Monhaupt’s ‘About the use of horse artillery’
(‘Ueber den gebrauch der
reitenden Artillerie’)
part 2: The use of horse artillery with the infantry
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Source: "Ueber den Gebrauch der
reitenden Artillerie"
(Berlin, 1836) pp. 19-28
"It has
already been said, that the advantages which the horse artillery has over the
foot artillery, are its speed and adroitness. Therefore, its use really begins there,
were the powers of the foot artillery do not suffice anymore, i.e. when special
speed and adroitness is demanded from the artillery 1). Preferable, the horse
artillery should be kept ‘at hand’, to be deployed at once there were artillery
is necessary, and fighting there, were a special adroitness of the artillery is
necessary. How the horse artillery could be utilised most effectively beside
the foot artillery, taking in regard their powers and organisation, will be
shown here, for each arm separately.
The infantry not
only fights from a distance by using its fire-arm, but also close-combat with
the bayonet: therefore, she is decisive, not only in the attack, but also
during defence. In addition, she fights in all kinds of terrain with about the
same advantage. As an expedient to make their victory easier to achieve,
support by artillery is necessary. The movement of the infantry is in such a
way that the foot artillery is able to follow, and can achieve everything
necessary; therefore its use is much more efficient in an infantry line, as the
horse artillery. These could disorder the infantry easily by its impetuosity and
the amount of horses present, and need more space. Especially, the infantry
would lose a much more efficient kind of support this way.
a. In position
If the infantry
has to defend a position, it is efficient to deploy the foot artillery in the
line, to keep the horse artillery however ‘at hand’. The former will accomplish
everything that will be expected from artillery, while the latter is at hand to
support the attacked or overwhelmed parts of the line, or to debouch and to
attack the advancing or retreating enemy unexpectedly.
During the battle
of Torgau [3. November 1760], the Prussian infantry attacked six subsequent
times, not covered by the cavalry which was still far behind. That she was able
to do so, decided the battle in favour of the Prussian army. It would however
not having been able to do this, when the Austrian army would have had good
horse artillery ‘at hand’ on its right wing. This would have debouched after
the first attack, throwing itself from all sides on the retreating Prussian
battalions, having dispersed these, and disordered the new lines before these
even could start the attack again. They would have been able to fight in front
of the infantry without any danger. The infantry would have stayed in position,
while the cavalry would engage the Prussian cavalry when it would arrive on the
battlefield during the course of the battle.
b. When attacking
When
the infantry attacks, the attack will be executed in closed order, or ‘en
debandade’ [dispersed]. The
foot artillery will always be able to follow, and support the attack with an
effective fire, as far as possible for artillery. It is also able to negotiate
every obstacle in the terrain, for example steep height’s, deep ditches, marsh,
brushwood, etc. much easier as the horse artillery, while the artillerymen are
immediately available with the guns in great numbers. The horse artillery
however, even when using the prolonge, will not fight more advantageously as
the foot artillery, and in addition cease to be horse artillery at all. And as
already told, the huge amount of horses that are with it, can easily disorder
the infantry an need more space. Therefore, in this case the foot artillery is
much more efficient to use then the horse artillery. The latter has to be kept ‘at
hand’ during the attack, to exploit any vulnerability of the enemy, and to make
victory easier to achieve for the infantry by preparatory fire, for which it is
very useful because of its speed and adroitness. When the attack would fail,
the horse artillery will be able to delay the pursuing enemy, and to prevent
defeat.
If during the
battle of Kolin [18. June 1757], the Prussian army would have had horse
artillery ‘at hand’ attached to its attacking left wing, it could have engaged
the enemy positions immediately after the advance of the infantry, and deployed
at an effective range in such a way, that it would make the advance of the left
wing easier. Or, when it would be beaten back [i.e. the left wing], it could
have covered its retreat, and its reforming. At this occasion, it would have
chosen its terrain in such a way that it could achieve this goals by
manoeuvring, on its left covered by Hülsen’s attack, on the right by the
following wing of the army. If the attack of the infantry would have been
beaten back, they would only take back its left wing, and by this being able to
take the Saxon and Austrian cavalry which advanced in pursuit in the right
flank. Such a manoeuvre of the horse artillery would have supported the attack
enormously. Possibly, the attack of the Saxon cavalry would also have been
prevented by this. The latter [i.e. the horse artillery] would not have decided
the battle in favour of the Prussian army, but it would have prevented the
defeat of the Regiments on the left wing.
c. During the retreat
When
the infantry retreats, the retreat will be executed in closed order, or ‘en
debandade’ [dispersed]. Of the
utmost importance is that order is maintained. So any pursuit of the enemy,
especially by their cavalry, must be prevented by the artillery, in such a way
that the infantry does not have to turn and form front and fire to often,
through which cohesion is lost and disorder is caused. At such occasions, the artillery
is from distance to distance divided behind the infantry line. Or is with the
square’s if the retreat takes place in this formation, to keep the enemy at bay
with their fire. In this occasion, the use of foot artillery is to prefer over
the horse artillery for the same reasons as pointed out with the attack,
especially in broken terrain. In this situation, the horse artillery has again
to be held ‘ at hand’, to support the points that are pressed hardest, to cover
the flanks and the back, and to occupy the dominating points of the terrain as
long as possible to facilitate the retreat.
Fouquet’s corps
was defeated at Landshut because of its bad situation and the superiority of
the enemy. In fact, it was defeated because the enemy cavalry reached the
defile of Landshut partly before, partly together with the defeated Prussian
troops. However, this defeat could maybe have been prevented, if General
Fouquet would have had horse artillery. When it, immediately after al hope on victory
had to be abandoned, would have speeded back through the defile, occupying the
heights behind Landshut and moving in all directions, it would have been able
to prevent the advance of the enemy. By this, and anyway under their
protection, the infantry would have gained time to pass the defile and to reach
these heights also, reform again there, and then to continue the retreat to
Schweidnitz. Probably all troops would have reached this place, especially when
the horse artillery and cavalry would have held their position for some time.
1) For what reason would one use the horse artillery anyway,
when the powers of the foot artillery suffice, or are even more effective as those
of the horse artillery? Especially because raising and maintaining it is,
related to other arms, very considerable, as their provision in the field is
also much more considerable. An army burdened with it, would feel its presence
soon, as will the State. Therefore, not so few horse artillery should be
present with the army, that half of it would go down by having to be
everywhere, while on the other hand so much is dragged along that it is not
understood for what it is there, while one by using foot artillery would be
able to reach the same results.
© Geert van Uythoven