Having done my duty up to the 25^th of August, I made an application to General Stephens for the obtaining His Majesty's leave of absence for a twelve month. I have the honor to enclose you his answer and my reply. The friendly disposition you have ever manifested towards me, emboldens me to request the favor of your influence, to prevent any difficulty in obtaining this leave, and anybody [else] being appointed permanently to the company of grenadiers during my absence. For trifling, as all the honor of this world may appear in Philosophic Eyes; yet whilst we continue our intercourse with society, worldly distinctions must have their weight; and as I trust the following circumstances will prove how much I have labored to acquire this Heather. It cannot be wonderful, if a regular molting creates [such] sickness, that an animal should become miserable, feeling himself suddenly divested of his whole plumage.

To a man who has endeavored to deserve well, nothing can be more painful than to speak of himself. But when neglected by those who ought to spare him mortification, necessity compels him to state his services in his own defense.

I have been near 23 years in the service without missing a day's duty; nor ever applied for leave of absence but once, with the intention of visiting those plains where the battles had been fought, and those [particular] posts, which had been occupied by the King of Prussia and Prince of Brunswick, during the war of Germany. I was for this purpose on my way, and with General Langlois at Mons, when the war which was threatened with Spain, occasioned my recall. That [war] blowing over, I proposed applying for leave to prosecute my intended purpose [of visiting battlefields]. But been weak enough to engage in play [gambling], I lost so much [money] as to put it out of my power. I then applied myself with assiduity [close application] to those regimens which with justice are considered the elements of our profession. Just as the American War broke out, my affairs were on the point of being arranged, and would have being satisfactorily settled in a few months. But being amongst the number of those who by seniority were destined for that [American] service, [and] though my whole future welfare depended upon my staying in England for so short a time, I would not apply for leave, knowing that according to the[service] arrangement then established, in two years if I lived, my rank would bring me home.

This sir, was the case with every officer obtaining an advanced rank till, it came to the time of Cols. [Frederick] Madan [1st Foot Guards], [Lowther] Pennington [Coldstream Guards] [and] myself; when, with our commissions, came an order from home, that all officers obtaining rank in America should remain there. This order was evidently for the good of the service, and therefore although it was inevitably my destruction, nobody ever heard me complain. But the heavy annuities [debts] under which [I] then labored, were going on without the possibility of redemption; by which means the interest amounted to the [sum of the] capital and it made the difference in my circumstances of about £5,000. Even under this pressure, in the face of an order, and being upon actual service, I would not ask for leave, but thus endure [my American service]. I [then] exerted every endeavor in my power to acquire such an experience in the service, as I hoped might at some future period, put me above that want; which a perseverance in my duty must occasion.

The way in which I had conducted myself had procured me the good opinion of [Brigadier] General [Edward] Mathew, under whose command I served. He immediately formed another light company out of the Guards for me and, on the first occasion in which we were employed, he added another Grenadier Company to my command. His good opinion, so much so, that in the winter of 1779, he offered the command of the detached outpost at Kingsbridge with whatever force of cavalry and infantry I should judge requisite. But as ever the outpost promised to be inactive, compared with the prospects of those services, which opened to the southward, the Commander in Chief [Sir Henry Clinton] then having in contemplation the reduction of Charlestown and being kind enough to offer me a place in his family, I attended him. He was likewise pleased to be so satisfied with my services, that after the reduction of that place and our own return to New York, he asked what he should do for me. I told him my object was seeing all the services possible. If therefore, when he [Clinton] did not take the field, he would give me leave to serve with my own Corps, and when the severity of the season precluded all operations to the northward, if then he would permit me to join the troops who were going to the southward, he would gratify my most sanguine wishes.

In policy I ought to say nothing of his goodness to me, least those truths, I shall ever feel myself bound to testify respecting his own services, should be thought the flattering account of a grateful heart; and however little it may be to the purpose in this place, I cannot help expressing my hopes that his merits may one day or other be as possibly acknowledged, as they are well understood, by all who know the truth of facts; for the man who bravely stated his life and character in violation of an order from the Minister [Lord George Germain]; and truly saved the whole army and navy from capture; has at this moment no other consolation but what arises from the consciousness of having served his country, confirmed by the thorough approbation of one of the most consummate Generals in Europe.

