The Spirit of the 'SAMMY-B'

by RADM Robert W. Copeland, USNR, Commanding Officer, USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE 413)

From the USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE 413) Survivor's Association

Used by permission


 

CHAPTER 5

The initiation was over by noon, and we were settling back to routine living in the course of the afternoon. The next morning we steamed into Manus. That's in the Admiralty Islands and the harbor there is called Seeadler Harbor. It is beautiful and very big. We went in early in the morning just at dawn, in through the submarine nets that opened for us on the enormous harbor. Already hundreds of ships were there, ships of all classes. There must have been thirty or forty of the Kaiser built escort carriers, six or eight of the old battleships of the PENNSYLVANIA, MISSISSIPPI and TENNESSEE class; and probably twelve or fifteen cruisers--the LOUISVILLE and the NASHVILLE were a couple of them.

"How many ships, large and small, would you say were there?"

It seemed as if there were thousands of them. Literally hundreds of ships were there, counting all the LSTs and the LSMs and the LCIs and the rocket launchers and the transports and the tankers and the cargo ships of all classes--every conceivable type of war vessel and auxiliary.

"And their primary purpose was--"

All of this was a part of the staging area for our contemplated invasion of the Philippines.

"And you had come down on convoy duty?"

We had just brought along a couple of non-combatant ships, a salvage tug and a submarine rescue vessel, which were a part of that operation. Since they had no sound gear, we had acted as escorts for them. Six DEs had also come down in our task unit.

As soon as we came through the antisubmarine nets and were in the harbor proper, we received a message telling us to go alongside the USS LYON to refuel. She was a liberty ship. She had just been anchored there and fuel oil had been pumped into her and had filled her cargo spaces. She was now nothing more than a floating oil storage tank. At that time we were so short of tankers and so short of storage facilities that some of the cargo ships had to be converted for oil storage.

We made a port landing, and as we came alongside, I looked down on her decks at the men working there. Frankly they were to be pitied. Theirs was a most disagreeable job. The ship had not been designed as a tanker nor was she properly equipped to handle the job. And the work was hot, tiring, and dirty. One of the first men I noticed was a rumpled, weary young Lieutenant. As he turned I got a glimpse of his face. At the time I still remembered his name although I have forgotten it since. I called down to him,

"Well, so and so, what are you doing here"' And he answered,

"Well, Commander, what are you doing here?" He was as surprised to see me as I had been when I first recognized him.

It was like "old home week." It was always that way during the war, Jack. To see someone, even though you may have known him only a week or a day, was like meeting a long lost aunt who had a million dollars. When I had last seen him he had been one of Captain Middleton's junior officers at the Naval Section Base, Neah Bay, Washington. That was when I had command of the USS BLACK DOUGLAS. Before fueling was finally completed I went over on the LYON, and he and I thoroughly cussed and discussed all the people and experiences of days gone by at Neah Bay.

Our fuel oil tanks topped off, we then proceeded as previously ordered to tie up alongside the DE-412. She was another ship of our division and was already at anchor. After we were tied up, the Commodore left us and moved back on board his regular flagship. Then commenced a series of conferences on board various carriers and destroyers. The Commanders of Task Groups and of the Task Units met with the commanding officers of the various ships. Further conferences followed, conferences of just the smaller groups of commanding officers who would work under some Task Unit Commander. During these conferences we were furnished with the Operation Order at that time, of course, classified as Top Secret. You know the established policy of giving code names to those various operations--they were called "Operation Umbrella" or Operation Snowflake." This one, the invasion of the Philippines, was designated as "King Musketeer II."

"How come such a long name?"

I don't know who dreamed it up. Anyway, it was a very comprehensive operation order. It was a standard joke during the war that if we had ever lost our typewriters we would have lost the war. This again bore out the same idea, for information came on board by the ream. Another of the standing jokes of the Navy with reference to routine paper work was that they made fourteen copies of everything and eventually ended by throwing twelve of them away. But with "Top Secret" material they were very careful about how many copies went out. We received three. One I gave to my executive officer, one to Tom Stevenson so that he could set up his communication plan, and the other I kept for considerable study.

It was at once apparent that they had figured out a very big operation. It evidently went back to the time when Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet planes had been over the Philippines on some reconnaissance and bombing missions and had brought back information which led Admiral Halsey to believe that the Japanese defenses there were much weaker than we had previously suspected.

