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To Judge Spencer Roane Poplar Forest, September 6, 1819
DEAR SIR, -- I had read in the Enquirer, and with great
approbation, the pieces signed Hampden, and have read them again with
redoubled approbation, in the copies you have been so kind as to send
me. I subscribe to every tittle of them. They contain the true
principles of the revolution of 1800, for that was as real a
revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in
its form; not effected indeed by the sword, as that, but by the
rational and peaceable instrument of reform, the suffrage of the
people. The nation declared its will by dismissing functionaries of
one principle, and electing those of another, in the two branches,
executive and legisltaive, submitted to their election. Over the
judiciary department, the constitution had deprived them of their
control. That, therefore, has continued the reprobated system, and
although new matter has been occasionally incorporated into the old,
yet the leaven of the old mass seems to assimilate to itself the new,
and after twenty years' confirmation of the federal system by the
voice of the nation, declared through the medium of elections, we
find the judiciary on every occasion, still driving us into
consolidation.
In denying the right they usurp of exclusively explaining the
constitution, I go further than you do, if I understand rightly your
quotation from the Federalist, of an opinion that "the judiciary is
the last resort in relation to the other departments of the
government, but not in relation to the rights of the parties to the
compact under which the judiciary is derived." If this opinion be
sound, then indeed is our constitution a complete felo de se. For
intending to establish three departments, co-ordinate and
independent, that they might check and balance one another, it has
given, according to this opinion, to one of them alone, the right to
prescribe rules for the government of the others, and to that one
too, which is unelected by, and independent of the nation. For
experience has already shown that the impeachment it has provided is
not even a scare-crow; that such opinions as the one you combat, sent
cautiously out, as you observe also, by detachment, not belonging to
the case often, but sought for out of it, as if to rally the public
opinion beforehand to their views, and to indicate the line they are
to walk in, have been so quietly passed over as never to have excited
animadversion, even in a speech of any one of the body entrusted with
impeachment. The constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing
of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape
into any form they please. It should be remembered, as an axiom of
eternal truth in politics, that whatever power in any government is
independent, is absolute also; in theory only, at first, while the
spirit of the people is up, but in practice, as fast as that relaxes.
Independence can be trusted nowhere but with the people in mass.
They are inherently independent of all but moral law. My
construction of the constitution is very different from that you
quote. It is that each department is truly independent of the
others, and has an equal right to decide for itself what is the
meaning of the constitution in the cases submitted to its action; and
especially, where it is to act ultimately and without appeal. I will
explain myself by examples, which, having occurred while I was in
office, are better known to me, and the principles which governed
them.
A legislature had passed the sedition law. The federal courts
had subjected certain individuals to its penalties of fine and
imprisonment. On coming into office, I released these individuals by
the power of pardon committed to executive discretion, which could
never be more properly exercised than where citizens were suffering
without the authority of law, or, which was equivalent, under a law
unauthorized by the constitution, and therefore null. In the case of
Marbury and Madison, the federal judges declared that commissions,
signed and sealed by the President, were valid, although not
delivered. I deemed delivery essential to complete a deed, which, as
long as it remains in the hands of the party, is as yet no deed, it
is in posse only, but not in esse, and I withheld delivery of the
commissions. They cannot issue a mandamus to the President or
legislature, or to any of their officers (*). When the British
treaty of ----- arrived, without any provision against the
impressment of our seamen, I determined not to ratify it. The Senate
thought I should ask their advice. I thought that would be a mockery
of them, when I was predetermined against following it, should they
advise its ratification. The constitution had made their advice
necessary to confirm a treaty, but not to reject it. This has been
blamed by some; but I have never doubted its soundness. In the cases
of two persons, antenati, under exactly similar circumstances, the
federal court had determined that one of them (Duane) was not a
citizen; the House of Representatives nevertheless determined that
the other (Smith, of South Carolina) was a citizen, and admitted him
to his seat in their body. Duane was a republican, and Smith a
federalist, and these decisions were made during the federal
ascendancy.
These are examples of my position, that each of the three
departments has equally the right to decide for itself what is its
duty under the constitution, without any regard to what the others
may have decided for themselves under a similar question. But you
intimate a wish that my opinion should be known on this subject. No,
dear Sir, I withdraw from all contest of opinion, and resign
everything cheerfully to the generation now in place. They are wiser
than we were, and their successors will be wiser than they, from the
progressive advance of science. Tranquillity is the summum bonum
of age. I wish, therefore, to offend no man's opinion, nor to draw
disquieting animadversions on my own. While duty required it, I met
opposition with a firm and fearless step. But loving mankind in my
individual relations with them, I pray to be permitted to depart in
their peace; and like the superannuated soldier, "quadragenis
stipendiis emeritis," to hang my arms on the post. I have unwisely,
I fear, embarked in an enterprise of great public concern, but not to
be accomplished within my term, without their liberal and prompt
support. A severe illness the last year, and another from which I am
just emerged, admonish me that repetitions may be expected, against
which a declining frame cannot long bear up. I am anxious,
therefore, to get our University so far advanced as may encourage the
public to persevere to its final accomplishment. That secured, I
shall sing my nunc demittas. I hope your labors will be long
continued in the spirit in which they have always been exercised, in
maintenance of those principles on which I verily believe the future
happiness of our country essentially depends.
I salute you with
affectionate and great respect.
(*) The constitution controlling the common law in this
particular.
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