Recent developments in East Timor should have drawn the country's attention to the damage inflicted on our defensive preparedness by decades of neglect of our armed forces.
It is doubtful whether we have even a pretence of defence: the Mission Statement of the Defence Force does not mention this activity in any form. The most warlike objective laid down is "To deal with small contingencies affecting NZ and its region". There is, therefore, no authority for defensive preparations even if the capability for these still exists. The statement adds that the level of armed forces should be capable of "contributing to collective efforts where our wider interests are involved" and it is to that end that almost all defence consideration has been devoted.
These objectives are distorted because they rest on four founding fallacies, which should be blown away by recent events in Indonesia.
First of these is the "No Threat" Delusion. Though there is no foe at present waving a sabre at NZ, South East Asia is increasingly heavily armed, with an arms market rivalling the Middle East, and as we are now seeing, intentions can become aggressive with little warning.
A parliamentary select committee report stated that the need to defend NZ "has been no more than a remote possibility for over 50 years", then makes the unwritten assumption that there will be no such threat in the future (Logic and 4th Form history suggest that the longer since the last threat, the closer the next will become). These folk fall into the induction trap, which Bertrand Russell illustrated with the fate of the chicken. It woke every day expecting to be fed, as it always had been. One day it woke to be strangled by the farmer. History, it is written, is littered with wars which everybody knew would never happen. It is useless for sheep to resolve in favour of vegetarianism while the wolf remains of a different opinion.
Second is the idea that distance will protect us, expressed in the "Moat Myth" promulgated in Defence Reviews: "we have the world's largest moat". The comforting word 'moat', which means a ditch round a castle or fortification, is misused here, as we have no defence works. Distance alone is no protection, as Argentina found out in the Falklands affair. Maori crossed this moat in the 16th Century in dugout canoes: sea transport has improved since then.
Thirdly, we believe that the Aussies/Yanks will come to our aid, though Australia will be hard pressed to help itself, and our politicians have made it almost impossible for the US to risk its sons in our protection.
The last illusion is "we haven't got the money", therefore the first factor in all defence expenditure is "affordability". But what we can afford is our choice, and should not govern the shape as well as the size of our forces, as it does. For example, a White Paper stated "Infantry training and equipment or long-range air transport, to give two examples, do not need the high cost of air defence fighters or missile batteries" (two essentials of a defence system). There is no hope for a country such as ours, which spends more on the Domestic Purposes Benefit than on our national security. The present emphasis on health and education is unbalanced. When a war emergency arises, possibly in 10, inevitably within 20 years, our streets will be strewn with the best-nourished, best-educated corpses in the world's history.
A military analyst writing in the NZ Herald recently, referred to our Army's "war-fighting doctrine called manoeuvre warfare" which exemplifies the contortion resulting from these fallacies. Its central idea is high-tech, wide ranging recce, intelligence, surveillance and so forth, backed by mechanised infantry and designed for very low-intensity operations. Supporting philosophy is dug from Captain Liddell Hart, whose works we devoured in the 1930s, and disregards the subsequent lessons of WW2, particularly the "blitz krieg" which established the deadly effect of tracked armoured vehicles, and the battle-winning power of massed artillery, of which the Alamein fire plan was only one example. The Army has also ignored a lesson of 1914-18: infantry should not be laden like mules. At present men are expected to carry 80 kilograms of kit, which will prevent "manoeuvre" by driving them into the ground like tent-pegs. This is at least twice the weight of the Field Service Marching Order of WW2 and three times the equipment of the White Knight in "Alice in Wonderland": and he had a horse.
A Defence Quarterly journalist, with unconscious honesty, states that in future "conflict enters the realms of philosophy, and force will no longer be the only solution". Just as well, when one hasn't got any force, but try philosophising the militia out of East Timor! The Select Committee's report on Defence Beyond 2000 has similar absurdities, repeatedly stating "Security is more than defence", neglecting to consider that without firepower we have no defence, without defence no security, and without security no future in the long term.
The other half of the Defence Establishment is the Ministry, a civilian organisation, the purpose of which is laid down as "to provide high quality advice ... and make available resources", ie advise and procure, the role of the courtier through the ages.
As recommended by the recent Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 report, the Small Contingencies Force and the Ministry should be recombined (we once had an effective Defence Department, remember?).
A new Mission Statement for the Department should require that a coordinated plan to defend our shores be prepared. Unlike Australia,as was pointed out in James Rolfe's recent book, we lack that at present.
Defence without expense is impossible: the Kiwi must learn to pull his weight or pull a ricksaw.
October 1999
Return to top
Now read Defence - minus the 'Fence' by Jim Ross
Return to Shrapnel page
Read about Jim Ross