Steve Weir: New Zealand's Master Gunner

The New Zealand Division was moved in August to an area at the southern end of the Alamein Line that soon became known as the 'New Zealand Box'. This covered a five-mile front from Ruweisat Ridge south to the Alam Niyal feature. The settling of the front provided Weir with an opportunity to constantly practise his regiments in the fire techniques developed in Syria and improve their divisional drills. This was made easier by improved 'communications, maps, survey, flash spotters, air photos, air co-operation, counter-battery and a close liaison with infantry and other arms'. Co-operation with the RAF and radio techniques had a high priority. For Weir, the August period in the New Zealand Box was where the Divisional Artillery as a battle machine was born. He personally considered that the New Zealand Divisional Artillery was ahead of the British, Indians, South Africans and even the experienced Australian 9th Division, in terms of divisional artillery technique.

On 13 August 1942, Weir met the newly appointed GOC 8th Army, Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Montgomery. Discovering that Montgomery was opposed to using divisions divided into individual brigade groups was encouraging to both Weir and Freyberg, as was the GOC's refusal to contemplate any talk of (or preparations for) further retreat in the event of another German offensive. Weir described the sudden change in command as reverberating right through the 8th Army within 24 hours of Montgomery's arrival. Montgomery's austere measures, such as immediately slashing the numbers of base and headquarters troops ('drones' in Weir's terminology) and throwing them into the line, met with Weir's whole-hearted endorsement.

'Such a display of mild brutality by a British General was all that was needed and we happily prepared for the coming offensive knowing we had somebody behind us who was not going to order us to withdraw as soon as the Hun came over the horizon. I am quite certain myself that if British generals could be a little more brutal and a little less polished we could get on better in this war'.

It was known through Ultra intercepts that Rommel would launch his final offensive in Egypt on 26 August. The New Zealand Division would play a pivotal role as it held the southern-most portion of the Alamein Line, beside the line of the enemy's advance. Rehearsals showed that the New Zealand Divisional Artillery had too few regiments for the task and Weir appealed for more. This resulted in the attachment of 4 and 7 Field Regiments, RA. A further appeal gained 3 Field Regiment, RHA and later 7 Medium Regiment, RA. Ammunition was in good supply and by 26 August Weir had a total of eight field regiments and two medium regiments with which to harass the German offensive.

Rommel's offensive began five days late on the night of 30/31 August. The first German attack was in the north against Ruweisat Ridge and the Divisional Artillery fired on pre-registered defensive targets in front of 9 Indian Division, in conjunction with Indian and South African artillery. This was effective but the attack was a diversion and the Axis main effort was to the south of the New Zealand Box. Daylight revealed the German 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions and 90 Light Division advancing eastwards, followed by three Italian divisions. Only a portion of the enemy, however, was in range of the New Zealand guns. Weir described it as 'a mass of vehicles, tanks and guns�you would have to see it to be believed'. 'There was hardly a minute of the day when the New Zealand guns were silent' and they fired at least 12,000 shells in the space of 24 hours.

By the morning of 1 September, most of Rommel's armour had reached a position south of Alam Halfa, east of the New Zealand Box. The main battle resumed but mounting losses and lack of fuel meant there was little choice for Rommel but to call off the attack. An attack on the New Zealand Box from the south-east was expected within the next day and Weir's gunners were continually busy with 4 Field Regiment firing over 6000 rounds. As part of the preparations to meet the attack, Divisional Artillery Headquarters selected defensive target areas for each of the regiments. This appears to be the first occasion that Stonks were prepared for battle (still known as 'Hates' at this time).

The New Zealand Division was next ordered to sever the Axis supply lines in a southwards thrust as part of Montgomery's counter-attack (Operation BERESFORD). The initial attack from the Box was to be silent with no preliminary bombardment although the artillery would still support it. Weir was additionally allocated 1 Field Regiment, RA, which meant he would have over a hundred 25-pounders and about 24 medium guns in total but the attack ultimately made little progress in the face of heavy opposition. Weir's regiments, however, fired numerous concentrations with great effect and Operation BERESFORD was probably the first occasion in North Africa when the New Zealand Artillery fired a full divisional concentration, as a New Zealand Artillery liaison officer with 132 Brigade was later awarded a DSO in part for 'calling for fire from the whole divisional artillery'.

Operation BERESFORD was an overall failure, but for the New Zealand Artillery, it 'was a striking demonstration of the power of artillery under divisional control'. The standard of fire dills and co-operation with the infantry had noticeably improved. Weir later commented that around this time infantry commanders had begun to realise the value of artillery and appreciate its capabilities, and became quite 'artillery minded' in that they demanded fire support for every operation. During 5 Brigade's attack in Beresford, the artillery was decisive in enabling the infantry to successfully withdraw and Weir regarded this as 'a very good example of infantry-artillery planning, co-operation and execution'. Shortly afterwards, Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks (GOC XIII Corps) visited the Division. Weir used this opportunity to tell him: 'instead of sending me a collection of individual regiments it would have been better to have sent me a formation of regiments under one commander'. This was the first of several occasions that Weir argued for the use of an Army Group Artillery for centralising large groups of artillery.

A few days later, the New Zealand Division withdrew from the line for a well overdue rest and Weir handed over to the CRA of 44 Division on 11 September. After the incessant pressure of the previous 11 weeks, he felt an enormous sense of relief. 'I shall never forget that night. To be freed of the responsibilities of the defence of the Div. Sector, to sleep by the sea in cool bracing air after the heat and fearful plague of flies was indeed a physical and mental relief'. Weir then took four days' leave in Cairo, suffering a mild dose of dysentery, before rejoining the Division in preparation for the next phase of the North African campaign.