Steve Weir: New Zealand's Master Gunner

A planned divisional exercise was interrupted on 14 June when the New Zealand Division was suddenly ordered to move to Mersa Matruh in Egypt, following Rommel's penetration of the 8th Army line at Gazala. The Division departed in piecemeal fashion, gathering isolated detachments en route and reaching the Suez Canal on 19 June. Weir led the Division the rest of the way to Mersa Matruh as Freyberg was temporarily detained in Cairo. As the Division moved westwards, it encountered a mass of 8th Army troops retreating from the front in various states of flight and disorder.

Weir's orders were to concentrate the Division to the west of Matruh in readiness for a counterstroke and most of the units were there by 21 June. News that day that Tobruk had fallen, however, meant the Division was ordered to withdraw to the Matruh Box. The withdrawal that night was confused, due to a late change in the route orders, with a result that Weir described as a 'sorry spectacle'. The Matruh Box was a poor defensive position, as an escarpment overlooked it from the south. Freyberg (now back from Cairo) was determined to challenge his orders to defend it and appealed to Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie (GOC 8th Army). The Division was subsequently ordered to move instead into the Nagamish Nulla and then to Minqar Qaim, an area of high ground about 25 miles south of Matruh that offered the New Zealanders a much better defensive position.

In the course of reconnoitring Minqar Qaim with Weir and Brigadier W. (Bill) Gentry, Freyberg turned to Weir and told him 'the position we take up will depend a good deal on what you say. You must fight the guns'. Weir later remarked 'as far as I know, in the development of Artillery doctrine in 2nd NZ Div that event marked a positive milestone from which we never looked back and as far as I know was the first occasion when the requirements of the Artillery Control took very high priority in the siting of the Division'. Weir considered Minqar Qaim 'not a bad position with fair observation and fair cover' but it was exposed to enemy observation. There was insufficient transport to move the entire Division and 6 Brigade (stripped of most of its vehicles) was sent eastwards to Amiriya, while the rest of the Division moved south as brigade groups. The New Zealand Division at Minqar Qaim on 26 June consequently faced the Afrika Korps with only two of its three infantry brigades.

There was intense activity throughout the night and at dawn on 27 June, enemy columns were observed to the north advancing eastwards past the New Zealanders' positions. A column of the German 90th Light Division was engaged at about 0900 hours and an artillery duel began that lasted most of the day. Late in the afternoon the New Zealand Division was attacked by tanks of the 21st Panzer Division, which emerged from the opposite direction. Casualties were light considering the concentrated deployment of the New Zealand guns and the difficulty of digging into the rocky ground, although a major blow was suffered when Freyberg was seriously wounded. The tanks were finally driven off by 25-pounders from 6 Field Regiment that had been hastily switched around from the action to the north and by 33 Anti-Tank Battery using its new 6-pounder guns for the first time in action. The gunners fought well and Kippenberger later commented 'I could see shells bursting incessantly among our guns and admired the way our gunners were standing to their work'. Headquarters Divisional Artillery had been scattered in the confusion of the night move and Weir improvised by controlling his guns from the central signals exchange.

By nightfall, the New Zealand Division was encircled. Ammunition was down to 35 rounds per field gun and the Division's capacity to resist a further attack was very much in doubt. Brigadier Lindsay (Bill) Inglis (now acting GOC) decided to stage a night breakout to the Alamein line. The artillery's role was to use the 25-pounders and portee anti-tank guns to guard the transport's rear and flanks. Fortunately for the New Zealanders, many of the Germans were caught by surprise as 4 Brigade charged through their lines. Tracer fire was so thick that Weir claimed he 'dodged lines of fire as you could see them as plain as day'. The charge continued for about five miles before halting and then moving off again to the safety of the Alamein line. Weir was extremely fatigued at the end of the battle and journey, describing himself as 'terribly tired - more tired than I think I had ever been before'.

Minqar Qaim was a narrow escape for the New Zealanders. 'What had saved the division was the ability of the divisional artillery to keep the tanks of Afrika Korps at bay on 27 June and the skill and discipline of the New Zealand transport drivers'. It took several days for Weir's regiments to reorganise in the Kaponga Box, which was occupied by 6 Brigade and located about 20 miles south of El Alamein. On 30 June, the New Zealand Artillery (less 6 Field Regiment) departed the Kaponga Box for Deir el Munassib, which was 10 miles away. The Alamein to Qattara line was thinly manned over its 40-mile length and Rommel was expected to launch a final offensive to reach the Nile Valley.

It was soon evident that Rommel's forces were advancing towards Ruweisat Ridge - a long and narrow feature protruding into the Alamein Line. Weir was ordered to 'take out a column and roam the country and do what I could'. The column, comprising an infantry battalion and 32 guns, after patrolling an area to the west, narrowly avoiding firing on a British column and being shelled by British artillery, halted and laagered for the night. At daybreak, a large concentration of Italian tanks, vehicles and guns (including Italian-manned German 88-mm guns) of Ariete Armoured Division was spotted on a ridge about a mile and a half away, oblivious to the presence of the New Zealanders. Weir went up to have a look, expecting them to be part of 2 Armoured Brigade but immediately recognised the 88s. He quickly got his forward observer officers together and ordered the guns aimed on the Italian position. What followed was described by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Burrows (acting GOC 4 Brigade) as 'one of the most extraordinary artillery duels that have ever been fought - a real toe to toe slugging match with the gunners on both sides blasting each other over open sights'.

