Steve Weir: New Zealand's Master Gunner

From late September 1942, the New Zealand Division began intensive training for Montgomery's coming offensive. A divisional exercise was held from 24-27 September with the emphasis on breaching a well-prepared defensive line, clearing gaps through minefields, passing the armour through the gaps, covering the infantry with artillery fire and providing them with armoured support. Weir then left for a planning conference in Cairo on 28 September, before returning two days later in time for a visit from Montgomery. That afternoon, on 30 September, Weir received the DSO he had been awarded for his performance at Sidi Resegh in November-December the previous year.

Montgomery revealed his outline plan for the upcoming offensive (Operation Lightfoot) on 6 October. The New Zealand Division's objective was to capture Miteiriya Ridge (near the Mediterranean coast) by destroying the enemy forces holding the forward positions and creating a corridor through the Axis minefields. This would then enable 10 Armoured Division to advance through the New Zealand Division and achieve the destruction of the enemy armour. 9 Australian Division would similarly clear a path for 1 Armoured Division to the north of the New Zealanders. Further south, XIII Corps would mount a diversionary attack to draw Axis forces away from the main effort and destroy the opposing Italian divisions in that part of the line.

The divisional exercise in late September had revealed the difficulties of commanding and controlling the infantry at night while reserves were being passed through the forward troops. Freyberg and Weir discussed the problems and agreed that a creeping barrage would provide the best form of fire support for a close assault. The British regarded this technique as obsolete, but Weir felt that it was entirely suitable for the type of attack the New Zealand Division would have to make. Freyberg agreed with Weir's assessment, commenting that the upcoming battle 'approximates the battles fought in 1918'. A rehearsal was held, watched by Lieutenant General Oliver Leese (GOC XXX Corps) who was sufficiently impressed to order its use by the other divisions in his Corps. Weir's re-introduced creeping barrage was the model that was eventually used for the Lightfoot offensive and this was the first occasion that a creeping barrage was fired at corps level in the Second World War. Leese also learned of the Stonk and 'laid this down as a compulsory method for defensive fire for the whole of the Artillery of XXX Corps for the offensive battle at Alamein'.

Training by the New Zealand Division for Lightfoot continued throughout the first two weeks of October. The guns were all recalibrated (creeping barrages required the greatest level of accuracy due to the proximity of the attacking infantry) and brigade exercises were held with 9 Armoured Brigade. Some friction occurred between Weir and Currie over the use of 4 Field Regiment, which was under command of 9 Armoured Brigade. Currie wanted the guns to deploy much further forward than Weir felt was prudent. Currie (himself an ex-CRA) was a commander used to the brigade group concept, every armoured brigade he had served in had had its own regiment of RHA and he stated openly that 'he loathed tanks without guns'. Weir felt that Currie was taking an unnecessary risk in pushing the regiment westwards over Miteiriya Ridge when it could support the armour just as effectively from its eastern slopes. This difference of opinion culminated in a complaint by Currie to Freyberg on 23 October. It concerned an alleged order from Weir to 4 Field Regiment's forward observers, telling them to join Currie's tanks only at the final objective. Freyberg concurred with Currie's view that they should move with the armour and rescinded the order. Weir, for his part, expressed surprise and denied ever making it.

Another problem that emerged during the training was the question of how to visibly mark the boundaries between the two New Zealand infantry brigades and the neighbouring divisions during the assault. During a conference with Montgomery, Freyberg suggested the use of the guns to fire coloured smoke, but the immense amount of dust and battlefield smoke thrown up would rapidly diminish its effectiveness. Shortly after the conference finished, Captain White (Freyberg's Personal Assistant) had the idea that tracer from Bofors guns fired down the boundaries might be the answer. Headquarters Divisional Artillery was busy and had spent little time considering the problem, but Weir was impressed and immediately accepted White's idea. The rest of XXX Corps also adopted this in time for Operation Lightfoot.

From their arrival in the line on 19 October until the start of the offensive on 23 October, the gunners remained concealed and carried out preparations for the massive bombardment that would herald the start of the Alamein offensive. Weir was everywhere, inspecting the gun positions with Freyberg and working feverishly with his staff on the artillery plan from 19-21 October. Weir's three field regiments (supplemented by six troops of RA and RHA guns plus 69 Medium Battery) were plainly too few to produce an adequate barrage for a frontage that widened to nearly 5000 yards at the final objective. The final artillery plan was consequently a compromise: being a 'complicated set of timed concentrations at �known� enemy localities in the line of advance'. Only a quarter of Weir's 104 guns fired a creeping barrage in the proper sense of the term.

