Steve Weir: New Zealand's Master Gunner

Thrust suddenly into the role of CRA in December 1941, Weir assumed command of a divisional artillery that had limited experience operating at even regimental level, with no divisional drills or doctrine and a vacuum of command experience. Weir was well aware of the deficiencies of the Divisional Artillery, but was determined that it should be divisional in practice as well as in theory. Like his predecessor, the highly capable Brigadier Miles, Weir was intensely interested in creating artillery as a force that could be effectively organised and effectively trained. He therefore developed methods and techniques that could be adopted extremely quickly and were easy to learn.

Weir's first real opportunity to develop his regiments into a true divisional artillery came in Syria in April-June 1942. There he was able to develop his ideas and bring to fruition several techniques he had conceived in the months following the Balkan campaign. Continual improvement was a constant theme with Weir who trained his gunners at every opportunity during the interludes in the North African campaign. The Forqloss exercises in Syria are the best known of these as it was there that the New Zealand Artillery first fired the 'Murder' and the earliest version of the 'Stonk'. The conception and subsequent development of both these divisional fire techniques have been widely attributed to Weir, but this was not entirely the case. Only six months prior to Forqloss, another brigadier of the Royal Artillery carried out trials to develop quick divisional fire drills. These were to have a major influence on British artillery doctrine and contribute to artillery's restoration as a dominant arm on the battlefields of North Africa and later Western Europe.

On 15 May 1940, 10 Field Regiment, RA, under Lieutenant Colonel H.J. (Jack) Parham, achieved a rare tactical success, during the otherwise disastrous French campaign, which was to have a profound influence on the development of artillery techniques. According to Parham �'I was rung up from the right OP, overlooking Wavre, by 'M' who said his lookout man (actually his signaller) had spotted Boche tanks camouflaging themselves on our side of a wood! The inference was that if some were there, there were probably lots more inside so I ordered a regimental concentration� some ten minutes later, we put 500 rounds at rate intense into the wood without any preliminary ranging. It was a grand crash and excited chuckles down the OP wire confirmed that we had struck a winner. The wood blazed for several hours with big black columns of smoke indicating petrol fires'.

This kind of regimental concentration was exceptional in 1940, as the British Army tended to disperse its artillery as batteries and troops. Nonetheless, it was still a reminder of the level of damage artillery could inflict if it arrived quickly enough in sufficient concentration. Like Weir, Parham was averse to decentralisation and dispersion of the guns, and for more than a year he pondered over the question of whether massed artillery could react with sufficient speed to be effective. Radio now provided the means for rapid communication and if a shortcut could be made across the chain of command, then a quick divisional concentration seemed entirely possible.

Parham's opportunity to perfect the divisional concentration came the following year when he was CRA of 38 (Welsh) Division. The resources became available to put his ideas to the test and he did so 'without asking anyone else'. After early experiments at an exercise in Dorset, Parham (now a brigadier) demonstrated his system to a group of senior officers and observers at the School of Artillery at Larkhill in December 1941. First, a volunteer fired a mortar shell randomly into the target area. One of Parham's COs, who was standing nearby, then called by radio for the fire of all the 38 Division's 70 guns to hit the spot where the shell had landed. Within seven minutes the target was struck by a massive concentration of shells and the sceptical were silenced. This demonstration was repeated several times until some rounds fell in the vicinity of the observers. Parham's system dispensed with most of the detailed calculations carried out at the gun lines. He reasoned that these did not produce the necessary pinpoint accuracy in any event and it was much more important to get the rounds on the ground, even if some would initially miss the target.

From the description of these events, it is clear that Parham invented the quick divisional concentration or 'Murder', six months before Weir trialed his version at Forqloss. Parham named his system using the phonetic alphabet. Regimental targets were 'Mike' (M), divisional were 'Uncle' (U), corps were 'Victor' (V) and army were 'Whiskey' (W). Parham subsequently developed and published his drills. The first 'Uncle Target' shoots took place south of Medjez el Bab, Tunisia, in January 1943 and thereafter, divisional targets were known as 'Uncles' by British armies for the rest of the war.

The Stonk, however, was a different matter and Weir must be given full credit for its conception and development. This was a New Zealand innovation that was successfully used in the North African and Italian campaigns. Originating in Syria, it was subsequently developed and formalised on traces at Nofilia in January 1943. Stonks were used extensively in the Tunisian battles and were soon adopted by the rest of the 8th Army, although the frontage was reduced from 1200 yards to 600 yards (to equal the standard frontage of a three-battery field regiment). Their use by the New Zealand Artillery became so common that 'the 25-pounder troops got into the habit of occupying gun lines so laid out (where the ground permitted) that the first and fourth guns were 150 yards apart and the two-troop batteries covered the 300 yards normally allotted to them in the Stonk area'. This facilitated the correct placement of rounds on the ground whenever batteries were called on to fire Stonks.

Use of the term later widened with Allied soldiers often referring to particularly intensive fire concentrations as Stonks, regardless of whether they actually were. The origin of the name is still slightly controversial as some writers consider Stonk to be an abbreviation for 'standard regimental concentration'. However this appears to be an assumption with no real evidence to support it. Weir described in post-war correspondence how he and Brigadier Stanford came up with the name and there is no reason to doubt his account. It appears that he wanted to name the technique after Stanford to show appreciation for Stanford's support and collaboration in its development.

