FEBRUARY 1904 - SEPTEMBER 1905

Sato Tetsutaro: Preparing for the Hypothetical Enemy, 1906-1916

Decades ago one scholar classified the period from 1867 to 1914 as "The Golden Age of Naval Thought." The phrase captured the years only partially, for a lack of adequate research limited the "Golden Age" to renowned western theorists. More pointedly, another scholar maintained that in the years before 1919 the Imperial Japanese Navy had suffered from a "dearth of creative leadership." Though few historians rarely acknowledge as much, no such dearth existed.

While a few Japanese authors have recognized the significance of Sato Tetsutaro to the Japanese Navy, the officer has long escaped scrutiny by most Western scholars. Consequently, there exists only one English-language study of Sato. A few historians have, nonetheless, documented the Japanese Navy's intellectual prowess. Their analyses confirmed the existence of superb naval thinkers in the years before the First World War. These historians revealed a detailed process in which naval planners identified serious threats to national security, argued for the acquisition of modern warships, and held off inter-service challenges. The planners generated a strategy for Japan, but their successors failed to sustain it in subsequent decades.

Sato became a significant member of a "strategic elite" after tensions increased between the United States and Japan. The friction stemmed, in part, from the "Open Door" policy and the rise of anti-Japanese fervor in California. The East-West confrontation exploded in late 1906 and continued throughout 1907. As the tensions escalated, a number of citizens on both sides of the Pacific thought war was highly possible. Now considered a much overrated affair, American and Japanese naval planners then prepared for war. The U.S. Navy produced its "War Plan Orange" with little cooperation from the army or government. The Japanese Navy, drawing on the intellect of its officer corps, developed its plans in concert with the army and government.

Sato Tetsutaro served at a time when his service, in a contest with the army, fought for increased funding. Associated with that struggle was the navy's search for a strategy. The navy desired a strategy that precluded foreign interference with national policy by deterring threats to Japan's security. Quite simply, in the years after 1906 the Imperial Navy sought to prevent the projection of American naval power along Japan's coasts, a mission that required sufficient assets for defensive purposes. Sato's professional competence proved useful as the Japanese Navy sought out its best officers to organize such a deterrent, a first class battle fleet. In that process the officer became a pivotal member of a professional cadre.

Sato rose to distinction with his examination of Japan's naval past, at a time when Alfred Thayer Mahan was garnering international fame, drew close attention from his superiors. Sato's analytical prowess marked him as a member of a growing strategic elite in the Japanese navy. The junior officer enhanced his reputation further by demonstrated bravery under fire during the Sino-Japanese War. Sato augmented his professional skills when he traveled to Britain in 1899. There, Sato examined the Royal Navy's position in imperial defense and evaluated Britain's "two-power standard." That norm required that the Royal Navy be numerically superior to the two next largest naval powers combined. Like British planners, though, Sato concluded that the best defense was one that deterred a foe from threatening the nation's coast.

Sato went next to the United States where he toured a number of American naval facilities. Returning to Japan in late 1901 Sato received orders to the Naval Staff College, the Japanese Navy's version of the U.S. Naval War College. At the behest of Navy Minister Yamamoto Gombei, Sato produced a controversial volume on imperial defense. Sato declared that the navy, and not the army, stood as Japan's first line of security. He argued, furthermore, that fiscal and defense policy should sustain such a strategy. At that point, however, the army carried greater weight in the government's decision making process. Yamamoto accepted, temporarily, a subordinate role for the navy in the nation's defense. To spare Sato any retaliation from the army's proponents Yamamoto ordered him to sea duty. Sato would, however, get another chance to press his vision after 1905. At the end of the Russo-Japanese War the Navy Ministry again ordered Sato to duty at the Naval Staff College. There, he evaluated the navy's operations in the just completed conflict. The officer contemplated, as well, the navy's role in imperial defense.

Japan's defeat of Russia changed decisively the balance of power in East Asia and increased international tensions. That new balance of power led the Japanese government to review its defense posture. In February 1906, fearing that Russia might seek revenge, the government decided to coordinate national policy and imperial defense with its armed services. The destruction of the Russian navy led army planners to decide that Japan faced no significant maritime threat. An early army draft of the Teikoku kokubo hoshin, or Imperial Defense Policy, designated a single hypothetical enemy. The document, though, favored the army over the navy.

Soon Sato became involved in the emerging inter-service rivalry and demonstrated a hitherto unheard of intellectual depth suitable to the challenge. Army planners argued that Japan should prepare for another war with Russia, their choice for the nation's primary hypothetical enemy. Due to the national debt entailed in financing the Russo-Japanese War such preparations threatened naval funding. The navy, of course, saw things differently. Many navy planners deemed it probable that Japan would clash with the Western powers, most likely the United States, their designated hypothetical enemy. Flash points stemmed from the rise of anti-Japanese legislation in America and the threat to China's economic and political autonomy. Through the "Open Door" policy the West sought to guard their Chinese interests. Now, Japanese ambitions seemingly menaced such interests. Only Western naval power could assure a balance of interests. Such Western naval power, however, threatened Japan's security.

