Monhaupt’s ‘About the use of
horse artillery’
(‘Ueber den gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie’)
part 5: Horse artillery in positions and in entrenchments
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Source: "Ueber den Gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie" (Berlin, 1836) pp. 63-82
c. In positions
In positions and in camp, the horse artillery always should be ‘at hand’, to enable its use according to the circumstances. But it may never, except when in great peril, deployed there, because this way it will be restricted to its position, and its strength, i.e. its speed and adroitness, will be lost and the army deprived from the support it could receive when the horse artillery would be held ‘at hand’.
In 1794, Marshal Kalkreuth decided to take up positions with his army corps on the Rochusbergen, near Bingen. The horse artillery was ordered to stay ‘at hand’. Finally together with ten dragoon squadrons it had to take post behind the positions of the remaining troops. Shortly afterwards, the same disposition could be observed in position near Ingelheim.
When, on the contrary, the Fürst von Hohenlohe in 1793 took up positions near Ramstein with his army corps (consisting of 13 battalions, 30 squadrons, and beside the regimental artillery, 3 foot and 2 horse artillery batteries), part of the horse artillery was assigned to take up position to cover the road coming from Ramstein and leading to Vogelwehe. Another part stood left of Ramstein village, also in position, and finally the remainder in the entrenched post at Hitschenhausen.
Despite the fact that the position at Ramstein was not to be defended, while it was only taken up to be able to observe the movement of the enemy more clearly; while this position was only taken up with the intention to deceive the enemy: it still was a mistake to deploy the horse artillery as described, because in this way wrong dispositions became common good within the army. And all that while this arm could be used with much more advantage. That this was not the case, and that the advantages of horse artillery were not known, is proved by the way it was utilised regularly, and is especially illustrated by the position this corps took up at Lauterecken later on, a position which had to be defended. The Fürst von Hohenlohe took up this position only a few days before the capture of Mayence [Mainz], after having been forced to abandon his position near Ramstein by the movement of the enemy.
The position at Lauterecken was a strong one by nature. The right wing rested on very mountainous terrain, which raised very steep between the Glan and the Odenbach. Its front was covered by the Glan, as well as the left wing by the Lauter and Lauterecken itself. The complete horse artillery, except for a half battery, was deployed in positions behind and to the right of Lauterecken. The half battery was assigned to deploy on a high slope on a projected part of the high terrain, on which the right wing rested. Because of the steep slope, it was not possible to move the guns to their assigned position from the front. Therefore, they had to move far behind the whole position, to climb up from behind, and to descend again, lowering the guns into their positions with ropes.
At that time (during the siege of Mayence [Mainz]), the Fürst von Hohenlohe mainly received assignments during which his corps was usually divided and exposed. In addition, he could not count on any support. Therefore, it was even more necessary to form a support element within his own army corps, to which purpose especially the 30 [cavalry] squadrons and both horse artillery batteries would have served best – the corps was sufficiently provided with artillery. Taking this in account, the use this general made from the horse artillery was a mistake twice.
d. In entrenchments
After what already has been said about the use of horse artillery in positions, it is really not necessary to say something about its use in entrenchments. It remains only to be pointed out that the situation could make it necessary that the horse artillery, for its own protection, would be placed behind a parapet. Because the goal of entrenchments is not compatible with the characteristics of horse artillery. It may be obvious that pointing out this would not be necessary. However, experience has learned that in many instances such mistakes were made. During the campaign of 1793 on the Rhine, in the ‘Hohenlohe’ Corps near Käshofen in the vicinity of Zweibrücken, part of the [horse] artillery was deployed in closed entrenchments. The same happened with another part of the same on the post near Hitschenhausen.
However, it is not always the commanding general who is to blame, when the artillery is utilised in an inefficient way in some cases. In many cases, cause are the wrong opinions with the artillery itself, by which wrong dispositions are produced. The post at Hitschenhausen for example which just has been mentioned, was an advanced post from the positions at Ramstein, where the main army was deployed, with the purpose of hampering the advance of the enemy through the defiles of the Schwarzbach and the Scheidenburger Bruchs. But properly, to fulfil the intention because of which the army stood near Ramstein (to observe the movements of the enemy) to the utmost. In any case, a speedy retreat from Hitschenhausen to Ramstein would have to be executed (which really took place when the enemy advanced). While the terrain that had to be covered in such a case was much broken, and the distance between to places was two hours, it was rightly decided to occupy this post with light guns. And while the foot artillery at this time was armed with heavy 6-pdr and 12-pdr guns, one was obliged to utilise horse artillery because of the lack of light guns.