At 2140 hours on 23 October, 910 guns of the 8th Army erupted in the largest artillery concentration so far fired in the war by the Commonwealth armies. The sky was filled with flashes and 'the storm of fire that burst was an experience never to be forgotten by those who heard it'. Compared with the barrages of the Somme and Passchendaele in the First World War, the Alamein barrage was small, but its impression was immense on those who witnessed it and who had never seen a bombardment of this magnitude before. 'It was if a giant had banged his fist down on a table' was the description by General Lungerhausen of the German 164 Division (on its receiving end). Weir and his staff stood outside his headquarters to watch the fruits of their planning. 'The sky was lit with myriads of sheets of dancing flame, throwing out a sharp but momentary silhouette of the immediate surroundings'. After quarter of an hour, the fire paused for five minutes before switching from counter-battery fire to the creeping barrages and timed concentrations so carefully planned in advance. The guns continued firing for nearly five hours, expending an average of 630 rounds per gun (according to the estimates of Weir's Divisional Artillery staff).

At 2200 hours, XXX Corps attacked along the northern coastal sector. The two infantry brigades of the New Zealand Division captured Miteiriya Ridge and by dawn the next morning they had achieved their objectives, although suffering about 440 casualties. Delays in clearing paths through the minefields and isolated pockets of heavy resistance, however, prevented 9 Armoured Brigade and 10 Armoured Division from advancing quickly enough to exploit the gains made by the infantry. It was the same for the rest of XXX Corps, where there was little likelihood of a breakout by the armour - Lightfoot's ultimate aim.

Montgomery was insistent that the advance must continue but further armoured attacks the following night made little progress. The armour's failure to achieve a breakout allowed the Afrika Korps time to recover and on 24 October, a series of counter-attacks were launched over the length of the front. Large-calibre Axis guns shelled Headquarters Divisional Artillery and 6 Field Regiment was attacked from the air. The German counter-attacks though, were largely held by the weight of artillery, the Desert Air Force and a newfound resilience in the 8th Army 'to absorb and not evade a panzer assault'. At noon on 25 October, Montgomery switched his main effort to 9 Australian Division while the New Zealand Division was temporarily withdrawn from the line. The exception was the New Zealand Artillery, which remained to support the Australians in their second major attack on 28-29 October.

The Australian artillery used a series of creeping and lifting barrages to support their attack on the Axis infantry. Significantly this technique, which Weir was responsible for re-introducing, was now the prevailing doctrine of the 8th Army for engaging enemy positions that could otherwise not be directly targeted. Weir's regiments worked for two successive nights, firing numerous defensive fire missions and a series of timed concentrations in support of the Australians. By 31 October, the Australian division succeeded in driving to the coastal road, but it failed to prevent most of the enemy escaping from the salient it had forged. The battle appeared to be losing momentum but Montgomery was determined to continue the pressure and planning began for a second major offensive. With Freyberg appointed as commander, Operation Supercharge was designed to accomplish the armoured breakout on a narrow front, where Lightfoot had failed on a broad front. This operation would also be Weir's first command of the artillery as a CCRA.

To replace the New Zealand brigades, Freyberg was given command of 151 (Durham) and 152 (Highland) Brigades to spearhead the attack, while most of his own Division (including 9th Armoured Brigade) was retained in reserve. XXX Corps artillery would support the infantry attack with a powerful barrage. The armour would then accomplish the final breakout once the minefields and defences had been sufficiently cleared.

Except for the initial 20 minutes of counter-battery fire, Weir was responsible for preparing and controlling the Supercharge artillery plan. Weir favoured using timed concentrations for much of the attack, which were designed to fall on the enemy defences just as the attacking infantry engaged them. These were only feasible, however, if the locations of enemy defences were reliably known. This was not the case, so Weir opted for a creeping barrage to create a continuous curtain of fire that would indiscriminately cover the infantry's entire front. Weir was keen to demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique and under command he had an unprecedented amount of firepower, including 13 field and three medium regiments. The scale of the attack presented a number of challenges but the infantry attack itself was reasonably simple. Weir also had a gun to every 25 yards of front - a very powerful concentration. The Bofors guns had proven their effectiveness and were used again for marking the boundaries, under Corps command. The final result was a plan that despite appearances to the contrary, was actually quite a simple one for the COs to carry out and was ready to go after only two days of intense preparation.

