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[p459]  Action near Camden. -- Surrender of fort Watson. -- Camden evacuated. -- Ninety-six invested. -- Surrender of Augusta. -- General Greene repulsed with loss at Ninety-six. -- Lord Rawdon forces Greene to retreat. -- Ninety-six evacuated. -- Action at Eutaws.

Although the events that occurred in Carolina are highly interesting, they could not be productive of such important consequences to Great Britain as the operations in Virginia; for which reason the narrative was not interrupted to relate them: But in order to render this work complete, to the fall of York town, the different affairs, sieges, and actions, between the King's troops and the Americans to the southward, are here given from the best authorities, and as frequently as possible in the language of the respective commanders.

The (1.) departure of Earl Cornwallis to Wilmington having left South Carolina open, General Greene did not neglect the opportunity of directing his views to that province. An experiment upon an untried enemy was satisfactory in the design, and afforded room for hope [p460] in the execution; at the worst, he could not reasonably apprehend falling into rougher hands than those he had so recently encountered: But it was also, in reality, that vulnerable part, to which a judicious commander must necessarily have directed his operations. He had, however, still a vigorous enemy to encounter, from whom no advantage could be cheaply purchased.

The communications were so entirely cut off, that Lord Rawdon had no manner of knowledge of the movements of the British army after the battle of Guildford; much less could he have the most distant idea of the hard necessity which compelled Earl Cornwallis to fly from the arms of victory, abandon the line of operation, and, by a difficult march of two hundred miles, retire out of the way to Wilmington: He could not, therefore, but be astonished at receiving the intelligence, that Greene, whom he looked upon as ruined, or, at least, as having fled to Virginia, was in full march to South Carolina, with a view of attacking him at Camden. He was likewise informed, about the same time, that Colonel Lee had passed the Pedee and joined Marion on the Black creek, or river, with an apparent view of entering the province on the eastern border. Lord Rawdon judiciously conceived, that this movement was only feint, subservient to the principal design; intending thereby, to induce him to divide his small force, and to draw him away from Camden, whilst Greene should, in the mean time, by forced marches through a deserted country, from whence no intelligence of his approach could be received, surprise that weakened post in his absence. From this right conception of the design, the measure produced a direct contrary effect to that which was intended; for instead of Lord Rawdon's going himself, or detaching, to resist the diversion on that side, it occasioned his immediately recalling Lieutenant-colonel Watson, who had been long [p461] employed, with a considerable detachment, for the protection of the eastern frontier.

In the mean time, the doubtful reports which had before reached him were now confirmed, and he received clear information of Greene's approach; and, though he was totally ignorant of his force, yet, being equally in the dark with respect to Earl Cornwallis's situation, and having no particular instructions for his guidance, he thought it his duty, in all events, to maintain his post. In these circumstances it was highly vexatious, that although some of the militia shewed great zeal and fidelity, in coming from considerable distances to offer their services, yet the scanty state of provisions prevented him from being able to benefit by their assistance, excepting only those whose particular situation exposed them to suffer from the enemy, and who were on that account received within the post. At length, General Greene appeared in full view. The paucity of troops, and the extensiveness of the posts which they had to defend, were sufficient motives with the British commander for not risking the loss of men, by another attempt to harass the enemy in their approach. The same causes had obliged him to abandon the ferry on the Wateree, although the South-Carolina regiment was on its way to join him from Ninety-six, and that was its direct course: He had, however, taken his measures so well, as to secure the passage of that regiment upon its arrival three days after. In these circumstances he received a letter from Colonel Balfour, at Charles town, acquainting him of Earl Cornwallis's situation; and likewise signifying to him, that the commander in chief, being fully sensible of the danger to which he would be exposed in his present position, wished that he might abandon Camden, and retire for security within the cover of the great river Santee. The necessity of the [p462] measure was, upon this information, sufficiently obvious, but the accomplishment of it was not now within his power.

The efforts made by the enemy to examine the British works, and particularly an attempt to destroy their mill, necessarily brought on some skirmishes. By the prisoners taken in these excursions, Lord Rawdon had the satisfaction to learn, that General Greene's army was not by any means so numerous as he had apprehended, but that considerable reinforcements were daily expected. To balance this, he received the unfavourable intelligence, that Marion had taken such a position, as rendered it impracticable for Colonel Watson to join him, whose arrival he had till that time impatiently expected.

In this state of things, it seemed that some immediate and decisive effort was become little less than absolutely necessary, in order to evade much greater, and not far distant, evil and danger. Greene himself had the fortune to make an opening for the operation of this necessity, in a manner which was, in appearance, far from being consistent with his conduct. With a view of a general assault upon the British posts, he had sent off his artillery and baggage, a day's march in the rear of the army; but soon after he abandoned that resolution, and detached all his militia to bring back the artillery. Such irresolution, or indecision of mind, can never be displayed under the eye of a vigilant enemy, without great, if not certain danger.

Lord Rawdon's intelligence was tardy; but he instantly perceived the importance of the occasion, and determined as instantly, if possible, to seize it. By arming the musicians, drummers, and every being in the army that was able to carry a firelock, he mustered above nine hundred for the field, including sixty dragoons. April 25th. With [p463] this force, and two six-pounders, he boldly marched to attack the assailing army in their camp, in open daylight, at ten o'clock in the morning; committing the redoubts, and every thing at Camden, to the custody of the militia, and a few sick soldiers. The enemy were posted about two miles in front of the British lines, upon a very strong and difficult ridge, called Hobkirk's hill. By filing close to the swamps on their right, the British columns got into the woods unperceived, and by taking an extensive circuit, came down on the enemy's left flank, thus depriving them of the principal advantage of their situation. They were so fortunate, and the enemy so shamefully remiss and inattentive, that they were not in all this course discovered, until the flank companies of the volunteers of Ireland, which led the column, suddenly poured in upon their pickets: These, though supported, were almost suddenly driven in, and pushed to their camp.

Although the enemy were in much visible confusion, yet they formed with expedition, and received the British column bravely. As if it had been in some measure to countervail the disadvantages incident to their surprise, they were cheered, early in the action, by the arrival of three six-pounders; a circumstance, which showers of grape shot soon announced to the British troops. The attack on that side was led with great spirit by Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, at the head of the 63d, and of the King's American regiment; but the extent of the enemy's line soon obliged the commander in chief to pull forward the volunteers of Ireland from the reserve. These three corps pushed the enemy with such resolution, that they drove them to the summit of the hill; and having made room for the rest of the troops to come into action, their rout was then quickly decided. They pursued them about three miles; but the enemy's cavalry being superior to the British, their dragoons could not risk much; and Lord Rawdon, duly [p464] considering his inferiority in number, would not suffer the infantry to break their order, for any benefit that might be expected from the pursuit of the fugitives.

During the pursuit, a part of the enemy's cavalry, under Colonel Washington, either by design, or through ignorance of the state of the action, came round to the rear, and exacted paroles from several of the British officers who lay wounded in the field; they likewise carried off several wounded men. The enemy's killed and wounded were scattered over such an extent of ground, that their loss could not be ascertained; Lord Rawdon thinks the estimate would be low if it were rated at five hundred; Greene's account makes it too low to be credited. About an hundred prisoners were taken; besides that, a number of their men, finding their retreat cut off, went into Camden, and claimed protection, under pretence of being deserters. The enemy's cannon escaped by great fortune: Being run down a steep hill, among some thick brush wood, they were easily passed without notice, in the warmth of the pursuit, by the British troops, and before their return they were carried clean off by Washington's cavalry.

The (2.) loss on the British side, however moderate in other respects, was much greater than they could afford, and exceeded one fourth of their whole number: It amounted, in killed, wounded, and missing, to two hundred and fifty-eight: Of these, only thirty-eight were slain; but the wounded were equally a detraction from immediate strength, and, in the present circumstances, a very heavy incumbrance. Only one officer fell; but twelve were wounded, and most of them [p465] were discharged upon parole. The spirit and judgement shewn by the young commander of the British forces, deserves great commendation. He was most gallantly seconded by his officers and troops.

Another (3.) account of the action is contained in a letter from Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to Lord George Germain, dated Charles town, May 1, 1781.

My Lord,
By Lord Cornwallis's dispatches, which are herewith transmitted, your lordship will be informed that after the action at Guildford, General Greene, being obliged to retire from before the King's army, turned his views towards this province, as the most vulnerable point, in the absence of Lord Cornwallis.

With this idea, on the 9th ultimo, he came before Camden, having with him near fifteen hundred continentals, and several corps of militia; Lord Rawdon having charge of that post, and about eight hundred British and provincial troops to sustain it.

For some days General Greene kept varying his position, waiting, as is supposed, to be reinforced by the corps under Brigadier Marion and Colonel Lee, which were on their way, being ordered to join him.

Judging it necessary to strike a blow before this junction could take place, and learning that General Greene had detached to bring up his baggage and provisions, Lord Rawdon, with the most marked decision, [p466] on the morning of the 25th, marched with the greater part of his force to meet him, and about ten o'clock attacked the rebels in their camp at Hobkirk's with that spirit, which, prevailing over superior numbers and an obstinate resistance, compelled them to give way, and the pursuit was continued for three miles. To accident only they were indebted for saving their guns, which being drawn into a hollow, out of the road, were overlooked by our troops in the flush of victory and pursuit, so that their cavalry, in which they greatly exceeded us, had an opportunity of taking them off.

