Monhaupt’s ‘About the use of
horse artillery’
(‘Ueber den gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie’)
part 4: Horse artillery with foot artillery & with combined arms
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Source: "Ueber den Gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie" (Berlin, 1836) pp. 42-62
When the foot artillery is fighting on its own, it is whether defending a position or a post, or it is shelling a retrenchment or a solitary entrenchment, or it will attack a well positioned and well covered numerous artillery in the open. In the first case, the horse artillery should be held close ‘at hand’, in order to support a part that is weakened, or attacked with superior force, or overwhelmed. In the second case, it should not enter the fighting, because she would be ruined the same way as the foot artillery, or at least being unusable for some time, without being able to gain more. The horse artillery is with the supports of the troops destined to execute the attack that will follow. In the third case however, as soon as the foot artillery has drawn all attention and fire of the enemy artillery, the horse artillery will advance boldly, and attack the enemy artillery and its cover, to hit them hard with canister. In the so called cannonades, the horse artillery will waste its power, as was the case at Valmy.
When the army is on the march, the horse
artillery belongs to the mass [main army]: on one hand, that it will not be
fatigued by unnecessary movements, on the other hand and especially because,
that it will be there were its presence will be necessary, in detachments or as
a mass [as a whole]. Because, when the marching army is attacked unexpectedly,
the attacker is in such a disadvantageous position against the defender that
the outcome is certain; or he has approached under cover with a so numerous
force that he is convinced to be able to crush the marching enemy (the first
case took to some extent place at Auerstädt, the latter at Roßbach). Therefore,
the army that is attacked, should even when superior numbers are on his side,
immediately break off the engagement at the point that is attacked, and not add
reinforcements to the combat. Because this would serve only that the arriving
units would be defeated in detail, or would be infected by the units that are
already routing, resulting in a general rout. Instead the part of the army
which is not engaged and in good order should deploy, without even regarding
the terrain. While at such an occasion, not taking in account the terrain, but
the deployment of the troops is important. To make this possible an arm is
needed which combines adroitness and speed with the ability to ranged combat,
and this is the horse artillery. If it is, as has been pointed out, ‘at hand’
in mass with the main army, it will speed towards the enemy, and while part of
it occupies the dominating terrain, to cover the approach of the army and to
cover the defeated troops, the other part engages the
enemy, to hamper his advance and to create disorder, during which it does not
matter if a few hundred of our own people will be killed in the process.
In this way it will be possible to continue the combat, or when a bad outcome
is expected, to retreat without great loss.
a. With the advance guard
When the army marches against the enemy, a
horse artillery detachment belongs to the advance guard; because it is often
necessary to capture terrain, or a post, speedily, or to attack an enemy
advance post quickly.
When
in 1806, the Prussian army marched from Weimar to Nauburg, (probably
unexpected) in Hassenhausen the enemy was encountered. The situation was
assessed wrongly and it was believed that the main army was still far away;
because of the heavy fog nothing could be discovered. And before the main army
would arrive, one wanted to capture the terrain around Hassenhausen. To reach
this goal, a horse artillery battery and ten dragoon squadrons of the advance
guard were quickly dispatched forward, to dispel the enemy and to maintain
position on the far side of the place. This was, in accordance to what is
described above, the right way to use the horse artillery, and illustrates the
advantage of it with the advance guard. That the fore mentioned combat however
was unlucky, and that the horse artillery battery was destroyed, was not caused
by the way it was used, but by the way it was led in battle.
b. With the rear guard
When the army is withdrawing from the
enemy, horse artillery is necessary with the rear guard, and on every plain or
broken terrain this arm will perform as a whole, in a way the horse artillery
is able to do during rear guard fighting.
When during the end of the 1793 campaign,
the Prussian army retreated form the Alsace and Lorraine borders to Mainz, the
great road which leads over Kron-Weissenburg, Neustadt, and Grünstadt, to Mainz,
was covered by General von Dermann with three fusilier battalions, some jäger
companies, 15 hussar squadrons, and a horse artillery battery. This rear corps
had arrived at Neustadt on 31 December at noon, after having fought several
lucky engagements. As it appeared that the enemy had given up the pursuit and
had retreated, the troops were billeted in and around Neustadt. Not two hours
had passed, when at once the enemy appeared. After the alarm the troops
collected, except for two fusilier battalions which had been quartered in
Mosbach, somewhat at the heights behind Winzig, about 1,500 paces left of
Neustadt. The concentration point of the corps was the only place were troops
could be deployed, because the vineyards made all surrounding terrain, up to
Wachenheim, military impassable.
