium battery. While this attack was proceeding, Weir personally took forward the remaining artillery batteries from 5 Field Regiment, 1 Armoured Division and X Corps and deployed them in the moonlight ready for the main assault. This was made particularly difficult by a severe dust storm that reduced visibility to only 100 yards.

Weir's artillery plan for Supercharge II was a complex one, due to the nature of the terrain. It consisted of a creeping barrage with a total of 42 lifts over 97 minutes, of which the last lifts were smoke. Some of the British batteries fired timed concentrations and one medium battery was dedicated to counter-battery fire. Zero-hour was set for 1600 hours with air attacks from 16 fighter-bomber squadrons scheduled 30 minutes beforehand. This attack was also the first west to east attack by the 8th Army - out of the setting sun, instead of at night to which the Axis forces had become accustomed.

Guided to their targets by the artillery firing coloured smoke, the opening air strikes of Supercharge II were very effective. Low-level strafing on the Axis positions was intense and Weir was reminded of Greece where the Luftwaffe had reigned supreme. This time, however, the RAF had air supremacy and 'the German efforts at the same kind of work in Greece were tame compared to the efforts of these young boys of the fighter service'. The German 164 Division's war diary later revealed its divisional artillery 'had lost more than half its guns in these fighter-bomber raids'.

At zero-hour, 200 guns opened fire as 150 tanks and three infantry battalions advanced, followed by 1 Armoured Division. The preliminary artillery bombardment lasted for 15 minutes in order to allow the tanks to move close in behind it. The creeping barrage then followed - deliberately thin with only one gun to every 100 yards of frontage to enable the following tanks to advance through the dust and smoke without losing direction, as well as benefit from the curtain of suppressive fire. The attack soon overcame the defences but 28 Battalion was unable to take its objective and two field regiments were ordered to fire Stonks to assist them at dawn. Stonks were normally defensive area targets but this time they were used in the attack. Soon 1 Armoured Division was streaming through the Gap towards the objective at El Hamma. 8 Armoured Brigade defeated the last rearguard of 15 Panzer Division and New Zealand Corps entered Gabes at mid-day on 29 March. That night Weir sat up with Freyberg and together they drank a bottle of whisky for their first quiet night after a long period of action.

Tebaga Gap was a decisive victory for the New Zealand Corps. Ian Wards described Tebaga as 'driven home with the precision that will make it for all time the perfect example of the blitzkrieg offensive'. Weir rated it as 'one of the greatest deeds of the New Zealand Division and also as one of the decisive battles of the North African war'. He later recalled 'a great many officers of the divisions facing the Mareth Line actually came to see me to express a heartfelt gratitude for having turned the Mareth Line because it saved those divisions a great deal of fighting and heavy casualties'.

With the loss of Gabes, the Axis forces withdrew to a defensive line along the Wadi Akarit, 15-20 miles to the north. There were some minor skirmishes with enemy rearguards on 30 March as elements of the New Zealand Division moved up to the Wadi Akarit and began to probe its defences. During the advance from Gabes, Weir personally received the surrender of a German officer and about 30 men. These were Panzergrenadiers of 15 Panzer Division and the first Germans Weir had seen surrender voluntarily. After talking with the officer, Weir decided that they posed no threat and he sent them to the rear, without a guard, holding a white flag.

The New Zealand Division was withdrawn into reserve on 1 April, and relieved by 50 Division. The Divisional Artillery (less the anti-tank guns), however, remained in the line to support 50 Division's assault on the Wadi Akarit, with Weir temporarily its CRA. The assault (Operation Scipio) began with a tremendous bombardment by 496 guns at 0415 hours on 6 April. The front was only 10-12 miles in length, which meant the bombardment was the most concentrated seen yet in North Africa. The creeping barrage had now completely returned to favour in the British Army and had been further developed. The one in front of 51 Highland Division even incorporated a change in direction by wheeling around to the left as the lifts progressed. Bofors guns also fired tracer to show the direction of the advance.

The New Zealand field regiments fired at selected targets for 25 minutes then commenced a 31-lift barrage in two phases, with the bombardment finally ceasing after five hours. Included in the fire plan were a number of Stonks but it appears these were never fired. The attack was successful although the assault continued all day and 50 Division fought hard in the centre without quite reaching its objective. That night, Weir sat up until 0300 hours preparing a fire plan to cover the advance of 8 Armoured Brigade, but dawn revealed the enemy had abandoned the line and the plan was no longer needed. Weir then ordered the guns to follow the armour but it was slow going with only a few gaps navigable through the minefields. Weir stopped for a look and observed for himself the strength of the former enemy positions, noting 'it was a very strong one and one which could have been held for ever and should never have been given up but they had been outfought in one day'. Nearby he counted 24 destroyed Axis guns.

For nearly a week, the New Zealand Division pursued the retreating Axis forces along the coastal plain. German rearguards slowed progress and it was 13 April before the Division closed with the enemy near Enfidaville, some 150 miles north of the Wadi Akarit. The Axis line was a strong one, set along steep hills, anchored at one end by the sea and dominated in the centre by the mountain fortress of Takrouna. Weir was in no doubt as to the difficulty that lay ahead �'the German[s] held the hills and they were high, leaving us a plain as flat and bare as a billiard-table to deploy in�I firmly believed it would take us three months yet to finish off North Africa'. There were few suitable positions to site the guns and the ground was extremely hard for digging in.