Through his indulgence I continued to serve with the Guards. When we took the field, I had the honor to attend him and, when the season drove both into winter quarters and enabled the southern troops to act, he formed a battalion of light infantry from the Provincial Line [8/21/1780], and flattering me with the command of it, and sent us with 2,000 men under [Major] General [Alexander] Leslie to reinforce Cornwallis. These troops being landed at Charlestown, upon the order for moving up the country, I was informed by [Lieutenant] Colonel [Nesbit] Balfour [Commandant of the Town] that I was not to go with the troops to Lord Cornwallis. Expecting my surprise, he endeavored to make me understand, I was to have a more distinguished situation than that of the rest of the advanced Corps of the Army, as mine would be a detached command and that the object of which was to protect the communications of the Santee River to Camden and to cover the Eastern District of the Province.

Whatever may be a soldier's opinion, whenever he received prospective orders, it's his duty to obey them in silence. I therefore held no further conversation with the gentleman on the subject, than inquiring of him what might be the length of the river that called for protection. As my whole number embarked did not amount to 340 men, he said the river, indeed, was of considerable extent, but the principal front in which it was available, was within a few miles of Nelson's Ferry, that the eastern part of the province was my front, that I was to consider Camden on the left and Georgetown on the right as my flanks and appear [there] in case of necessity; that I should be supplied from the post on this side of Nelson's Ferry and that I was to communicate by letter with Lord Rawdon at Camden and with him at Charlestown.

As the country was in perfect security on this side of the Santee River; myself, with every Man and Officer of the Corps, [were] total strangers to the part of it in which we were to act. [Since there were] several Officers, living in Charlestown, who had served in that province, I remained there, whilst the troops were on their march to collect [12/20/1780] such maps, plans and intelligence of the nature of the country, the force, character and conduct of the enemy. [Then] as [soon] as was possible, [I] joined my Corps just as they reached Nelson's [12/25/1780]. By this means [temporarily staying in Charlestown] I soon learned what I had been before, totally unable to apprehend. In spite of all, [Lieutenant] Colonel Balfour obliging endeavored to make me sensible of it [the necessary knowledge]. The flattering preeminence of this allotment, [was] in [the] preference to [now] being one of the advanced Corps of the Southern Army. For the Commander-in-Chief, foreseeing the occasion that [the] army would have for such Corps, had properly clothed and appointed these troops as Light Infantry. The justice of this discernment became evident, when in the course of the campaign, to such distress were they [the army under Cornwallis ] induced for want of similar Corps, they were obliged to appoint a regiment of Hessians as light troops. But sir, I became sensible to the compliments paid to my abilities and the high esteem to which an untried Corps of Provincials was considered. When I found that I was to succeed [Lieutenant ] Colonel [Robert] Mc Leroth in his command and to take the field against the enemy with no more troops than he had, when they [the enemy] obliged him to find himself in one of the strongest posts [Nelson's Ferry] of that country, and send to Camden for a reinforcement acknowledging himself surrounded and unable to move, in a country _________desolate of provisions, by the supplies it had afforded to his troops and those of the enemy; all communications being cut off with the post at Nelson's Ferry, on the other side of the [Santee] River, wherever it [the river] rose which happened in a few hours at any time, in consequence of rains falling in the upper country.

Under these circumstances, and whilst the enemy remained in this force, I inquired where our sick and wounded were to be lodged, and, if we kept our body together for covering the assailable points of the river, how we were to be fed, as detachments became impossible, if the they [the enemy] could surround when collected an equal, at least, [it is as said an superior force] to remain in a strong post in such a manner, that Colonel Mc Leroth could not show a sentinel but was fired at. Nobody would tell me. I applied to [Major] General [Charles] O'Hara for his service and such instructions, as his experience might furnish us with, who only shrugged his shoulders [in reply].

Having then applied for the mounted peoples [detachments of New York Volunteers under loyalist Major John Coffin] being attached to me who had attended Colonel Mc Leroth, some spare ammunition and wagons to convoy the sick or wounded we might have, and being informed that the mounted peoples must go with the other troops, that they could give me no ammunition, and as for wagons that I had already five, which was more than would be allowed me and which they actually took away two or three, I drew up two papers, copies of each other, describing my situation as total stranger in that country, without any place of security for sick and wounded nearer than Camden or Georgetown, the one fifty or sixty, the other not nearer than fifteen or twenty miles of my chief post, no wagons to convey sick, wounded or provisions if they could be fetched from a distance, not a horse ,except one I had purchased, among the whole Corps, not a mounted man to place as a videt, to form a patrol or send with intelligence, and not a cartridge but was in the men's pouches, to oppose an enemy of superior numbers flushed with their late ascendancy.