Such inconveniences, which in the above examples are of a minor importance, in many cases could have a disadvantageous influence on the outcome of the battle. They arise when all matters regarding the artillery are left to unmilitary persons, or persons without any battle experience. If one would have been convinced of the truth of this statement, or would have known his men better, in 1806 not the whole foot artillery would have been equipped with 12-pdr cannon, and would not have appeared in the field armed as such in general, to the astonishment of the complete military world. How is it possible that one believed to be able to abstract the armament from the field artillery out of the results of the experiments at Neuenhagen in 1796, from which was ascertained that the grape-shot of a 12-pdr exceeded that of a 6-pdr? The effect of a single grape-shot of various calibres has been ascertained, in case it was not known before. And of course knowing this is important to know when using artillery in the open. But when ascertaining the armament of the field artillery, which especially in the Prussian army should be calculated for offensive action, totally other aspects beside the effect of grape-shot have also to be considered. If this effect would be the only aspect, one would be wrong in not utilising ‘faule Grethe’ or ‘großen Christoph’ again; these would have even better results.
In battle, an artilleryman obviously cannot fire at longer ranges as within a certain effect is assured. This is, according to the terrain 800 – 1,500 paces. Only on level terrain, with solid ground, range with a certain effect is 300 – 500 paces more, because the roundshot will not be fixed when hitting the ground. However, experience learns that in regard to the effect, at such distances the 12-pdr cannon have no advantage over the 6-pdr’s: because the fact that a roundshot of a 12-pdr cannon has deeper penetration is insignificant, because in battle on does not want to smash, only to disable for the day of battle. The advantage of a smaller deviation of its line of fire of a 12-pdr roundshot is insignificant, and when firing at a specific target is totally removed by the fact that a 6-pdr is easier to load and aim because of its lesser weight, and therefore is able to fire more roundshot at the enemy in the same period of time. That a 12-pdr is able to fire its roundshot 600 – 800 paces further then a 6-pdr has no influence on the outcome of the battle, and has no influence on the situation in which one finds itself; then a hit at such distance is purely accidental, and a soldier of the army which has campaigned 20 years or more, will not run for the whistle and the striking of such roundshot. What in any case is the result of artillery fire at a greater ranges, has learned the cannonade of Valmy. There, two of the best trained artilleries fought, firing for several hours thousands of roundshot at each other. Despite that, the situation was not altered, and total loss of the French army was only 500 men, despite being placed in six columns behind each other, and while the Prussian artillery was mostly armed with 12-pdr’s.
When discussing the use of grape-shot by both calibres in battle, first it has to be laid down that grape-shot should only be used when its effect will double that of roundshot; this is 800 paces for both calibres. To use grape-shot at longer ranges, especially when the enemy will make great use of it and would remain in place at such range to draw fire, would deplete stock for the --for grape-shot important– range of 300 – 500 paces. This would especially be ineffective, while the calibre balls would have had a more effective effect on 1,000 – 1,200 paces against enemy artillery, and a better effect against other arms. When the 6-pdr roundshot is compared with the 12-pdr grape-shot, the order of battle of the artillery has great spaces in between, which are at least in the proportion of 3 : 1 in the most restricted terrain against the targets in line to be hit. It has however several lines behind each other: in the first [line] the guns with their crew; in the second [line] the limbers; and in the third [line] the ammunition wagons with the heavy artillery, the riding horses with the horse artillery. And all these lines have great depth. Therefore, in combat against artillery it has to be preferred to aim for an effect in depth. From experiments it has been ascertained that the grape-shot of a 12-pdr cannon at 1,000 – 1,200 paces gives 7 to 4 balls that hit on a closed line. However, because a grape-shot has no effect in depth at such distances, one even cannot count, because of the spaces in between, on only a third of the effect, i.e. one or two balls that hit. The 6-pdr roundshot however keeps its full power on this range, bursting through all three artillery lines, as well as through the troops behind them, smashing everything on its path, at the same time disabling the enemy guns and as such diminishing the fighting force of the enemy in a way that cannot be compared at all with a 12-pdr grape-shot. In addition, when assuming that at distances of 1,000 – 1,200 paces those 7 – 4 balls of the 12-pdr grape-shot manage to hit the line of the other kind of troops, the 6-pdr roundshot will take away a whole squad, i.e. three men with the infantry, and two with the cavalry. When additional lines are standing behind each other, one will reach a double or even threefold effect, spreading fear evenly through all lines. When one is enfilading the enemy, or when firing at columns, the roundshot of a 6-pdr has an effect that cannot be compared at all with a 12-pdr grape-shot.