The New Zealand Division was given the task of attacking Takrouna on the night of 19/20 April. Possession of Takrouna and the surrounding hills enabled the enemy to keep the New Zealanders under constant observation so daylight was spent under camouflage. By night, Weir sent forward parties to prepare gun positions about 6000 yards south-west of Takrouna while his headquarters staff worked hard on the artillery plan. Weir was adamant that Takrouna needed to be captured as early as possible and stated this at X Corps' conference on 18 April. His regiments would be deployed on the open plain and if the enemy still held Takrouna by dawn following the assault, the guns would be under observation, vulnerable to heavy counter-battery fire with their positions untenable.

The artillery fire plan for Takrouna was similar to that of Supercharge at Alamein with an advance of 4000 yards over the same length of frontage. The major difference from Supercharge was the mountainous terrain, which made plotting targets much more difficult. Weir also benefited from intelligence provided by an Air OP, which was able to locate a number of enemy positions. This was the first occasion that the New Zealand Artillery operated with air observation in the Second World War.

Weir moved his guns forward during darkness on 19 April and all was ready by 2230 hours. The artillery barrage opened 30 minutes later with 6 Brigade attacking on the right while 5 Brigade assaulted Takrouna on the left of the line. After a pause on the opening lines of each brigade, the barrage began its forward creep but it soon became evident that the rate of the lifts was much too fast as the infantry began lagging behind. By dawn, 6 Brigade had taken its objectives but 5 Brigade encountered stiff resistance as 28 Battalion (unsupported by the creeping barrage due to the very steep slope in its sector) stumbled into minefields and took heavy fire from Takrouna. By morning they clung to a toehold, but the feature was still heavily contested. With Takrouna still in enemy hands, Weir ordered 6 Field Regiment and 47 Battery to retire before dawn to the safety of their original positions out of enemy observation.

By dawn on 20 April, 5 Brigade was stalled and the enemy appeared to be massing for a counter-attack. Weir travelled with Freyberg to 5 Brigade Headquarters where he learned of the problems the infantry were facing. A call for fire was received at 1000 hours from a forward observer with 23 Battalion for a concentration on Point 136 behind Takrouna, where the enemy appeared to be forming up. Weir responded by ordering several Stonks from all the artillery in range (now only 4 Field Regiment and the mediums), which quickly dissuaded the enemy from launching an assault. Weir also targeted enemy artillery and on one occasion that morning, brought down fire from nine regiments on a single Axis battery. Fighting continued on Takrouna throughout the day until an attack by 25 Battalion the next morning finally succeeded in securing the feature, aided by the use of a 17-pounder as a forward sniping gun.

Takrouna's capture was not the end of the battle, however, as X Corps continued to push into the hill country beyond Takrouna using massed artillery concentrations to destroy pockets of enemy resistance. On 24 April, Weir called down a 200-gun Stonk on enemy guns and followed this the next day with a massive 14-regiment concentration on the Djebel Froukr ridge to the front of 6 Brigade. This was impressive for those observing but the summit of the ridge was a difficult target and the actual effects were much less damaging. Stonks were increasingly common and the New Zealanders' use of massed artillery culminated in a 15-regiment Stonk on 25 April.

Takrouna was an epic victory for the New Zealand Division, but for the artillery it was less of a success despite the unprecedented amount of guns and ammunition at the CRA's disposal. The initial creeping barrage was fairly ineffective as the infantry had quickly been left behind. The rate of lift had been reduced after the original Supercharge barrage had proved too slow, but Takrouna was a different matter with its vastly more difficult terrain. Weir had planned it as the infantry requested, but the faster rate was clearly too optimistic. Kippenberger later stated �I still think lifts of 100 yards every four minutes would have been better, going partly by our experience in Italy'. The rugged terrain also diminished the effects of artillery fire as individual features on the ground were harder to land rounds on accurately.

The New Zealand infantry was withdrawn on 26 April but the gunners stayed in the line. Weir 'was puzzled whose orders we were under during this stage. I don't remember getting any orders from anybody, so mostly made up our own'. The New Zealand Artillery (less 6 Field Regiment) was finally withdrawn from the line on 2 May. After three days of rest from 1-4 May, the New Zealand Artillery were sent back into action to support the attack by XIX French Corps on Djebel Zaghouan. Tunis fell on 7 May, but fighting continued until 13 May when the Axis forces in Africa finally surrendered, after 4 Field Regiment fired the last rounds in 8th Army's land campaign.

The initial reaction of the New Zealanders to the end of the campaign was somewhat subdued. Weir felt the reason for this was 'the fact that we who had marched from El Alamein and done so much were not really in at the kill'. No actual orders arrived at Headquarters Divisional Artillery to end hostilities but it was obvious from the lines of Axis troops emerging from the hills that the surrender had occurred. Weir went to see for himself by moving up to the front and observing the long lines of prisoners walking to the coastal road. Once he was satisfied the war in Tunisia was over, he gave the order to cease-fire. Characteristically Weir also went and inspected the enemy's equipment and assessed the effects of his counter-battery fire on the former enemy positions.

Later that day, the guns assembled in a close laager around Weir's headquarters. Emulating Montgomery's oratory style by repeating each line for emphasis, Weir gave a speech to all his gunners as he 'felt it was my duty to offer to all ranks my sincere commendation for the great work which had been done in building and upholding the great tradition of the 2 NZ Div Artillery'. With the campaign finally over, Weir was kept busy with the arrangements to return to Egypt. He managed a brief visit to Tunis and toured the ruins of ancient Carthage, before being ordered by Freyberg to travel to Egypt by air. The Divisional Artillery meanwhile departed by road on 16 May to finally reach Maadi Camp on 1 June 1943. Shortly after his arrival in Egypt, Weir was summoned by Montgomery and asked to go to England 'to spread the gospel amongst some of the new Divisions'. Weir considered the request but felt he had to decline, due to the need to continue training and refit the New Zealand Division, which had fought in almost every major action since its return to North Africa from Syria, nearly a year before.