As a matter of fact, just before we sailed from Pearl they had actually loaded ships to stage an invasion of the Japanese held island of Yap. But now that appeared no longer necessary. The ships with the embarked troops and loaded supplies were diverted to the speeded up Philippine invasion. Our top command in planning the operation had not picked the large islands of Luzon or Mindanao but had decided to go in somewhat between them. If you look at the map, Jack, you can see its strategic significance. South of Luzon is an island shaped somewhat like an arrow head that hadn't been chiseled out too well with the pointed end of it to the south. That is Samar Between Samar on the north and Mindanao to the south is a gulf or channel. To the west of this channel is the island of Leyte. Right in the entrance itself is a very small island called Dinagat. Leyte was our objective.

You are familiar with all those other invasions, where they speak of "D Day" and "H Hour". This invasion, instead of being "Dog Day" was called "Able Day." For example, our task unit was supposed to commence air operations against the Leyte beaches by naval air bombardment on "Able minus three days," which was October 17. "H Hour" was ten o'clock in the morning.

The whole operation was staged from two areas: Manus and Hollandia, which is in New Guinea. Ground forces designated to assault the beaches were General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army. Most of the troops embarked at Hollandia. Those transports were escorted to the assault area by a few carriers, cruisers and accompanying destroyers. The bulk of the naval air and gun power, however, staged at Manus. We sailed from Manus as a part of a large Task Force which was made up of many task groups and task units.

Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet had all of the modern fast battleships and the big carriers of the ESSEX type. The mission of the Third Fleet was to carry out air strikes over the Philippine area in general, to neutralize it, so to speak, and keep reinforcements from reaching the Leyte area. The Third Fleet, however, was not expected to directly support the Leyte invasion. This was the mission of the Seventh Fleet.

The battleships and cruisers were to go in and start bombarding the beaches on "Able -minus -three " or Able-minus -four " --everything was dated from "Able Day." The first that were to go in were the Underwater Demolition Teams. They were to go in and destroy underwater barricades, mines, and other underwater obstructions. Next the minesweepers would sweep the channels so that the fire support ships could get in to shell the beaches intensely just before the landings. Then on the morning of "Able Day," the transports were to start disgorging their troops in the little LCVPs and they were to land them on the beaches in wave after wave.

The SAMUEL B. ROBERTS was one of seven ships assigned as the "screen" for a task unit built around six escort carriers. The boys called them, sarcastically and not too fondly, "Kaiser Coffins." No particular reflection was intended upon Mr. Kaiser who owned the shipyard; it was simply his name. There was no particular reflection upon the Navy, either. Those hulls were not originally designed to become carriers. They had no protective armor, and they didn't have all the protection devices. If they should ever be caught in combat and their gasoline should catch on fire, they would probably turn into just what the slang name implied--a coffin. They were ships that could be built faster than larger carriers and were designed mainly for escort work--to ferry planes across and to work with submarines, antisubmarine-hunter-killer groups, where a carrier and three or four DEs went out to hunt down submarines with combined use of sonar on the DEs and airplanes on the carriers.

They were never meant to come into contact with the enemy.

Oh, I wouldn't say they were never meant to come into contact, but they were never meant to go out in a front line naval engagement like the big carriers. What I am trying to point out is that those ships and ships like the ROBERTS weren't designed for what we actually got into. They were all right for the mission we were supposed to be on.

You are familiar with the fleet's division of task forces, task forces into task groups, and groups into task units. For example, take Task Group 77.4--that's the way they had it numbered--the 7 came from the Seventh Fleet and we were the Seventh Force, so we became 77; then we were the Fourth Group in the Seventh Force of the Seventh Fleet; so we were 77.4. Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague commanded the Fourth Group, which was the supporting carriers. They were to give an air support to the ground troops--that was our mission. That group was broken up into three units. Admiral Sprague himself commanded group 77.4.1, Admiral Stump had 77.4.2, and Rear Admiral C. A. F. Sprague, who was my Admiral out there, had 77.4.3.

For a screen, which was a double-barrelled screen, we had an antisubmarine screen and an antiaircraft screen. I might explain at this point that there are many types of screens in this world. With men who deal with naval vessels a screen might be anything to hide themselves from an enemy or with proper equipment to tell of the enemy's presence to the rest of the fleet. Now on this assignment we were short of destroyers--we were always short of destroyers--and actually this was a destroyer's job. So they used a lot of the DEs to finish out the screens. In all we had three destroyers and four DEs which made up the screen ships. We actually should have had eight or ten in the screen. We were over-extended and trying to carry on a big operation.