My Lord Rawdon states the loss of the enemy on this occasion as upwards of one hundred made prisoners, and four hundred killed and wounded; his own not exceeding one hundred, in which is included one officer killed and eleven wounded.

After this defeat, General Greene retired to Rugeley's mills, twelve miles from Camden, in order to call in his troops, and receive the reinforcements; but as Lieutenant-colonel Watson, of the guards, who had been for some time detached by Lord Rawdon, with a corps of five hundred men, to cover the eastern frontiers of the province, is directed by me to join his lordship, I am in hopes he will be able speedily to accomplish this.

It is to several letters, which Lord Rawdon has been so good to transmit me, that I am indebted for the detail I have now the honour to present your lordship, and which, I trust, his lordship will hereafter conclude in the most satisfactory manner.

[p467] The following is the account, published by order of Congress, of the action between General Greene and Lord Rawdon, on the 25th of April, 1781.

To Samuel Huntingdon, Esquire.

Sir,
(4.) I had the honour to write to your excellency the 2d instant, April, to inform you that we were encamped before Camden, having found it impossible to attempt to storm the town with any hopes of success; and having no other alternative, but to take such a position as should induce the enemy to sally from their works. To this end, we posted ourselves on an eminence about a mile from the town, near the high road leading to Wacsaws: It was covered with woods, and flanked on the left by an impassable swamp. The ground between this place and the town is covered by a thick wood and shrubbery. In this situation we remained constantly on the watch, and ready for action at a moment's warning.

On the morning of the 25th, about eleven o'clock, our advanced pickets received the first fire from the enemy, and returned it warmly. The line was formed in an instant. General Hugee's brigade to the right; Colonel Williams's Maryland brigade to the left; the artillery in the center; Colonel Read, with some militia, formed a kind of second line; Captain Kirkwood, with the light infantry, was posted in our front, and when the enemy advanced, he was soon engaged with them, and both he and his men behaved with a great deal of bravery; nor did the pickets under Captains Morgan and Benson act with less courage or regularity. Observing that the enemy advanced with but [p468] few men abreast, I ordered Lieutenant-colonel Ford, with the 2d Maryland regiment, to flank them on the left, while Lieutenant-colonel Campbell was to do the same on the right. Colonel Gunby, with the 1st Maryland regiment, and Lieutenant-colonel Hawes, with the 2d Virginia regiment, received orders at the same time to descend from the eminence, and attack in front; and I sent Lieutenant-colonel Washington at the same time to double the right flank, and attack the rear of the enemy. The whole line was soon in action in the midst of a very smart fire, as well from our small arms as from our artillery, which, under the command of Colonel Harrison, kept playing upon the front of the enemy, who began to give way on all sides, and their left absolutely to retreat; when, unfortunately, two companies on the right of the 1st Maryland regiment were entirely thrown into disorder; and, by another stroke of fortune, Colonel Gunby ordered the rest of the regiment, which was advancing, to take a new position towards the rear, where the two companies were rallying. This movement gave the whole regiment an idea of a retreat, which soon spread through the 2d regiment, which retreated accordingly; they both rallied afterwards; but it was too late; the enemy had gained the eminence, silenced the artillery, and obliged us to draw it off. The 2d Virginia regiment having descended the eminence a little, and having its flank left naked by the retreat of the Marylanders, the enemy immediately doubled upon them, and attacked them both on the flank and in front. Colonel Campbell's regiment was thrown into confusion, and had retreated a little; I therefore thought it necessary for Colonel Hawes to retreat also. The troops rallied more than once; but the disorder was too general, and had struck too deep for one to think of recovering the fortune of the day, which promised us at the onset the most complete victory; for Colonel Washington, on his way to double and attack in the rear, found the enemy, both horse and foot, retreating with precipitation [p469] towards the town, and made upwards of two hundred of them prisoners, together with ten or fifteen officers, before he perceived that our troops had abandoned the field of battle. The colonel, upon this occasion, and indeed his whole corps, acquired no inconsiderable share of honour. We then retreated two or three miles from the scene of action, without any loss of artillery, waggons, or provisions, having taken the precaution to send away our baggage at the beginning of the action. The enemy have suffered very considerably; our forces were nearly equal in number; but such were the dispositions that I had made, that, if we had succeeded, the whole of the enemy's army must have fallen into our hands, as well as the town of Camden. I herewith enclose a list of the killed and wounded; among the first is Captain Beatry, of the Maryland line, one of the best of officers, and an ornament to his profession. Our army is full of spirits; and this little check will not by any means derange or alter our general plan of operations.

Your excellency will find enclosed also, the articles of capitulation of Fort Watson, which, I trust, will be followed by many other surrenders.

I have the honour to be, &c
NATH. GREENE.

P.S. The cavalry and a part of the infantry charged the enemy in the dusk of the evening, and made them fly with precipitation into the town.

[p470] List of the officers killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, in the action before Camden, the 25th of April, 1781.

Lieutenant-colonel Ford, Maryland, dangerously wounded in the elbow; Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, Virginia, a slight contusion on the thigh.

Captain William Beatry, Maryland, killed; Captain J. Smith, 3d Maryland, taken prisoner; Captain Dunholm, Virginia, slight contusion; Captain-lieutenant Bruff, Maryland, wounded in both ancles, and prisoner on his parole; Lieutenant M. Gallaway, Maryland, wounded slightly; Lieutenant Ball, Virginia, ditto dangerously in the leg.

Non-commissioned officers and soldiers killed, wounded, and missing. 1 sergeant, 17 rank and file, killed; 7 sergeants, 101 rank and file, wounded; 3 sergeants, 133 rank and file, missing. The greatest part of those who are missing had not well understood the order to rally at Saunder's creek; some were killed; 47 of them were wounded, and are in the enemy's hospital; we have tidings of about one third of the remaining number, and hope they will be able to join us.

(Signed) O. H. WILLIAMS,
Deputy adjutant general.

[p471] Brigadier-general Marion's letter to General Greene.

Fort Watson, April 23, 1781.

Sir,
(5.) Lieutenant-colonel Lee joined me on the Santee the 14th instant, after a rapid march from Ramsey's mills on Deep river, which he finished in eight days. The 15th we marched to this place, and invested it: Our chief hope was to cut off the water: Some riflemen and continentals were, for this purpose, posted between the fort and the lake. The fort lies on a rising ground, about forty feet high, surrounded by three rows of abbatis. There were no trees near enough to cover us from the enemy's fire. The third day after we had begun the siege, we perceived that the enemy had dug a well near the abbatis without meeting with any opposition from us, which was for want of several very necessary implements, without which we could not make trenches in order to make our approach to the fort; we therefore resolved immediately to erect a work as high as the fort, and it was finished this morning by Major Maham; we then made a lodgement on the side of the eminence near the abbatis; this was accomplished with great spirit and address by Ensign Robinson and Mr. R. Lee, a volunteer in Colonel Lee's regiment, who, surmounting every difficulty, got up to the abbatis, and pulled it away: By this the commander of the fort found himself obliged to hoist a white flag. I enclose the capitulation, which I hope will meet with your approbation. Our loss was only two militiamen killed, and three continentals wounded. I shall demolish the fort without loss of time, and then proceed [p472] to the heights of Santee, and shall halt at Captain Richardson's plantation to wait for farther orders.

I am, Sir, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS MARION, B.G.

Articles of capitulation proposed by Lieutenant M'Kay, commandant at Fort Watson.

ART. I. The officers to be allowed their parole; to wear their swords, and shall have their private baggage secured to them.
      GRANTED.

ART. II. The British officers shall be permitted to march to Charles town, where they shall remain, without entering into any active service, till they shall have been exchanged; till which time they shall be bound to surrender themselves, whenever called upon by the commander in chief of the American southern army.
      GRANTED.

ART. III. The irregulars shall be treated as prisoners of war.
      GRANTED.

ART. IV. All public stores shall be surrendered to the quarter-master general of the legion, and the fort to Captain Oldham, who shall take possession this evening with a detachment of the Maryland division.

[p473] I agree to this capitulation, such as it is at present, in consideration of the bravery with which the fort was defended.

(Signed) PATRICK CARNS,
Captain of foot, belonging to the
legion.

April 23, 1781.
JAS. M'KAY, Lieutenant.

List of prisoners taken in Fort Watson.

Two lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 surgeon, 73 rank and file, (British) and 36 tories. Total, 5 officers, 109 rank and file.

Some of the events subsequent to the action at Camden are related by Major-general Greene, and by Lord Rawdon, in the following letters:

To Samuel Huntingdon, Esquire.

(6.) Camp, at M'Cord's ferry, on the Congaree,
May 14, 1781.

Sir,
I had the honour to send dispatches to your excellency on the 5th from near Camden, by Captain O'Hara. On the 8th the place was evacuated by the enemy with the utmost precipitation; Lord Rawdon burnt the greatest part of his baggage, stores, and even the effects belonging to the inhabitants; he set fire also to the prison, mill, and several other buildings, and left the town little better than a heap of ruins: He left behind him our people who had been wounded in action of the 25th of April, and had been taken prisoners; they are [p474] thirty-one in number. His lordship left also fifty-eight of his own people, with three officers, who were so badly wounded, that they could not bear a carriage. Several of the inhabitants assert it as a fact, that, in the last action, the loss of the enemy, in killed and wounded, was not less than three hundred men.

