
by RADM Robert W. Copeland, USNR, Commanding Officer, USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE 413)
From the USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE 413) Survivor's Association
CHAPTER 6 We took off on the new course. Then the Admiral gave the order to "scramble" all planes--to get them off in a hurry. A lot of the planes had just come back and they were being refueled and rearmed. Some of them had a little mechanical trouble, and some probably had a few holes in their wings from the previous flight. The planes were being armed and made ready for another air strike. But no time was wasted. Any plane that couldn't be made operational right away was pushed over the side to make room. The planes that were being readied for the next flight were hurried up and sent off whether they were armed or not. Some went off without even adequate gas, and, of course, on all of the carriers the armor crews were trying to get torpedoes and armor piercing bombs that the carriers always had in reserve aboard ship ready for use. It takes quite a while to get a torpedo ready to use when it's been stored away, so the armor crews were working just as hard as they could to get the planes ready. The battle broke out at about 0655 in the morning and everything happened very fast. We had been under fire about ten minutes when the Admiral sent another message. The Admiral's call was "Taffy III." The screen Commander's call was "Taffy three- three." The whole formation collectively was "Mercury Three" and the whole screen was "Mercury Thirty-three." Each individual ship had its own call. Ours was "Juggernaut." The Admiral got on the air and sent out a message essentially like this: "Taffy Thirty-three, this is Taffy Three. Make smoke. Make protective smoke." Then Commander Thomas, the Screen Commander, called us: "Mercury Thirty-three, this is Taffy Thirty-three. Make smoke." We all started making smoke--two kinds of it. Back on our fantails we had big containers and smoke generators that laid a white chemical concoction called FS smoke. Then we could cut in the big burners in our boiler fire boxes and make heavy black smoke through our stacks. It made a very effective smoke screen. I don't think a better smoke screen has ever been laid at any time in any place by any group of ships than the smoke our seven escorts laid out there that day. Lying right down on top of the heavy FS white smoke was the heavy black smoke made from our funnels by burning our own fuel oil. Right away it was obvious, even to us, that the Japanese did not have nearly as good fire control as the Americans had because the smoke seemed to bother them to beat the band. They were apparently using visual or optical fire control instruments to estimate their ranges and deflections. So our smoke screen was very effective. As a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, so a fleet can move no faster than its slowest ship. Those carriers of ours were incapable of going over 19 knots. Away we went to the east on a course of about zero-nine-zero, our carriers making 19 knots shaking, trembling, and sweating at every pour to do it. The Japanese ships were all capable of making much better speed. The slowest battleship they had with them was good for about 26 knots. They had a bunch of heavy cruisers that could make 33 to 35 knots and their destroyers were all good for 35 or 36 knots. The battleship YAMATO carried 18-inch guns. We assumed at the time that she carried 16-inch guns because up until that time nobody knew of a naval rifle bigger than a 16-inch. "What would be the approximate difference in range and accuracy between the 16- and 18-inch?" Probably a matter of 4000 or 5000 additional yards' range out of the 18-inch gun with the same percentage of accuracy. The Japs had the NAGATO, which was a 16-inch gun battleship, and the KONGO and the HARUNA which were 14-inch gun battleships. They were extremely fast for battleships of their age. They were lightly armored but they were fast and very good ships. The Japs also had about nine heavy cruisers with four turrets of two guns each, about eight 8-inch rifles per ship. They had one or two light cruisers and about eleven good big fleet destroyers. Now that means that they were capable of throwing at us about nine 18-inch guns, eight to twelve 16-inch guns, about double that number of 14-inchers; and they had somewhere in the neighborhood of fifty to sixty 8-inch guns. Then the destroyers collectively carried between forty-five and fifty-five 5-inch guns. In addition to all that, the Japanese had the custom of arming their cruisers with torpedoes, which is not the policy in the American Navy. "Is that good or bad?" Well, it's one of those things that you can add up on both sides. We think it is not too good because we believe a destroyer is essentially the torpedo weapon carrier, but sometimes when you get an exceptionally weak force it is an advantage to have a cruiser that can launch torpedoes. Now just look for a minute at the kind of gun power we had out there. We had three Fletcher-class destroyers that each carried