Monhaupt’s ‘About the use of
horse artillery’
(‘Ueber den gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie’)
part 7: The use of horse artillery with detachments, at so called ‘posts’
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Source: "Ueber den Gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie" (Berlin, 1836) pp. 93-110
These posts are: observation posts, supporting posts, and ‘standing’ posts.
a. With observation and supporting posts
The observation posts have the task to observe the area between the own and enemy army, and to discover movement of the latter. These posts would not have to be defended, but often they would have to be maintained for some time.
The supporting posts have to support and cover the observation posts, as well as the advanced pickets or other detachments, or to receive these during their retreat. Both kind of posts have to move quickly, especially during retreat. So when artillery is necessary, it should be horse artillery.
During the 1794 campaign at the Rhine, Field Marshal Graf von Kalkreuth took up positions on the Kuhberg near Neukirchen. The greatest part of the troops, especially cavalry, was in cantonments in order to spare them. To receive message in time of any enemy approach advanced posts, consisting of two hussar squadrons of the Regiment ‘Von Köhler’, commanded by the then Major von Prittwitz, were placed on the road to Saarlouis. These posts had to observe this road, and keep the enemy occupied during a possible advance, for which task two cannon of the Horse Artillery Battery ‘Von Lange’ had been assigned.
Later, this army corps took up position near Martinshöhe and the Rosenköpfchen. An advanced post was positioned at Hitschenhausen, consisting of two squadrons of the Dragoon Regiment ‘Von Anspach-Baireuth’, commanded by the then Major von Schäffer, reinforced with two cannon of the battery mentioned above. Its task was to observe the area from Schwarzbach and the Scheidenburger Bruch, through which the road from Homburg over Ramstein to Kaiserlautern led.
When in the month May 1793, General Houchard advanced with a superior force from St. Imbert and Röhrbach against the Corps of Fürst Hohenlohe standing on the Carlsberg near Homburg; forcing it from there with his superior numbers and manoeuvres, during the night before the retreat of the Corps to Kaiserslautern posts were advanced against Homburg and Erbach. To support these, a strong detachment of Hessian troops was placed at the foot of the Carlsberg, reinforced with a cannon of the battery mentioned above, commanded by myself [i.e. Monhaupt].
The posts first mentioned received the task to hamper the enemy advance for a considerable distance. Therefore, they had to advance [to the enemy] with great speed, keeping him busy in the covered terrain and in this way slowing him down. When this goal had been reached they had to retreat to Wibelskirchen quickly, where an infantry battalion was positioned. Obviously, to reach the goal mentioned, beside the cavalry a fire arm was needed, and this could only be the horse artillery, because of its speed and adroitness under all circumstances, and because these troops were not to engage in any serious fighting.
The case mentioned took place at the post of Hitschenhausen. One wanted to hamper the enemies’ defile across the Schwarzbach and the Scheidenburger Bruch; after that, a speedily retreat would have to be executed, which would become especially dangerous when the enemy would force its way at Schöneberg at the same time.
With the posts at the foot of the Carlsberg one wanted to support the posts that had been advanced to Homburg and Erbach, and to cover their retreat, as well as masking the march of the army corps. These supporting posts therefore needed artillery, and because of the crowding it would find itself in during a retreat (when discovered by the enemy early), this should be horse artillery.
b. ‘Standing’ posts
‘Standing’ posts are troop detachments, with which certain points of the terrain are occupied, which in fact are part of the position of the army; because with these posts one is able to continue the offensive, or to hold its position, as was the case with the posts near Kettrich when the Duke of Brunswick was in position near Pirmasens in August 1793. In addition, with the posts at the Kreuzberg near Zweibrücken, while Hohenlohe’s Corps was in position near Homburg. Or such as with which communications are maintained, as the posts at Ronnenbuscher Hof, while Hohenlohe’s Corps was in position near Homburg. The posts mentioned first gave the Duke of Brunswick the freedom to push into the Vosges; in the second case, Hohenlohe’s Corps was enabled to hold its position near Homburg. In the latter case, communications between the posts on the Kreuzberg and the troops near Homburg was maintained.