After a 24-hour postponement, the Supercharge barrage erupted at 0105 hours on 2 November. Anticipation was high, but it was nowhere near as spectacular to view as Lightfoot's barrage a week before. Rounds from 296 field and 48 medium guns fell on the enemy forward defences for 20 minutes then lifted before 192 guns (moving at 100-yard intervals every two and a half minutes) crept their shells towards the first objective. The remaining guns engaged known or likely enemy positions in the path of and astride the advance, or fired against the Axis artillery. After 30 minutes the barrage lifted and moved again, reaching the last objective at 0345 hours.

The fire plan was effective and the infantry reached their objectives and quickly formed a new defensive line before the armour advanced at dawn. After heavy fighting, by nightfall on 2 November the German armour was reduced to 35 tanks.

The battle was not yet over, however, and the enemy continued to prevent a breakout by using screens of anti-tank guns to cover the gaps. Another push was needed to widen the breach and 5 Indian Brigade was brought up for the assault. Leese and Dennis visited Headquarters Divisional Artillery early on 3 November and asked Weir to provide the artillery support. Weir and Freyberg agreed and additional guns were provided, including three more medium regiments. Weir and his staff then immediately set to work preparing the fire plan while most of his gunners rested for the remainder of the day.

Time was limited to prepare the plan and Weir was short of staff, as several had been hospitalised with jaundice. Weir again opted for a creeping barrage (coupled with timed concentrations to fall on known enemy positions), in view of the terrain, intelligence available and the success of this technique in the earlier assaults. 5 Indian Brigade had not been trained to follow a creeping barrage but Weir felt it was the only option and managed to persuade its commander, Brigadier 'Pasha' Russell, to accept this technique. No definite start line for the infantry to attack from had been decided, so Weir went forward with Russell to the front and helped him to select one. With Weir calling down rounds on known coordinates, Russell was soon orientated with the ground. Weir then demonstrated how fire would lift after each phase and briefed Russell on the details before he finally returned to his headquarters and resumed work on the plan. With time running short, Weir decided to dispense with issuing a formal barrage trace. Instead he contacted each of the regiments and gave them all the details verbally over the telephone. Some of the regiments were 'shocked at getting a barrage in this form'.

The barrage opened after a 90 minute delay at 0230 hours on 4 November. At Weir's insistence, the opening line was bombarded for the first 90 minutes so as to indicate it clearly and allow the infantry of 5 Indian Brigade to move up close. The barrage finally stopped and then resumed with 100-yard lifts every three minutes with the now familiar Bofors guns marking the boundaries. It was extremely effective and the Indian Brigade had little more to do than 'gather up the dazed enemy in their line of advance'.

As well as being a turning point in the fortunes of the 8th Army, El Alamein marked a milestone for the use of artillery in which Weir had played the decisive role. After two long years in the Western Desert, the artillery was permanently back to centralised control. Alamein was 'one of the most striking examples of the centralised control of artillery, which was one of the great battle-winning factors of Alamein and, indeed, of all the operations of the 8th Army'. Montgomery was firmly convinced of the effects of artillery and shortly after he wrote 'the concentrated fire of artillery is a battle-winning factor of the first importance. Artillery command must be centralised, under the CRA of the Division so that he can use the Div artillery as a 72 Gun Battery when necessary'.

The scale and destructive power of the barrages used at Alamein showed that infantry unsupported by armour could take their objectives without prohibitive casualties, if they were covered by sufficiently heavy artillery concentrations. Even Weir was surprised at the enormous level of damage done by the Corps artillery in Supercharge. 'I drove through the area in my jeep the following day and I thought that this barrage caused more destruction than any other that I have known'. Weir's fire plans also demonstrated that the creeping barrage was not a redundant technique and it could be used effectively in the right conditions.

Freyberg's confidence in Weir's ability was vindicated at El Alamein by his performance as both the CRA of the New Zealand Division and CCRA of XXX Corps. His divisional and corps fire plans were both effective and in the hastily prepared fire plan for the attack by the Indian Brigade, Weir was able to improvise by verbally issuing barrage traces yet still be ready in time. This was the first action where he issued what became known as a 'quick barrage'. For 'the skill and efficiency of the artillery under his command' at El Alamein, Weir was awarded a well deserved bar to his DSO.