five 5-inch 38s--that's fifteen of those guns; we had four DEs that carried two each--that's eight more; we had twenty-three 5-inch guns in strictly surface combat vessels. The three destroyers had quintuple torpedo mounts. In other words, they could launch thirty "fish." We had forty-two "fish" available to the entire outfit. The carriers had one 5-inch 38 back on their fantails--they called them "pea-shooters" --buy they were rather limited and restricted in the area they could cover. They could only be used from a stern chase. Admiral Kurita, the Japanese Commander, sent a column of heavy cruisers off to his left as he pursued us on the course which Admiral Sprague varied from zero-nine-zero to one-one-zero to one-one-five to one-two-zero to one-three-five to one-four-five to one-seven-zero, finally to one-eight-zero, and eventually to two-two-five. You can see how he worked around the compass. He described a succession of tangent course changes which in the final analysis made up a circular course. "Was his primary purpose to run until such a time as he could get in position to do something?" Not exactly that, Jack. His first purpose was to run to the eastward and launch his planes. After that his purpose was two-fold; one to get away and the other to lead the Japs as far away from Leyte Gulf as possible. Our fleet, in the meantime, down in Leyte Gulf could get set. Then the Admiral could head us back toward Leyte Gulf and into the protection of our battleships that were trying to get ready to allow Admiral Olendorf to come to our rescue. But Olendorf's men were worn out from the engagement the night before and they had used up most of their ammunition. They had to get organized to be effective. "About how many miles away from you was Admiral Olendorf's fleet?" About fifty or sixty miles away from us at that time. "That was really heavy stuff the Japs had with them, and you were a comparatively light outfit against their big stuff?" It wasn't even comparative. We had just the three destroyers and four DEs and, of course, the carriers, which were a liability at that time rather than an asset because they were large targets and they were slow. "You couldn't protect them and do your own job?" In a sense, yes, and in another sense, no. Our main job was to protect the carriers, but we were not in sufficient strength to do that adequately. One of the ways of protecting the carriers would be to make torpedo attacks, but the minute we would do that they would lose the protection of our smoke screen which we could keep in close proximity to them. The Japanese Admiral divided his forces into three parts. As I said, he sent the cruiser column off to his left to hem us in to the eastward. He sent another cruiser column straight on south to pen us in to the westward so that we couldn't escape by turning in toward land. Then he kept his battleships and his destroyers creeping up on us in the middle rear. What he was doing was blanketing us in from three sides until he could shove his cruiser columns far enough ahead to cut across and have us in the middle of a box. It was a very nice operation. Actually he should have sunk every ship we had in a matter of less than thirty minutes; but we got one of those breaks, and Admiral Sprague was quick to seize upon it. Afterwards in a letter he published to all the units of the force--a dispatch of congratulations--he gave thanks to the "courage and heroism of the men of our Task Unit and to the Providence of Almighty God." For here we picked up a rain squall and the Admiral conned our outfit right into it, and that was even more effective than the smoke screen. While we were in that rain squall for probably fifteen or twenty minutes, the Japs didn't have the faintest idea of where we were and they couldn't hit us. But even so when we came out of the squall they had started to box us in effectively. The two cruiser columns were beginning to get out on our flank and pin us down, and the battleships were still sneaking up on our middle rear. Splashes were falling all around. We had an open bridge on that class of DE, and by that time I was soaking wet from the water that had splashed up over the ship from those near-misses of the big, heavy-caliber shells that hit in the water right alongside us. As we came out of the rain squall we continued to lay our smoke, but the Japs were getting too close for comfort and the shells were falling close to every ship, The carriers were starting to get hit notwithstanding the smoke. I still don't know why the Japs didn't blast us all out of the water. They should have. At that stage Admiral Sprague realized that it was getting to be a pretty tight pull, so he called Commander Thomas--the Screen Commander--and requested that he make a torpedo attack. His purpose was two-fold: one to inflict what damage he could on the Japs, and secondly to drive them back. A torpedo attack would naturally drive them back because they would take evasive maneuvers to avoid it, and anything that would force them out of their course would be that much gain in time and distance for us who were trying so