The
troops had just been collected when the enemy started the fighting with his
artillery on the opposite heights, at the same time pushing through Neustadt
against the chaussee. I had received orders to cover this [the chaussee], and
to prevent the enemy from debouching through the gates of Neustadt, with two
cannon of the horse artillery battery ‘Langen’. Initially, because of the lack
of troops, I had only received an NCO and 12 hussars as cover; later on, this
cover was reinforced with an officer and 30 hussars, and soon after with a
fusilier company. While however the enemy at the same time penetrated left of
Neustadt, along the hills, the cover left me to hamper the advance there.
General
Hermann realized that the movement of the enemy threatened his retreat, and so
he retreated to Deidesheim. I received however the order to maintain my
position as long as possible, until the whole corps behind me had left, and
then to act as the rear guard.
The
terrain in front of me favoured my defence (vineyards surrounded with high
walls, between which the chaussee climbs up to my position, hampering the
advance and the fire of the enemy infantry, and his cavalry could only advance
on my front, in column [along the chaussee]). After the corps had retreated a
long distance along the chaussee, which continuously ran between vineyards,
making every advance, even that from the infantry, impossible, the order to
retreat was yelled at me from a distance. I was strongly pushed by then. In
addition, one of the twelve hussars which I had dispatched to General Dermann
to ask for reinforcements (a request which was not complied with), had spread
the rumour that the enemy cavalry had been between my cannon. This was not the
case. The enemy cavalry made three charges, but only because they had deceived
me, they managed to come at 200 paces of my position during the first charge.
I
had only just began my retreat, when enemy horse artillery deployed on the open
spot near Winzig, and started shelling me without effect. His cavalry also
started advancing. The latter forced me to dismount during the retreat and to
beat off the attack. The chaussee now ran over hilly terrain, and this enabled
the enemy cavalry to stay in my vicinity all the time, while his artillery fire
still annoyed me. Therefore, from now on I retreated ‘en échiquer’
[alternately, one gun after the other], and in this way I succeeded in keeping
the enemy cavalry at a safe distance.
After
having retreated this way for about half an hour, I received the order to halt,
to cover the corps which had to defile along a hollow road, the vineyards
preventing any other way. I also managed to get away luckily this time.
However, if I had not received the order to retreat in time I would have been
captured, because several enemy infantrymen had arrived, and made their way
through the vineyards against my flank and back. From here, I continued my
retreat more quickly to Mosbach village, were I found two fusilier companies,
with which I covered the advance of the corps behind Mosbach, and after that
united with the battery again.
From
Mosbach on, the retreat was continued to Deidesheim during continuous fighting,
in which the horse artillery, now commanded by the present-day Major Lange,
almost continuously fought alone because of the fact that the more open terrain
still was intersected with vineyards. The same could not have been achieved by
any other arm.
While General Blücher was marching from
Strelitz to Lübeck, I was ordered to the rear guard with two cannon of the
horse artillery battery ‘Hahn’, and attached to the ‘Blücher’ Hussar Regiment.
On 12 November [1806] in the morning, before eight, this regiment moved at the
same time as the remaining troops of the rear guard commanded by General
Winning, through the Wahren pass. The rear guard of Winning, commanded by
General von Plötz, moved through Wahren itself on the road to Schwerin. The
Regiment ‘Blücher’ however moved along a secondary road right of this town.
During
the last night, the enemy had closed in by forced march, and arrived at this
moment before the town with his whole cavalry, and heavy fighting ensued
between the head of the enemy [column] and five squadrons of the ‘Köhler’
Hussars.
If
one follows the road from Wahren to Schwerin, it leads trough a fir-wood a
short while after the [Wahren] town, at about 400 paces. Behind this forest is
a wide plain, which the road crosses for 2,000 to 2,500 paces on level ground,
after which it passes as a small road between two huge lakes, after which there
are a number of level hills.
The
enemy cavalry followed Winning’s rear guard through Wahren, crossed the
fir-wood that was mentioned, and deployed in front of it.
The
‘Blücher’ Regiment had followed its own [secondary] road, and found itself at
this time level with the enemy cavalry, maybe at 800 paces distance, masked by
a row of heights.
While
I had remained before Wahren in person for some time, observing the advance of
the enemy, and convinced that he was completely unaware about the march of the
‘Blücher’ Regiment, I proposed to stay in cover, to attack the enemy cavalry,
which was indeed very strong but without any support of infantry and artillery,
in the back, to cut it off from the forest and to place it between two fires.