I showed the letter to General O'Hara, telling him my situation, presenting one to General Leslie and conveying its copy to a friend, in case of misfortune to me, to be disclosed to the Commander-in-Chief. He approved it, said it was a justice I owed to myself, then, and never he believed was an officer left in such a situation; that he was persuaded I should do what could be done; but he was as seen putting his fingers before his eyes and cropping them, [as if ] I should in a few days be in that manner peeping through the Grate of Hillsborough jails [as a captive with the enemy]. This bill I sent to General Leslie and soon after had about twenty mounted men of that country, under a Captain [John] Harrison [of the South Carolina Rangers], sent to me.

This whole country, the great roads excepted, is one continuous wood, without any underwood, minimally flat, except our place called the High Hills of Santee, where Colonel Mc Leroth had taken post. Our first object therefore was to look, while General Leslie was on his move towards Camden, for some spot in the vicinity of the weak spot of the River, which might be rendered secure for a time with a few men and having found a place [the future Fort Watson], supposed to have been the burying ground of their Indian Chiefs in former times, resembling the barrows [burial mounds] of this country. We scraped it at the top, abated it at the bottom, and rendered it as strong as the materials we could collect, the only utensils we had, our tomahawks, would admit. This being done [12/27/1780] and Lord Rawdon, to whom I had made know my predicament and applied to, either for some cavalry to enable me to act offensively with a prospect of success, or for a gun to secure any defensive situation, having sent me a three-pounder with ammunition, and information that Sumpter and Marion were the Partisans I might expect in that quarter. His Lordship added instructions that I was to seek and fight them wherever they were found.

Prior to the arrival of this piece, as the river soon rose and interrupted our communications with Nelson's Post, we were obliged to make long marches in pursuit of provisions, and as the enemy were all mounted, they used to attack us in small parties at a distance, drive when they could the cattle before us and, by long and chance shots at the column wound our men; nor did they neglect on our first taking the field, their customary attack by day on the sentinels and piquets by night. But ambuscades being laid with success and the spirit and activity of the officers, together with the courage and zeal of the men to emulate the Light Infantry of the Line, occasioned their constant impulse [to attack] with loss, soon rendered their visits less frequent, thus [making their] feeling for our several posts more tender [to their sensibilities].

Upon the reinforcement of this gun, I left forty of the men who seemed least qualified for the severity of our marches, under Lieutenant [James] McKay, a very good officer of [Lieutenant Colonel Edmund] Fannning's [Kings American ] Regiment whom I appointed Commandant of the Post [Fort Watson]. We began in our turn to beat up Mr. Marion's quarters.

We succeeded in our endeavors so fortunately that, with the operation and effectual support in every instance we experienced from Lord Rawdon, whose merit, as a soldier, I want language to express, that he [Marion] began to conceal his quarters, encamping always in swamps, with every know avenues covered with small parties; videts stationed at the distance four and sometimes seven miles. We had however just fallen in with and defeated Marion, pressing him as far as Black River, which crossing, he broke up the Bridge when we learned that Sumpter had made his appearance on the opposite side of the Santee River, defeated the escort and captured the camp equipage [2/23/1781] and stores which was going to Camden for the Army. I therefore forwarded all the provisions possible to our Post [Fort Watson].

Ignorant of a concealed but commanding spot, we kept a guard on this side of the river. He attempted sending his prize, which he had embarked in boats, down the river, and which, by this means, we had the good fortune to recover, taking all his boats. He therefore determined to attack our Post, of which Lord Rawdon, obtaining information, sent me intelligence and that he would reinforce me in person. We continued fetching and laying in whatever new Indian corn we could.

