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To John Adams Monticello, Aug. 15, 1820
I am a great defaulter, my dear Sir, in our correspondence, but
prostrate health rarely permits me to write; and, when it does,
matters of business imperiously press their claims. I am getting
better however, slowly, swelled legs being now the only serious
symptom, and these, I believe, proceed from extreme debility. I can
walk but little; but I ride 6. or 8. miles a day without fatigue; and
within a few days, I shall endeavor to visit my other home, after a
twelve month's absence from it. Our University, 4 miles distant,
gives me frequent exercise, and the oftener as I direct it's
architecture. It's plan is unique, and it is becoming an object of
curiosity for the traveller. I have lately had an opportunity of
reading a critique on this institution in your North American Review
of January last, having been not without anxiety to see what that
able work would say of us: and I was relieved on finding in it much
coincidence of opinion, and even, where criticisms were indulged, I
found they would have been obviated had the developements of our plan
been fuller. But these were restrained by the character of the paper
reviewed, being merely a report of outlines, not a detailed treatise,
and addressed to a legislative body, not to a learned academy. E.g.
as an inducement to introduce the Anglo-Saxon into our plan, it was
said that it would reward amply the few weeks of attention which
alone would be requisite for it's attainment; leaving both term and
degree under an indefinite expression, because I know that not much
time is necessary to attain it to an useful degree, sufficient to
give such instruction in the etymologies of our language as may
satisfy ordinary students, while more time would be requisite for
those who would propose to attain a critical knolege of it. In a
letter which I had occasion to write to Mr. Crofts (who sent you, I
believe, as well as myself, a copy of his treatise on the English and
German languages, as preliminary to an Etymological dictionary he
meditated) I went into explanations with him of an easy process for
simplifying the study of the Anglo-Saxon, and lessening the terrors,
and difficulties presented by it's rude Alphabet, and unformed
orthography. But this is a subject beyond the bounds of a letter, as
it was beyond the bounds of a Report to the legislature. Mr. Crofts
died, I believe, before any progress was made in the work he had
projected.
The reviewer expresses doubt, rather than decision, on our
placing Military and Naval architecture in the department of Pure
Mathematics. Military architecture embraces fortification and field
works, which with their bastions, curtains, hornworks, redoubts etc.
are based on a technical combination of lines and angles. These are
adapted to offence and defence, with and against the effects of
bombs, balls, escalades etc. But lines and angles make the sum of
elementary geometry, a branch of Pure Mathematics: and the direction
of the bombs, balls, and other projectiles, the necessary appendages
of military works, altho' no part of their architecture, belong to
the conic sections, a branch of transcendental geometry. Diderot and
Dalembert therefore, in their Arbor scientiae, have placed military
architecture in the department of elementary geometry. Naval
architecture teaches the best form and construction of vessels; for
which best form it has recourse to the question of the Solid of least
resistance, a problem of transcendental geometry. And it's
appurtenant projectiles belong to the same branch, as in the
preceding case. It is true that so far as respects the action of the
water on the rudder and oars, and of the wind on the sails, it may be
placed in the department of mechanics, as Diderot and Dalambert have
done: but belonging quite as much to geometry, and allied in it's
military character, to military architecture, it simplified our plan
to place both under the same head. These views are so obvious that I
am sure they would have required but a second thought to reconcile
the reviewer to their location under the head of Pure Mathematics.
For this word Location, see Bailey, Johnson, Sheridan, Walker etc.
But if Dictionaries are to be the Arbiters of language, in which of
them shall we find neologism. No matter. It is a good word, well
sounding, obvious, and expresses an idea which would otherwise
require circumlocution. The Reviewer was justifiable therefore in
using it; altho' he noted at the same time, as unauthoritative,
centrality, grade, sparse; all which have been long used in
common speech and writing. I am a friend to neology. It is the
only way to give to a language copiousness and euphony. Without it
we should still be held to the vocabulary of Alfred or of Ulphilas;
and held to their state of science also: for I am sure they had no
words which could have conveyed the ideas of Oxigen, cotyledons,
zoophytes, magnetism, electricity, hyaline, and thousands of others
expressing ideas not then existing, nor of possible communication in
the state of their language. What a language has the French become
since the date of their revolution, by the free introduction of new
words! The most copious and eloquent in the living world; and equal
to the Greek, had not that been regularly modifiable almost ad
infinitum. Their rule was that whenever their language furnished or
adopted a root, all it's branches, in every part of speech were
legitimated by giving them their appropriate terminations.
