Monhaupt’s ‘About the use of
horse artillery’
(‘Ueber den gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie’)
part 6: Horse artillery in battle, during retreats and pursuits; and at rivers
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Source: "Ueber den Gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie" (Berlin, 1836) pp. 82-93
e. In battle
On the day of battle the horse artillery should be held ‘at hand’, if one would attack or expect to be attacked, with the part [of the army] that would have to do the initial fighting; to cover the attack; to support the cavalry; or to proceed the attack.
During the battle of Leuthen [5 December 1757], it would have been of no use to the Austrian army to deploy their horse artillery (assuming that they had horse artillery at that date) to reinforce their left wing. As it would have been of no use to the Fürst of Hohenlohe, when he would have given both his horse batteries the same assignment during the battle of Jena; then they would have been upset the same as the other troops, and having been rolled up the same way. When however one would have held them ‘at hand’ [at Leuthen], they could have hampered the outstripping and pushing back of the left wing that was attacked, and better still could have attacked the victorious right wing of the Prussians unexpectedly themselves. This probably would have led to different results in this situation, in any case not such a severe defeat would have been suffered. In the meanwhile, they [i.e. the horse artillery] would have been used even more effectively, when with it the Prussian left wing would have been attacked unexpectedly; these would have been defeated without doubt, because of the condition it was in (according to Retzow), and then the advance of the right would halt automatically.
According to French sources, Emperor Napoleon made the same manoeuvre with his horse artillery at Wagram. The result of this great idea is known. From the proclamation of the Archduke Carl to his army after that battle, which had fought bravely, in which he rebukes the behaviour of the left wing, the dreadfulness of this weapon can be recognised. Resist this, who can!
Assuming that the Prussian army already had horse artillery during the battle of Kunersdorf [12 August 1759], when assigned at the start of the battle to fire at the Russian troops from the Windmühlenbergen it would have fired all its ammo, being fatigued, and weakened by the losses suffered. When held ‘at hand’, it would be able to act with all its strength after the initial victory. Part of it would pass the ground speedily, having thrown itself on the disordered retreating Russian battalions impetuously, and having dispersed these. While the other part would advance with the cavalry on the plain between Kunersdorf, the Repener Horst, and the Spitzen Berge. Taking in regard the state the Russian army was in, it would not have been difficult to throw the Russian battery down from the Spitzen Berge, when it would have been attacked in front and in flank by the whole horse artillery. After that, the right wing of the horse artillery could have attacked Loudon’s [Austrian] Corps from the Spitzen Berge, while the left wing would have done the same along the Reppener Heide. These troops, contained within the limited space between the Reppener Forst, the Laudonsgrunde, and the Spitzen Berge, could not have made use of their numbers, and having been chased back into their hiding place. Because such manoeuvre could have been executed by the horse artillery with the utmost speed, and would have been supported by the whole fresh cavalry force of General Seydlitz, in such a way the disorder which the Russians found themselves in could never have been remedied. By the advance of this part of the Prussian army however, the former were thrown into the Laudensgrund and the low ground, and completely having been cut down.
f. When the army is retreating from battle
The horse artillery covers the retreat, together with the troops assigned to this task, and is used the way as has already been described when its use with the rear-guard was discussed.
g. When pursuing the enemy after the battle
Being the quickest fire-arm, the horse artillery does great service here. By utilising it [i.e. the horse artillery] one is able to keep the enemy retreating; the cavalry is supported while breaking into the enemy; [enemy] troops which cover the retreat are broken and scattered; debouching and defiling of its own troops is supported; it hampers the enemy, to give its own following troops time to close in; and finally it advances together with the cavalry to cut off the enemy.
h. At river crossings
The enemy is either present or not. In the
latter case, one is able to cross at leisure, in the former situation the
crossing has to be forced, or achieved by demonstrating.
1. When
a crossing is forced, the horse artillery cannot be utilised before suitable
terrain has been occupied on the other side of the river. Therefore, in such
case it will be hold in reserve, until it is able to cross, as a whole or in
detachments, according to the circumstances.
Is
for example the enemy weak, and the terrain behind them unfavourable, because
of which it will only think about a quick retreat as soon as it will be forced
to leave the river bank, the horse artillery will cross early, to be utilised
as has been described when pursuing the enemy.
Is
however the proportion the contrary, and will they [i.e. the enemy] only leave
the river bank because of its disadvantageous nature, the horse artillery will
attack during the crossing. In this situation the infantry and foot artillery
should have a firm hold on the opposite river bank, before the horse artillery
crosses. In addition, the crossing of the army may never be hampered by the
crossing of arms that because of their nature could create disorder and increase
the difficulty of that crossing easily; that is the cavalry and the horse
artillery. Therefore, the horse artillery crosses with the reserve.
2. When
a crossing is achieved by demonstrating, the horse artillery will cross in
detachments or as a whole right at the start, to secure the crossing and
advance of the army.
Such conduct was observed when the Prussian
army crossed the Rhine near Bacharach during March 1793. The opposite river
bank was hardly occupied by some battalions when the horse artillery battery of
the present-day Major Lange crossed together with the ‘Leibhusarenregiment’,
continuing the march to Argenthal immediately, to capture this post (entrance
to the Saoner forest). Arrived there, there was a rest for some hours, after
which, during the night, the march to Schöneberg (exit of the Saoner forest to
Kreuznach) was resumed to ensure occupation.
i. When retreating across a river
When an army retreats across a river in
full view of the enemy, the horse artillery will cover the retreat until the
last position, together with other forces assigned to this task. From here, the
crossing will have to be executed immediately; it [i.e. the horse artillery]
will cross first together with the cavalry. Such conduct was observed when
Field Marshal Graf Kalkreuth retreated across the Rhine at the end of the 1794
campaign.
k. When defending a river
The horse artillery is held ‘at hand’, when
one wants to prevent the enemy advancing any further. If the crossing place is
known, and if the enemy will be opposed, the horse artillery also will be
utilised here. If on the contrary the crossing place is unsure, the horse
artillery will enable one to engage the enemy during its crossing speedily, or
to occupy advantageous parts of the terrain first and prevent the enemy advance
any further.
When General Custine would have had other
thoughts while the Prussian army was still crossing near Babarach, or if he
would have changed his system, his cavalry and horse artillery would have been
quicker then the Prussians, and coming from Hungrigen Wolf and Wlad-Algisheim
would have been able to occupy the posts at Argenthal and Rheinbellen before
the Prussians which only arrived at 5 o’clock in the evening. They would have
been able to maintain their positions long enough for sufficient infantry to
arrive, and being able to withstand the Prussians for the whole day. During the
night, the whole army could have been concentrated. And at dawn the Prussian
army could have been attacked from the Saoner forest, while they were turned along
the road from Simmern to Bacharach and forced back across the Rhine, with the
advantage of the terrain in favour of the French.
On
6 November 1806, the horse artillery battery of Captain von Lahn was assigned
to observe the Trave between Lübeck and Travemünde, together with the cavalry
regiments ‘Von Beeren’ and ‘Heikink’. When they enemy would try to cross at any
place, it would have to engage them. Especially under such circumstances, the
horse artillery will be very efficient.
© Geert van Uythoven