Returning one day from a foraging party, one of the wagons, which was bringing a mill to grind the corn, broke down as it was not about one mile and a half from home. I left an Ensign [of the Provincial Light Infantry], whose name was Richard Cooper, with twenty men to repair and bring it on. Our men were just in [2/28/1781] and began to start their dinner, when we heard a continued firing towards the line, in which he had just left. Every man was instantly in arms, suspecting the cause, which was confirmed by the horses galloping home by themselves. We were soon up to the spot which was about a mile from having repaired the cart. They were proceeding home, when Sumpter wholly summoned them, called him [Cooper] to surrender but forming his men in a circle, joined the men nearest him. He replied "Light Infantry never surrender" and began firing as hard they could. Seeing us approach, they quitted our gallant Ensign and formed to receive us. This fighting did not last long before they fled, leaving what killed and wounded may be seen by the actions. We took some [38] prisoners and thirty horses. Lord Rawdon came the next day, flattered his ______ Corps much by his manner of thanking them and took that particular notice of Mr. Cooper, [which] he so well deserved. Sumpter was himself said to have been wounded which was probably the case as he never afterward appeared in that Quarter. I believe not very long after, [he] died [Watson mistaken]. His Lordship too, much approved the Post we had taken and the manner in which we had strengthened it.

As [our] infantry, who were to follow mounted troops, became so little stationary, [it] would rarely permit their remaining two days upon the same ground. The fatigues of marching together with such skirmishes having weakened our Corps, Lord Rawdon, who apprehending the return of Sumpter and his junction with Marion, left me the 64th Regiment, for its services, likewise reduced in number, with another 3-pounder, saying he should want them again at a given time.

The stores being sent forward from our Post and the country on this side of the Black River, evacuated by Marion, I determined to make the tour of the eastern part of the district, where Marion still continued his ravages upon those supposed to be well affected. [He] forced those who were disposed to remain at home, out in arms, under pain of military execution. As he had broken up all the bridges upon the River, I did not choose to expose the troops to his long shot with a river between us. I took the lower road [3/6/1781].

[Transcriber Note: Events of the period 3/7 to 3/27/1781 are omitted from Lt Colonel Watson's manuscript. Actions which took place during this interim were skirmishes with Marion's Brigade at Wiboo Swamp on 6/5/1781, Mount Hope Swamp on 3/13/1781 and Lower Bridge of the Black River on 3/14 and 15, 1781. He stayed at Blakely Plantation until 3/28/1781 when he marched toward Sampit Creek.]

Over Sampit Creek was a bridge rising in pyramid form, so that till upon it, you could not see that the boards had been taken up on the opposite side. Ordering therefore a few Light Infantry to get over upon the rafters and make that examination, so suspicious a circumstance warranted. They soon discovered the enemy behind the thickets and railings of a house adjoining; who upon this came out and began firing upon the troops at the Bridge, whilst Mr. Marion at the same instant appeared formed to attack our rear. Having ordered one gun up with Major [Thomas] Barclay of the Light Infantry to face the Bridge, I formed the 64th to receive Mr. Marion. A better regiment than this never took the field.

The spirit of these hardy veterans soon broke his [Marion's] line and put them in confusion. The enemy being driven by the Light Infantry and the Bridge secured, I ordered part of the 64th to pursue, whilst the commanding officer, with the remainder, followed in good order. But observing a little knot of them, who from eagerness to run different ways, had got huddled, they could not clear themselves. I led those twenty mounted men of Captain Harrison's, before mentioned, to charge them, [having in the course of time picked up cutlasses and other sword like instruments for them], when by one on those panics, which are never meant to be accounted for, in the very instant of charge, where each of the enemy were twisting how to avoid the stroke, every individual man, turned about, galloped off and would have rode over the 64th Regiment, if Captain [Dennis] Kelly, who commanded it, had not ordered his men to present their arms and swore he would fire upon them, calling out and pointing to where they had left me; for not feeling the destruction they expected, the enemy, turning their heads over their shoulders, saw me alone. Our surprise was mutual, but Parthian like, they fired a volley as they fled and shot my horse. On seeing him fall and me laying under him, one fellow more determined than the rest, separated himself to fire at me, but a black servant I had, who always carried a fowling piece of mine, seized by anxiety, at seeing my horse fall, ran up, stood over me and shot him. Providentially, I was not hurt and preserving in the pursuit, as far as could be any advantage to infantry, we continued our march, the Light Infantry having repaired the Bridge. Going up the west side of the Great Peedee River [4/7/1781], in order to cross through the heart of the country, which showed the strongest marks of disaffection, I received a deputation from the inhabitants of the Little Peedee, to say if I would only cross the Great One, to cover them whilst they assembled, they would join to a man. I did and the day following about 200 of them rode into our camp. The assembling of these people, Mr. Marion's latter ill success, and the showing ourselves in that quarter; together with the declarations we have out that, whenever Marion insists upon them turning out in arms, we only advise them to stay at home, cultivate their land and that every man found at home might rely upon protection, had reduced their Partisan numbers from 400 to less than 150, daily diminishing .

