The American Civil War

    My main research into the Civil War was done in 1983-5, resulting in the publication of 'Battle in the Civil War' (Fieldbooks) in 1986 and, more significantly, 'Rally Once Again' (Antony Bird and the Crowood Press, now out of print in the British edition: ISBN 0 946284 48 2). A slightly revised US edition of the latter was published by Yale University Press in 1989, under the new title of 'Battle Tactics of the Civil War' (ISBN 0 300 04247 7), although to save separate printing costs this edition confusingly became the only one available in Britain, as well (ISBN 1 85223222 6), which meant that essentially the same book was being sold as two different ones.

    'Rally Once Again' shows that the front line soldier's problem had not changed as much as is normally assumed from the conditions that had prevailed in earlier wars. The level of casualties was no greater than that of Napoleonic battles; the new rifle-muskets were used at scarcely greater ranges, and with little higher rates of fire, than had obtained with the old smoothbore muskets. The basic tactics did not change in the 1860s in response to these new weapons, for the simple reason that the weapons had produced little objective increase in the dangers of combat.

    Many Americans (such as William J Bradley in ISBN 0 51769325 9 - no relation to the Presidential candidate) have nevertheless liked to believe that the new weapons really did make a big difference. Part of the reason stems from a certain parochialism, in which Americans know that their Civil War was very deadly to them, and far more deadly than the miniscule operations of 1777-83 or of 1812-15. Yet this is a false comparison since it takes no account of the massive losses in Europe at Borodino, Leipzig or Waterloo in 1812-15 (or at Solferino, 1859, which was twice as deadly as 'America's bloodiest day' at Antietam three years later).

    "...a stimulating think piece, a challenge to American military historians to consider the larger military context of the Civil War. Even if it is possible to criticize Griffith on particulars, it cannot be denied that he has, to a great extent, swept away the Civil War's claim to uniqueness."
    Paul D Lockhart in Indiana Military History Journal

    Secondly, there is an excessive faith in gadgetry, and an assumption that a rifle which performs better than a smoothbore on the test range will automatically perform equally better in real combat. Yet this assumption does not seem to be confirmed by the eyewitness evidence from 1861-5. The theoretical capabilities were not realised in practice because of problems of training (few regiments did much target practice), of doctrine (officers originally trained to fight with smoothbores did not know how to adapt to rifles), and of terrain. In the woods of North America it was often very difficult to find a field of fire greater than around 50-100 yards, which was a distance that could already be beaten effectively by smoothbores.

    The love of fortification that was widespread in the Civil War was not a result of deadly new weapons, since several generals had already embraced it at the start of the war, before many of the new weapons were available. Instead, it was the accepted schoolbook training for any improvised militia forces, just as it had been for the large but green armies of the French Revolution in the early 1790s.

    Equally there is no real evidence that new infantry weapons forced either the artillery or the cavalry off the battlefield. The terrain certainly went a long way towards limiting their operations, as did doctrine, organisation and the difficulties of training. For example the Army of the Potomac made only five cavalry charges during large battles before 1864, all of them very small by Napoleonic standards. It was therefore unsurprising that they won little success with this particular tactic. The Union cavalry would come into its own on the battlefield only in 1864-5, when it was equipped with repeating carbines which - unlike the infantry's rifle-muskets - had a high volume of fire rather than a long range. It was this combination, and not accuracy at long range, which pointed the true pathway towards the future of smallarms design.

    The whole problem for those who claim that infantry fire was suddenly effective at much greater ranges than it had been in the past is that there seems to be very little evidence from genuine eye-witnesses to support that theory - but apparently plenty to support the contrary view.

    It is certainly my contention that the best type of evidence is what I have called 'tactical snippets', or extracts from the letters, diaries or memoirs of participants, where they let slip a few rare comments about the technicalities of combat rather than the (far more common) accounts of food, billets or memorable personalities. On its own a single 'tactical snippet' may be ambiguous and may tell us very little: but when a number have been collected and properly analysed, they can often reveal a great deal about the real tactics of the battlefield rather than the ideal tactics of the drill hall or the target range.

    Alas, some reviewers simply did not understand what this book was about, doubtless because American English is such a strangely different language from English English. Others, however, were more than fair - for example Colonel John W Mountcastle in Parameters: "Add this excellent study to your professional library if you want a better understanding of the nature of combat on the Civil War battlefield. Paddy Griffith... has drawn on his extensive knowledge of warfare in the 19th century and has completed a review of a host of published and primary sources to produce a book with an arresting thesis....Griffith's style is as agreeable as his organizational skill, so the book is a darn good read."

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