Such posts must be held. Therefore, the necessary measures must be taken to enable this. They must be occupied with a sufficient force and be supported quickly.
In no case, horse artillery may be utilised to occupy such a post itself, but it should be held ‘at hand’ at the most effective location, especially when more of such posts are maintained, or when the whole position consists of such posts. To occupy such posts one should utilise foot artillery, because this is more suited to defend positions. The speed of the horse artillery enables one to support these posts quickly, or to attack an enemy which already has broken through the line and to throw it back. An example will illustrate this even more.
During the middle of August 1793, the French army of the Rhine had retreated to the borders of Lorraine and Alsace, taking up positions to cover these provinces. Were these positions were, as well as the Prussian positions at that time, one can find in the description of the battle of Pirmasens by Lieutenant-General von Grawert, and in the appendix to this description, were the position of Hohenlohe’s Corps is described by the then Major von Massenbach.
The latter Corps –which headquarters was in Homburg-- had to defend a large frontage. To the right, it stretched to Altstadt and Limbach; to the left to Zweibrücken and Nieder-Auerbach.
The roads from Zweibrücken over Martinshöhe and Landstuhl; as well as the road from Homburg over Hauptstuhl, and the road from Homburg over Jägersburg and Schöneberg, had to be covered. For that purpose, posts were placed on the Kreuzberg near Zweibrücken, Ronnenbuscher Hof, on the Klosterkopf, Kaninchenberge and Weberberge, and near Altstadt and Limbach. The post on the Kreuzberg covered the main road from Zweibrücken over Martinshöhe to Kaiserslautern, and secured at the same time the positions near Homburg. When the enemy would be able to dislodge this post quickly and advance to Martinshöhe speedily, the whole position near Homburg would be turned. And when the enemy would act cunningly, the forces of Kaiserslautern would also be cut off. In this way, the Prussian army would have been separated 1), and the result of all this would be devastating when the French army would be strong enough and ably led. How the attack would have to take place is described above. It remains to be noted that the enemy occupied the Bubenhauser heights, and indeed all heights forming the valleys of the Erbach (on the left bank) and the Blies (on the right bank), having positioned advanced posts here. These advanced posts were at cannon shot from the posts on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof, separated of them by the valley of the Erbach.
With its posts, the enemy possessed the Schmalscheides (a forest between Neu-Hornbach and Zweibrücken), and it was impossible for the posts on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof to acquire information about what happened on the other side of the Erbach. If therefore the enemy would struck camps near Hornbach and Blieskastel at nightfall, they could be at Einöde village and the Ronnenbuscher Hof, in front of Zweibrücken and the Kreuzberg before daybreak, ready for the attack at a cannon shot distance, to undertake it at daybreak before anyone on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof knew what was happening. Therefore, it was a big mistake to occupy the posts on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof with three infantry battalions, five hussar squadrons, and a horse artillery battery 2), and to regard them as advanced posts for about six weeks. Then quite some time after the battle of Pirmasens, and only then after the enemy at a certain morning at daybreak (when on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof still everyone was quiet in their tents) attacked Zweibrücken and Einöde village, these posts were occupied permanently with five battalions and two infantry companies, and a half 12-pdr and a 6-pdr heavy artillery battery 3). In this way, with the weakness of Hohenlohe’s Corps, the posts were occupied with a sufficient force. However, the whole position of this Corps (properly consisting now of posts only) was divided in two main parts; the one near Homburg and the one near Zweibrücken. The former consisted of the posts on the Weberberg and the Kaninchenberg, the Klosterkopf, near Benden and near Altstadt and Limbach; the latter consisted of posts on the Kreuzberg and at Ronnebuscher Hof and near Nieder-Auerbach.
Both main parts were separated from each other by a strong defile, which began near Schwarzacker, and which ran into the Martinshöhe area. As such, they [i.e. both main parts] were only connected directly to each other by the chaussee from Homburg over Schwarzacker to Zweibrücken, and by a side road which crossed the defile near Kirchberg. The chaussee however, which ran over Schwarzacker and through the Erbach valley, was covered even by small arms fire of the enemy on the heights on the other side, and therefore not useful as a line of communications. So the only road left was the one over Kirchberg; a detour of two hours when one wanted to give mutual support.
