Monhaupt’s ‘About the use of horse artillery’
(‘Ueber den gebrauch der
reitenden Artillerie’)
part 1: Introduction
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Note: Around 1808,
only published after his death, the (later) Lieutenant-General Monhaupt wrote
an in-depth thesis, including historical examples, about the use of horse
artillery. When writing this thesis, Monhaupt had already sixteen years
experience in the Prussian army, and had participated in several campaigns, not
without distinction. As such, this thesis gives an interesting insight in the
contemporary views about the horse artillery, and its use in battle, in relation
to the other arms.
As the contents are connected to other pieces on my website under ‘Revolutionary Wars’, and most examples are from this period, I have decided to insert the thesis here.
Source: "Ueber den Gebrauch der
reitenden Artillerie"
(Berlin, 1836) pp. 1-18
"If one wants
to establish the use of horse artillery, it is necessary to investigate its
powers and other characteristics beforehand. Its powers consist of its speed
and adroitness. Speed means, that it is able to move quickly, over great
distances, able to execute quick movements in the face and under fire of the
enemy. Especially while executing the latter it [i.e. the horse artillery] is
not surpassed by the cavalry, because these have to ride in close formation in
battle during all movement, and save energy and breath; therefore they can only
move at the trot or gallop, except for the shock, speeds that always can be
followed by the horse artillery. Experience has
learned that the horse artillery is able to keep up with the cavalry for
distances of several thousand paces, even for miles.
This is the natural result of the situation the
cavalry finds itself in during strategical and tactical movements; as the
cavalry horses also have a heavy burden to carry. The order of the cavalry also
has to be maintained during the most fatiguing forced marches, breath and
energy has to be saved, even more as for the horse artillery. Otherwise the
cavalry, when they have to engage in combat directly after such a march, will
find itself in a precarious situation; instead, the horses of the horse
artillery have the time to regain their breath and powers once combat has
started.
During the combat
near Wald-Algisheim (27th March 1793), the horse artillery battery of the
present-day Major Lange was attached to the Cavalry Regiments ‘Herzog von
Weimar’ and ‘von Lottum’, which the Herzog von Weimar led against the Neiwinger
Cavalry. The combat began on the great chaussee between Roth village and the
Erbacher Hofe. The enemy was defeated and pursued to Wald-Labersheim, a
distance of about an hour. During this engagement the Battery von Lange
followed the cavalry all the time, although they came from Schöneberg, and had
covered the road from Schöneberg to Stromberg in a hurry just before, without
having had the time to catch their breath.
The same battery was, together with the
Hussar Regiment ‘von Eben’ (30th March 1793), thrown back from the Esselsborner
heights to behind the paper mill of Alzel, a distance of more then half an
hour, without delaying the hussar regiment, although it was necessary to defile
nearly the whole distance.
The same battery, beside the one of the
present-day Major von Hahn, together with the Dragoon Regiments ‘von Schmettau’
and ‘von Katt’ (27th December 1793) left a position at Bergzabern and retreated
about 3,000 paces, to redeploy on this side of Bergzabern, and to engage the
enemy which turned our left flank. The horse artillery arrived at the same time
as both dragoon regiments, although the cavalry rode as fast as possible.
In the year 1794, I was attached with
two cannon of the Battery ‘Lange’ to two squadrons of the Dragoon Regiment
‘Anspach-Baireuth, at Hitschenhausen village, five hours in front of
Kaiserslautern. This post had the purpose to observe the roads of Homburg and
Zweibrücken. The enemy turned our right flank over Schonenberg and Münchweiler,
and from there easily could have cut us off over Ramstein. It may be clear that
we covered the road from Hitschenhausen to Ramstein, which has a distance of
two hours, as fast as possible. It was not necessary for the cavalry to delay
their movement because of me.
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In the
meanwhile the season, the condition of the roads, as well as the kind of soil
and its condition, of course has effect on the proportion of speed of the horse
artillery compared with that of the cavalry: however, the first will always,
even under the most unfavourable circumstances, maintain enough speed to keep
up with the latter. The horse artillery battery of Major Lange (this is the
exercise battery from Potsdam) was at the Rhine during the whole war. Although
it was, especially during the 1793 campaign, from all horse batteries that were
with the army the one that was used most often, and the most times exposed,
never the case that it was not serviceable in any way.