Having now marched the eastern limits of the province, I trusted that our march, with a force that in militia was hourly increasing and of a kind too, who when collected, win by themselves, not the least afraid of Marion, would restore, if not quiet, our supremacy in that district. The boats were collected for our crossing the river at four the next morning and in three days I had promised, marching by the head of Lincho Creek and Black River, to have restored to his Lordship, the 64th at Camden. Judge of my astonishment at twelve that night [4/9/1781], to be informed by one of those faithful men of the Peedee, that he had seen the militia of the Cheraw District assembling and heard the Major read there a letter he had received from Greene, directing him to order every man to take arms; that Lord Cornwallis had quitted the province, that he [Greene] himself was going against Camden, where his success might not be certain but at all events he might make sure of me. He directed they [the militia] should occupy all of the passes of the river and that to the support of the whole militia, he had attached [Lieutenant ] Colonel [Harry] Lee, with his cavalry, guns and some Continentals.

To have heard nothing of this, neither from Lord Rawdon nor Georgetown, seemed strange. But the assembling the militia where we had even been successful, when in their neighborhood, and with our militia collecting, put it past doubt and I began to suggest what proved to be the fact: that our respective messenger to & from Camden, had been intercepted.

This melancholy intelligence soon confirmed by accounts from one of our people; of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton being at some place, they said, within forty miles of us, and as these precautions were said to be taken [by the enemy] respecting the passes of the river, our guides recommended our moving up to join Lord Cornwallis, as the ferries [being] secured, we could not reach Georgetown.

Lord Rawdon's accumulated force, was, I know insufficient to oppose Greene, out of which he had lent the 64th Regiment, and as he had no cavalry, he could not easily move, unless I joined him. It was therefore of little import, in that great line of consequence, should I fail in attempting the junction; and whilst I made it, their detachments against me, and those I presumed they would make against our Post, must I knew summon the enemy's collective force less considerable. I moved within the hour, and marching fifty miles that day, fell back upon the Little Peedee. I had just thrown troops enough over, to secure the post on the other side, when the enemy came to possess themselves of it. I then crossed the Wacamaw River, as our own militia left us, whilst those of the enemy ever daily augmenting, and marched down to Georgetown. Here to my amazement, I found an order from Lieutentant Colonel Balfour to leave forty men to reinforce that post. I represented to the commanding officer [of the post], I conceived there must be some mistake as Lord Rawdon's situation called for more troops than I had to carry if I could get to join him. That when it was considered I was to attempt this, with Greene's whole army to intercept me upon the Congaree River, and Colonel Lee's detachment, with the aggregate militia of the province, now said to be 1,500, to oppose my crossing the Santee, one of which two [rivers] must be affected. If success crowned our endeavors, it surely could never be meant, but to strengthen the party, who was to attempt what appeared next to be an improbability. I therefore presumed he was to give me the forty men [rather than vis-versa], for if Lord Rawdon succeeded, his front was secure, if not, it must be evacuated. This sir, said he, is the order. I am not disposed to remember this gentleman's name [it was Captain John Saunders of the Queen's Rangers, on detached duty in South Carolina], for upon his producing it [the order], I said there was no disputing an order and picked out forty men, whom I left. As he told me [however] he thought it strange, I should leave only disabled men.

This noble Corps, the 64th Regiment, were almost all grey headed men, but such men, that if they had no legs, they would have crawled upon their hand and knees to join Lord Rawdon. I therefore did not think it worth while to tell him, that in a march of fifty miles, not a man was left behind; nor that every poor fellow, independent of the distance he had marched, had each according to their respective strengths, carried sails for miles, as to reach this place. We had crossed two swamps, presumed impassible, one of which, Catfish Swamp, tradition reported, had never before been trod by human foot. With these sails we made platforms as we went without loss [of] our guns and men.

