'The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789-1802' (Greenhill Books, London, 1998, as a companion volume to 'The Viking Art of War'.) This book looks at the way French commanders in the 1790s tried to base their methods on the classical practice of the Seven Years War, but found that without sound money, sound logistics or trained soldiers, they were forced to cut quite a few corners. They could not fight in open terrain, and they had to live by a cruel system of ever-expanding pillage and conscription. There was therefore a degeneration in the art of war, rather than a 'Military Revolution', and most of the battles ended in either indecisive draws or ignominious routs. Yet through sheer persistence and the disunity of her opponents France did nevertheless manage to win most of her campaigns by the end of 1794, to become 'the most powerful state the world had ever seen'. That was before either the army had been reformed or General Bonaparte had risen to prominence. When that officer did come to rule the roost in the 1800s he still tried to use the methods of the Old Regime - and by that time with the great advantages that the soldiers were veterans and the army had been reorganised. But with no reform in the economy or the logistics, he was doomed to remain imprisoned within the same constraints as the Revolution, and disaster was ultimately unavoidable.

Pictured above: The mill at Valmy, the centre of the French position in the tactically drawn, but strategically decisive, battle of 1792. This mill is a recent reconstruction, built in the wrong place. The original was pulled down during the battle, in order to protect nearby troops from splinters struck off it by incoming Prussian cannon balls.

'French Artillery 1800-1815' (Almark, London 1976, long out of print: ISBN 0 85524 257 0). A short guide, colourfully illustrated by Emir Bukhari. It traces the weapons used, the organisation of batteries, and particularly the new tactics of massing guns and making 'artillery charges', which emerged during the Revolution and Empire. This book was one of three (together with Nigel de Lee's 'French Lancers' and the late John Pimlott's 'British Light Cavalry') in a promising series on tactics which was, alas, terminated early in 1977 (It was also my only book in which my name was given as 'Patrick' rather than 'Paddy').

    My findings on the British 'Thin Red Line' in the Peninsula were first printed in 1981 in 'Forward Into Battle' , but they were re-cast with new material in 'Wellington-Commander: the Iron Duke's Generalship' (edited by Paddy Griffith; published by Antony Bird and the Victoria & Albert Museum, 1985: ISBN 0 907319 08 4). This is a collection of essays written by seven leading historians (including Michael Glover, John Terraine, Graeme Rimer, David Howarth, John Keegan and Correlli Barnett), based on a conference which I had chaired at Apsley House, Wellington's London home (where he had installed the iron shutters against brickbats, from which his 'iron' nickname derived). It was the best book on Wellington of its decade, and John Keegan drew much material from it (sadly unacknowledged) for his 'Mask of Command'. Apart from my essay on tactics, I myself also contributed a biographical essay on the Duke, which I like to think began to strike away from the unquestioning hero-worship that many of his biographers seem to display. This trend has recently been extended by eg Robin Thomas (on 1793-5) and Peter Hofschroer (for Ligny & Waterloo 1815, and for the Duke's subsequent re-writings of his own history).

'Military Thought in the French Army 1815-51' (Manchester University Press 1989, now out of print: ISBN 0 7190 2882 5).
    "...a stimulating challenge... a useful and provocative volume. It is essential to students of nineteenth-century military thought and institutions; students of French military affairs will ignore it at their peril." Thomas J Adriance in The Journal of Military History
    This is an updated edition of my doctoral thesis, based on extensive reading of the 'military literature' (both published and manuscript) produced by the men who remained in Napoleon's army after the Emperor himself had been consigned to St Helena. The popular perception is that the mid-19th century French army was dreadfully inefficient (as would be proved in 1870); but in fact it was well abreast of new ideas, new technologies and new methods of training. The tactics of the Duke of Orleans' Chasseurs a Pied from 1838 onwards harnessed new developments in both musketry and gymnastics, and would be the basis for the tactics used by both sides in the American Civil War. The French also used steamships and railways widely during their operations in the 1850s (ie a decade before the Americans) and, unlike the first Napoleon, they won all their wars from the invasion of Spain in 1823 to the liberation of North Italy in 1859.

'A History of the Peninsular War, Vol.IX, Modern Studies of the war in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814 edited by Paddy Griffith (Greenhill Books, London 1999: ISBN 1 85367 348 X).
    This is an up-to-date companion to Sir Charles Oman's great seven-volume history, containing essays by ten scholars as well as my own comments on Sir Charles's life, his book's place in the bibliography of the war, and on operational art in the Peninsula. The other essays are by James Arnold on the French army, Philip Haythornthwaite on the British and on sieges, Harold Livermore on Beresford and the Portuguese, Juan Jos� Sanudo on the Spanish army, Ren� Chartrand on the Guerrillas, Brent Nosworthy on Line vs Column, Arthur Harman on the British Light Infantry, Charles Esdaile on the Spanish background, Leopoldo Stampa on the role of Joseph Bonaparte, and Rory Muir on the British political and strategic background.

    Oman's Peninsular War has for long been one of my favourite military books, and I was particularly proud to be allowed to conduct this modern survey and up-dating.