At that moment Sato understood that Japan had stretched its maritime assets to the limit during the Russo-Japanese War. Sato recognized furthermore that the Russian failure to mobilize early and fully had created a false sense of security. The lessons of decisive naval victories in the Russo-Japanese War became ingrained among many less enlightened and more nationalistic officers. These officers ignored the disparity in resources between Japan and the United States. Stressing spiritual strength, national character, and a willingness to sacrifice, these poorly informed officers assumed that Japan would force its foe to the peace table and secure a favorable end to any struggle.

While Japan seemed only a nominal threat in the minds of many Americans that situation changed after 1905. Continued trouble with the "Open Door," Japanese threats to Western interests in East Asia, an immigration crisis in California and a related war scare elevated American fears of Japanese aggression. Spurred on by the war scare, U.S. Navy planners designed a trans-Pacific campaign to combat Japan. American planners expected the American battle fleet to destroy Japan's naval forces in one decisive battle. The Americans would then impose a strangling blockade. Such a blockade menaced Japan with the threat of an amphibious assault as the final drama of a victorious campaign. Bolstered in part by their Russian encounter, navy planners anticipated that strategy.

Imperial Navy planners, primarily Sato, and Akiyama Saneyuki, sought to parry any American advance into the Western Pacific by a policy of attrition. Sato theorized that a decisive Japanese victory in the last stages of a naval campaign might force the United States to the bargaining table. Sato realized, however, that Japan's matériel and economic resources precluded a drawn out campaign. Thus, naval planners settled upon a defensive posture, and an early decisive engagement, believing that such a strategy best served Japan's national security. Beginning in November 1906, the Japanese navy practiced such a stratagem in annual fleet exercises. The army's pursuit of a different strategy, however, forced the navy to fight for its funding. The army's proposals relegated the navy to a minor role and designated Russia as the sole hypothetical enemy, leading Japan toward a "continental" policy. Both proposals, linked to an army-first and navy-second defense posture, threatened a reduction in naval appropriations.

Spurred on by the challenge, the navy needed solutions fast. This was certainly true following the onset of a global naval arms race spurred by the Royal Navy's launch of the all big-gun, high-speed battleship H.M.S. Dreadnought. If the Japanese government cut or froze the navy's appropriations the Imperial Navy would lag further behind the major western naval powers. Navy Minister Saito Minoru, Yamamoto's successor, turned to officers of the Naval General Staff and the Naval Staff College, again primarily, Sato and Akiyama, and ordered them to provide counter-proposals. Drawing upon Sato's early work, naval planners recommended that Japan acquire a battle fleet tonnage equal to seventy percent of that held by any hypothetical foe. Sato concluded in his staff college studies that the seventy percent ratio was the minimum standard for defensive purposes. Conventional wisdom of the period asserted that a maritime power required at least a fifty percent numerical superiority over its opponent to successfully conduct offensive operations. Quite simply, if the United States possessed ten capital ships, Sato argued that the Japanese Navy required only seven to avoid defeat at the hands of the U.S. Navy. That ratio calculation conjectured that an American fleet would reach Asia exhausted after a long trek. Naval planners presumed, furthermore, that the enemy fleet would be spread along the extended sea lanes between the United States and Japan. In that case, the Japanese navy would not need parity.

There is little doubt that Sato's calculations influenced Japan's long-range naval planning. In subsequent decades his successors fought for a seventy percent ratio as a deterrent vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy. Although reproached by recent scholars, Sato had joined a growing cast of international planners applying calculations and mathematics to naval warfare. His ratio originated well before Frederick Lanchester's famed force to force formulas cited prominently after World War I. Sato's work drew, most probably, upon the published work of American naval officer Bradley A. Fiske, himself a superior innovator. In any case, criticism of Sato's work by modern observers seems most unwarranted, particularly as he was not the first nor the last naval officer to conduct such policy calculations. That assertion is easy to make based upon the widespread adaptation of mathematics and numbers to naval warfare at the turn of the century. Wayne Hughes, a recent naval observer, noted a number of such planners in the French, Russian, Italian, and American navies. Today such calculations are a normal component of national defense, used by nearly every major power to promulgate defense requirements. In the years after 1916 the ratio proved a source of discord between the United States and Japan. A number of inter-war naval conferences prohibited Japan from effecting the seventy percent ratio, leaving many in the Japanese Navy deeply suspicious of American intentions.