"What was the origin of the term DE?"

Well, Jack, you know what a destroyer is?

"yes, I was on the old 4-piper FERRY and the DALLAS."

The destroyer itself was an outgrowth of the original torpedo boat. Those vessels were first known as torpedo boat destroyers. They were designed to destroy torpedo boats. Soon the name was abbreviated to destroyer, and they still retained the torpedo as their main offensive weapon. They were then, in fact, a large torpedo boat capable of destroying an enemy torpedo boat.

From the outbreak of the submarine warfare in World War 1 it was found that the destroyer was the most suitable type for antisubmarine warfare and escort of ocean convoys. Even before the United States entered World War II the need for more of these vessels was apparent, and we commenced a heavy building program of modern destroyers which were a great improvement over the old 4-pipers.

After our entry into the war it soon appeared that the war in the Pacific was making heavy demands upon our supply of destroyers for purely combat missions. The convoy job was primarily one of submarine detection and then attack with antisubmarine weapons. All of the gun and torpedo power of the destroyer was not needed for antisubmarine and convoy missions. Nor was all of the engine horsepower for high speed needed. This led to the development of a smaller ship of the destroyer type, designed especially for escort and antisubmarine work. It still retained the general characteristics of the destroyer and a limited amount of the destroyer's weapons. It was, in fact, a destroyer type especially designed for escort work, and probably from a grammatical purist's standpoint should have been named an "Escort Destroyer." It was, however, named a "Destroyer Escort," which was quickly reduced to DE.

That reminds me of a session I had in Pearl Harbor not long before we left there. I was called in to pay my respects to the Admiral who was COMDESPAC out there. He asked me what I thought about my ship. I told him she was a good ship and she had a good crew. He asked me if I would be pleased to know that he was recommending that the torpedo tubes be taken off and more 40- millimeter guns be installed. I told him I wasn't pleased about it at all because I figured that although we were a DE and had 5-inch 38 guns, someday somebody was going to forget we were boys and send us over to do men's work. Well if I was ever sent to do a man's work, I wanted a man's weapons. And if somebody was going to think we were big enough to be destroyers and if I was to be used as a destroyer, I wanted a destroyer's main offensive weapon, which is a torpedo.

I guess it was shocking for me, a Lieutenant Commander, to talk to an Admiral in that way. He was of the old school and believed that junior officers should be seen and not heard, He probably thought that I was a little bit, shall we say, impudent and a little bit insubordinate. But I have always believed that a direct question calls for a direct answer. He had asked me what I thought, and I told him that I just didn't think much of his idea. I didn't then and I still don't now, but that's a matter on which reasonable minds can differ. And when he informed me that he was intending to have those torpedo tubes removed, I said, 'Well, Admiral,"--and I smiled when I said it--"as far as my ship is concerned the torpedo tubes will be removed over my dead body. I've got torpedo tubes and I expect to use them, and I expect sometime to get a hit with them." I said that more or less as a figure of speech merely to let him know how strongly I felt on the subject, never dreaming that I might actually do that. But that's just what happened. He didn't much like what I said; he got kind of red on the back of his neck. He let me know the interview was over and I left in a hurry. I suppose I was a little bit impertinent.

The night before we left Manus we lost one of the ship's officers, but we sailed from Manus with more officers than we originally had. At Pearl Harbor we had received two additional officers on board: Ensign West, a line officer, and Ensign Jack Moore, a supply officer. What had happened was that our complement had actually been raised from ten officers to twelve.

"Officially?"

That was official.

"In other words they figured you needed two more officers to man the ship?"

Yes, these two officers brought us up to full complement. And actually we had plenty of reason to use them.

Before Mr. Moore came on, We had a line officer doing the duties that are generally done by a supply officer. Bill Burton had come aboard at Houston as the stores and commissary officer, and he was also our recognition officer. Then when we had a supply officer aboard, Bill didn't have to do any of that work. Now we had anticipated that we were going to get a supply officer and had asked Bill to study up on some of the other departments. He had been working with Mr. Moylan, the sonar officer, and had learned some sonar; he had spent quite a little time with Mr. Stevenson and had learned communications, and he had spent a lot of time with Lieutenant Ulrich and Ensign LeClercq learning gunnery.