hard to run away. We weren't meant to fight those big Jap warships. I believe that Admiral Kurita's task force was fully as surprised at running into us as we were surprised to see his fleet, because after all, Admiral Kurita's mission was not to fight us. His mission was to invade Leyte Gulf and sink the transports and cargo ships and isolate and cut off the Sixth Army on the beach and subject them to a murderous bombardment. When Admiral Sprague ordered the torpedo attack, Commander Thomas simply gave an order for the torpedo attack. Now I am not criticizing Commander Thomas--he was under a great deal of strain. And if he had had the time and had had the reason previously to make any preparation for a surface action, he would probably have given his orders a little more cogently. He more or less repeated the order the Admiral had given. He said, "Little fellows, make a torpedo attack." He didn't designate a target or anything of that kind, and so we didn't know just exactly what was what. "What did he mean by 'little fellows' and 'big fellows'?" Over those voice circuits they used a lot of slang expressions that were nearly as good as code as far as the Japs were concerned. The "little fellows" referred to the destroyer and DE types. The carriers in that particular set-up were referred to as "Great Danes." So being a little doubtful, Jack, of just exactly what he did want, and working with what little naval knowledge I had, it struck me that you should never try to mix in the same attack two types of ships that have different tactical characteristics. It seemed to me it was unsound procedure to have the DEs--which were limited at best, we thought, to 24 knots--attempt to go in with destroyers that were capable of doing 36 knots. In other words, we couldn't stay together if they went 36 knots, and why should they sacrifice more than 10 knots of their speed in order to stay back with us? It just didn't seem right to me. So I got on the air and called Commander Thomas. I coined a little phraseology of my own to distinguish the DEs from the DDs, or destroyers. I said, "Taffy 33, this is Juggernaut. Do you want the little little fellows to go with the big little fellows?" That was probably unnecessary verbiage but I was trying to distinguish the different destroyer types, and like Commander Thomas, I didn't have much time to think it out, either. He immediately answered, "Juggernaut, this is Taffy 33. Your last transmission negative--negative." He dropped the double talk and came back and said, "The big fellows"--meaning the destroyers-- "form up for the first attack, and the little fellows"--meaning the DEs--"make the second attack." He did not want them to go together. He felt exactly the same way as I did but he hadn't made that clear in his first transmission. Then he gave the order of ships, "Big fellows form up for the first attack in the following order"--and he used the code names of the three destroyers. They started forming up. At that time the visibility was poor because of the smoke all over the area and we nearly collided with the destroyer HEERMANN because she started to swing across our bow in order to join up for the torpedo attack. Both of us had to back down then immediately get up speed again. As I waited I thought, "My God, how are we going to work this?" The destroyers were on their way making a torpedo run. I knew that the skipper of the DENNIS was the senior DE skipper. He was a good friend of mine by the name of Sig Hansen, a very, very fine gentleman and a very capable officer. He had had a lot of training in bigger ships. Of the four skippers he was the senior and I was the junior; and of the other two, which was the senior, I never did know. Since nobody designated exactly how the DEs would make their torpedo attack nothing happened, "The fact that a plan wasn't carefully designated was due to the Commander's not expecting the Jap flotilla to come through?" Jack, it was never in the world dreamed by anybody that a Task Unit such as ours would ever have to fight a surface engagement. Sure, you are always supposed to be ready for emergencies--and our commanders did a fine job in emergencies--but this one was just beyond the realm of possibility. Not probability, but possibility. You know your hindsight is always better than your foresight or immediate sight. And it struck me that apparently nobody was going to designate how the torpedo attack should be made by the DEs. Since the attack had been ordered it obviously had to be carried out. Everything happened so fast and so much was being thrown at us that the attack wasn't done in exactly the best approved Naval War College fashion. I am not being critical. I remember as though it were only yesterday. I was standing on the bridge looking at the instruments over in the Captain's conning station which told me what our speed was and our course and heading and a lot of other data, and to my right was what we referred to as the "squawk box," an intercommunication system something like those the big executives have on their desks. My Exec was down in CIC and I just took a look at