As soon as the enemy left Camden we took possession of it, and are now employed in razing all the works; a plan of which I enclose for your excellency. Had the Virginia militia joined us in time, the garrison must have fallen into our hands, as we should then have been able to invest the town on all sides; and the garrison was in too great want of provisions and military stores to be able to stand out a siege. The detachments under General Marion and Lieutenant-colonel Lee, in the lower districts of the country, had cut off the enemy's provisions, and particularly salt, with which they were totally unprovided. On the 9th our army began their march towards this place. On the 11th the post of Orangeburgh, defended by eighty men, under the command of a colonel and other officers, surrendered to General Sumpter, who, by his skill in the disposition of his artillery and troops, so intimidated the garrison, that the place soon submitted. We thus got possession of a very strong post, without loss either of men or time: A great quantity of provisions and other stores were found in it. The 12th, Mott's fort submitted to General Marion; the garrison consisted of upwards of one hundred and forty men; one hundred and twenty were British or Hessians, with seven or eight officers. The place had been invested the 8th; nor did it surrender till our troops had made their approaches regularly up to the abbatis; the redoubt was very strong, and commanded by Lieutenant M'Pherson, a very brave officer. Great praise is due to General Marion, and the handful of militia that remained with him till the reduction of the fort. Lieutenant-colonel Lee's legion, [p475] and the detachments under Major Eaton, the artillery under Captain Finlay, and the corps of infantry under Captains Oldham and Smith, were indefatigable in carrying on the siege. There were found in the fort one carronade, one hundred and forty muskets, a quantity of salt provisions, and other stores.

When we marched from Deep river towards Camden, I wrote to General Pickens to assemble all the militia he could muster, to lay siege to Augusta and Ninety Six. These two places are actually invested, and the fort at Friday's ferry will be invested to-morrow morning, with Lieutenant-colonel Lee set out for that purpose last night, with his legion, and the several detachments which serve under him: The whole army began their march this morning for the same place. The last intelligence I received informed me, that Lord Rawdon was near Nelson's ferry, where the enemy have a post; but they were sending away their stores from it, which sufficiently indicates that they intend shortly to evacuate it. Generals Sumpter and Marion narrowly watch all his lordship's motions.

I am, &c.
NATH. GREENE.

Extract of a letter from Lord Rawdon to Earl Cornwallis, dated camp at Monk's corner, May 24, 1781. (7.)

The situation of affairs in this province has made me judge it necessary, for a time, to withdraw my force from the back country, and to assemble what troops I can collect at this point. I hope a recital of [p476] the circumstances which have led to this determination will satisfy your lordship as to the expediency of the measure.

After the action of the 25th of April, (an account (8.) of which I had the honour of transmitting to your lordship) Major-general Greene remained for some days behind the farthest branch of Granny's-quarter creek. A second attempt upon his army could not, in that situation, be undertaken upon the principles which advised the former. In the first instance, I made so short an excursion from my works, that I could venture, without hazard, to leave them very slightly guarded; and I had the confidence, that, had fortune proved unfavorable, we should easily have made good our retreat, and our loss, in all probability, would not have disabled us from the farther defence of the place. To get at General Greene in his retired situation, I must have made a very extensive circuit, in order to head the creek, which would have presented to him the fairest opportunity of slipping by me to Camden; and he was still so superior to me in numbers, that, had I left such a garrison at my post as might enable it to stand an assault, my force in the field would have been totally unequal to cope with the enemy's army. I had much to hope from the arrival of reinforcements to me, and little to fear from any probable addition to my antagonist's force.

Whilst, upon that principle, I waited for my expected succours, General Greene retired from our front, and, crossing the Wateree, took a position behind Twenty-five-mile creek. On the 7th of May Lieutenant-colonel Watson joined me with his detachment, much reduced in number through casualties, sickness, and a reinforcement which he had left to strengthen the garrison at George town. He had crossed [p477] the Santee near its mouth, and had re-crossed it a little below the entrance of the Congaree.

On the night of the 7th, I crossed the Wateree at Camden ferry, proposing to turn the flank and attack the rear of Greene's army, where the ground was not strong, though it was very much so in front.

The troops had scarcely crossed the river, when I received notice that Greene had moved early in the evening, upon getting information of my being reinforced, I followed him by the direct road, and found him posted behind Swaney's creek.

Having driven in his pickets, I examined every point of his situation; I found it every where so strong, that I could not hope to force it without suffering such loss as must have crippled my force for any future enterprize; and the retreat lay so open for him, I could not hope that victory would give us any advantage sufficiently decisive to counterbalance the loss.

The creek (though slightly marked in the maps) runs very high into the country. Had I attempted to get round him, he would have evaded me with ease; for, as his numbers still exceeded mine, I could not separate my force to fix him in any point, and time (at this juncture most important to me) would have been thus unprofitably wasted. I therefore returned to Camden the same afternoon, after having in vain attempted to decoy the enemy into action, by affecting to conceal our retreat.

On the 9th I published to the troops, and to the militia, my design of evacuating Camden, offering to such of the latter as chose to accompany [p478] me every assistance that we could afford them. During the ensuing night I sent off all our baggage, &c, under a strong escort, and destroyed the works remaining at Camden, with the rest of the troops, till ten o'clock the next day, in order to cover the march.

On the night of the 13th, I began to pass the river at Nelson's ferry, and by the evening of the 14th, every thing was safely across. Some mounted militia had attempted to harass our rear guard on the march; but a party of them having fallen into an ambuscade, the rest of them gave us no farther trouble. We brought off all the sick and wounded, excepting about thirty, who were too ill to be moved, and for them I left an equal number of continental prisoners in exchange. We brought off all the stores of any kind of value, destroying the rest; and we brought off not only the militia who had been with us at Camden, but also all the well-affected neighbors on our route, together with the wives, children, negroes and baggage, of almost all of them.

My first news, upon landing at Nelson's, was, that the post at Motte's house had fallen. It was a simple redoubt, and had been attacked formally by sap. Lieutenant M'Pherson had maintained it gallantly till the house in the centre of it was set in flames by fire arrows, which obliged his men to throw themselves into the ditch, and surrender at discretion.

But as Major M'Arthur had joined me with near three hundred foot and eighty dragoons, I conceived I might, without hazarding too far, endeavor to check the enemy's operations on the Congaree. On the 14th, at night, I marched from Nelson's, and on the evening of the 15th I reached the point where the roads from Congarees and [p479] M'Coard's ferry unite. Various information was brought to me thither, that Greene had passed the Congaree, at M'Coard's ferry, and had pushed down the Orangeburgh road. The accounts though none of them positive or singly satisfactory, corresponded so much, that I was led to believe them, and the matter was of such moment, that it would not admit of my pausing for more certain information; therefore, after giving the troops a little rest, I moved back to Eutaws the same night, but hearing nothing there, I pursued my march hither.

By my present situation, I cover those districts from which Charles town draws its present supplies. I am in readiness to improve any favourable occurrence, and guard against any untoward event.

It is a secondary, but not a trifling advantage, that I have been able to supply the troops with necessaries; for the want of which, occasioned by the long interruption of our communication, they suffered serious distress.

I am using every effort to augment our cavalry, in hopes that the arrival of some force will speedily enable us to adopt a more active conduct.

Extract (9.)  of a letter from Lord Rawdon to Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis, dated Charles town, June 5, 1781.

General Greene invested Ninety Six on the 22d of May. To my great satisfaction, however, I learned, by messages which I have found means to interchange with Lieutenant-colonel Cruger, that the [p480] new works were completed before the enemy's approach. The garrison is ample for the extent, and the fire of the enemy had no effect. Lieutenant-colonel Cruger, therefore, only apprehends, that relief may not arrive before his provisions are expended.

Fortunately we are now in a condition to undertake succouring him, without exposing a more valuable stake; and from the report of his provisions which he sent to me, I trust we shall be fully in time.

Augusta is likewise besieged; but I hope in little danger. Sir James Wright represented so strongly the want of troops at Savannah, that I thought it necessary to send the King's American regiment thither with all dispatch.

On the 3d instant the fleet from Ireland arrived, having aboard the 3d, 19th, and 30th regiments, a detachment from the guards, and a considerable body of recruits; the whole under the command of Colonel Gould, of the 30th. Lieutenant-colonel Balfour and I immediately made known to Colonel Gould the power which your lordship had given to us, for detaining such part of the expected reinforcement as we might conceive the service required: And it has been settled, that the three regiments shall all remain here until your lordship signifies your pleasure respecting them. I shall march on the 7th towards Ninety Six, having been reinforced by the flank companies of the three new regiments.

I am happy in mentioning to your lordship a handsome testimony of zeal for his Majesty's interests, which has occurred here: Considerable difficulty having arisen in the formation of cavalry, some of the principal inhabitants of this town made a subscription, amounting [p481] to near three thousand guineas: which sum they requested I would apply to the purpose of equipping a corps of dragoons in the manner I should judge most expedient. As I had no means of forming such a corps but by drafts from the infantry, I thought your lordship would be pleased that a compliment should be paid to the loyalty of the gentlemen above mentioned, by fixing upon men connected with the province; I have therefore ordered the South-Carolina regiment to be converted into cavalry, and I have the prospect of their being mounted and completely appointed in a few days.

June 6. I have just had the satisfaction to learn, that the King's American regiment arrived safe at Savannah.

Extract  (10.)  of a letter from Colonel Lord Rawdon to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Charles town, June 6th, 1781.