In 1907, however, Sato did not anticipate any real hostilities between the two countries. Rather, the officer used the U.S. Navy as a budgetary benchmark. Sato, like Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku later, recognized the latent strength possessed by the navy's designated hypothetical enemy. Similarly, the men had no clear view of victory over the U.S. Navy. With the seventy percent ratio some planners stressed that the odds were no better than fifty-fifty, while Sato argued for a better than fifty-fifty chance of victory. Since the United States posed potentially the largest fleet expansion, for budgetary purposes the Japanese navy designated the U.S. Navy as its number one hypothetical enemy. As such, navy planners calculated their grounds for appropriations and expansion upon America's industrial capacity and existing assets. Sato and the other planners concluded that the Japanese navy would require eventually sixteen modern capital ships, as opposed to the twenty-four available, or under construction, for the American navy. This, then, proved to be the genesis of the "Eight-Eight" fleet program, that is, the development of two fleets of eight capital ships each (defined as battleships and battle cruisers). The combination of a numerical ratio and specific fleet expansion program proved later to be the weak link when Japan's strategic vision and resources management proved incapable of supporting an aggressive national policy. After 1907, the Japanese navy could maintain its relative position only if the United States limited capital ship construction. The outbreak of war in 1914, though, forced the U.S. Navy to reconsider its own fleet requirements. The U.S. Navy sought a substantial growth in capital ship tonnage and in August 1916 received congressional backing to substantially expand its battle fleet. Sato's seventy percent ratio meant the Japan would need eventually an "Eight-Eight-Eight" program, that is, twenty-four capital ships to America's proposed thirty-five. Clearly, the 1916 American Naval Bill threatened a larger gap, more than 2:1, between the two navies.

Developed as a blueprint for a service mission and fleet expansion, the seventy percent ratio and the "Eight-Eight" plan became inculcated in succeeding generations of naval officers. The planning proposals became "unquestioned article[s] of faith" among the officer corps of the Japanese navy. After 1916 the Japanese navy deemed the "Eight-Eight," and later, the "Eight-Eight-Eight," fleet expansion program mandatory as long as the U.S. Navy maintained its quantitative superiority. To supplement Sato's work, Akiyama sought, finally, to overcome the obvious weakness inherent in the seventy percent ratio. To secure a 1:1 ratio at the site of a decisive engagement, the planner's plans drew heavily upon the lessons of Tsushima. They devised a two-phased ambush plan, known later as the "interception-attrition" operation. To achieve parity and increase the odds of success, the Japanese navy would whittle away at an advancing American fleet at a distance well before the site of a decisive engagement. For this purpose, the navy argued that it needed a large fleet, not for parity but for defensive purposes.

As the "Eight-Eight" fleet plan projected a force able to attrit American naval strength, the Imperial Navy practiced regularly such an engagement, expected to occur between Kyushu and Taiwan. Such exercises incorporated the "interception and attrition" concept, and focused upon the interception of an enemy fleet sailing north from the Philippine Islands. From 1907 to 1940, however, it was defensive tenets that drove Japan's naval strategy.

Neither the fleet expansion programs nor the seventy percent ratio reached fruition during the lifetime of Sato, who retired in 1923 and died in February 1942. The growing international clamor for peace after 1918, as well as domestic fiscal considerations, stalled such programs, and prompted the major maritime powers to convene the Washington Conference in 1921. The resulting conference constrained by treaty the growth of the American, Japanese, and British navies. Specifically, the major naval powers pledged not to complete currently funded projects nor authorize additional capital ship programs during a ten year "holiday." Those restrictions included both the American and Japanese expansion programs. In addition, treaty restrictions forced Japan to accept a ratio of 10:6, or sixty percent of the American navy. Subsequent conferences reiterated the treaty restrictions. For Japan the seventy percent ratio became a possibility much too late to make a difference. Japan withdrew from the treaty system in 1935 seeking to attain sufficient naval assets to battle the United States. The shift, however, to an offensive strategy proved disastrous, for the successors to Sato demonstrated an inability to sustain its deterrent effect upon the U.S. Navy.

Even so, after 1916 a growing number of Japanese naval officers considered indispensable both the seventy percent ratio and the "Eight-Eight" fleet program. The officers seemingly ignored the actual financial costs required to compete in an international naval race. The officers ignored as well Japan's significant lack of resources. The concern over Japan's perceived maritime weakness and strategic insecurity became a blinding obsession of Japanese planners well into the twentieth century. The subsequent treaty restrictions further alienated the increasingly nationalistic naval planners, for it was the conduct of a decisive engagement with the U.S. Navy that plagued them. The original Imperial Defense Policy had meant to protect the empire by defensive means. That philosophy changed, however, after the inter-war naval conferences prevented the Japanese Navy from establishing either the seventy percent ratio or the "Eight-Eight" plan. Driven by the need to overcome a numerically superior fleet in an offensive war, planners eventually tinkered with aspects of the "interception and attrition" plan and made it, instead, an offensive weapon against the American fleet. The planners moved the decisive battle further and further eastward. In 1941, they selected Pearl Harbor.

Source: Carlos Rivera PHD.
LCDR USNR