the general situation and where the cruiser column was and estimated the course to put me sixty degrees on the bow of the cruiser column. The standard tactics that I knew were that the best torpedo attack is delivered by destroyers from 5000 to 7000 yards and sixty degrees on the bow of the target vessel. In other words, in this attack position more than in any other you have restricted the enemy's possibility of maneuvering to escape. So by "seaman's eye" I estimated my course change to the left to bring me to what I estimated the course would be, and at the same time I reached over and grabbed the handle on the squawk box. I twisted it down and I remember what I said: "Well, Sis on you, pister. Let's go!" And I added, "Bob, give me a course to put me sixty degrees on the bow of the leading ship in that cruiser column that bears about such-and-such, and compute me a torpedo firing high-speed torpedo run at about 5000 yards on the target's bow." He said, "Aye, aye, Sir," and in less than thirty seconds he gave me a course that was about six degrees to the left of the one I had picked by "seaman's eye." I came to it and we were on our way and committed to go in on a torpedo attack. "About what time was this, Bob?" This was about eight o'clock in the morning. For about an hour and five minutes after the action had begun we had been under constant shelling from, as we thought, 16- and 14-inch and 8- and 5-inch guns, but actually by 18-inch as well. But we hadn't even been scraped. We hadn't taken a single hit, "And during that time you were maneuvering and jockeying, trying to avoid--" We were chasing--what we call in common parlance--salvos. If one landed off to our left we headed for it right where it hit because we figured that since it was a miss the Japs would change their range or deflection setting. In other words, the minute a shell-splash hit the water we headed for where the splash was, hoping the next one would be on the other side of us, and it usually was. But you know, Jack, it's one thing to be shot at without firing back, and it's another thing to shoot back, Mr. Burton, my poor gunnery officer--he had ants in his pants. About every three minutes he'd say, "Captain, may I open fire?" and I'd say, "No, Mr. Burton, you may not open fire," He'd wait about three minutes; then, "Captain, may I open fire?" Finally even though Burton was one of my favorite fair-haired boys, I got mad and I said, "God damn it, Mr. Burton, I'll let you know when you may open fire." That stopped him for a bit. Now the reason I didn't want to open fire was that we were still about 12000 to 13000 yards from the enemy and their cruisers carried about six or eight inches of protective armor plate, and a 5-inch shell cannot penetrate it-- can't penetrate it even at point-blank range. At our range we couldn't be sure of hitting the ship's upper works. Besides, a 5-inch shell fired at ranges over 10000 yards is not particularly destructive anyway, no matter where it hits, because you can't control its fall accurately enough at that range to be sure you are getting it where you want to get. I didn't want to waste our ammunition. I admit it was a bad situation to sit there and be shot at and not be able to shoot back. We could have shot back as far as morale was concerned, in fact, it would have helped the morale if we had fired. But the situation was so critical that I couldn't see wasting a shot. We started on the torpedo attack. I reached over and picked up the JV telephone and called No. 1 engine room where the chief engineer's battle station was. That was Lieutenant Trowbridge. In formal conversation while on a strictly duty status I always called the officers Mr. Trowbridge or Mr. Burton, as the case might be, and between themselves the junior officers did likewise. In the privacy of the wardroom, however, or while visiting in someone's stateroom, most of us called Mr. Trowbridge "Lucky." He answered my call and I said, "Lucky, this is the Captain." "Yes, Sir." I said, "Lucky, we are going on a torpedo attack and I have rung up full speed; we are going in at 20 knots. As soon as we fire our fish, I will ring up flank speed and I want you to hook on everything you've got. Don't worry about your reduction gears or your boilers or anything," and I added, "because there's all hell being thrown at us up here, and we are just fortunate we haven't been hit yet, so don't worry about it." He said, "Yes, Sir." That was the last time I ever talked to Mr. Trowbridge because he was lost with the ship. Now I knew that our ship--a high-pressure steam job--was designed to carry 440 pounds of steam pressure on her boilers. Also by the manufacturer's specifications she was not supposed under any circumstances to turn over more than 420 RPMs on her main shafts. "She was twin screw, wasn't she?" Twin screws, yes. The starboard shaft ran out of No. 1 engine room and the port shaft out of No. 2 engine room. After we were picked up and I was interviewing survivors, I talked with Metzger, the only survivor out of No. 1 engine room. He was the only survivor because he was down in the lower