We proceeded up the hither side of the Santee, to a point near the confluence of the two rivers, and which, being supposed impracticable, was left unguarded. Here we crossed [4/24/1781] and after wading six creeks, which though deep, were fordable. We built a bridge of sixty feet over the seventh that was not so [fordable] ; then cutting away for about a mile and a half, through the canes that grow in those swamps, we, the next morning, joined his Lordship without molestation. We had now learnt that Lieutenant McKay, after defending the post [Fort Watson], with his forty men, for nine days against about 1,000 men and Colonel Lee, and when there was not a spot in his post, but was commanded by their riflemen, he had made [on 4/23/1781] honorable terms for his brave garrison.

The afternoon of the day we joined Lord Rawdon [5/7/1781] he moved out meet Greene, encamped at a five mile distance. But this able general [Greene], instructed, by the defeat he had experienced [at Hopkirk's Hill on 4/25/1781] from his Lordship, with only his weak garrison, a few days before, retreated to a stronger post some miles farther back. His Lordship followed him the next day, but found he [Greene] had so secured his front, as to be in attackable [position], but by the turning [of] his flank to have effected [a situation] which we must have made such a detour, as might have gotten him an opportunity of slipping into Camden during our attempt [to attack him]. After, therefore, driving in his advanced parties, so as to be afraid of his situation, we retired to that place, but so wary had this gentleman [Greene] become of Lordship, we were not followed by a single man. His Lordship, having made the necessary preparations, then evacuated Camden [5/9/1781] We moved down, unfollowed, to the post at Nelson's Ferry [5/14/1781] contracting our lines to the boundary of the Santee River [at Monck's Corner on 5/24/1781]

The arrival soon after at Charletown of the 3rd, 19th, 30h Regiments, changing the aspect of affairs, enabled Lord Rawdon, reinforced only by the flank companies of those regiments, to march to the relief of the post at Ninty Six, then at the mercy of Greene's whole force and most handsomely defended by [Lieutenant ] Colonel [John] Cruger, an action as glorious as was performed by any individual, during the whole war. Finding Lord Rawdon preparing to reach the place, they made their assault with that determination which animates troops, who know their only hope to rest in their bravery, but were completely repulsed; when Greene moved off by such rapid marches, that Lord Rawdon, who followed him as far as the Saluda River, finding he would not stop and hopes of overtaking him vain, discontinued the pursuit.

His Lordship now seeing that country once more in security, turned his thoughts toward establishing a health, which had been long much affected by that climate. He therefore left the Province.

The superiority established by the arrival of these troops, ending my longer continuance useless. I explained my having leave to go to New York, for the General [Sir Henry Clinton] had honored me with this at [originally] quitting him, to enable me to return when I judged requisite, with this additional flattering circumstance, of making my [re] joining him early in the spring [of 1781], the condition of my southern command; he then proposing to take the field as soon as the season would admit, for the purpose of giving efficacy to whatever might be hoped from Lord Cornwallis's operations.

This, the hitherto distressed situation of the province, had prevented my fulfilling [my original intention] but I now returned [arriving in New York on 6/26/1781]. I found the commander-in-chief not circumstanced, as the infamous publication in the new edition of the Encyclopedia had represented him. A description so false that a stranger would be led to think that it was written by an American, but so injurious, that slight discernment teaches it could only be the production of a set of people, who own no allegiance but to the arm which can outstretch itself for their support, who know no gratitude to a patron who has no more bounties to bestow, whose security, whose federal principles are such that led by their idol, temporal advantage, they would link against that God, who finds them in their orative wilderness.

Sir Henry Clinton is a soldier and skilled in those arts which afford ability to his profession but is ignorant of those disagreeable wiles which constitute the machiavellian policy of little minds. He therefore cherished a knot of these fawning and snaky characters, favoured by his fostering hand. They could now rear their crests, when suspecting his declining consequence. They burst at once from his bosom and helping left him. That the fate of ingratitude may not be delivered and to deaden the tongue of truth, starvelings from the same faith, were employed in the work to murder his reputation.

By the following authentic statement, foreigners would be informed, the present age know and prosperity form an very different estimate of that gentleman's [Clinton's] character.

