Steve Weir: New Zealand's Master Gunner

July and August were months of reorganisation and consolidation for the New Zealand Division in the aftermath of Greece and Crete. With little expectation of action in the immediate future, Weir's 6 Field Regiment trained at Mahfouz (next to Helwan Camp, 15 miles from Cairo) with the 5th Field and 7th Anti-Tank Regiments. This training consisted of a series of practice shoots although the training was hampered by a shortage of transport. On 30 July, Weir was promoted to substantive Lieutenant Colonel.

August saw the field regiments adopt the new RA three-battery organisation with a total of 689 personnel (formerly 611) all ranks. 6 Field Regiment's batteries were re-numbered as 29, 30 and 48 Batteries and additional Quad gun tractors and 25-pounder guns arrived to bring all the New Zealand field regiments up to full strength. The following month 6th Field Regiment took part in exercises with 6 Brigade, before the Division moved to the Baggush Box on 13 September. This location was a sharp contrast to the more regulated camps near Cairo and the stay there was generally welcomed by most of the gunners.

Once at Baggush, the New Zealand Division began training for the upcoming Crusader offensive almost immediately. Emphasis was put on moving the brigades in open formation, both by night and day. A brigade group contained about 1000 vehicles, which when spread out at 16 vehicles to a mile, made up a column 100 miles long that took over seven hours to pass a given point. In the absence of any divisional tanks the artillery had the role of protecting the columns on the move. 6 Field Regiment conducted troop and battery-level exercises in fighting armour on the move with the first full-scale brigade exercise carried out on 8 October. This was the first of three separate brigade group exercises with the 6th Brigade over rough terrain.

The New Zealand Artillery was originally intended to be concentrated at divisional level. 'Freyberg therefore specified at the first Crusader conference with his brigadiers on 17 October that the field regiments were �not to be decentralised unless necessary�. Brigadier Reggie Miles, the NZ Division CRA, supported Freyberg's decision, but nonetheless, the New Zealand Artillery field regiments fought in Crusader under the command of their respective infantry brigades. By early November, the New Zealand Division had conducted extensive training and Freyberg wrote 'our preparations were as complete as we could make them' and that 'nothing appeared to have been left to chance in the preparations for the Second Battle of Cyrenaica'.

On 14 November, virtually all the New Zealand Division was assembled in its entirety for the first time in the Second World War, on the Siwa Road (about 40 miles south of Matruh). The next day it completed a 70-mile day move, which Weir described as 'rather ragged'. After a further day spent halted under camouflage nets, the Division (along with virtually all of the 8th Army) finally set off for the front in the first of several night moves, each of about 15-20 miles. These moves were fraught with problems and highlighted the inexperience of the New Zealand Division in functioning as a complete formation.

Operation Crusader was one of the most fluid and complex battles fought in the North African campaign. Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham (GOC 8th Army) planned to drive the newly formed XXX (Armoured) Corps towards Tobruk from the south, and engage and destroy the bulk of the German armour when it confronted its advancing British counterpart. Simultaneously XIII Corps (which included the New Zealand Division) would by-pass and then isolate the Axis frontier garrisons and prevent them from intervening in the main battle near Tobruk. Once XXX Corps had defeated the German armour, XIII Corps could turn westward and attack the Axis forces besieging Tobruk. A portion of the Tobruk garrison would also stage a breakout and entrap Axis forces between the 32nd Army Tank Brigade (leading the Tobruk garrison's spearhead) and XIII Corps. Cunningham envisaged the relief of Tobruk occurring by the end of the first week.

The plan was inherently risky in that it rested on the assumption that the German armoured formations would obligingly engage the British armour. 'Only after the enemy reacted to the moves of the British armour could the main objective of the plan be reached'. This meant (for XXX Corps at least) that the initiative lay with the Afrika Korps and any other response by Rommel's forces would ensure the plan's likely failure. There was also a 60-mile gap between the two British corps that meant they would effectively fight separate battles and there would be a dispersion of effort. It was evident too, from 8th Army planning conferences, that GHQ thought in terms of the brigade group (as opposed to the division) in the employment of their fighting formations. 'The battle reflected what [Major General] Willoughby Norrie [GOC XXX Corps] called the �cowpat� theory of war; where your troop dispositions are widely spread like cowpats in a paddock, one here, one there'.