level oiling pumps; everybody up on the grating level was killed. He told me that while he was down there oiling before we were hit and before he was knocked into the bilges, he heard them computing data for the engineering log on the good old average counter RPMs that go into the log book; he heard something about 477 RPMs on the starboard shaft, which is about fifty-seven RPMs more than the manufacturer says those things can do. I also talked with Labbe, who was a water tender second class and was in No. 2 fire room--we got all the personnel out of there alive. Labbe said that Mr. Trowbridge personally called him on the QJV phone while we were going in on the torpedo run and told him to secure the safety valves and to carry 660 pounds of steam pressure on the steam gauges. I asked, "What did you do, Labbe?" He said, "I secured the safety valves, Sir, and carried 660 to 670 pounds on the steam gauge." I know that was the reasons why we were able to make the extra speed. If the ship hadn't been sunk I shudder to think what the boiler tubes and reduction gears and other related equipment would have looked like. But, after all, I felt the situation justified the methods taken. Well, we started in. The destroyers were quite a way ahead of us. As we went in they were retiring from the torpedo attack that they had previously delivered. "Had they made any really effectual--" Yes, apparently they had done even a better job than they realized. They didn't claim too much as I recall it, but they had done some damage. As a matter of fact, in keeping with most claims made by the American Navy during the war, they were very modest. I think they claimed about one hit, one probable and one possible for each ship. Later evaluation, made after the war by examining Jap log books and interviewing Jap survivors, would indicate that they got more hits than they actually claimed. As they were coming back they were under the heavy fire of the Jap battleships and cruisers. "Were they coming back directly toward you, or were they deploying out?" They were coming back generally toward us so that our courses more or less criss-crossed on the way as we went in and they came back out. "How much visibility did you have--how many yards?" We had visibility for at least five miles, but it was interrupted. It would come and go as smoke got in our way. You see all the time the destroyers were going in they continued to lay their smoke because they had been laying it. So the visibility might one second be five miles and the next minute it might be practically zero. "At the time they were coming back were you in some danger of colliding with the returning destroyers?" Some slight danger, Jack, but we had our radar working again and we could check by that. As we went in there, one of those freak accidents happened that influenced the effectiveness of our torpedo attack. Torpedoes have three settings they can be set for high speed, intermediate speed or low speed. We carried them set on intermediate speed because that's the average, and then if we had to change them we had a speed-setting wrench. Mr. Roberts computed his problem to fire sixty degrees on the bow of the target vessel--5000 yards at a high-speed torpedo setting. "How many knots does a modern fish make on a high speed-setting?" A high-speed torpedo runs at about 45 knots. That doesn't give the target too much opportunity to maneuver to avoid it. That was why Lieutenant Roberts set it up that way. Skau, Chief Torpedo Man, was back there right in the act of using his torpedo speed-setting wrench when one of the shells from the Jap cruisers or battleships aimed at a destroyer--our destroyers were still under heavy fire--passed over us and hit our radio antenna and knocked it down. The antenna fell across Skau's hand and nearly broke it, knocking the wrench out of his hand and over the side. Well, the spare speed-setting wrench was down in the torpedo shack and there wasn't time to go get it. Skau on the telephone told Mr. Roberts that he had lost the wrench and he couldn't change the speed-setting of the torpedoes, so there we were stuck with an intermediate speed-setting and Lieutenant Roberts had to hurry in recomputing because at that time we were only 6000 yards from the Japs. He had to work his problem more or less "by guess and by gosh." He computed the new target angle very quickly in his head. There wasn't time to do it on paper based on the new speed of the torpedo. He was awfully close because he was awfully good, but if you were off a hair on your calculations it would affect the accuracy of the torpedo run. As a result two of our torpedoes passes astern of the cruiser we had aimed at, but one of them hit it. "How close did you actually get before you fired your torpedoes" We had intended to fire at 5000 yards, but we actually got into 4000. As far as I know, even at that range, no splashes landed near us. The only thing that bothered us was the blasts, the air currents of shells going well over our heads. I don't think the Japs saw us before we let our torpedoes go. Now I can't say that I personally saw the hit. I