Further one finds, that the horse artillery is more feared then the foot artillery,
because it combines the same firepower when in position, with a much greater
ability for speed and adroitness. And because the fire of the horse
artillery is much more devastating as that from the infantry, and is combined
with the adroitness and speed of the cavalry in their movement, it will surpass
both in long range combat, and solves the problem of combining both
characteristics. This combination connects the horse artillery tight with the
cavalry, from which at the same time both arms, especially in open terrain, receive
great independence. The cavalry is withdrawn from its isolated situation, in
which they would have to evade fighting, or would be defeated, as soon as the
enemy engaged them with fire-arms. Connected with the
horse artillery, they [i.e. the cavalry] can defend themselves against all
attacks of combined arms, or attacking these as soon as they are strong
enough for not having to fear the enemy cavalry.
The only
thing, which especially could be a problem for them [i.e. the horse artillery],
are the enemy tirailleurs, when these are favoured by the terrain. In such a
case, a number of cavalrymen would have to dismount and to engage these.
Therefore, it was not right to withdraw the carbines from the dragoons.
To which profit this is, is illustrated
by the following examples.
The retreat of the
Austrian army under General Wurmser, from Hagenau, marked the end of the 1793
campaign at the Rhine. The corps of the Prussian left wing, which partially
supported the Austrians, partially maintained communications of both armies,
concentrated near Bergzabern, were also greater part of the Austrian right wing
arrived. Seven Prussian infantry battalions, besides ten dragoon squadrons and
two horse batteries, received order to cover the retreat of these troops.
Probably it was also intended to support the blockade of Landau from here by
keeping the enemy busy for some time. Finally, these troops took up positions a
quarter of a mile from Bergzabern. The right wing stood at a vineyard at the
foot of the mountain range; the centre was positioned on a row of level
heights, across which the road from Bergzabern to Kron-Weissenburg was; the
left wing was formed by the ten dragoon squadrons, to which a horse artillery
battery was attached. The other horse artillery battery was positioned just to
the right side of the road. The outposts were formed by some squadrons of the
Hussar Regiment ‘von Wolfrat’, and two Jäger companies. Already at daybreak all
remaining troops had left. At 1 o’clock in the afternoon the enemy arrived,
with great numerical superiority. Immediately the outposts were engaged and
thrown back, after which the enemy advanced to attack the right wing. But soon
it became clear of the feebleness of the attack, that the enemy only wanted to
mask his real intentions. The Duke of Brunswick, who was present, therefore
turned all his attention to the enemy right wing, whose strength and movement
could not be ascertained because of the broken terrain in which it was, and
which was situated a few thousand paces further away then the [Prussian] left
wing. Soon thereafter it was discovered that the enemy with his cavalry,
followed by infantry and artillery, was turning our left flank, marching in a
great hurry to the heights behind Zabern. If he would have succeeded in
reaching this objective, we would have been taken in the left flank and in the
back, and pushed back against the mountain range, which would have brought us
in a desperate situation. To prevent this, the cavalry and the horse artillery
received order to retreat immediately and to oppose the enemy left of Zabern.
At this occasion, there was ridden as fast as the straps would endure.
Nose-bags and port-manteau’s, carbines and pistols, hats and greatcoats were
lost during the ride. Some ammunition caissons turned over in a ditch at a
causeway, and several horsemen were ridden down. They succeeded however in
reaching Zabern before the arrival of the enemy, and took up positions, The
enemy, much surprised by this bold manoeuvre, halted and gave up the attempt.
If he however would have dared to attack, both arms would have been able to
hold them at bay long enough for the infantry to pass Zabern, and to take up
positions on the heights just behind this town.
When later during this campaign the
Prussian army advanced to the Lorraine border after the capture of Mainz
[Mayence], Fürst Hohenlohe left Laurecken with his corps to take up new
positions between Homburg and Zweibrücken. Near Küssel, were a marching camp
was arranged, or maybe earlier, message was received that an enemy corps of
about 6,000 strong was in a lightly entrenched camp near Altstädt and Limbach
village. It was decided to try to destroy this corps. For this purpose, the
whole corps would turn the left flank of the enemy, to cut it of from the Saar
[River]. A detachment of this corps however, consisting of four battalions,
five squadrons, a heavy battery and a half horse battery, commanded by General
von Eben, would have to advance from Küssel directly to the front of the enemy
camp. Probably this detachment had the task to keep the attention of the enemy
fixed, and at the same time to occupy the road which leads from Altstädt and
Limbach to Homburg, along which the enemy could retreat to either Blieskastel
or Zweibrücken. The following morning, before daybreak, the corps marched
accordingly to the above dispositions. A terrible heat caused great suffering.