The first few days of Crusader involved little action for the New Zealand Division. 6 Field Regiment lay up for the most of 18 November and repaired the damage resulting from the previous two nights travelling. The next move that evening was a vast improvement with the whole Brigade Group moving at a comfortable speed and like a machine.

After reaching Bir el Tgheit on 21 November, Weir was informed that 6 Brigade was detaching itself from the Division and moving to Trig 213, to the left (west) of the other New Zealand brigades and would also pass under command of XXX Corps. On the move, the brigade column encountered two areas of treacherous mud with many vehicles having to be extricated. With darkness ebbing, the Regiment halted eight miles short of its destination. At some point, part of the Regiment's Light Aid Detachment was discovered missing but Weir wisely refused to risk any troops searching for it in hostile territory. 6 Field Regiment also picked up a handful of German prisoners during the move, from armour that had broken down and been abandoned.

The Brigade set off again the next morning (22 November) and crossed the fresh tracks of the German armoured divisions heading in a westerly direction. Trig 213 was occupied by 1000 hours. While personally reconnoitring the defensive perimeter of his anti-tank guns Weir and his driver personally captured two Germans driving a truck transporting tank ammunition to Fort Capuzzo. Weir later recalled:

'My driver and I were standing outside the perimeter surveying the country to the west when a lorry came bundling along the Trigh Capuzzo [road] going East. Through my glasses I recognised this as a German so my driver got his rifle and we dropped under cover. It came on gaily though it could see our lager [sic] plainly. At the correct moment my driver stood with his levelled rifle and two very startled Huns hopped out with their hands up. I disarmed them both, asked them if they could speak English, one of them replying that he could... They had no idea we were about the place and though he stated he had seen us miles away he had no thoughts of anyone hostile up this way'.

About this time, Divisional Headquarters was becoming aware of the disaster that had befallen the XXX Corps armour against the Afrika Korps. Freyberg, under orders from XIII Corps, was forced to split the New Zealand Division. 5 Brigade was ordered to remain and mask off Fort Capuzzo while 4 and 6 Brigades moved westwards to secure the airfield at Gambut and relieve the Support Group of 7th Armoured Division, which was cut off at Sidi Resegh. At nightfall, 6 Brigade was halted about eight miles short of Sidi Resegh and orders were given for an advance at 0400 hours the next morning. Simultaneously the Tobruk garrison was to sortie to Sidi Resegh (a distance of 12 miles from the closest perimeter defences) and 5 South African Brigade was to attack from the south.

6 Brigade advanced westward along the Trigh Capuzzo and halted just before sunrise near Gambut. Many of the troops were beginning their normal morning routine activities when suddenly 'A' Troop of 48 Battery opened fire on some unidentified vehicles moving in column at close range in the still dim light. 6 Brigade had unknowingly halted in the vicinity of Headquarters Afrika Korps. Quickly realising this, the infantry of 25 Battalion seized the initiative and attacked immediately. Within minutes, the area had turned into a conflagration of burning German vehicles as the gunners of 6 Field Regiment destroyed many of them at almost point-blank range. Weir heard his guns firing and responded somewhat impetuously by jumping into a German field car (captured previously) with his batman and Intelligence Officer to ascertain what his men were firing at. 'We charged off in the dim dawn unarmed stupidly and soon found ourselves in the middle of a lager [sic] of German vehicles including armoured cars and anti-tank guns'. Coming under fire, Weir sent his batman back for weapons and reinforcements. He returned in a short time with about 20 men from Regimental Headquarters and they joined in engaging the enemy with small-arms fire. Weir armed himself with a rifle and his small group succeeded in killing 12 enemy soldiers, capturing about 20 vehicles and some 80 prisoners (by Weir's own estimate).

Headquarters Afrika Korps was not destroyed, however, and enough of it survived to continue functioning for the remainder of Crusader. The New Zealanders narrowly missed capturing Lieutenant General Ludwig Cruewell, the German corps commander.

From the prisoners it was discovered that the enemy held Point 175, which lay just east (and in the path) of Sidi Resegh. As Point 175 was not an easily identifiable physical feature on the ground, Weir went forward with Brigadier Harold Barrowclough, (Commander 6 Brigade) to 'have a look and make a plan'. Neither could see any signs of the enemy on Point 175 but Barrowclough decided to use 25 Battalion to advance on foot and occupy it. Weir provided 29 and 48 Batteries in support.