was too busy trying to get the ship out to watch the torpedo attack. I did turn for a moment, and I saw what looked like a big column of steam and smoke coming up from back underneath the aftermast of the cruiser. One of our men said that he saw a big column of water go up when the torpedo hit. Later I talked to a survivor of the destroyer HOEL, which at the time was retiring from the combat, and he said he saw the column rise up. And one of the men on our bridge,--I don't know who--yelled, "We got her." The minute our torpedoes were away I put on full left rudder and came around to head back and rang up flank speed. The destroyers that had fired their torpedoes were getting back into position to lay further smoke because after all we still had never abandoned our original mission, which was to stay there and keep a smoke screen around the carriers. They were going back to do that. It was after that stage of the game that we turned in those big speeds, and I noticed on our Pit log that it got as high as 28-1/2 knots. That means that we were probably doing 30 sometimes. "Just was is a Pit log?" It is contraption that works by pressure. It has a sword arm that sticks out from the side of the ship with a lot of perforations in it. The speed at which the sea water comes into it puts a pressure on the diaphragm and that causes a hand to turn on a dial inside the ship. Of course, little particles of seaweed and such corruption get into the Pit log. To keep it functioning well, we used to blow it about every two hours; but when you are fighting you don't have time to blow the Pit log, so our speeds could have been possibly greater than the Pit log indicated. It's a cinch we were doing as much as it showed and probably a little bit more. It was somewhere around 8:30 A.M. when we delivered our torpedo attack. As I said, we at once started off to get back into screening station. By the time we got back down there, the Jap cruisers had crept up a lot farther on the formation's beam than they had been. The one we had hit with the torpedo had been slowed down and had left the column, but they were getting down now to where they were well up on our port side as we went further south. We must have been on a course of about one-five-five or one-six- zero then. They were just a little bit abaft the beam, and they were crawling right up. The range between the cruisers and us narrowed down. Lieutenant Burton was gun-happy again; he wanted to open fire. I came a little bit left and when the range was closed down some more I said, "Mr. Burton, you may open fire." Immediately he opened up with both of our 5-inch guns and-- "What in particular did he have as a target?" He picked what was then the leading cruiser in the column off to port. It was either the CHIKUMA or the TONE. "And what was their displacement roughly'" I don't know. They were designed as 10000 ton cruisers. I guess they ran 14000 tons. Anyway, it was a beautiful ship. It had quite a flair on its bow and had four turrets all forward, a long fo'c'sle and the turrets alternated--a low one, a high one, a low one, and a high one--right up the fo'c'sle. There is a picture of it in Jane's Fighting Ships. Well, we opened fire on that cruiser and the men on our guns were really good. Gun No. 2 had a crew just out of this world; it had been outstanding from the time we shook down. A lot of its success was due to the leadership of a third class gunner' s mate, named Paul Carr, who was not only a genius mechanically in keeping his gun in shape, but he had a lot of leadership qualities which made the men on that gun very, very good. Carr was Gun Captain and was responsible for the maintenance on the gun. He kept that gun the way a very meticulous housewife keeps her kitchen and kitchen utensils. It was absolutely spotless. It is not an exaggeration to say you could have eaten off the deck of that gun mount at any time. That is the way Carr kept it. Every man on the gun crew was given an award and unfortunately all those, with one exception, were posthumous awards. The least that any man connected with that crew received was a bronze star for just being a member of the gun crew that did such an outstanding job. One of the boys on the gun was just a kid. He was Sammy Blue, a young second class seaman. He was the fuse setter on the gun. Fortunately for Sam, when the gun exploded he was blown clear of it and lit, unconscious, in the water. He was one of about fifteen men who happened to be wearing an automatically inflated C02 life belt--that's the kind you inflate with those little C02 capsules. He apparently hit the water so hard that the life belt was inflated and he was found. "All the crew were required to wear jackets, weren't they?" They all had to have some kind, but a lot of them had just the orally inflated type or the kapoks. We had about fifteen or twenty of the cartridge type and Blue happened to be wearing one. We got a lot of information about the gun from a fellow named Goheen. Goheen was our metal smith and was in repair 3. He was decorated with the Navy and Marine Corps Medal for his courage and