Therefore, the infantry and foot artillery of General von Eben was not able to
keep up with the cavalry and horse artillery which formed the advance guard,
and lagged far behind. About a half mile from the enemy camp an enemy post was
encountered, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, about 1,200 men
strong, which had taken up position in much broken terrain. because of this,
General von Eben probably suspected that the enemy had received message from
his movements and was already marching to Homburg, the enemy post having the
task to cover this march. To try if it would be possible to prevent this, the
attack could not be delayed. The attack could be made even more safe, because
nothing was to fear from the enemy cavalry, which was only about 200 horses
strong. Therefore it was decided to attack, without waiting for the infantry to
arrive. The horse artillery, with a strength of five guns, attacked the enemy
advanced posts and threw them back. The mass of them [i.e. the enemy] had
concentrated near a solitary building at the side of the road, and the left
wing of his infantry rested on this building. Before them, two 8-pdr cannon of
his horse artillery were positioned. The right wing rested on an alder grove;
his cavalry was retreated behind this line. After having surveyed these
positions, and not having discovered any reinforcements, the horse artillery
engaged both enemy guns and drove them back after a short fight. The enemy
infantry, unsettled by this, ran away and threw themselves in an alder grove
behind their line. The enemy cavalry and the horse artillery retreated, took up
another position again after about 4,000 paces, and by their fire they
prevented a further retreat of their infantry. In this way it went all the way
back to the enemy camp, in which the enemy was still present. However, the rout
of their defeated forward post had demoralised them so much, that they left the
entrenchments in front of Altstädt, and routed across the Blies. This attack
would not have been possible without the presence of the horse artillery.
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The horse
artillery is also necessary when the cavalry charges, because the cavalry has
always to approach the enemy at sword-length, to be effective. Therefore,
cavalry combat is properly speaking close combat, and because of its physical
characteristics it is a perfect weapon to destroy infantry and artillery. To
use this quality, the enemy line must have been pierced, or the engagement
already decided and the enemy routing. In both cases, the aid of the horse
artillery is necessary; then although Von Bärenhorst proves that it is for
other arms impossible to resist a cavalry charge, experience
learns that an attack by cavalry on infantry or artillery seldom succeeds.
Cause of this is the morale weakness of which the cavalry suffers, when it has
to engage against fire-arms. One of the most striking examples of this is the
combat near Neustadt in Upper-Silesia between the Prussian Infantry Regiment
‘von Manteuffel’, and the Austrian cavalry under General von Laudon. If this
general would have had only half his cavalry, and a horse artillery battery
instead, the Regiment ‘von Manteuffel’ would not have made itself immortal in
this engagement.
Further, all cavalry combats must
succeed, in any case the cavalry never can be allowed to be chased from the
field, if their failure should have no disadvantageous results for the other
arms, i.e. for the army itself; because part of it will lose by this their
cover and support; the enemy instead receives a great superiority 1). Other
arms in different parts of the army will be ruined directly by the rout of the
cavalry. The horse artillery is able, as will be shown further on, prevent such
an occasion by its presence.
Everything that until now has been said
about the cavalry and the horse artillery, is convincing the necessary
combination of both arms: from this one should however not conclude that the
horse artillery only, or totally would be there for the cavalry, and that it is
only an expedient to make their victory easier to achieve. The use of this
weapon is versatile, as will be shown further on.
In addition the horse artillery is
there when it is necessary to disorder troops which cannot be approached, or to
keep these disordered; or when it is necessary to hamper the advance of troops,
or when the only can be reached from a distance, or when one is forced to fight
before the frontline and wants to prevent any disorder – more effective then
the cavalry, which will need to approach to sword-length. Instead, the horse
artillery is able to speed forward as quick as the cavalry, and from a safe
distance of the enemy weapons able to send death and disorder in the enemy
ranks."
1) If during the
battle of Kolin [18. June 1757] Nadasdy’s [Austrian] Cavalry not was hunted
from the field by the Prussian cavalry lead by General von Ziethen, or had the
Prussian cavalry experienced such disaster, probably the whole attack of the
Prussian army would not have taken place. In any case, the retreat afterwards
of the Prussian army would not have taken place so well.
© Geert van Uythoven