Forgoing reconnaissance patrols in order to save time and with no obvious sign of the enemy, Barrowclough ordered an attack by 25 Battalion supported by Valentine tanks (of 8 RTR). Near the stone cairn that marked the trig point, German infantry in shallow entrenchments were quickly located and engaged. The result was the capture of Point 175 and the taking of about 200 prisoners. The attack then began to encounter serious resistance. Beyond Point 175 itself, the terrain offered better defensive cover for the enemy and an area occupied by an old Bedouin blockhouse contained well-concealed anti-tank guns of 361 Afrika Regiment. The New Zealanders succeeded in holding on to Point 175 against counter attacks (though losing the cairn) but casualties were heavy. It was a difficult day for 6 Field Regiment with observation poor and the targets hard to locate. By nightfall, 'the 6 Brigade group appeared to be isolated with all flanks open'.

At 0500 hours the next morning (24 November), Weir re-deployed his batteries, along with the anti-tank and Bofors AA guns, in anticipation of an armoured attack that seemed highly likely. Two German tanks that appeared at daybreak were allowed by the gunners to approach to close range before being shot up in flames, along with an accompanying ammunition truck a short while later. The rest of the day passed uneventfully with the armoured attack on 6 Brigade failing to occur due to Rommel's decision to use his armour in the famous 'dash to the wire' into Egypt. The infantry succeeded in regaining the cairn of Point 175 in the afternoon but with minimal artillery support due to dwindling ammunition stocks. Freyberg had ordered the rest of the Division (mainly 4 Brigade Group) to move to relieve Tobruk the previous morning and at nightfall, 6 Brigade was joined by 21 Battalion Group. This included 47 Battery, which was transferred to Weir's command.

Sidi Resegh was finally captured in the early hours of 26 November, but 6 Brigade was seriously weakened and occupied an exposed position overlooked by the enemy. The Brigade came under fire at first light and it was clear 'the position was untenable unless the high ground overlooking the Mosque of Sidi Resegh could be taken'. A further attack that night by 6 Brigade was successful in capturing the mosque despite heavy opposition. 6 Field Regiment could offer little support in the darkness but Weir ensured the guns were positioned and ready by dawn after being moved over very difficult terrain.

The morning of 27 November finally saw 6 Brigade in possession of Sidi Resegh and within sight of Tobruk. The day was 'devoted to consolidation and reorganisation'. Parties of 6 Field Regiment gunners were sent out to salvage ammunition from wrecked vehicles and 500 rounds were spared for 4 Field Regiment, whose ammunition stocks were even lower. Weir used the time available to personally examine many of the captured German weapons and positions.

The next day was spent mopping up German positions. Weir directed fire from inside a derelict tank onto a well-concealed platoon-sized position. Infantry from 26 Battalion over-ran the position and to Weir's astonishment, they took 80 German prisoners and freed 14 men from 24 Battalion, who had been held captive for four days. 4 Brigade also successfully attacked enemy positions between Belhammed and Sidi Resegh, capturing about 1000 prisoners. At Miles' request, both field regiments were personally controlled by Weir who fired two timed concentrations ahead of the advancing troops from an observation position that held a commanding view of the battlefield. This occasion, in Weir's opinion, 'was the first impromptu centralisation [of the New Zealand Artillery] on the battlefield during the war'. Weir was then recalled to headquarters and directed an artillery concentration on an attacking force to the south.

Supplies were received from Tobruk on 29 November and 6 Field Regiment fired throughout the day as German units returned from their foray into Egypt. Point 175 was lost in the afternoon along with most of 21 Battalion. The next morning a large formation of vehicles appeared and halted to the south. These were thought to be the long-awaited South Africans. Weir was suspicious and ordered the guns aimed on the vehicles and asked Barrowclough to send out a patrol. This was done but it failed to confirm their identity and Weir decided to dispatch a patrol from his own officers. The formation was identified as German and at 0840 hours, the Regiment's guns opened fire at 3000 yards, destroying numerous vehicles and routing the survivors. A German attack at 1600 hours, however, saw the destruction of two battalions of 6 Brigade. The gunners were now at their most vulnerable with very little infantry protection. Weir favoured withdrawing into Tobruk but Divisional Headquarters ordered the position held. Weir recalled that he 'felt very bitter about this decision as it threw me into a helpless position and appeared to me to expose my Regiment to certain destruction'. Early the following morning, Weir rose, toured his guns and allocated all spare men to local defence. Many gunners expected the Regiment to move to Tobruk though and were somewhat oblivious to the danger with some guns left limbered up in preparation for a move.