bravery and devotion to duty, for going into the gun mount and trying to save men. That was after the battle was over, so it was an award for heroism after the battle, not a combat award. Another man who made gun No. 2 outstanding was a little kid named Stovall. I don't think Stovall was more than eighteen years old--I doubt if he weighed more than 115 pounds dripping wet--he was just a little shaver, but he was cool as a cucumber. He was the gun pointer. We had quite a few seasoned men on board and you would normally think that one of them would have been picked for such an important job as gun pointer, but although Stovall was nothing more than a youngster and only a seaman second class, he was just a natural for this job and earned it by his cool-headed ability. I'm telling you these two guns--No. 1 and No, 2--beat a regular tatoo on the Jap cruiser's upper works. The boys took the ammunition just the way it came up the hoist--nobody cared what it was. They just took it as it came. Five-inch blind loaded and plugged, 5-inch AA, 5-inch common, 5-inch AP, 5-inch starshells, 5-inch proximity fuse: just whatever came up the ammunition hoist. It was all fodder for the guns. They threw it in as fast as they could get it. It was very odd to see those starshells banging off over there in the daylight. The boys set up a terrifically rapid rate of fire. We carried 325 rounds per gun and it's almost unbelievable that from the time those guns received word to commence firing till the time they ceased firing--it was a period of only thirty-five minutes--Gun No. 2 had put out 324 rounds of 5-inch ammunition. "All individually loaded?" That's right. That is a phenomenal rate of fire for a 5-inch gun. Gun No. 1 didn't do quite so well. It fell short by forty-one rounds of equaling the mark of gun No. 2. When the ship went down, there was only one round of ammunition left for gun No. 2. That shows how nearly out of ammunition gun No. 2 was. Because I have said so much about gun No. 2, I would not want anyone to think that gun No. 1 had a poor crew. In my opinion both of our gun crews were above average. It just happens that the crew on our No. 2 gun was the best I have ever seen and I imagine one of the best that has ever existed. That crew was, in fact, so good that another very good gun crew, namely No. 1, looked more or less mediocre by comparison. A lot of these facts I am telling you were not of my own personal observation. It's information that I found out when I interviewed the survivors of the ship. I tell it to you now just because it came up in the course of the action. About this time one of those disheartening things happened that puts a lump in your throat. The destroyer HOEL had been hit pretty hard. Her engine rooms were knocked out. We had to pass her by and leave her lying there dead in the water with a big list on her. She was on fire. We could see men scrambling around launching life rafts. We just had to steam by. In combat you have to leave the wounded behind whether they are men or ships and go on your way and fight. Nevertheless, it was something that made every man on our topside feel the same as I did, and it bothered us to leave those men to the mercy of the Japs, but there was no other choice. There had been seven of us and now there were six. The other three DEs were back on the stern of the carrier formation over on the starboard side: the JOHNSTON, the HEERMANN and our ship, the ROBERTS. By that time the shells were really hitting. The water was churned up around us all the time. "Approximately how many ships were leveling off at you at this time?" It was very hard to tell but all of the enemy that was in range and could bear were pouring it at us. The TONE or the CHIKUMA, whichever it was, was firing two of her 8-inch turrets right at us and she had two of them trained on the carrier, the GAMBIER BAY. The range had closed down now to where it was very easy to see. She had turned those guns right at us and we could see those four 8-inch barrels pointing down our throats, so to speak. The range had closed enough so that apparently they couldn't load their guns with the guns depressed quite that much; so they'd raise the guns, turn them inboard and load, swing them out and drop down into position. We'd see the flash of fire; then we'd hear the blast, and seemingly much later but actually at about the same time--Whoosh--they'd go right over our heads. Fortunately, most of the misses were over rather than short; if they had been short at that range they would have ricocheted right into us. One thing I attributed our success to in not being hit was the way our ships were designed by the Bureau. They had a very low silhouette. They did not have a great big bulky superstructure. They just seemed to blend right into the water and they were therefore hard to hit. Besides, the Japs had misconceived our strength. They thought the three destroyers were cruisers and they thought the four DEs were heavy destroyers. They rated us a little better than we really were--we have learned this fact from books written since the war and from their records and