Mr. Ulrich was a senior grade lieutenant, and from the beginning I realized that in having three senior grade lieutenants on board there was always a likelihood of losing one. Mr. Roberts was the senior of the three. Lieutenants Trowbridge, Ulrich and Roberts were full two-stripers. While Mr. LeClercq was an excellent assistant gunnery officer and knew his gunnery, he was a very young chap and was only an ensign. The gunnery officer should really be a lieutenant or a very senior lieutenant, J. G. The night before we left Manus Mr. Ulrich was transferred and sent back to the officer's pool of PACFLEET in Pearl Harbor further assignment. While we were cut short one officer, we weren't as seriously handicapped as we might have been if we hadn't received Mr. West and Mr. Moore aboard, nor were we as seriously handicapped as we might have been if we hadn't given Mr. Burton a lot of instructions in gunnery as well as in communications and sonar. And, of course, since he was an officer with a great deal of intelligence and a great deal of drive and since, after Mr. Ulrich left, Mr. Roberts had taken things in hand and given Mr. Burton a tremendous amount of help in gunnery, he was pretty well set to step in and relieve anybody. Judging by our gunnery performance, Bill Burton did as good a job as anyone could have done regardless of who he was.

We went out of the harbor there at Manus and, of course, the whole outfit went together. They formed what we called a "cruising disposition," which included many of the transport and bombardment groups and the major portion of the air support group. It was an enormous formation. Our mission actually called upon to start our operations flying off supporting aircraft on "Able Day minus three," or on the morning of October 17, 1944. We went up to a place called Castle Roads which is south of Angora Island. We had a rendezvous there with three oil tankers and their escorting ships to refuel. I can remember that very well; we had all the call signs and code names. The call sign of the commander of the refueling group was "Ron Rico,: and I can still hear them calling on the air: "Ron Rico, Ron Rico, Ron Rico: this is Paddywagon," or whoever it was that was calling. They finally got together and we refueled at sea. When everybody was all fueled we took off. The three carrier groups took off at advance speed because we were supposed to be there ahead of the rest and start the softening-up air attacks on the beachheads.

"Did you have anything such as standard speed, or would it be varied every day?"

Standard speed, but it might be varied from day to day. Generally speaking out there we used 15 knots for standard speed. On this junket, however, we started up at 18 knots.

"And what would flank speed be on your ship?"

As far as the ship was concerned, if we were operating for a single ship operation--that is, not operating with a fleet set-up--we operated at 15 knots. That was our standard speed. Twenty knots was full speed and of course flank speed was whatever we could get. Our DEs were rated as not being capable of doing more than 24-1/2 knots. That was based upon the maximum RPMs which the manufacturer had prescribed our shafts could turn over.

"But what did you succeed ultimately in getting flank speed at?"

Ultimately we got up something over 28-1/2. That's as high as it showed on the Pit log, but I have reason to believe that at times we turned over as much as 30 knots.

We started up there on this operation, after leaving the rest of the big task force, at about 18 knots. We hadn't gone very far when we ran into a typhoon. It was a rough deal. I've been in many storms--some were violent storms--and I think you've been in a few, Jack. I was in a bad one off Cape Bianco on the Oregon coast and in another off Point Arguello on the California coast. I was in a terrific storm off Neah Bay in Washington, also down off the west coast of Mexico on the way over to Pearl Harbor. But this was no storm--this was a genuine typhoon. We got wind gusts up to ninety miles an hour. In peacetime, if you were going on a cruise, you would turn away from those things. We had warning of the typhoon early enough to get away from it, but we had a combat mission. As a matter of fact, a lot of our boys didn't know it but they had a rendezvous with death.

We plowed right into the middle of the storm. That typhoon was a humdinger. The Admiral kept right on and we had to keep right on. You know: "Hew to the line and let the chips fall where they may." It got to the point where it was actually hazardous to try to relieve the watches or to be out on deck trying to move. A lot of the men just took a beating until they were sick. We spent a period of about twenty to twenty-two hours in which we seldom had any enlisted personnel in the wheel house. A few times one or two of our men, either quartermasters or other deck ratings, were on the bridge for several hours. During part of this time Mr. Gurnett, the First Lieutenant, and I relieved each other on the wheel.

"You took the wheel yourself?"