As such, it was especially necessary not to use the horse artillery of this Corps, which consisted of two batteries, to occupy posts of these positions, deploying them for their defence, but to keep them ‘at hand’ together with the cavalry, in order to have them ready to support those posts.
After the changes of position had taken place as described, these horse artillery was distributed the following way. One battery camped with the Dragoon Regiments ‘Von Schmettau’ and ‘Von Katt’ near Benden, to have them at hand when the enemy would try to break through between Altstadt and Klein-Ottweiler. Of the other battery, one half stood near Altstadt and Limbach, the other half in posts near Nieder-Auerbach.
The intention which one had with the horse artillery near Benden, made its presence necessary there. That was not the case with the other battery. Near Altstadt stood three battalions, which had to defend their posts, together with a heavy 6-pdr [foot] battery in a position on the heights, with the Blies in front –a river which by itself, and because of the over 300 paces wide and very wet pastures on both river banks was not practicable to cross-- to defend the causeway from Altstadt to Limbach and its bridge across the Blies. The half horse artillery battery could therefore be spared, especially while the one at Benden was in the vicinity. The other half [horse artillery battery] however stood in position near Nieder-Auerbach, a duty which could have been better done by a half foot battery of heavy 6-pdr’s. These could have been taken from the post on the Kreuzberg and the Ronnenbuscher Hof, their place taken by the eight battalion guns which were present there. Maybe they could also have been spared near Altstadt, because this post could be supported easily by the vicinity of the main corps, and the one of Graf von Kalkreuth.
The second horse artillery battery, together with the five squadrons of the Hussar Regiment ‘Von Eben’, should be held ‘at hand’ in Kirchberg, or somewhat more forward near Zweibrücken; in this way, they would be at hand to be able to support the posts of Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof, and near Nieder-Auerbach. Or be able to concentrate both [horse artillery] batteries and the whole cavalry in a matter of 45 minutes, to be used as a whole on a certain spot to give a strong punch.
Footnotes:
1) During this time, the Duke of Brunswick
stood near Pirmasens.
2) From these troops, the Grenadier
Battalion ‘Von Romberg’, the Fusilier Battalion ‘Von Ernst’, and the half Horse
Artillery Battery ‘Von Lange’ stood on the Kreuzberg; the Fusilier Battalion
‘Von Thadden’ however, beside the other half of the Horse Artillery Battery
‘Von Lange’, stood near Ronnenbuscher Hof. Both posts were only separated by a
small stretch of ground. The hussars cantoned in Kirchberg.
3) An not as it is in the description:
“Initially, only the half Horse Artillery Battery ‘Von Lange’ stood on the
Kreuzberg. Because the enemy brought heavy cannon on the Bubenhauser heights
from time to time, firing with these not only at Zweibrücken city, but also at
the Kreuzberg, the hereditary prince not only placed the half Foot Battery ‘Von
Berneck’ on the Kreuzberg near Zweibrücken at the brick-yard [‘Ziegelei’], but
also requested to the Graf von Kalkreuth three Brummer [i.e. 12-pdr cannon],
which also were posted there.”
Further: “initially greater
part of the corps, being three battalions of the [Infantry] Regiment ‘Von
Hohenlohe’, the Grenadier battalion ‘Von Schladen’, the 2nd battalion [of the
Infantry Regiment] ‘Graf von Herzberg’, and the 1st and 2nd battalion [of the
Infantry Regiment] ‘Von Romberg’ stood on the Weberberg in front of Homburg. To
maintain communications with this camp and the camp on the Kreuzberg, on the
heights near Ronnenbuscher Hof stood the Fusilier Battalion ‘Von Thadden’, and
the second half of the [Foot Artillery] Battery ‘von Berneck’. Later some minor
changes took place; the 2nd battalion [of the Infantry Regiment] ‘Graf von
Herzberg’, and the two musketeer battalions [of the Infantry Regiment] ‘Von
Romberg’ moved from the camp on the Weberberg to the heights near Ronnenbuscher
Hof, to the remaining both companies of the Fusilier Battalion ‘Von Thadden’.”
© Geert van Uythoven