reports. "So they were being more or less careful?" That's right. They were being a little bit cautious of us; they thought we had more potency than we did. Besides, the way we kept pouring shells at them made them think that we would have to be a little more than we were to fight so hard. You remember the classic naval battle down off the River Platte between the GRAF SPEE and the AJAX and two other British cruisers? "Of course, but they had her outnumbered." But she had them out rated with gun power, and they worked in echelon and cut back through each other's smoke. Well, that 's exactly what we did. Whoever was out on the advanced flank was taking a terrific beating. The others would be fairly well protected in her smoke and the smoke they were laying for the protection of the carriers. So every few minutes, when it got too heavy going on the outboard flank, whoever was up there would cut in to the right, fall in, and come down on the inside of the formation; and the next one would push out. We, that is, the JOHNSTON, the HEERMANN, and the ROBERTS just played "leap frog" and kept peeling off. The last time I got out on the advanced flank the range had closed between us and the Jap cruiser considerably. It was practically point-blank and we were doing a lot of damage to that Jap cruiser. Afterwards I talked to a number of our survivors. Some of them, you know, underestimated and some of them exaggerated, saying, "Flames were shooting a half-mile in the air," etc. But my own observation, borne out by at least twenty-five survivors that had good judgment and were in a position to see, was that we had the Jap cruiser on fire from the start of her bridge superstructure, just above the main deck, clear up to the fighting tops--absolutely an inferno of flames, flames that were shooting about seventy-five feet in the air above the fighting tops. Obviously we hadn't done one solitary bit of damage to her vitals because her hull was impregnable against 5-inch shells and that's why Lieutenant Burton was firing mainly at her upper works. I imagine our shell fire probably killed many of the topside personnel and did a lot of topside damage. "Did you notice at this time any faltering in her course or in the change of her firing?" No, Jack. And I'll say this for that Jap cruiser; she never once faltered in her course. If her Captain or her officers on the bridge were killed, as they probably were, it made no difference; she plowed steadily along and her guns never ceased. I'll give them credit for that. You would never have known that she was damaged. By this time the cruiser was pulling a little forward of our beam and I could tell that we were about to be finished. The GAMBIER BAY was farthest forward of the carriers in the left hand side of the carrier formation and had been hardest hit. She was a good sized target and they were making her look like a colander. The Jap battleships apparently were loaded with high-capacity ammunition--stuff that exploded when touched by anything, to be used against ground troops--whereas the cruisers were loaded with armor piercing ammunition. That was a break for us because it was the cruisers that were engaging us at this particular time. We didn't have any armor. We were just thin-skinned. So were the Kaiser carriers. The shells would go in one side and out the other. Believe it or not, up to that time--which had been an hour and about forty minutes--we still hadn't taken one single hit except to our radio antenna. At that time I was really busy. I wasn' t paying much attention to anything but chasing salvos, and I was chasing 8-inch salvos from the cruiser off our port side. About that time one of my lookouts--I don't know who--yelled up at me, "Captain, there's 14-inch splashes coming up on our stern." I turned and looked just in time to see 14-inch splashes--great big ones--off our fantail-- oh, I'd say maybe fifty yards dead astern. Later I learned from one of the Japanese battle reports that those splashes were made from projectiles that came from the Jap battleship KONGO which was 9500 yards away and possibly as far as 11000. It was firing at us with 14-inch shells and so, for the moment, those shells seemed to be a greater hazard than the 8-inch shells from the cruiser. So I yelled, "All engines back full." Now in a normal operation you always slow down gradually from flank speed to standard and two- thirds to one-third and stop, but this was an emergency. I didn't even give them a stop bell. That was one time the old ship really shuddered and shivered and quaked. She just kind of lay down and pretty nearly backed her stern under water. About the time we were starting to back down, directly over us and right ahead about 100 yards, "Whoosh", were three or four 14-inch shell splashes. The instant those things hit I yelled, "All engines ahead flank." We had barely started moving when we were no longer dodging and chasing salvos. We had walked right into an 8-inch salvo.
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Honor the Missing in Action and Killed in Action of Taffy III
We do remember. We won't forget.