I cannot in any manner give your excellency a more explicit account of what has passed in this province, and of the present state of our affairs, than by enclosing to your excellency, copies of the letters which I have, at different periods, written to Lord Cornwallis. The situation of the province has been critical; yet I am well convinced, that numbers have joined the enemy merely to shield themselves from the atrocious barbarity of the rebel militia, which has been beyond what I have ever heard of among the most savage nations. Should we be successful in our present enterprize, it will probably be found necessary to make the Santee and Congaree the boundaries of our posts, and to invite the friends of government to settle upon the estates of revolters within the claim of our stations. The back parts of the province [p482] must necessarily depend upon the country enclosed by those rivers, as long as we keep possession of the Chesapeak.

It is in some measure necessary to connect the foregoing letters by a citation from a periodical work.

On (11.) the night of the 13th, the army began to pass the river at Nelson's ferry, and by the following evening every thing was safely landed on the other side. The first intelligence Lord Rawdon received on passing the Santee, was the unwelcome news, that the post at Motte's house, after a gallant defence, had already fallen into the hands of the enemy. This was a heavy stroke, as that place had been made a deposit for all the provisions that were intended for the supply of Camden: Things were, however, worse than he yet knew, for the strong post at Orangeburgh was already taken, and fort Granby not long after. Thus the British force in the province was exceedingly weakened, by the number of brave officers and soldiers who fell into the hands of the enemy, through this sudden and unexpected attack upon their detached posts in every part of the country.

Lord Rawdon was met at Nelson's by Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, the commandant of Charles town; who came thither to represent to him, and to consult upon, the state and circumstances of that city, as well as of the province in general. He stated, that the revolt was universal; that from the little room there had been to apprehend so serious and alarming a turn of affairs, the old works of Charles town had been in part levelled, to make way for new ones, which were not yet constructed; that he had full conviction of the disaffection, in general, [p483] of the inhabitants; and that, under these circumstances, his garrison was inadequate to its defence, against any force of consequence that might attempt that city.

The conclusions drawn from a full consideration of this untoward state of affairs were, that if any misfortune happened to the corps under Lord Rawdon, the probable consequence would be, the total loss of the province, including the capital; but that, although the highest degree of prudence and caution were upon that account indispensably necessary, yet, as he was just joined by Major M'Arthur, with about three hundred foot and eighty dragoons, he conceived he might, without hazarding too much, endeavour to check the operations of the enemy on the Congaree.

A signal instance now occurred of the general, if not universal, disaffection of the country. For five days after Lord Rawdon had passed the Santee, not a single person of any sort whatever, whether with intelligence, or upon any other account, came near the army, although he had advanced directly from Nelson's ferry, that night and the following day's march into the country, to a certain point where the roads from Nelson's and M'Cord's ferry meet; nor could the emissaries and spies which he detached on all hands procure him any true intelligence, as to the situation of the enemy, or the state of the country: A number of reports, however, which were contradictory in other respects, seemed to concur in one point, which was, that Greene had passed the Congaree river, and was pressing down the Orangeburgh road with a strong force. This intelligence was of too great moment to be slighted; and not only obliged the British commander to relinquish his design of advancing to the Congaree, but laid him under a necessity of falling back to the Eutaws, and afterwards of [p484] moving to Monk's corner, for the protection of Charles town, and of the rich intervening country.

As the dereliction of the upper country left the post of Ninety Six entirely exposed to the enemy, Lord Rawdon was under great anxiety for the safety of that garrison. The objects now at stake were, however, too great to be hazarded, for the purpose of protecting that place, or even of extricating the troops: But if no such restraint had been laid upon his activity, it still would have been a question of great doubt, whether, in the present state of things, the design would have been practicable; for, besides the growing force of the enemy, and their possession of the posts on all hands, there were no magazines, no deposits of provisions of any kind, for the support of the army on the way; and to trust to the uncertain gleanings of a wasted and hostile country on a march, surrounded on every side by swarms of light troops, and of militia on horseback, with an enemy much superior in number still to encounter, would have been hazardous in the extreme. Thus circumstanced, he dispatched several messengers by different routes, and, to guard as much as possible against mischance, applied to Colonel Balfour to send others from Charles town, with instructions to Lieutenant-colonel Cruger, who commanded at Ninety Six, to abandon that place, and to remove, with all the garrison, as speedily as possible, to Augusta, upon the Savannah, which was the nearest post of Georgia.

So bad was the intelligence, and so difficult to be obtained, that it was not until after the arrival of the troops at Monk's corner, that Lord Rawdon discovered, that it was not General Greene, but Sumpter, who had taken possession of Orangeburgh; the former being then occupied in taking a British post on the Congarees. Whilst the troops [p485] were employed in covering the districts from which Charles town drew its supplies of provision, Lord Rawdon was preparing for more active service, by unceasing efforts for the augmentation of his cavalry.

(12) Whilst the important post at Ninety Six was closely invested, and held to be in the utmost danger, it seemed ominous, but such was the hostile state of the country, that none of the messengers which Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour had dispatched to Colonel Cruger, with orders for abandoning that place, had been able to reach him: The fort was, however, in a better state of defence than had been expected; the works were completed, and strong; and the garrison amounted to near four hundred regular troops, besides militia. In these circumstances, Greene found himself obliged to sit down before it in form, on the 22d of May; the garrison made a gallant defence, and the failure of provisions afforded the principal cause of apprehension.

The fortunate arrival of three regiments from Ireland, under the conduct of Colonel Gould, afforded an opportunity for the relief of this garrison, which would otherwise have been desperate; for though they were destined to join Earl Cornwallis, the good disposition and promptness of the commander to concur in the immediate defence of the province, as a more urgent service than any other in view, prevented those difficulties which must otherwise have arisen. These circumstances suddenly changed the face of affairs, and enabled Lord Rawdon to undertake the relief of Ninety Six.

[p486] Augusta had also been for some time besieged; and the whole province of Georgia was deemed to be in such imminent danger, that Lord Rawdon found himself under a necessity, even in that state of weakness which preceded the arrival of the troops from Ireland, to part with the King's American regiment, and to commit it to the hazard of passing in such small craft as were at hand, and without convoy, from Charles town, in order to reinforce sir James Wright, at the town of Savannah.

Lord Rawdon marched from Charles town with something more than one thousand seven hundred foot and one hundred and fifty horse, for the relief of Ninety Six, in four days after the arrival of the troops from Ireland. He was joined on the way by Colonel Doyle, with the troops which he had left at Monk's corner, (13.) and he pressed his march with all the rapidity which the excessive heat of the weather would permit. To prevent the enemy's detachments on the Congaree, and other parts on the eastern side, from reinforcing Greene, while he was pushing forwards, he deviated from the course which he otherwise would have taken, and keeping considerably more to the right, passed the little Saluda near its junction with the greater river of that name. This route, however, enabled a Colonel Middleton, who was on his way from the Congarees with about three hundred cavalry and [p487] mounted militia, to endeavour to harass his rear, and particularly to obstruct the parties which were necessarily engaged in collecting cattle for the support of the army. After giving some trouble of this nature, Middleton being trained into a well-laid ambush, was spiritedly charged by Major Coffin, at the head of the royal cavalry, and his party was so completely routed and dispersed, as never again to appear during the march.

Before he approached General Greene, Lord Rawdon had intelligence of the fall of Augusta.

The following is General Pickens and Lieutenant-colonel Lee's report of the capitulation of fort Cornwallis.

(14.) No. I.

Augusta, May 31, 1781.

Sir,
The usage of war renders it necessary that we present you with an opportunity of avoiding the destruction which impends your garrison.

We have deferred our summons to this late date, to preclude the necessity of much correspondence on the occasion. You see the strength of the investing forces; the progress of our works; and you may inform yourself of the situation of the two armies, by inquiries from Captain Armstrong, of the legion, who has the honor to bear this.

We have the honor to be, &c
ANDREW PICKENS,
B. G. Militia.
HENRY LEE, junior,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding continental troops.

Lieutenant-colonel Brown.

[p488] No. II.

Gentlemen,
What progress you have made in your works I am no stranger to. It is my duty and inclination to defend this post to the last extremity.

I have the honor to be, &c
THOMAS BROWN,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding the
King's troops at Augusta.

Brig. gen. Pickens and Lieut. col. Lee.

No. III.

Sir,
It is not our disposition to press the unfortunate.

To prevent the effusion of blood which must follow perseverance in your fruitless resistance, we inform you, that we are willing, though in the grasp of victory, to grant such terms as a comparative view of our respective situations can warrant.

Your determination will be concluded as conclusive, and will regulate our conduct.

We have the honor to be, &c.
ANDREW PICKENS,
B. G. militia.
HENRY LEE, junior,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding
continental troops.

Lieutenant-colonel Brown.

[p489] No. IV.

Fort Cornwallis, June 3.

Gentlemen,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your summons of this day, and to assure you, that as it is my duty, it is likewise my inclination to defend the post to the last extremity.

I have the honor to be, &c.
THOMAS BROWN,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding the
King's troops at Augusta.

Brig. gen. Pickens and Lieut. col. Lee.

No. V.

Head quarters, June 4, 1781.

Sir,
We beg leave to propose, that the prisoners in your possession may be sent out of the fort, and that they may be considered your or ours as the siege may terminate.

Confident that you cannot oppose the dictate of humanity and custom of war, we have only to say, that any request from you of a similar nature will meet our assent.