Oh, yes, and so did Lieutenant Gurnett. We were just down to that point. Mr. Roberts, the Exec, and Mr. Stevenson, the Communications Officer, were out on the open bridge in oilskins soaking wet, acting together as the Officer of the Deck and mainly as a glorified lookout at that stage of the game. I think Mr. LeClercq and Mr. Burton were down in CIC checking on the radars, doing the best thing they could to help us keep station. Both the engineering officers, Mr. Trowbridge in No. 1 engine room and Mr. Riebenbauer in No. 2, had a gang of machinist's mates and water tenders down in those spaces, and they never left during that time. When a man would get dead tired he would lie down on the gratings, rest a little while, and then get up and work. A lot of the crew were down in their bunks, sick, almost ready to die.

All of our crew with the possible exception of one man had by this time long recovered from any attacks of seasickness in what is generally known as rough weather. This typhoon, though, was far worse than any ordinary rough or heavy weather, and a lot of the men who had never been seasick in their lives before were seasick this time and had no need to feel ashamed, either. It is probably a miracle that every person on board wasn't sick. The seas were so rough and the ship rolled and pounded so badly that for the first two or three hours many of them were afraid the ship would sink. For the next sixteen or eighteen hours many of them were so sick that they were afraid she wouldn't sink.

We took two rolls of fifty-five degrees, according to the inclinometer--which means that it was easier at the end of a roll to stand on the bulkhead than it was to stand on the deck. All the time we were rolling over forty degrees, thirty-five to forty and pitching. That became routine. But one good thing was that this type of DE had an excellent design for heavy seas. There wasn't that hard snap at the end of a roll. The ship would roll over a long way, kind of balance, then she would start back again. It was a nice even roll although we were in a terrible storm, and the ship didn't quiver and buckle a lot.

"You didn't get that knee and chin feeling?"

No, she was a very nice ship from that standpoint. The typhoon delayed our operations so that, naturally, we were not able to launch our aircraft until the morning of "Able minus two," or the eighteenth--we were just one day late when we started getting the air strikes off.

Now we had checked the crew over very carefully and I had talked with them before we left Manus. We weren't fooled about this assignment, for we knew we were going into an invasion on a combat operation. In genuine seriousness I told all my men before they left down there that they should get their personal affairs in shape, that they should be prepared to have casualties. We had eleven officers and 213 enlisted personnel--in all, 224 men; that was our total complement. I wouldn't have been surprised to have had from ten to twenty-five casualties on our ship from air attack. No telling who they were to be. I had no doubt in my mind when we left down there that the Japs would probably put us under air assault, that we would probably toss a lot of ammunition at Japanese airplanes because they would do anything to head off our invasion. But I didn't anticipate what was going to happen. Apparently I wasn't alone in that lack of foresight. Even as late as the night of October 24 neither Admiral Halsey nor Vice Admiral Kinkaid fully anticipated just what was going to develop; otherwise San Bernardino Straits would not have been left unguarded and the ROBERTS and several other ships might still be afloat.

You see we didn't realize that the Japanese air force had become as impotent as it had. The Japs had lost so much of their first line air power all through the war that they just didn't have the first line planes or pilots to wage modern air warfare. They didn't have enough left to be a potent factor in the regular method of air warfare. They had to resort to something desperate. That's what caused the Kamikaze to come into being.

"What operations had contributed mainly in knocking out the terrific air force that they had had earlier in the war?"

As far as I know, Jack, it was mainly carrier backed aircraft. Everybody has heard about the "Marianas turkey shoot" in the first battle of the Philippines. They called it a turkey shoot because our Third Fleet went up there and shot them down like nobody's business. They just were not a match for our carrier air power. Several other factors contributed to the Japanese weakness among which was the wonderful job done by our submarines in cutting the Jap's supply lines, mainly gas and oil, and in sinking their cargo ships. We started getting our strength in the Pacific along about 1943 with all those big flattops and all those very finely trained pilots aboard them. I still marvel at our aviators. I think they were the most wonderful group of fellows in the world. How those pilots, making 100 knots or more, could come down with their planes, particularly when they had been shot up, and land safely on those little flight decks, which were jumping around there making twenty-five knots without cracking themselves all up--I will never know. I just take my hat off to them.

We got out of the typhoon and started on the eighteenth getting up thirty minutes before sunrise and going to pre-dawn GQ.

The Exec and I spent a good deal of time on the bridge because we were operating with carriers where aircraft would take off. Our main function was as an antiaircraft screen and an antisubmarine screen for the carriers. But an incidental and very important job was plane guard. In other words, every time the carriers were launching and recovering aircraft we closed in nearer to the carriers than we did for ordinary screening. There was, of course, a certain percentage of operational accidents. They'd launch the planes off the carriers with a catapult and once in a while, either because the pilot misjudged or something went wrong with the catapult or his engine would conk out, and in he would go. It was part of our job to recover those men. By and large most of them were saved because of the quick action of the destroyers and DEs' acting as plane guards.