At a distance of 800 paces, on which both calibres use grape-shot, indeed the 12-pdr grape-shot has nearly double the effect compared with a 6-pdr. However, a 6-pdr cannon can be loaded and aimed quicker then a 12-pdr, on solid ground and at straight direction with a proportion of 3 : 2. This proportion becomes more favourable to the 6-pdr, as soon as the ground becomes more difficult or sandy, when the 12-pdr sinks in deeper compared with the 6-pdr, and is not to compare anymore at all when the artillery has to move. While during the experiments before mentioned the best effect of the 12-pdr grape-shot has been assumed, an effect however that is totally lost in unlevelled, especially mountainous terrain at the assumed distance; while further the grape-shot fire of the foot artillery as a rule only takes place during defence, and therefore is totally out of the question during the offensive; while there is not at single example that a 6-pdr battery with its grape-shot was not able to achieve as much as a 12-pdr [battery], an equality which is caused by the higher rate of fire of the first; and finally while the foot artillery seldom fires grape-shot, --most of the foot [artillery] batteries returned from the campaigns at the Rhine without having fired a single grape-shot, although one can say that they ‘fired themselves through’ all three campaigns—so it is perfectly clear, that a 12-pdr cannon has no advantage to a 6-pdr during battle. After the above it is however very clear, that two 6-pdr cannon have a much greater effect as one 12-pdr. One is able to find a passage in Scharnhorst’s manual, where he proves that the cost of equipping and maintaining a 12-pdr cannon is double that of a 6-pdr; therefore, one would reach a much greater effect by arming the field artillery with 6-pdr cannon, at the same cost, or if this is not desired, be able to make great savings. But when also taking in account the mobility of both calibres, and the efficient arrangement for battle of the 6-pdr cannon, the latter has to be preferred much more.
The 12-pdr cannon has also the following disadvantages compared with the 6-pdr. The 12-pdr has less ammunition on its limber, and therefore, and also because of the heavier weight (of its ammunition), a 12-pdr battery needs the double amount of ammunition wagons, a necessity of which the influence is shown during marches, as illustrated during manoeuvres. It makes the guns dependable from its wagons, and provides the enemy with a greater amount of targets. Further mentioning should be made of the inconvenience with the 12-pdr cannon during movement and manhandling, driving, movement, lifting, limbering and unlimbering, loading and aiming. Which all has to take place on untracked or bad roads, sandy or difficult ground, especially during bad seasons. Accumulating disproportional, because of which all movement becomes slower and unsure. With the 12-pdr cannon, the axles are burdened very disproportional; because of this the wheels cut deeper into the soil, and the horse team has to overcome much more resistance, also because of the bigger width between both wheels, as compared with a 6-pdr cannon where the burden is better divided over both axles.
Because of the horse-team of a 12-pdr which has two horses more, without getting this way the same proportion between power and burden –because while the accumulation of power this way is disproportional, as 8 horses in one team are unable to pull the eight folded burden as one horse is able to (deriving from how power is divided, and the way how it works on the burden, of which besides the concentration of burden on one axle derives that the 12-pdr is often stuck), and while the 12-pdr is limbered directly on the centre of the axle of the limber— because of the necessity of a longer span, which hampers strategical, especially however tactical movements, or movement in front or under fire of the enemy. In this way, speed compared with the 6-pdr cannon is disproportional slower.
When also taking in account the manhandling of the 12-pdr cannon during marches when an accident should occur, limbering and unlimbering, bringing in and out of position, moving to the sides in front and under fire of the enemy manhandled, which with double burden and no twice as strong crew is very exhausting labour; one should prefer arming the foot artillery with 6-pdr cannon. It is however without doubt, that a good organised army should take a certain amount of 12-pdr cannon with it, to be able to use them in specific instances.
Form old times, the Prussian artillerymen are big friends of heavy guns, or guns of heavy calibre; the disadvantage of this has been illustrated in all wars. The slowness and the delays during column marches, and even worse, the outcome of battles such as Kunersdorf, where one was not able to bring the guns across the Mühlen- and Beckergrund to the Windmühlenberg, are clear proof. Admittedly, the worse quality of the artillery was also the cause, and the more speedily strategical and tactical movements in our times, and the speed and restlessness with which the artillery has to act nowadays, balances the relation of the previous and nowadays situation of the artillery more or less.
© Geert van Uythoven