We have the honor to be, &c.
ANDREW PICKENS,
B. G. militia.
HENRY LEE, junior,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding the
continental troops.

Lieutenant-colonel Brown.

[p490] No. VI.

Gentlemen,
Though motives of humanity, and a feeling for the distresses of individuals, incline me to accede to what you have proposed concerning the prisoners with us, yet many reasons, to which you cannot be strangers, forbid my complying with this requisition -- such attention as I can, confident with good policy and my duty, shall be shewn them.

I have the honour to be, &c.
THOMAS BROWN,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding the
King's troops at Augusta.

Brig. gen. Pickens and Lieut. col. Lee.

No. VII.

Gentlemen,
In your summons of the 3d instant no particular conditions were specified; I postponed the consideration of it to this day.

From a desire to lessen the distresses of war to individuals, I am included to propose to you my acceptance of the enclosed terms, which being pretty similar to those granted to the commanding officers of the American troops and garrison in Charles Town, I imagine will be honourable to both parties.

I have the honour to be, &c
THOMAS BROWN,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding the
King's troops at Augusta.

Brig. gen. Pickens and Lieut. col. Lee.

[p491] No. VIII.

Sir,
There was a time when your proposals of this date ought to have been accepted. That period is now passed. You have every notice from us, and must have known the futility of your farther opposition.

Although we should be justified by the military of both armies to demand unconditional submission, our sympathy for the unfortunate and gallant of our profession has induced us to grant the honourable terms which we herewith transmit.

We have the honour to be, &c.
ANDREW PICKENS,
B. G. militia.
HENRY LEE, junior,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding the
continental troops.

No. IX.

Fort Cornwallis, June 5, 1781.

Gentlemen,
Your proposition relative to the officers of the King's troops and militia being admitted to their paroles, and the exclusion of the men, is a matter I cannot accede to.

The conditions I have to propose to you are, that such of the different classes of men who compose this garrison, be permitted to march [p492] to Savannah, or continue in the country, as to them may be most eligible, until exchanged.

I have the honour to be, &c.
THOMAS BROWN,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding the
King's troops at Augusta.

Brig. gen. Pickens and Lieut. col. Lee.

No. X.

Fort Augusta, June 5, 1781.

Sir,
In our answer of this morning, we granted the most generous terms in our power to give, which we beg leave to refer to as final on our part.

We have the honour to be, &c.
ANDREW PICKENS,
B. G. militia.
HENRY LEE, junior,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding
continental troops.

Lieutenant-colonel Brown.

No. XI.

Fort Cornwallis, June 5, 1781.

Gentlemen,
As some of the articles proposed by you are generally expressed, I have taken the liberty of deputing three gentlemen to wait upon you for a particular explanation of the respective articles.

I have the honor to be, &c.
THOMAS BROWN,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding the
King's troops at Augusta.

[p493] Articles of capitulation proposed by Lieutenant colonel Brown, and answered by General Pickens and Lieutenant-colonel Lee.

ART. I. That all acts of hostilities and works shall cease between the besiegers and besieged until the articles of capitulation shall be agreed on, signed, and executed, or collectively rejected.
      ANSWER. Hostilities shall cease for one hour; other operations to continue.

ART. II. That the fort shall be surrendered to the commanding officer of the American corps, such as it now stands. That the King's troops, three days after signing the articles of capitulation, shall be conducted to Savannah, with their baggage, where they will remain prisoners of war until they are exchanged; that proper conveyances shall be provided by the commanding officer of the American troops for that purpose, together with a sufficient quantity of good and wholesome provisions till their arrival at Savannah.
      ANSWER. Inadmissible. The prisoners to surrender field prisoners of war: The officers to be indulged with their paroles; the soldiers to be conducted to such place as the commander in chief shall direct.

ART. III. The militia now in garrison shall be permitted to return to their respective homes, and be secured in their persons and properties.
      ANSWER. Answered by the second article, the militia making part of the garrison.

[p494] ART. IV. The sick and wounded shall be under the care of their own surgeons, and be supplied with such medicines and necessaries as are allowed to the British hospitals.
AGREED.

ART. V. The officers of the garrison, and citizens who have borne arms during the siege, shall keep their side arms, pistols, and baggage, which shall not be searched, and retain their servants.
      ANSWER. The officers and citizens who have borne arms during the siege shall be permitted their side arms, private baggage, and servants; their side arms not to be worn; and the baggage to be searched by a person appointed for that purpose.

ART. VI. The garrison, at an hour appointed, shall march out, with shouldered arms and drums beating, to a place to be agreed on, where they will pile their arms.
      ANSWER. Agreed. The judicious and gallant defence made by the garrison, entitles them to every mark of military respect. The fort to be delivered up to Captain Rudolph at twelve o'clock, who will take possession with a detachment of the legion infantry.

ART. VII. That the citizens shall be protected in their persons and properties.
      ANSWER. Inadmissible.

ART. VIII. That twelve months shall be allowed to all such as do not chuse to reside in this country, to dispose of their effects, real and personal, in this province, without any molestation whatever, or to remove to any part thereof as they may choose, as well themselves as families.
      ANSWER. Inadmissible.

[p495] ART. IX. That the Indian families now in garrison shall accompany the King's troops to Savannah, where they will remain prisoners of war until exchanged for an equal number of prisoners in the Creek or Cherokee nation.
      ANSWER. Answered in the second article.

ART. X. That an express be permitted to go to Savannah with the commanding officer's dispatches, which are not to be opened.
      ANSWER. Agreed.

ART. XI. Additional. The particular attention of Col. Brown is expected towards the just delivery of all public stores, monies, &c; and that no loans be permitted to defeat the spirit of this article.

Signed at Head Quarters, Augusta, June 5, 1781, by
ANDREW PICKENS,
B. G. militia.
HENRY LEE, junior,
Lieutenant colonel, commandant.
THOMAS BROWN,
Lieutenant colonel, commanding the
King's troops at Augusta.

(15.) As soon as Augusta fell, the troops employed in the reduction of that place joined General Greene, who formed a resolution, rather than give up his point at Ninety Six, to stand an action with the British troops that were advancing to its relief: But, upon deliberation afterwards, that commander did not think himself in condition to [p496] hazard the encounter of so formidable a foe from without, while his hands were fully occupied by the exertions of an enemy within, who had from the beginning given constant proofs of their determined courage and resolution; and still much less could his force admit of such a diversion as would enable him, with any prospect of success, to encounter Lord Rawdon on his way, and at the same time to leave such a strength behind as would be necessary for guarding the works, and overawing the garrison. He was likewise disappointed by Sumpter, to whom he had sent instructions to join him with all the force that could be collected on the side of the Congaree, with a view of fighting the British army on its way; but whether it proceeded from some slowness in his movements, or from unavoidable delay, the junction was not effected in time; and the route taken by Lord Rawdon for the purpose, rendered it afterwards impracticable.

But, exclusive of these causes, he was not now to learn the great superiority of his enemy in all field or general engagements: Nor, in fact, was his force very considerable in respect even to number; and it was still much less so in point of estimation. His continental or regular troops formed but a diminutive part of the whole; and the others, whatever service they might be of in their own way, were of very little in regular (16.) action. On the other hand, he knew that the troops that were marching against him were fresh, excellent, and that those who were newly arrived were particularly full of ardour for an opportunity to signalize themselves.

[p497] He, however, saw that something must necessarily be attempted, and that even the running of some risque, which would not be too decisive in its worst consequences, could scarcely, in the present circumstances, be construed into imprudence. He had already pushed his sap very close to the principal redoubt of the fort at Ninety Six, and had nearly completed a subterraneous passage into the ditch; but his artillery had failed in their effect, and the works of the fort had yet suffered little. The nearness of Lord Rawdon left no time for proceeding farther by regular approach; and as he could not venture an engagement, he must either abandon the place shamefully without an attempt, or hazard a premature assault.

General Greene determined upon the latter. The attack was made on the 19th before day; and the Americans who were appointed to storm the redoubt displayed an undaunted courage. The garrison received them with equal gallantry. Scarcely an officer or private man who entered the ditch but was either killed or wounded; and yet, though the impracticability of the attempt soon became as obvious to all as its danger, no one betrayed by a single movement the smallest indication of quitting his ground. The commander, seeing so many brave men fruitlessly fall, and that fortune or chance, which so often befriend bold enterprize, shewed no disposition at all of acting in their favour, put an end to the combat, before it became more ruinous, by calling off the remainder soon after daylight.

As Greene scarcely less than expected what now really happened, he had accordingly provided for the event. All the baggage and incumbrances of the camp had been previously dispatched across the Saluda; whither, immediately upon this repulse, he also retired with his whole force. Though the Americans lost some valuable officers, and not a [p498] few private men, in this attack, yet the number actually slain (as frequently happens in such cases) was much below what might have been expected. Nothing could exceed the conduct and firmness of the governor and garrison, whether in the assault, or during every previous part of the siege.