Fortunately not too many of our planes splashed during the operation. In all, I think that between October 18 and the night of October 24 only about five or six went in as a result of operational accidents. All of the personnel were recovered, and it was our good fortune to assist in picking up the crew of one of the planes. As near as I remember, that was the night of October 23. We were recovering planes from the last mission of the day. It was almost dark. The squadron leader of a group of torpedo planes off the FANSHAW BAY, having herded all of his other planes aboard, was coming in for the last landing. At that particular moment we were the closest escort vessel in the plane guard group to the FANSHAW BAY. We had watched so many planes take off and land that we could almost sense that something was wrong. When this plane was about one hundred feet from the carrier, all of us on the bridge of the ROBERTS knew that she was going to splash. Even before she hit the water, I had called the engine room for flank speed and had ordered the course changed to head for the stern of the carrier. Seven minutes after she hit the water we had all three men on board, a pretty good record, we thought, and I know the men concerned were glad to be picked up that promptly. By the time we had them aboard darkness had already closed in.

"What was your general procedure in this type of rescue?"

Our method of picking these men up was not, as you might imagine, by the use of a lifeboat but rather by running the bow of the ship right up to within ten to twenty-five feet of the man and then throwing him a line or sending an expert swimmer in after him. The torpedo planes carried a crew of three men, a pilot, a radio operator, and a gunner. The two crewmen were shaken up and bruised, but not badly injured, and they had no difficulty in swimming to the lines we threw them so that they could be promptly hauled on board. The pilot, however, had been rather badly hurt. Those planes go down within just a matter of seconds after they hit the water. When she was spinning in, the pilot pushed back the top of his "greenhouse."

"What do you mean by 'greenhouse'?"

That is the slang name the aviators give to the Plexiglas cover that slides up over the cockpit to protect the pilot from the wind. The edges of it are encased in metal strips. When the plane hit the water there was apparently enough slack in the pilot's safety belt, or he was in the act of unhooking it, and his head got a good solid whack on the edge of the greenhouse. He had inflated his Mae West and was in no danger of drowning, but he was not able to swim or help himself. Our ship's baker, Lynn Ferris, who was one of the best swimmers on board, dove off the fo'c'sle and swam to the pilot with a line with which we hauled him in.

As soon as we had them all on board Lieutenant Roberts took over and got the ship back on station. He went down to the wardroom where the three men had been taken to ascertain the extent of their injuries and what we could do for them. We didn't have a doctor on board and our medical department consisted of two pharmacist's mates, King, a first class, and Gonyea, a third class. The two crewmen needed no medical attention, only dry clothes and some warm food; but the pilot was in rather bad shape. From about the middle of his head his scalp, torn loose from the skull clear down to his forehead, had flopped over leaving the skull bare with the hair hanging down over his face. The sight proved too much for Gonyea. King took one long look at the job ahead of him and while he didn't say much, I could see the thought going through his mind: "Good God, what do I do now?" King was a crackerjack pharmacist's mate, but after all, he wasn't a doctor. Before the war he had owned and operated his own drugstore in Brunswick, Georgia. Suturing up badly lacerated scalps had not been his stock-in-trade This is just another example, like some of the appendectomies which were performed on submarines that didn't have doctors aboard, how versatile the average American is when he is right up against the gun. King broke out his sterilizer, his razor, and his suturing materials and went to work. When Gonyea passed out of the picture it was absolutely necessary to have some assistance for King. One volunteer was immediately present. That was Hogan, second class ship's cook. I don't call him exactly blood-thirsty but he wasn't exactly blood-shy either. Within two minutes he was figuratively and almost literally up to his elbows in it. Several of the ship's officers remained there with me to do what we could to help King. The pilot was obviously in a great deal of pain, but we had no one on board qualified or willing to administer ether. Both King and I were afraid of a possible skull fracture or at least a severe concussion, and this certainly made the administration of morphine very undesirable- A happy solution, at least probably so from the standpoint of the pilot, was a partial anesthetic consisting of a half-tumbler-full of straight whiskey from the sick bay allotment. He sat hunched up on the wardroom table, a hand gripped firmly around his ankle, while King very nervously shaved his scalp and Hogan acted as a general mop-up man. Then King got out one of his half moon suturing needles and went to work. I don't remember the exact count but it was about twenty- seven stitches, and most of us watched in open-mouthed amazement as King's violently shaking hand came in for the first stitch. As if it were hypnotized, just as the needle almost touched the scalp, King's hand stopped shaking. He put the needle through and then as he withdrew it and completed the stroke shaking overtook his hand again. This same procedure followed for all of the approximately twenty-seven stitches that he took. That is one sight I shall never forget: the shaking hand, the steady hand, the shaking hand--three distinct stages to each stitch. After the pilot was sewed up and then cleaned up, they put him to bed in Mr. Roberts' room and the revived Mr. Gonyea was sent in to sit up with the patient overnight. I think he was given another shot of "medicinal" whiskey after the stitching was completed, a reward for being such a good patient. And believe me, he was really a good patient, typical of the fortitude with which ninety-five percent of our American boys accepted the pain and suffering incidental to injuries and wounds.