{adelphos} ["brother"], {adelphe} ["sister"], {adelphidion} ["little
brother"], {adelphotes} ["brotherly affection"], {adelphixis}
["brotherhood"], {adelphidoys} ["nephew"], {adelphikos} ["brotherly,"
adj.], {adelphizo} ["to adopt as a brother"], {adelphikos}
["brotherly," adv.]. And this should be the law of every language.
Thus, having adopted the adjective fraternal, it is a root, which
should legitimate fraternity, fraternation, fraternisation,
fraternism, to fraternate, fraternise, fraternally. And give the
word neologism to our language, as a root, and it should give us it's
fellow substantives, neology, neologist, neologisation; it's
adjectives neologous, neological, neologistical, it's verb neologise,
and adverb neologically. Dictionaries are but the depositories of
words already legitimated by usage. Society is the work-shop in
which new ones are elaborated. When an individual uses a new word,
if illformed it is rejected in society, if wellformed, adopted, and,
after due time, laid up in the depository of dictionaries. And if,
in this process of sound neologisation, our transatlantic brethren
shall not choose to accompany us, we may furnish, after the Ionians,
a second example of a colonial dialect improving on it's primitive.
But enough of criticism: let me turn to your puzzling letter of
May 12. on matter, spirit, motion etc. It's croud of scepticisms
kept me from sleep. I read it, and laid it down: read it, and laid
it down, again and again: and to give rest to my mind, I was obliged
to recur ultimately to my habitual anodyne, `I feel: therefore I
exist.' I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other
existencies then. I call them matter. I feel them changing place.
This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call
it void, or nothing, or immaterial space. On the basis of
sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the
certainties we can have or need. I can concieve thought to be an
action of a particular organisation of matter, formed for that
purpose by it's creator, as well as that attraction in an action of
matter, or magnetism of loadstone. When he who denies to the
Creator the power of endowing matter with the mode of action called
thinking shall shew how he could endow the Sun with the mode of
action called attraction, which reins the planets in the tract of
their orbits, or how an absence of matter can have a will, and, by
that will, put matter into motion, then the materialist may be
lawfully required to explain the process by which matter exercises
the faculty of thinking. When once we quit the basis of sensation,
all is in the wind. To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of
nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial,
is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no
soul. I cannot reason otherwise: but I believe I am supported in my
creed of materialism by Locke, Tracy, and Stewart. At what age of
the Christian church this heresy of immaterialism, this masked
atheism, crept in, I do not know. But a heresy it certainly is.
Jesus taught nothing of it. He told us indeed that `God is a
spirit,' but he has not defined what a spirit is, nor said that it is
not matter. And the antient fathers generally, if not universally,
held it to be matter: light and thin indeed, an etherial gas; but
still matter. Origen says `Deus reapse corporalis est; sed graviorum
tantum corporum ratione, incorporeus.' Tertullian `quid enim deus
nisi corpus?' and again `quis negabit deumesse corpus? Etsi deus
spiritus, spiritus etiam corpus est, sui generis, in sua effigie.'
St. Justin Martyr `{to Theion phamen einai asomaton oyk oti asomaton
-- epeide de to me krateisthai ypo tinos, toy krateisthai timioteron
esti, dia toyto kaloymen ayton asomaton.}' And St. Macarius, speaking
of angels says `quamvis enim subtilia sint, tamen in substantia,
forma et figura, secundum tenuitatem naturae eorum, corpora sunt
tenuia.' And St. Austin, St. Basil, Lactantius, Tatian, Athenagoras
and others, with whose writings I pretend not a familiarity, are said
by those who are, to deliver the same doctrine. Turn to your Ocellus
d'Argens 97. 105. and to his Timaeus 17. for these quotations. In
England these Immaterialists might have been burnt until the 29. Car.
2. when the writ de haeretico comburendo was abolished: and here
until the revolution, that statute not having extended to us. All
heresies being now done away with us, these schismatists are merely
atheists, differing from the material Atheist only in their belief
that `nothing made something,' and from the material deist who
believes that matter alone can operate on matter.
Rejecting all organs of information therefore but my senses, I
rid myself of the Pyrrhonisms with which an indulgence in
speculations hyperphysical and antiphysical so uselessly occupy and
disquiet the mind. A single sense may indeed be sometimes decieved,
but rarely: and never all our senses together, with their faculty of
reasoning. They evidence realities; and there are enough of these
for all the purposes of life, without plunging into the fathomless
abyss of dreams and phantasms. I am satisfied, and sufficiently
occupied with the things which are, without tormenting or troubling
myself about those which may indeed be, but of which I have no
evidence.
I am sure that I really know many, many, things, and none
more surely than that I love you with all my heart, and pray for the
continuance of your life until you shall be tired of it yourself.
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