Four batteries of New Zealand artillery (4 Field Regiment and 28 Battery) plus four troops of anti-tank guns simultaneously opened fire. The Italian gunners returned fire but were silenced within 30 minutes. Burrows described Weir that morning 'literally licking his lips at the glorious opportunity that had presented itself, his big voice booming encouragement to his gun teams'. After an hour, Weir ordered firing to cease and sent in some infantry from 19 Battalion who returned with about 500 prisoners. In addition, 11 German 88mm guns, seven Italian 105mm, four Italian 75-mm and over 30 Italian 47-mm guns were captured, along with three tanks and over 100 vehicles. Only two New Zealand infantrymen were wounded. Weir inspected the carnage for himself, 'Italian gunners [were] blown to bits and burnt to death by exploding charges, not by the dozen but by the hundred'. This action on 3 July severely damaged the Ariete Division and has been described in the Official History as an 'outstanding episode in the Dominion's military history'. Even Rommel described the attack on Ariete as a 'complete success' and a 'reverse that took us completely by surprise'.

The New Zealand Division (renamed 2nd New Zealand Division on 8 July) regrouped and prepared for a night attack on the western half of Ruweisat Ridge. 4 and 5 Brigades were deployed near Alam Nayil on 11 July and for the next two days, Weir and his staff worked hard on the artillery plan. Throughout this time the guns were constantly in action harassing the enemy and engaging known targets in preparation for an assault in the early hours of 15 July.

The night attack on Ruweisat by the New Zealand Division was initially successful. The infantry pushed through the enemy front and seized most of the objectives, but they by-passed pockets of enemy infantry and 20 tanks of 8th Panzer Regiment. These were left unmolested and proved decisive in preventing most of the anti-tank guns and all of the artillery from following up in support. With daylight, the unprotected infantry on top of the feature were exposed to shellfire and an armoured counter attack. The ridge was too rocky for digging in and the result was a disaster with 355 troops taken prisoner, mainly from 22 Battalion.

The New Zealand Artillery was on call for the attack and fired in support at maximum range. Weir prepared his regiments to move up to the edge of Ruweisat, but enemy fire forced them to halt. The gunners were then forced to engage the enemy forces in their immediate vicinity, sometimes under air attack, at the expense of supporting their own infantry on top of Ruweisat Ridge. Matters were made worse when few of the forward observers accompanying the infantry succeeded in maintaining radio contact. Promised British armoured support failed to arrive and the position became untenable.

Ruweisat Ridge was a frustrating battle for the artillery and Weir acknowledged his regiments' failure to provide adequate support. He later wrote 'I don't think there is any doubt that the Artillery did fail to give good support on this day'. Weir attributed much of the blame to himself as the CRA, for not properly communicating the difficulties for the guns to the acting divisional commander. The guns had to support an advance over a long distance (about seven miles) and the loss of fire cover for the attacking infantry would be serious if the guns were unable to quickly deploy nearer to Ruweisat Ridge after its capture. Kippenberger was one who felt that Weir was unduly hard on himself, noting that 'we all saw the difficulty and knew what range our guns had'. One positive outcome for the employment of artillery did emerge from Ruweisat - the BRA, Headquarters 8th Army broke with tradition and for the first time co-ordinated the British artillery under centralised control.

The New Zealanders were in action again on 21 July when Auchinleck ordered a further attack. 6 Brigade advanced along Ruweisat Ridge towards the El Mreir depression under a heavy preliminary bombardment from Weir's three regiments, 64th Medium Regiment, RA (under Weir's command) and an RHA battery. At zero hour at 2045 hours, the artillery erupted and 'the dim skyline was darkened with the pall of dust and smoke from the mass of heavy artillery concentrations'. It was one of the heaviest concentrations so far in the North African campaign and 'only First World War men had experienced anything like it'.

The infantry attack by 6 Brigade was initially successful but it was soon pinned down on the primary objectives and the problems of a week prior surfaced again. The anti-tank guns of 7th Anti-Tank Regiment suffered heavy casualties from enemy artillery and small arms fire while advancing and the infantry faced close attack from German tanks at first light. British armoured support again failed to arrive and by the end of the day the New Zealand Division had lost 6 Brigade Headquarters and most of 24th and 25 Battalions, comprising a total of 904 men. The gunners lost 25 anti-tank guns, of which half were 6-pounders. The portee anti-tank guns suffered the heaviest losses with Brigadier George Clifton (GOC 6 Brigade) lamenting that 'it is regrettable that the gun shield is not double and proof against heavy MG [machine gun] fire'. The New Zealand Artillery gave further support on the night of 26/27 July to a diversionary attack in the north and then settled into a lull as both sides ceased offensive operations, due to few remaining reserves and a mutual state of exhaustion.

The 8th Army's morale was at its lowest ebb in the aftermath of the disasters of Ruweisat Ridge and El Mreir. The New Zealanders, from the divisional commander down, felt particular contempt for the British armour that had twice failed to support them at critical junctures and had diminishing confidence in the 8th Army's high command. Kippenberger revealed his disdain for the performance of Gott and Auchinleck in personal letters home and was reluctantly admonished by Freyberg. Weir privately shared this lack of confidence and later wrote that 'this period will stand out in my memory as one of great vacillation and lack of determination on the part of our [8th Army] higher command'.