When the three men were taken off our ship the next morning, the doctor praised King's work and said he doubted if he himself could have done any better.

Along about October 22, two of our submarines the USS DACE and the USS DARTER on reconnaissance patrol in the South Pacific, detected a big Japanese task force headed north out of Brunei Bay. The submarines barrelled right along on their flanks, keeping track of them and sending contact reports. This Jap outfit contained all their big battleships, all their big cruisers, and a lot of destroyers; and they were coming up through the Philippine Archipelago.

My exec and I had a chart down in CIC onto which all this information flowed. We plotted the reports as they came through and speculated and wondered what the Japs were up to. There wasn't any doubt that they were coming up to intercept, but we thought they were probably going to descend on the backside of Leyte at Ormoc Bay where later they did try to reinforce their garrison. But it wasn't our job to guess what their plans were; the Navy had admirals who were doing that. But we did notice it and took stock of it. Then on the afternoon of October 24 we got some of the late hot hockey which showed that the Jap Fleet had split up and part of them were getting pretty close to the island of Leyte.

Now we ourselves were about fifty miles from the island of Leyte and thirty miles off the coast of Samar. We were the northernmost of the three task units. Admiral Stump was about thirty miles to the eastward of Dinagat Island, which I mentioned earlier, and Admiral Tommy Sprague was a little father south, about thirty or forty miles off the island of Mindanao.

We recovered our last airplane the night of October 24 and shoved off to the night operating area. We used to take zigzag courses and fiddle around out there anywhere from fifty to sixty miles off the coast to ward off submarine attacks. Then just before dawn, we'd start heading back in closer so that our planes wouldn't have to fly so far to make their strikes. During the night we started heading back in and we got off a pre-dawn flight. I was up for it because naturally the commanding officers were always on the bridge when the planes were taking off. We never knew when we would have to go over as a plane guard, although I don't know what we would have done in the middle of a black night if a plane had splashed. This flight was taking off in darkness--I suppose a total of about thirty or forty planes were launched from the carriers. Soon after that we had our pre-dawn GQ and all men were at their battle stations.

One thing that I should tell you, which has a little bearing on this story, is that in every twenty-four hour period some ship was given the radar guard. We had a surface detection radar and an air detector radar. One of the carriers maintained the primary radar guard. The escorts had the secondary air guard. We were assigned the secondary surface radar guard that night. About 2300 (11 P.M.) our surface radar went out. That gave us difficulty because we had to go back to the old system of trying to tell where we were at night without any lights, by being able to see in the dark like a cat. It also meant that we must immediately notify the Admiral that our radar was out of operation and ask that we be relieved of the guard because we didn't want him to think we were keeping guard duty when we could not.

I didn't get any sleep that night because about midnight all hell broke loose on the radios in CIC. We had one radio down there tuned in on the frequency which was the scene of action frequency for our combat operations. All of our battleships and cruisers and some of our destroyers were in Leyte Gulf, and they found that the Jap Fleet was coming into the gulf from the south via Surigao Straits. You have read how some of our ships did what hasn't been done since the good old days of Horatio Lord Nelson's time, of capping the T. The Japs sped right up the narrow channel and let our ships line up right across them where they could be raked with fire. Admiral Jesse Olendorf took advantage of the situation and very expertly deployed his ships. Now our radio was on a voice frequency and we could hear everyone down there giving their commands and we could hear the heavy guns booming. My Exec and I became so excited and interested that we just camped in CIC until it was time to go up for the pre-dawn flight, and after that I went back down there again and stayed until morning GQ.