These illusions were quickly dispelled when sunrise of 1 December revealed enemy tanks advancing from the south-west, accompanied by lorry-mounted infantry. At the same time 6 Field Regiment began to receive counter-battery fire from two enemy batteries with an effect 'just sufficient to raise the dust'. Weir's batteries held their fire until the tanks were close and then fired with devastating effect. Three or four tanks were immediately destroyed and the battle was on. Dust and smoke rapidly obscured visibility down to 150 yards and Weir had to personally direct one of his batteries by radio as it was blinded for a time. When the lull came after two hours of fighting, Weir hurried to 30 Battery in the forward-most position only to see that there was little left of it. Many of the crews lay dead around their guns, most of its vehicles were burning and some survivors were making their way over the escarpment to the north. Despite Weir's determination to hold the position, the situation was far worse than he had realised. Up until then he thought the New Zealanders had been winning. Gunner Nicholson observed Weir in the midst of the battle and described it in his diary:

'The enemy fire was murderous. It's hard to believe that anyone came out alive. Steve Weir watched it all and would not come out. Some of the boys offered him a lift but he refused it. He stood watching his gunners get mowed down. It must have been a terrible sight for him. He was as cool as a cucumber and was stroking his chin with his hand'.

Weir finally withdrew to his headquarters and directed the Regiment's surviving spare vehicles to move into cover. By this time, 47 Battery had also been over-run and Weir gave the order for 29 and 48 Batteries to pull out when their positions became untenable. 29 Battery was under the heaviest pressure and was fighting off infantry that were penetrating its lines. Weir then made his way to 48 Battery in the rear to see the vehicles off and turned back alone to his headquarters. Upon returning towards its location, he saw it had gone and German infantry now occupied the area. Weir hastily retired about 300 metres, twisted his knee on the way and hid on the side of an escarpment. After an hour, he made his way towards some British tanks in the distance near 4 Brigade's area at Belhammed. Here he found an abandoned vehicle that he was able to start and use to escape. Weir reached 4 Field Regiment's lines at mid-day and was back with 6 Field Regiment about an hour later. After beating off a further attack at 1600 hours, the remnants of 6 Brigade retreated east and then south to finally depart Crusader.

Weir's 6 Field Regiment suffered severely in Crusader with 275 casualties (including the attached 47 Battery), the heaviest losses of any New Zealand Artillery unit in the Second World War. Sidi Resegh was one of the fiercest battles for the gunners in North Africa with Weir describing it as 'a hammer and tongs go'. The two New Zealand field regiments inflicted heavy damage and were finally forced to withdraw only after their defending infantry had been beaten. Brigadier Harry Latham (BRA XIII Corps) visited the battlefield shortly after and was moved by the carnage.

'The first thing one noticed was that the Gunners had obviously put up the hell of a fight�the dead were lying around each gun, each man nearly in his place and burnt out tractors and trailers were just in view. Here undoubtedly there had been no thought of surrender or withdrawal and all had died in the service of the guns'.

Weir's gunners fought well against overwhelming odds and Weir had remained until it was obvious that the battle was irretrievably lost. His conduct during Crusader was recognised by the award of a Distinguished Service Order (DSO), 'for great skill and gallantry in the operations in Libya during the period from 18 November to 2 December 1941'.

The losses from Sidi Resegh also included Brigadier Miles, who had been taken prisoner in the vicinity of 29 Battery when he had rushed forward with a rifle to join the fighting. With the CRA's capture, the choice of replacement fell between Weir and Lieutenant Colonel C. Duff (CO 4 Field Regiment) who were the only remaining COs of the pre-war regular New Zealand Artillery left in the Division. 'Weir was one rung higher on the graduation list' and was therefore promoted to Colonel on 7 December 1941. He had mixed feelings about his promotion at first as he regretted leaving his regiment, describing it as 'a very happy family and though I say it myself, a splendid fighting machine'.