The term Murder does not appear to have achieved the same widespread use as the Stonk but it was also a technique adopted for use by the 8th Army. Initially known as 'Method A', it was changed to Murder several months later at the suggestion of Brigadier Sidney Kirkman (BRA 8th Army) to enable its standardisation between the different divisional artilleries. The New Zealanders used both Murder and Uncle. For the New Zealand Artillery, Uncle meant a divisional-level (defensive fire) target, with Murder and Stonk being the names for the actual techniques or methods of fire that could be used to engage it.

There is no evidence to show that Weir was aware of Parham's demonstrations and it is probable that each of them developed their divisional fire concentrations quite independently. It was Parham's terminology, however, that became the formalised standard for the Commonwealth Artillery and this continued after the war. Uncle became 'Uniform' in 1954, when parts of the military phonetic alphabet were changed for NATO standardisation and this name remains to the present day.

The Royal New Zealand Artillery in the Korean War later continued the use of Murders and Stonks, where they were used for predicted defensive fire. Targets such as likely enemy approach routes and forming-up areas were selected from the map, designated a Murder or Stonk and given a nickname or number. 'The scale of response up to regimental level was determined by the caller, or on occasions by Headquarters Divisional Artillery if a predicted fire Uncle target had been called'. Neither Stonks nor Murders were formalised in official training pamphlets but they appeared in the standard operating procedures of the Korean theatre. Against the massed attacks of the Chinese infantry, both were ideal defensive fire techniques. There were also variations of the Stonk in Korea, including one for suppressing anti-aircraft weapons. Response times in Korea were reduced due to the improved radio communications over the whole of the divisional artillery and command post procedures had also been greatly simplified by the adoption of the US Target Grid procedure. Korea, however, appears to be the last conflict where Stonks and Murders were used. Thereafter, the Royal New Zealand Artillery appears to have adopted Parham's system of target designation, using standard methods of fire.

As well as developing the Murder and the Stonk, Weir was also responsible for the re-introduction of the creeping barrage and demonstrating its worth, long after the Royal Artillery thought it had no further use. This technique, almost unused since the First World War, had nonetheless remained in the Royal Artillery's training manuals in case it was ever needed. During the preparations for Lightfoot in September-October 1942, Weir was confronted with the problem of providing artillery support for a two-brigade infantry attack over open ground, against an enemy in strong defences. While there were some similarities with the nature of battles in the First World War, the Lightfoot offensive was still far from a straight attack on a linear line of well-defined entrenchments and the barrage itself was minor compared to that of 1914-18. To use a creeping barrage after such a long period meant more preparation than just making calculations and devising traces. The infantry needed to be trained to follow the barrage at just the right distance. If they followed it too closely they would suffer casualties from their own artillery; too distant and the enemy would re-emerge and cut them down once the curtain of shellfire passed overhead. The decision to use a creeping barrage therefore generated additional obstacles and without Freyberg's support, this technique would never have been used. The New Zealand Division demonstrated its use in rehearsals at the Wadi Natrun in front of Leese, who accompanied the infantry following the barrage. Weir further explained the details and the Corps Commander decided to use the creeping barrage as the close support for the assault troops, for all of XXX Corps.

The creeping barrage (in conjunction with timed concentrations) ultimately proved successful at Lightfoot and was used again in Supercharge. From that point on, creeping barrages were employed in the remainder of the battles in North Africa. This technique was developed further by other 8th Army CRAs with modifications made to allow the barrage to wheel on its axis in a series of complicated manoeuvres.

Weir also influenced the development and formation of an Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA), which was used by the 8th Army in the later part of the North African campaign. Another First World War practice, this was a stand-alone formation of (mostly medium) regiments held at Army level, which could be attached to the artillery of a division or corps for additional fire support. Weir had first been provided additional RA regiments during the Battle of Alam Halfa in September 1942, but much effort had been expended attaching each of them to the New Zealand Divisional Artillery and integrating them individually into its communications net. After the battle, Weir stated to Horrocks and Stanford that 'in similar circumstances, it would be better to send a division an artillery formation under one commander complete with staff and communications rather than individual regiments'. These difficulties occurred again at El Alamein and Tebaga Gap where Weir was allocated additional artillery regiments on an individual basis. To overcome these problems, the 8th Army formed its first AGRA (5 AGRA), which Weir used at Medenine, acting as the CCRA. There he quickly linked 5 AGRA to his own and two other British divisions, and defeated Rommel's last offensive in North Africa using massed anti-tank guns and artillery.

Weir 'employed artillery always with an eye to every favourable possibility that could be brought into work for him'. His willingness to continually experiment and develop ideas led to the adoption of several new techniques, such as using Bofors guns to fire tracer. This idea, conceived by Captain White, was successfully implemented by Weir at El Alamein and adopted by the 8th Army from Tunisia onwards. It was later used extensively in the Italian campaign including the Sangro and Monte Cassino. Use of the AA guns in this way would not have been possible, however, without the decline of the Luftwaffe and the dominance of the Desert Air Force from late 1942. This situation enabled Weir to allocate the Bofors guns another role without adversely affecting their primary function. Weir also utilised his heavy 3.7� anti-aircraft guns in his fire plans, at Medenine, later in the campaign. By then the 8th Army's air superiority meant their role was less critical and Weir included them with the medium guns to deepen his Stonks.gdg

Weir contributed much to the pool of knowledge and experience painstakingly built up by the Royal Artillery over three years of fighting in North Africa. Several techniques and practices of the New Zealand Artillery became widely established throughout the 8th Army after El Alamein, and Weir can take credit for their introduction. Only the Stonk and the Murder survived the war, however, and Korea was the last campaign where they were effectively employed. Weir therefore can be seen as a highly innovative commander whose influence is clearly evident in any history of artillery in the North African campaign.