It was after the pre-dawn GQ on the morning of October 25, 1944, that our own fireworks really began. Either my Exec or I tried to be on the bridge whenever there were flight operations. I remember I said to Bob Roberts, "I think I'll go down to the wardroom and have a cup of coffee. I'll be up in a few minutes and you can go down for one." I stepped into the pilot house from the open bridge and had just gotten to the top of the ladder to go below when the officer of the deck called me and said, "Captain, Wheaten just told me that they have the radar back in operation." I stepped back up to talk to Wheaten a few minutes. He said, "I've got her back operating, Captain, but something is still wrong because the scope is a little bit fuzzy. If you want to put the regular watch back on, though, you can and I can keep on trying to find out what else is wrong." So I said, "Well, put the watch on and keep working and let me know when you get it fixed."

Again I started to go below to get my coffee when the officer of the deck, I think it was Mr. Moylan, called me and said, "Surface radar reports that they have a contact, Sir, bearing about three-three-zero approximately thirty or forty miles away." Again I went back up and talked to the radar man, asking him what kind of a contact he had. He replied that it was kind of fuzzy-looked like a dense area on the screen. Then those of us on the bridge looked out at three-three-zero and saw a storm cloud or thunderhead on that bearing. We could see those great big black storm clouds, and, of course, one thing that radar will pick up is the ionized particles in a heavy thundercloud. I told him, "Well, there's a storm over there, but there could be something inside of it, so keep an eye on it." And again I started back for my coffee. I passed a few words with this one and that one--it all took a little time but not much--and I was halfway down the ladder that time when I heard one of the lookouts call to the officer of the deck, "Object on the horizon." And then he added, "Looks like the mast of a ship."

One of the last things that Lieutenant Roberts and I had heard the night before on the combat frequency in CIC was that our ships had actually routed the Jap Fleet down Surigao Straits. They had been talking back and forth in plain English how they were chasing the fleeing Jap remnants that had escaped from the original holocaust down there. So we were lulled into a false sense of security.

Now we didn't know which way our fleet was chasing the Japs--whether back the way they had come from or whether some of them had broken through, or out to sea, or where they were.

The minute Burton told me they were Jap ships I picked up the TBS and called the Admiral to tell him that we had sighted them. But before I could actually get my transmission through, a lot of ack-ack all of a sudden went up there over the horizon. We had a combat air patrol out and we also had an antisubmarine air patrol of three TBMs flying around. What had happened was that when the Jap ships broke out from under the clouds, our antisubmarine air patrol had gotten over there and had seen them and flown right over them. The Japs, of course, had opened up on our aircraft, and our pilots had sent back a contact report which the Admiral received before he could get ours. He immediately sent out a dispatch himself, "Jap Fleet sighted," giving us a course change from one- eight-zero to zero-nine-zero which meant that we were to head due east.

There were two reasons for that order: one was that the Japs had been picked up on a bearing of three-three-zero, which means that they were exactly to the north-west of us--we were headed just five degrees to the west of north. We were on a three-five-five heading. Also the wind was from zero-seven-five or zero-eight-zero. We always headed into the wind when we launched planes and he wanted to get his planes off. The new course would get us running away from the coast that the Japs were coming down. We weren't meant to fight that kind of an outfit. The change of course order would also give us a chance to launch our aircraft, which was really the only effective weapon we could use against such a heavy enemy Task Unit. Unfortunately, however, our planes were not at that moment set up to fight ships. Our planes had been loaded with general purpose bombs and light bombs for doing a lot of destruction against ground troops and personnel on the beach.

Now Halsey's Third Fleet was loaded with torpedoes and armor piercing bombs to fight ships, but he was not with us. Our planes had no armor piercing bombs readied. So with a battle only minutes away it was impossible to rearm our planes to fight a ship action. About the time we received the message from the Admiral the Jap Fleet let fly, and the first salvo landed right in between the JOHNSTON and the ROBERTS and the FANSHAW BAY, which was the flagship. In other words, we were spread out in a cruising disposition with all six carriers on equalized bearings about 1500 yards from an imaginary fleet center. Our escort vessels were on an outer-perimeter of about 2000 yards. Into this triangle between us and the JOHNSTON and the FANSHAW BAY the first Jap salvo hit kerplunk and the fight was on.



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