Lord Rawdon arrived at Ninety Six on the 21st of June; and having received intelligence that Greene had halted in a strong position behind Bush river, at about sixteen miles distance, and that he was likewise still incumbered with some waggons and baggage, that active commander put his fatigued troops again in motion, and crossed the Saluda on the following night in his pursuit, every kind of baggage, even the men's packs, being left behind at Ninety Six. Greene was, however, so well acquainted now with the character of his enemy, and so well guarded against surprise, that the British troops had scarcely passed the Saluda, when he moved with the greatest expedition from Bush river. Lord Rawdon pursued him with the utmost rapidity, and arrived at the fords of the Ennoree, forty miles from Ninety Six, within two hours of the time that Greene's army had passed them. The troops were so spent with fatigue, and overcome by the heat, that it was impossible to do more; but Greene was so apprehensive of his enemies, that he continued his retreat, or rather flight, without ceasing, until he had passed both the Tyger and the Broad rivers.

The American account was published by order of Congress in the following extract of a letter from Major-general Greene, dated at Little river, near Ninety Six, June 20, 1781:

In my last letter of the 9th, I informed your excellency, that the enemy had received a considerable reinforcement at Charles town, and [p499] that I was apprehensive they would march and interrupt our operations. On the 11th I got intelligence they were advancing; I immediately advanced all the cavalry, with orders to General Sumpter to collect all the force he could, and keep in their front, and by every means in his power to retard their march. The enemy passed him at Congaree before he got his troops in motion; afterwards he found it impracticable to gain their front. It was my intention to have fought them before they arrived at Ninety Six, could I have collected a force sufficient for the purpose.

We had pushed on our approaches very near to the enemy's work; our third parallel was formed round their abbatis; a mine and two approaches were within a few feet of the ditch. These approaches were directed against the Star fort, which stands upon the left of the town as we approached it from the Saluda. On the right our approaches were very near the enemy's redoubt: This was a strong stockade fort, with two block houses in it. These two works flanked the town, which is picketed in with strong pickets, a ditch round the whole, and a bank raised near the height of a common parapet. Besides these fortifications, were several little flèches in different parts of the town; and all the works communicated with each other by covered ways. We had raised several batteries for cannon; one upwards of twenty feet high, within one hundred and forty yards of the Star fort, to command the works, and a rifle battery also within thirty yards, to prevent the enemy from annoying our workmen. For the last ten days not a man could shew his head but he was immediately shot down; and the firing was almost incessant day and night. In this state of the approaches, I found the enemy so near us, that it would be impossible to reduce the place without hazarding a storm. This, from the peculiar strength of the place, could only be warranted by the success of a [p500] partial attempt to make a lodgement on one of the curtains of the Star redoubt, and a vigorous push to carry the right-hand work.

The disposition was accordingly formed, and the attack made; Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with his legion infantry, and Captain Kirkwood's light infantry, made the attack on the right; and Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, with the 1st Maryland and the 1st Virginia regiments, was to have stormed the Star redoubt, which is their principal work, and stands upon the left; the parapet of this work is near twelve feet high, and raised with sand bags near three feet more. Lieutenant Duvall of the Maryland line, and Lieutenant Selden, of the Virginia line led on the forlorn hope, followed by a party with hooks to pull down the sand bags, the better to enable them to make the lodgement. A furious cannonade preluded the attack. On the right the enemy were driven out of their works, and our people took possession: On the left never was greater bravery exhibited than by the parties led on by Duval and Selden; but they were not so successful. They entered the enemy's ditch, and made every exertion to get down the sand bags, which from the depth of the ditch, height of the parapet, and under a galling fire, was rendered difficult. Finding the enemy defended their works with great obstinacy, and seeing but little prospect of succeeding without heavy loss, I ordered the attack to be pushed no farther.

The behavior of the troops on this occasion deserves the highest commendations; both the officers that entered the ditch were wounded, and the greater part of their men were either killed or wounded. I have only to lament that such brave men fell in an unsuccessful attempt.

[p501] Captain Armstrong, of the 1st Maryland regiment, was killed, and Captain Benson, who commanded the regiment, was wounded at the head of the trenches. In both attacks we had upwards of forty men killed and wounded; the loss was principally at the Star fort and in the enemy's ditch, the other parties being all under cover. The attack was continued three quarters of an hour, and as the enemy were greatly exposed to the fire of the rifle battery and artillery; they must have suffered greatly. Our artillery was well served, and I believe did great execution.

The troops have undergone incredible hardships during the siege; and though the issue was not successful, I hope their exertions will merit the approbation of Congress.

We continued the siege until the enemy got within a few miles of us, having previously sent off all our sick, wounded, and spare stores.

Enclosed is a list of our killed and wounded during the siege.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, during the siege of Ninety Six, in South Carolina.

Virginia brigade. Killed, 41; wounded, 33; missing, 16. -- Maryland brigade. Killed, 12; wounded, 24; missing, 3. -- Light infantry. Killed, 1; wounded, 9; missing, 1. -- Legion infantry. Killed, 2; wounded, 2. -- Virginia militia. Killed, 1; wounded, 2. -- Total. Killed, 57; wounded, 70; missing, 20. -- Captain Armstrong, of the Maryland line, killed; Captain Benson and Lieutenant Duvall wounded. Captain Bentley, of the Virginia line, prisoner; Lieutenants [p502] Evans, Miller, and Selden, wounded. Colonel Koscuilzko, chief engineer, was slightly wounded.

O. H. WILLIAMS,
Deputy adjutant general.

Published by order of Congress.
CHARLES THOMPSON, Sec.

(17.) The British commander found it necessary to abandon the post of Ninety Six; but as he would not omit any mark of attention to the loyalists of that country, much less have it imagined that they were abandoned, he ordered that the principals should be convened, and proposals made to them: That if they would keep together, and undertake the defence of the district against their own disaffected inhabitants, a small party should be left to keep them in countenance, with the farther encouragement, that detachments from the Congarees should at all times be sent to their support, equivalent to any force which Greene might dispatch to invade their territory; and that, on the other hand, care should be taken to provide for the removal of such families as should prefer to be fixed upon the abandoned plantations within the new frontier, which was now intended to be established. The result was, that the loyalists determined, for the security and preservation of their families, to bring them away under the protection of the army; with the farther view, when they were settled within the assigned limits, that the men should be embodied, in order to make incursions into the disaffected settlements.

[p503] As Lord Rawdon's impatience to prosecute the business of the campaign would not admit of his waiting for this determination, he left Colonel Cruger behind with much the greater part of his force, for the purpose of carrying it into execution, while he marched himself, with eight hundred infantry and sixty horse, for the Congarees.

He had previously written, when on his way to Ninety Six, to Colonel Balfour, stating the expediency of sending a strong corps from Charles town to Orangeburgh, as a provision against any sinister event that might possibly happen. Upon Balfour's application to Colonel Gould, he immediately granted a battalion of his corps for that purpose; and Lord Rawdon, before his departure from Ninety Six, had, in consequence, received advice from the commandant of Charles town, not only of Gould's compliance, but that the 3d regiment was under orders to arrive at Orangeburgh by a specified day, and there to wait his instructions; and, as if it were to remove every possibility of doubt, he received a succeeding letter from Colonel Stuart, who commanded that regiment, with information that he was already considerably advanced on his way to Orangeburgh. This information, and a full confidence in the expected support, were the grounds upon which Lord Rawdon founded his immediate plan of operation, and were particularly the cause of his leaving so great a part of his force behind, and advancing with rather an unequal corps to the Congarees. In the same persuasion he dispatched a number of messengers by different routes to meet Colonel Stuart at Orangeburgh, and appointing their junction at the Congarees on the 3d of July.

(18.) Through some error or misapprehension, which has not been explained, Colonel Stuart was not only stopped on his march by orders [p504] from Charles town, but was so far recalled, that he fell back to Dorchester on his return to that place. It may be observed, that the expectation and apprehension of a French fleet and army on the coast, in order to co-operate with Greene, and to put a final end to the war in that quarter, by the reduction of Charles town, had a great influence on the operations of this campaign, and on the conduct and movements of the commanders on both sides; it may not, therefore, be unreasonable to suppose, that this apprehension, perhaps revived by some new report, occasioned the recall of Colonel Stuart. But however that may be, it certainly was a measure which, under other circumstances, might have proved fatal in the event to Lord Rawdon, and which was attended with no small danger even in the present instance.

Greene had early information of the state of force in which the British commander marched from Ninety Six, and had the fortune likewise to intercept a letter from Colonel Stuart, signifying the change that had been made in his instructions, and the consequent impossibility of meeting him at the time and place appointed. These circumstances led him to the design of surrounding Lord Rawdon so effectually, that he could not extricate himself, while he continued lingering in the vain expectation of a reinforcement which was not to arrive.

Lord Rawdon, by forced marches, in order to surprize a body of militia, of which he had received some intelligence, arrived at the Congarees on the 1st of July, two days before the appointed time; a rapidity of movement which probably had no small effect upon the issue of Greene's scheme. He soon discovered that the enemy's light troops were in the neighbourhood, and took the necessary precautions [p505] on that account; but his cavalry, regardless of express orders to the contrary, went out by themselves to forage on the morning of the very day upon which Colonel Stuart was expected: They were soon surrounded by Lee's legion; and two officers, with forty dragoons, and their horses, were all taken without a blow. This, which in other circumstances would not have been much thought of, was, in the present, a most grievous stroke; and more particularly so, as the means of procuring intelligence in this crisis of so much danger was thereby cut off almost entirely. This loss, with the unexpected assemblance of the enemy, which had already been discovered in the neighbourhood, and the unexpected failure on Stuart's side, happily laid open at once to Lord Rawdon, all the danger of his own situation: He accordingly determined instantly to begin his march towards Orangeburgh, and to meet, or find Stuart wherever he was.