This proposal was however turned down, and the regiment formed up and advanced
against the right flank of the enemy. While General von Plötz at the same time
was charging in front with 15 squadrons, the enemy was defeated and driven back
through the forest, without any loss to ourselves. I was with the [Blücher] Regiment, to be able to support it
when an emergency would occur, and had followed it to the forest. Now I moved
to the road, to cover the same [cavalry] reforming. While I expected much the
enemy cavalry to be much disordered, I rode into the forest to see if I could
reach the other side covered by the trees, to decide if I could do some more
harm to them. I found out that this was impossible to pass the forest itself
because of the thicket, but was assured at the same time that because of this
the enemy cavalry could only advance on the road itself again. I also observed
that the enemy cavalry had reformed already for the greater part, and that
numerous infantry and artillery columns were present between the forest and the
town. I rode back, to cover the further retreat of the cavalry. At my arrival,
the ‘Blücher’ Regiment had already turned back over the heights, and from there
had already retreated further before the fire of an enemy battery which had moved
left around the forest, and had deployed on a height there, that we were
already separated from each other by a wooded height. The cavalry of General
von Plötz had just resumed its retreat.
I
expected that the enemy cavalry, supported by artillery and infantry, would
advance again soon, which would be very disadvantageous to the Plötz’s cavalry.
And even when they would not be chased into the lakes, the victory which just
had been won, and the self-confidence that had been gained by this, would have been
lost. Therefore I decided to mask the exit of the forest as long as possible,
until the cavalry had retreated long enough to be out of danger. To hide my
weakness for the enemy and to surprise him –the only means I had to reach my
goal and to protect myself- I gathered, with the aid of the present-day Major
Eisenhart and another, unknown officer, 15-20 hussars which were still
wandering about in the vicinity, and placed these in one rank in front of my
cannon, to mask them.
After
this arrangement had been made, a while later the enemy advanced again, but
halted and formed up when noticing the hussars. While I was told by a hussar
which I had dispatched forward to the edge of the forest, that the enemy was
moving up artillery, I unmasked my artillery and opened fire, with such effect
that in a few seconds the road was empty again.
After
having scared away the enemy this way, I remained in position for some time,
until I observed that Plötz’s infantry and horse artillery had reached the
heights behind the lakes and deployed. The cavalry however had reached the
lakes, after which I retreated slowly. Without being hampered further by the
enemy, beside the fire of a few cannon of the battery already mentioned above
which had advanced further, but which had no effect.
After
I also had arrived at Plötz’s positions, I noticed that the ‘Blücher’ Regiment
stood to the left of these, at a distance of about 2,000 paces. The enemy had
extended all his troops between both roads, and advance everywhere. I moved
along the enemy front, to reach the [‘Blücher’] Regiment again, and with this I
continued the retreat on terrain that was raising all the time. When we reached
the top, we found a deep defile behind us, in which a causeway of about 500
paces long was situated, nearly parallel with the height mentioned, leading to
a wide plain. On the other side, the causeway was enclosed by a great lake.
In
this defile, at the beginning of the causeway, an important height is situated
–which however can be completely overseen from the height in front of it- on
which General Oswald, which commanded our rear guard proper, had deployed three
grenadier battalions and the remaining part of his fusilier brigade. While I
believed that these troops were able to retreat trough a village situated
behind this height, I followed the ‘Blücher’ Regiment on the causeway, and
dispatched an officer who I came across, with the message that the enemy
followed use closely, with horse artillery at the front.
When
the ‘Blücher’ Regiment arrived on the plain it deployed against the defile. But
because I noticed that the infantry, which was just leaving its positions, not
was able to retreat through the village but had to follow on the causeway, and
they enemy already had arrived on the heights, I returned into the defile and
deployed on a high sand hill. From here I was able to cover the whole terrain
between the causeway and the heights, already occupied by the enemy, as well as
the heights itself. In this way I was able to hamper the attack of the enemy
against the marching infantry column.
The
enemy artillery fire disordered the queue [‘tail’] of the column, and
then a column of enemy cavalry appeared behind a great farmstead, to descend
into the valley and to attack our infantry unnoticed by these. At this decisive
moment I opened fire at them with both cannon, after which they [the cavalry]
immediately retreated behind the farmstead again. When the infantry had passed
the defile safely, I followed them, and united again with the Hussar Regiment
‘Blücher’.
Both examples suffice to prove, what has
been stated, that when with the rear guard no arm will be able to accomplish
what the horse artillery is able too.
When
a marching army needs flank cover, it should receive, like the advance and rear
guards, horse artillery.
© Geert van Uythoven