The commander having repeatedly explained to the Minister at home, the true state of that country [America] and if a force, inconsiderable as his, was to be permanently divided, or established posts so detached, attempted [to aid Lord Cornwallis] ; what must be the consequences ,should the French ever feel a superiority at sea, though but for a moment, could not but be mortified in the highest degree at finding Lord Cornwallis in Virginia, without his orders. To do however all that was possible for his Lordship, so circumstanced, he sent his very choicest troops under [Major ] General [William ] Phillips, a command under [Brigadier General Benedict] Arnold, to strengthen and cooperate with his Lordship. This services to contradict the slanderous narrative of his being deceived,by any contrived letters of Washington, had this experienced officer felt, at the very time [he] had attached so largely [a force ] in support of Lord Cornwallis, how vulnerable he should become in such extensive and detached posts as Staten Island, Long Island, Long Island, Paulus Hook and York Island, when the season enabled the foe to take the field.

The French having secured Rhode Island, it was no longer the Americans only, but them in conjunction with the gallant and disciplined armies of that Perfidious Nation, who had now declared herself our avowed enemy.

Having then made know his apprehension of the French fleet superior at sea, he [Clinton] directed his Lordship to select a defensive situation, to keep all the troops, till he had rendered it impregnable; and then to return [to] him such as he could to New York, naming what Corps' he should wish to be sent, in [order of] preference.

Every part of Sir Henry Clinton's conduct, is a flat contradiction to their absurd account of his being deceived. For upon Washington, with his whole army, supported by the Count de Rochambeau with 4,000 French troops, taking a post in the front of York Island, his [Clinton's] accumulate [remaining] force for this extensive defense not being [more than] 11,000 men. He called a Council of his General Officers to know their opinion, respecting what number of troops they thought sufficient for the several garrisons, if he moved towards Washington. Having learn't their opinion, he left what number he judged necessary and collecting the remainder, he posted himself so as to take advantage if Washington should detach or, by any forage, separate his army; applying at the same time to the Navy to transport him with the troops, if Washington should move to the southward. As he took this direction, the General [Clinton] ordered the troops to the coast, but [Rear] Admiral [Thomas] Graves, doubting the naval strength, held it advisable to wait for [Rear Admiral] [Robert] Digby, who was daily expected with the ships of the line. This, together with the refitting of some ships, which had suffered in a partial engagement that officer had just had with the French, took some time. As soon however as he gave notice, they were ready to receive the troops. We embarked and found ourselves off the Capes of Virginia, October 24 [1781]. We there saw the whole French fleet in the York River and learn't that Lord Cornwallis had capitulated on the 19th.

With all these delays, for which Sir Henry was not accountable. It was only five days after the surrender. The Army was a porteé to have afforded succor to his Lordship.

It was the object of Sir Henry Clinton wishes to form a junction with Lord Cornwallis and fight the united enemies of these Kingdoms upon the neck of Williamsburg. For spite of their very superior numbers, the discipline and know spirit of the French troops, he hoped every thing from Officers trained by the experience of a long war, commanding troops inured to toil and victory. Here, if fortune favored, it would be victory, which no success elsewhere could give his Majesty's arms.

The same idea struck these distinct leaders [Clinton and Washington]. Their object was different. Their mode of reasoning similar. Each saw his separate interest in its new light. The junction of the French had taught, less experienced minds than Sir Henry, that good was now to be despaired of, unless it could be effected by some decisive stroke. The American Fabius held the converse of this opinion. The Commander-in-Chief urged and performed all that was possible to get there. Washington knew it as a cull de sac. He therefore halted at the Head of the Pamunkey River nor would he put himself upon the Neck till the French fleet had anchored in the York River.

The personal spirit of Lord Cornwallis [which] led him, was to despise danger; and he had in consequence neglected till too late, those precautions for defense, which had been recommended; where the price of his surrender seem to have been accelerated by a circumstance not generally adverted to [and which is explained as follows]. His Lordship, to this gallantry, has joined great national goodness of heart and unappreciateness of so trying a situation. This disposition seem to have led him to the selection of an Engineer [Captain Alexander Sutherland], more amiable for his private virtues, than vetted by his abilities to rival that great character in the same line [Captain James Moncreiff], whose defense of Savannah would in other times have immortalized him.

