Steve Weir: New Zealand's Master Gunner

By the end of the First World War, the artillery of Germany, France and the British Empire was capable of firing massive, tightly co-ordinated and centrally controlled concentrations or bombardments. These carefully prepared programmes of massed firepower were able to be closely co-ordinated with the advance of the infantry so as to neutralise enemy defences and provide a curtain of suppressive fire. This enabled the attackers to overcome the defenders before they could emerge from their entrenchments and bring their weapons to bear. First used by the British at the Somme in July 1916, the creeping barrage could be planned in a remarkably short time. A divisional barrage took only about two and a half to three hours to prepare by 1918.

For the artillery, 'the principal lessons derived from the [First World] war were the value of radio communication, the importance of predicted fire and the overall importance of concentrating the handling of the available artillery as high in the command structure as possible'. Each corps now had a permanent Corps Commander Royal Artillery (CCRA) who could concentrate all the guns of his corps in a single attack. Once a breakthrough was achieved and the battle became more fluid, the artillery could be quickly decentralised with individual regiments, batteries and troops detached to accompany advancing infantry and tanks. The future of artillery seemed assured, given the advances in technology that had emerged during the war. By 1918, the Royal Artillery was at a peak of effectiveness and efficiency.

By 1939-40, however, defence spending cutbacks and apathy in the inter-war years had taken a noticeable toll on the Royal Artillery. Even with developments such as the establishment of a School of Artillery at Larkhill in 1920, wide-scale mechanisation and significantly improved radio communications, there was no likelihood of maintaining the efficiency achieved in 1918. The inter-war years 'were hard going for professional soldiers since their governments, almost without exception, starved them of money and gave them no chance to deploy large amounts of artillery and actually try out some of the techniques and doctrines which were developed during and after the war'. The New Zealand Artillery was no exception, suffering neglect in the inter-war years with a dearth of funding, training and resources. In 1939, the New Zealand Artillery had barely advanced from 1918 and although some trials had been held at Waiouru in 1937 to find suitable vehicles, it remained very horse dependent. The field artillery still consisted of obsolescent (First World War-era) 18-pounder guns and 4.5-inch howitzers. Training had similarly been neglected with it rarely if ever going beyond battery level.

The emergence of the German Blitzkrieg doctrine of mobile warfare brought with it enormous challenges for the artillery and appeared for a time to threaten its very existence as an integral arm. Indeed, one of the principal aims of Blitzkrieg warfare was to avoid the immensely costly and artillery-dominated attrition warfare of the previous conflict. Artillery was now increasingly vulnerable, both from the air, and from tanks that were capable of advancing at unprecedented rates. The artillery though, successfully responded to the new threat of armoured Blitzkrieg. 'A natural law which governs military evolution began to assert itself; this is that a new weapon rapidly generates a counter-weapon, and so on'. Guns deployed correctly, with infantry protection and with the proper ammunition, were able to successfully defend against armour. The use of artillery guns in an anti-tank role was a major development that had been refined by 1940.

There was much disagreement among British commanders over the best use of artillery in the Western Desert. Large-scale artillery barrages were anathema to some commanders who were determined to avoid the attrition battles characteristic of the First World War and who preferred mobile warfare fought by brigade groups. The failures of Operations Brevity and Battleaxe in April and June 1941 revealed the brigade group's fundamental weaknesses of dispersion of strength and the frequent separation of mutually supporting arms. Battleaxe appeared to mark the first use of amour operating alone and the artillery (including anti-tank guns) was dispersed in a manner not seen before.

By June 1941, the New Zealand Artillery (like the rest of the New Zealand Division) was in a depleted state after the successive defeats in Greece and Crete. The exceptions were Weir's 6th Field Regiment and much of the 7th Anti-Tank Regiment. Both of these units were evacuated directly from Greece to Egypt and were thus spared the mauling in Crete. Losses in gunners, guns, vehicles, and equipment were severe and replacements were needed before the New Zealand Artillery could again be used in action.

Deficiencies in the capability of the New Zealand Artillery were revealed from the fighting in Greece and Crete. No divisional drills or doctrine existed and the Divisional Artillery was incapable of firing above regimental level. Even firing above battery level had been little practised in action due to the dispersed deployment of the artillery, especially in Greece. Other problems included shortages of ammunition and the lack of any medium guns. An inquiry into the lessons from Greece highlighted the need for larger quantities of light anti-aircraft weapons and better anti-tank guns (than the 2-pounder) for the New Zealand Division.

Nonetheless, despite the heavy losses and problems experienced, the New Zealand Artillery emerged from Greece and Crete with a reputation for performing well under the direst conditions. Officers and soldiers of the Divisional Artillery had distinguished themselves in several actions, including Weir who had been mentioned in dispatches. Reinforcements soon arrived and 25-pounders re-equipped the field regiments. By the end of July 1941, virtually all the losses were replaced and training began for the desert warfare of the North African campaign.