The route lay across Congaree creek, at about three miles distance; a broad piece of water, in most parts deep, and enclosed by difficult banks. Colonel Lee, who had been appointed to the guard of this passage, having destroyed the bridge, and felled trees to render the ford impracticable, had then posted himself behind the creek, with a considerable body of cavalry, and some infantry of his legion. The intense head of the sun about noon, which seemed almost to disable every sort of motion, and in every species of animal, had thrown the Americans off their guard; and the unexpected arrival of the British forces in that critical period, served much to facilitate the passage. After the exchange of only a few ineffectual shots, a body of infantry were thrown over, who having dispersed the enemy without trouble, the troops soon cleared the fords, and passed them without interruption.

[p506] Lord Rawdon was joined on the day after his arrival at Orangeburgh by Colonel Stuart, with his own regiment; but was greatly disappointed at finding that he was unaccompanied by a body of cavalry which had been promised, and which were so particularly wanted. At the same time advice was received, that Greene had passed the Congaree, and was in full march to attack the British army. That commander having missed what he little less than considered as a certain prey, had collected all the force which the country afforded, and seemed determined, before they were farther strengthened, to try his fortune in the field: He accordingly, on the 10th of July, led his army within four miles of the British camp, and in the evening, at the head of his cavalry, closely reconnoitered their position. As their situation had but little of strength in it, excepting that the winding of the river which lay in their rear would in some measure remedy the total want of cavalry, by serving as a cover to their flanks, and reducing the enemy to a direct attack, Lord Rawdon flattered himself, that Greene's superiority of numbers would in the morning have tempted him to the trial.

While the British forces were impatient for the wished event, their disposition and countenance had produced a direct contrary effect; for Greene had abandoned his camp, and retired with such precipitation in the night, and his movement was so long and effectually covered by his numerous light troops, that he secured his passage back across the Congaree before Lord Rawdon had received notice of his retreat. An unsuccessful attempt made by Sumpter, Lee, and Marion, upon the 19th regiment, at Monk's corner, along with this retreat of Greene, closed the campaign in South Carolina; the intemperateness of the climate, for a season, overcoming the violence of man. Greene being joined by Marion and the rest, took post in the high hills of [p507] Santee, to the eastward of that river. The Santee, the Congaree, and the Edisto, were the established boundaries on the British side.

(19.) It is impossible to do justice to the spirit, patience, and invincible fortitude, displayed by the commanders, officers, and soldiers, during these dreadful campaigns in the two Carolinas. They were not only to contend with men, and these by no means deficient in bravery and enterprize, but they encountered and surmounted difficulties and fatigues from the climate and the country, which would appear insuperable in theory, and almost incredible in the relation. They displayed military, and, we may add, moral virtues, far above all praise. During renewed successions of forced marches, under the rage of a burning sun, and in a climate, at that season, peculiarly inimical to man, they were frequently, when sinking under the most excessive fatigue, not only destitute of every comfort, but almost of every necessary which seems essential to his existence. During the greater part of the time, they were totally destitute of bread, and the country afforded no vegetables for a substitute. Salt at length failed; and their only resources were water, and the wild cattle which they found in the woods. Above fifty men, in this last expedition, sunk under the vigour of their exertions, and perished through mere fatigue. We must not, however, confine the praise entirely to the British troops, as a detachment of Hessians, which had been lent upon the occasion by General de Bose, deservedly came in for their proper share. The same justice requires, that the Americans should not be deprived of their share of this fatal glory. They had the same difficulties to encounter, joined to a fortune in the field generally adverse: Yet, on the whole, the campaign terminated in their favour; General Greene [p508] having recovered the far greater part of Georgia and of the two Carolinas.

The two following letters will explain the operations in South Carolina in the middle of September, and close this appendix.

Extract of a letter from Lieutenant-colonel Stewart to Earl Cornwallis, dated Eutaw, September 9, 1781.

(20.) With particular satisfaction I have the honour to inform your lordship, that on the 8th instant I was attacked by the rebel General Greene, with all the force he could collect in this province and North Carolina, and after an obstinate engagement, which lasted near two hours, I totally defeated him, and took two six-pounders.

Soon after I had the honour of writing your lordship from Thompson's, I received information of Greene's having moved with the rebel army towards Camden, and crossed the Wateree near that place, and, from the best intelligence I could collect, was on his march to Friday's ferry, on the Congarees.

The army under my command being much in want of necessaries, and there being at the same time a convoy with provisions on the march from Charles town, which would have necessarily obliged me to make a detachment of, at least, four hundred men (which at that time I could ill afford, the army being much weakened by sickness) to meet the convoy at Martin's, fifty-six miles from the camp: The [p509] distance being so great, a smaller escort was liable to fall by the enemy's cavalry, which are very numerous.

I therefore thought it adviseable to retire by slow marches to the Eutaws, where I might have an opportunity of receiving my supplies, and disencumber myself from the sick, without risking my escorts, or suffer myself to be attacked at a disadvantage, should the enemy have crossed the Congaree.

Notwithstanding every exertion being made to gain intelligence of the enemy's situation, they rendered it impossible, by way-laying the bye paths and passes through the different swamps; and even detained different flags of truce which I had sent on public business on both sides.

About six o'clock in the morning I received intelligence by two deserters, who left General Greene's camp the preceding evening, about seven miles from this place; and from their report, the rebel army consisted of near four thousand men, with a numerous body of cavalry, and four pieces of cannon.

In the mean time I received information by Major Coffin, whom I had previously detached with one hundred and forty infantry and fifty cavalry, in order to gain intelligence of the enemy, that they appeared in force in his front, then about four miles from my camp.

Finding the enemy in force so near me, I determined to fight them, as from their numerous cavalry, seemed to me to be attended with dangerous consequences. I immediately formed the line of battle, [p510] with the right of the army to Eutaw branch, and its left crossing the road leading to Roache's plantation, leaving a corps on a commanding situation to cover the Charles-town road, and to act occasionally as a reserve. About nine o'clock the action began on the right, and soon after became general.

Knowing that the enemy were much superior in numbers, and at the same time finding that they attacked with their militia in front, induced me not to alter my position, unless I saw a certain advantage to be gained by it; for by moving forwards, I exposed both flanks of the army to the enemy's cavalry, which I saw ready formed to take that advantage, particularly on the left, which obliged me to move the reserve to support it.

By an unknown mistake, the left of the line advanced, and drove their militia and North Carolinians before them; but unexpectedly finding the Virginia and Maryland lines ready formed, and at the same time receiving a heavy fire, occasioned some confusion: It was therefore necessary to retire a little distance to an open field, in order to form, which was instantly done, under cover of a heavy well-directed fire from a detachment of New-York volunteers, under command of Major Sheridan, whom I had previously ordered to take post in the house, to check the enemy, should they attempt to pass it.

The action was renewed with great spirit; but I was sorry to find that a three-pounder, posted on the road leading to Roache's, had been disabled, and could not be brought off when the left of the line retired.

[p511] The right wing of the army being composed of the flank battalion, under the command of Major Majoribanks, having repulsed and drove every thing that attacked them, made a rapid move to their left, and attacked the enemy in flank: Upon which they gave way in all quarters, leaving behind them two brass six-pounders, and upwards of two hundred killed on the field of action, and sixty taken prisoners, amongst which is Colonel Washington, and from every information, about eight hundred wounded, although they contrived to carry them off during the action. The enemy retired with great precipitation to a strong situation, about seven miles from the field of action, leaving their cavalry to cover their retreat. The glory of the day would have been more complete, had not the want of cavalry prevented me from taking the advantage which the gallantry of my infantry threw in my way. I omitted to inform your lordship, in its proper place, of the army's having for some time been much in want of bread, there being no old corn or mills near me: I was therefore under the necessity of sending out rooting parties from each corps, under an officer, to collect potatoes, every morning at daybreak; and unfortunately, that of the flank battalion and buffs having gone too far in front, fell into the enemy's hands before the action began, which not only weakened my line, but increased their number of prisoners.

Since the action, our time has been employed in taking care of the wounded; and finding that the enemy have no intention to make a second attack, I have determined to cover the wounded as far as Monk's corner with the army.

My particular thanks are due to Lieutenant-colonel Cruger, who commanded the front line, for his conduct and gallantry during the action; and Lieutenant-colonel Allen, Majors Dawson, Stewart, Sheridan, [p512] and Coffin, and to Captains Kelly and Campbell, commanding the different corps and detachments; and every other officer and soldier fulfilled the separate duties of their stations with great gallantry: But to Major Majoribanks, and the flank battalion under his command, I think the honour of the day is greatly due. My warmest praise is due to Captain Barry, deputy adjutant general, Major-brigade Coxon, Lieutenant Ranken, assistant quarter-master general, and to acting Major-of-brigade Roorback, for the great assistance they rendered me during the day.

I hope, my lord, when it is considered such a handful of men, attacked by the united force of Generals Greene, Sumpter, Marion, Sumner, and Pickens, and the legions of Colonels Lee and Washington, driving them from the field of battle and taking the only two six-pounders they had, deserve some merit.

Inclosed is the returns of the killed, wounded, and missing of His Majesty's troops. From the number of corps and detachments which appear to have been engaged, it may be supposed our force is great; but your lordship will please to observe, that the army was much reduced by sickness and otherwise. I hope your lordship will excuse any inaccuracy that may be in this letter, as I have been a great deal indisposed by a wound which I received in my left elbow, which, though slight, from its situation is troublesome. It will give me most singular pleasure, if my conduct meets with the approbation of His Majesty, that of your lordship, and my country.