Sufficient experience had not learn't this gentleman, to secure the most important line of defense. The contracted works upon which he had employed himself, differently constructed, might have formed a citadel to retire to. When the outward strong portion had been carried, such a defense would have at least have gained that time, which would have afforded the opportunity of some attempt in his Lordship's favor. As it was, his Lordship's sole defense consisted in narrow works, thrown up in such a manner as gave the French ,ever ready to insult, under an appearance of compliments, an opportunity of observing after the capitulation, that inspecting the entrenchments of our army, brought shame upon them, as a uninformed spectator comparing the lines of attack with those of defense, would be disposed to judge the Besieger, the Besieged.

Thus sir, led from circumstances to paint my own situation, I have not suppressed those ideas which presented themselves in the attempt; and which led naturally to touch on outlines, at the close of an unfortunate campaign, in concerns of such consequence it is as important that the eight line of truth [not to bear false witness] should be seen, as it is difficult to be discovered, amidst the various interests which combine to warp or veil it.

When false representations take place from the scanty means of a compiler, to get better information, illuminated candor should correct the error. But when calumny usurps the rank of history, the herald cry of justice is called up to detect the importune and expose the friend. It may be alleged, that some explanations I have used are severe. But when it is considered that the Encyclopedia is a book not confined merely to Europe, or like other publications, which are read with the day and forgot, but that it is a book of reference, and from its merits, in many respects, it must find its way into the Library of every enlightened individual who can purchase it. What asperity of language is sufficient to express the indignation due to them, who not only rob a man of his good name, but contrive to perpetual reflection undeserved, upon his memory, and destroy that honest pride of family, arising from the fair name of a meritorious ancestor.

To return to the first object of this add up, which was designed a letter, but is drawn into a volume. Myself: Reflection, upon the cause of Lord Cornwallis's misfortunes and other experience I had acquired in the field: Pointing the necessity of every officer being in some degree himself an engineer, led me to the tora of understanding that work, the plan of which I had the honor of submitting to your inspection; and I have in view to compress in one volume all the elements requisite to complete a horn for this purpose.

Not considering my own interest, but devoting myself to what I hoped, might be found beneficial to our profession, I refused that situation which was proposed to me, and to which your son is since appointed. [This is] because the inclusion necessary to application, was incompatible with the popularity essential for so distinguished a post in that hospitable country; and [I] preferred the alternative in which I now find myself, of living hid up two pair of stairs in the heart of this metropolis, upon a guinea a week which I find ample to supply every want of my own, except those books and instruments required by a man, who considers himself merely initiated in the great school of his profession.

I hope then sir, through your kind interference to find no difficulty in procuring the leave of absence which can alone enable me to continue in that service for which I have so labored to qualify myself.

If I can obtain but half of that time which has been granted to officers in our own regiment, who never served at all, I do not despair of being able to settle my affairs as my present debts do not exceed 3,000 pounds. With 1,000 pounds, I could regain my freedom; for which sum, I have still left, a better security to give than friendship might require. As I have not so conducted myself, either in public or private life, as not to deceive a friend, sooner or later: some one may be found to advance this money.

I preferred this retirement to going abroad, on account of the expense, and because books, instruments and an intercourse with scientific men in my circumstances was not to be found out of a great Capital. My desires are, you see Sir, very limited. My child I can teach to defy or despise want. [But] I should rejoice accordingly, to put a deserving woman, above feeling the neglect of opulent and misfeeling relations, whose first cousin, living at the next door with a clear income of sixteen thousand pounds a year and not spending eight, [stays] ignorant whether or not she [the deserving woman] was starving, [and the cousin] has never inquired if she was grown thinner.

I desire to remain only three years longer in the Army, if in that time, I can acquire some of those advantages, to which my present rank might give me some claim. I shall quit it and pay my debts, considering what may be thought a misfortune by some people, a chastisement designed to correct a presumptuous vanity, which had led me to hope some time or other have been no dishonor to my King, whilst I was of some service to my country. I have the honor to be with great respect.

I am much obliged and
most obedient and humble servant

Source: The document from which this is transcribed is in the Clinton Papers, William Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and is posted with their permission. The recipient of the previous memoir is not specified, but may have been John Campbell, 5th Duke of Argyll.