Steve Weir: New Zealand's Master Gunnerby Staff Sergeant Tim RoweConclusion |
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The North African campaign marked the end of a long and frequently difficult period, both for Weir and the New Zealand Artillery. It was fraught with problems and failure until late 1942, when the arrival of a new 8th Army commander, improved tactics and materiel superiority finally turned the tide in favour of the Allies. In the meantime, however, the New Zealand Division suffered major defeats at Sidi Resegh and Ruweisat Ridge, and narrowly escaped annihilation at Minqar Qaim. The Division's transition to fighting in North Africa was a bloody learning curve and in his first desert battle as the CO of 6 Field Regiment, Weir had to endure the despair and ignominy of watching two of his batteries over-run at Sidi Resegh, despite his best attempts to hold the position. This left the Divisional Artillery depleted, largely commanded by inexperienced officers and in need of a period of re-equipment and training. The capture of Brigadier Miles also propelled Weir to the role of CRA and brought rapid promotion to brigadier, which accentuated the sharpness of the learning curve he had already faced as a CO. Weir had quickly risen to the role and had acutely realised the need to improve the drills, doctrine and performance of his regiments before facing the Afrika Korps in battle again. The move to Syria in early 1942 gave him the respite he needed to rebuild the Divisional Artillery and analyse its deficiencies, an opportunity of which he made the maximum use. At Forqloss, Weir put the Divisional Artillery through its paces, practising both old and new techniques, with the primary aim of forging it into a true divisional entity rather than just individual regiments. Under Weir's leadership this training ultimately paid significant dividends and Forqloss can definitely be said to be a turning point for the New Zealand Artillery in the Second World War. Weir had also fought hard to keep his regiments centralised. His success in this was mainly due to the support of Freyberg, who refused to fight the New Zealand Division as individual brigade groups. Nevertheless, the next few battles in North Africa were fraught with problems and casualties were high, particularly at Minqar Qaim and Ruweisat Ridge. By Operation Beresford though, the drills and performance of the Divisional Artillery had noticeably improved. Weir seized the opportunity for further intensive training in the Alamein Line and it was there that he finally succeeded in making his regiments capable of performing effectively at divisional level, in time for the principal battle of the North African campaign - El Alamein. It was at El Alamein in October 1942, that Weir was given the opportunity to prove his effectiveness as the CRA with a fire plan that incorporated both new and old techniques. Weir's use of the creeping barrage challenged the prevailing doctrine of the Royal Artillery, but he successfully demonstrated it to Freyberg and Leese, who were impressed and agreed to its use. Such was its effectiveness at Lightfoot it was used by the rest of the 8th Army in subsequent offensives. Weir had been aided by the 8th Army's greatly improved supply situation and the arrival of an army commander who was convinced of the importance of massed artillery on the battlefield, but it was still a major accomplishment after a long period of Allied failures. The success of Weir's fire plan for Lightfoot led to his appointment to command the Corps artillery during Supercharge and at the final breakout by 5 Indian Brigade, which ultimately proved to be the pivotal point of the whole campaign. From El Alamein onwards, artillery was used by the 8th Army in ever-increasing mass. One of Weir's greatest triumphs was at Medenine where his careful planning and the concentration of his guns repulsed Rommel's last offensive in North Africa. This battle marked the first large-scale use of Stonks, which Weir had developed since the New Zealand Division's interlude in Syria a year before. Weir followed Medenine shortly after with another highly successful artillery plan at Tebaga Gap in Operation Supercharge II, one of the most decisive battles of the whole North African campaign. The success of Supercharge II was due in no small part to Weir, whose fire plan enabled X Corps to rapidly break through to Gabes and outflank the formidable Mareth Line. By the New Zealand Division's final action in Tunisia at Takrouna, Weir's techniques and tactics had been widely emulated by the rest of the 8th Army, which continued their use into Italy, long after the Axis surrender in North Africa in May 1943. Over the course of the North African campaign, Weir contributed significantly to the New Zealand Division's overall performance and the effectiveness of the 8th Army's artillery on the battlefield. Always the professional leader, Weir never lost sight of his primary goal to develop the New Zealand Artillery into a true divisional entity. During his efforts to train his gunners to ever-higher levels of performance, Weir also conceived several innovations that were successfully employed by the New Zealand Artillery. The most famous of these - the Murder and the Stonk - were highly effective methods of delivering a divisional artillery concentration (although Parham beat Weir by six months in devising the former). Weir influenced the 8th Army's tactics such as the employment of army groups of artillery and the innovative use of other artillery assets (including AA and AT guns). In doing so he contributed significantly to the pool of artillery knowledge accumulated at great cost by the 8th Army. These contributions ultimately helped to hasten the restoration of the artillery to its former dominance on the battlefield and brought about the successful outcome over the Axis forces after a long and costly campaign. By the end of the North African campaign, Weir had clearly emerged as one of the most highly skilled and innovative commanders of artillery in the 8th Army. Leese regarded Weir as his best CRA and Montgomery had unsuccessfully urged him to impart his expertise and knowledge at training establishments in England. Weir though, had not been ready to leave the New Zealand Division and resolved to continue as its CRA. He continued to effectively lead the New Zealand Artillery in the subsequent Italian campaign and briefly commanded the New Zealand Division before ultimately becoming the GOC of the British 46th Division in 1944; the only Dominion officer to command a British division during the Second World War. This unique achievement underlines Weir's ability, not just as a commander of artillery, but as a highly regarded military leader. He holds a prominent place in New Zealand military history alongside his contemporaries Freyberg, Kippenberger and Thornton. |
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