[p513] Return of killed, wounded, and missing.

Three commissoned officers, 6 serjeants, 1 drummer, 75 rank and file, killed; 16 commissioned officers, 20 serjeants, 2 drummers, 313 rank and file, wounded; 10 commissioned officers, 15 serjeants, 8 drummers, 224 rank and file, missing.

Copy of a letter from General Greene to the President of Congress, from his head quarters, at Martin's tavern, near Ferguson's swamp, in South Carolina, Sept. 11, 1781.

(21.) In my dispatches of the 25th of August, I informed your excellency, that we were on the march to Friday's ferry, with the intent of forming a junction with the troops of the state and a corps of militia that were there assembled, and to attack the English army, encamped near M'Leod's ferry.

On the 27th, upon our arrival there, I received advice that the enemy had retired. We passed the river at Howell's ferry, and our first post was Mothe's plantation, where I learnt that the enemy had stopped at Eutaw's spring, about forty miles from us, where they had received a reinforcement, and they prepared to establish a post there. To dislodge them, I determined to hazard an engagement, although we were considerably inferior in number.

We began to march on the 5th of September; and we advanced by small marches, as well to disguise our intention, as to give time to [p514] General Marion, who had been detached, to rejoin us; so that it was the 7th when we came to Bendell's plantations, within seventeen miles of the enemy.

We marched to attack the enemy at four o'clock in the morning of the 8th. Our front line was composed of four small battalions of militia, two of North and two of South Carolina; our second line consisted of three small brigades of continental troops, one of North Carolina, one of Virginia, and one of Maryland; Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with his legion, covered our right flank; and Lieutenant-colonel Henderson, with the state troops, our left. Lieutenant-colonel Washington, with his cavalry and the Delaware troops, formed the body of reserve. Two three-pounders were in the front of our line, and two six-pounders with the second line. The legion and the state troops formed our advanced guard, and were to retreat on our flanks when the enemy should form. We marched in this order to the attack. The legion and state troops met with a part of the enemy's horse and foot, about four miles from their camp, and put them to flight with fixed bayonets, having killed and wounded many. As we thought this was the van of the enemy, our first line was ordered to form, and the legion and state troops to take post on our flanks. From the place of action to Eutaw springs, the whole country is covered with wood. The firing began at three miles from the English camp. The militia advanced firing, and the advanced posts of the enemy were routed. The fire redoubled; our officers behaved with the greatest bravery, and the militia gained much honour by their firmness: But the fire of the enemy, who continued to advance, being superior to our's, the militia were obliged to retreat.

[p515] The Carolina brigade, under General Sumner, were ordered to support them, and, though not above three months raised, behaved nobly. In this moment of action, the Virginians, under Colonel Campbell, and the Marylanders, under Colonel Williams, advanced in the face of the enemy's fire; a terrible cannonade, and a shower of bullets, overturned all that presented, and the enemy were put to the rout.

Lieutenant-colonel Lee turned his left flank to the enemy, and charged them in the rear, while the troops of Maryland and Virginia charged them in the front. Colonel Hampton, who commanded the troops of the state, charged one part, of whom he made one hundred prisoners. Colonel Washington advanced with a corps de reserve upon the left, where the enemy appeared to prepare again to make resistance, and charged them so impetuously with his cavalry, and a body of infantry, that they had not time to rally.

We continued to pursue the enemy, after having broken them, until we attained their camp. A great number of prisoners fell into our hands, and some hundreds of fugitives escaped towards Charles town: But a party having got into a brick house, three stories high, and others took post in a pallisadoed garden, their rear being covered by springs and hollow ways, the enemy renewed the fight. Lieutenant-colonel Washington did his utmost to dislodge them from a thick wood, but found it impossible; his horse was killed under him, and himself wounded, and taken prisoner. Four cannon were advanced against the house, but the fire from it was so brisk, that it was impossible to force it, or even to bring on the cannon, when the troops were ordered to retreat, and the greatest part of the officers and men who served those cannon were either killed or wounded.

[p516] Washington having failed in his attack on the left, the legion could not succeed on the right; and seeing our foot roughly handled by the enemy's fire, and our ammunition almost expended, I thought it my duty to shelter them from the fire from the house, being persuaded that the enemy could not maintain their posts but a few hours, and that we should have better play on their retreat, than to obstinately persist in dislodging them, which would expose us to a considerable loss.

We collected all our wounded, except those who were too forward under the fire of the house, and we returned to the bank, which we occupied in the morning, not finding water any where nearer, and our troops having great need of refreshment, after a fight which had continued four hours. I left upon the field of battle a strong picket.

I shall send Colonel Lee and General Marion early to-morrow morning between Eutaw's and Charles town, to prevent the reinforcements which may come to succour the enemy, or to retard their march, if they attempt to retreat, and give room to the army to attack their rear guard, and complete our success. We lost two pieces of artillery to the enemy, and we have taken one of theirs.

The night of the 9th the enemy retired, leaving more than seventy of their wounded behind them, and more than a thousand arms, which they had broken and concealed in the springs of the Eutaw's; they staved twenty or thirty barrels of rum, and destroyed a large quantity of provisions, which they could not carry with them.

We pursued them as soon as we had notice of their retreat, but they joined Major M'Arthur, General Marion and Colonel Lee not having [p517] troops enough to hinder them. At our approach they retired to Charles town. We took five hundred prisoners, including the wounded they had left behind; and I reckon they had not less than six hundred killed and wounded. The fugitives spread such an alarm, that the enemy burnt their provisions at Dorchester, and quitted their post at Fair lawn. A great number of negroes and others have been employed to throw down trees across the roads in some miles from Charles town. Nothing but the brick house, and their strong post at Eutaw's, hindered the remains of the British army from falling into our hands.

We have pursued them to the Eutaw's, but could not overtake them. We shall rest here one or two days, and then retake our old position near the heights of Santee.

I think I owe the victory which I have gained to the brisk use the Virginians and Marylanders, and one party of the infantry, made of the bayonet. I cannot forbear praising the conduct and courage of all my troops.

(Signed) NATH. GREENE.

State of the continental troops

Killed. 1 lieutenant colonel, 6 captains, 5 subalterns, 4 serjeants, 98 rank and file. -- Wounded. 2 lieutenant colonels, 7 captains, 20 lieutenants, 24 serjeants, 209 rank and file. -- Total, 408 men.

[p518] State of the continental troops of the state and militia.

Killed. 1 major, 4 subalterns, 4 serjeants, 16 soldiers. -- Wounded. 3 lieutenant colonels, 6 captains, 5 subalterns, 8 serjeants, 91 soldiers. -- Missing, 8 soldiers. -- Total, 146 men.

Total of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the continental troops of the state and militia, 554 men.

Published by order of Congress.
CHARLES THOMPSON, Sec.

THE END.

Notes:

(1.) See Annual Register, page 80, year 1780. [ back ]

(2.) Vide Annual Register, page 83, year 1780. [ back ]

(3.) Vide Remembrancer, page 27, 2d part, year 1781. [ back ]

(4.) Vide Remembrancer, page 126, 2d part, 1781. [ back ]

(5.) Vide Remembrancer, page 127, 2d part, 1781. [ back ]

(6.) Vide Remembrancer, page 197, 2d part, 1781. [ back ]

(7.) Vide Remembrancer, page 151, 2d part, 1781. [ back ]

(8.) The author regrets that he cannot insert this account, as it is not to be found in any of the public prints. [ back ]

(9.) Vide Remembrancer, page 153, 2d part, 1781. [ back ]

(10.) Vide Remembrancer, page 154, 2d part, year 1781. [ back ]

(11.) Vide Annual Register, page 85, year 1781. [ back ]

(12.) Vide Annual Register, page 91, year 1781. [ back ]

(13.) There appears to be an error in this statement of the force marched from Charles town. Lord Rawdon, in his letter of the 5th to Earl Cornwallis, says, he should move on the 7th of June toward Ninety Six, with the troops at Monk's corner, and the flank companies of the three regiments lately arrived: Therefore it seems more probable that Lord Rawdon's whole force did not exceed two thousand men; viz. the garrison withdrawn from Camden, Lieutenant-colonel Watson's corps, Major M'Arthur's reinforcement, and the flank companies of Colonel Gould's brigade: But perhaps the 3d and 19th regiments might move from Charles town, towards Dorchester or Monk's corner, at the same time that Lord Rawdon left it, though not intended for the expedition to Ninety Six. [ back ]

(14.) Vide Remembrancer, page 289, 2d part of 1781. [ back ]

(15.) Vide Annual Register, page 92, year 1781. [ back ]

(16.) This is rather an erroneous remark, as the British generally found themselves considerably annoyed by the militia during all actions, when their officers distributed them on the flanks of the assailants, or composed the front line of these irregular troops. [ back ]

(17.) Vide Annual Register, page 94, year 1781. [ back ]

(18.) Vide Annual Register, page 95, year 1781. [ back ]

(19.) Vide Annual Register, page 97, year 1781. [ back ]

(20.) Vide Remembrancer, page 152, 1st part, year 1782. [ back ]

(21.) Vide Remembrancer, page 175, 1st part, 1781. [ back ]