The War of American Independence began the United States' national military effort. It also marked the country's first experience with coalition warfare. This paper explores aspects of the Franco-American alliance from a military perspective and is intended to supplement the work of other scholars on the diplomatic relationships of the combatants. [1] As such, it suggests areas for further study rather than offering a definitive statement.
Several premises underlie a study of e Franco-American war effort. The first is Forrest C. Pogue's observation that
An alliance is based on an agreement by two or more powers that they will oppose their combined resources to a common enemy. They do not agree thereby to have an absolute community of interest. The success of such an alliance is to be judged, therefore, not by the amount of heat which may be engendered between the powers ... but rather by the degree to which the powers, while frankly working on a basis of self-interest, manage to achieve the aim for which their forces were brought together. [2]
A second is that the personalities of commanders and key staff members will have an important impact on relations. The final assumption recognizes that a military alliance functions better if the partners share common tactical and organizational concepts and employ similar weapons.
Although the war ultimately became a global struggle involving many nations, the United States had a formal alliance only with France. This paper concentrates on that alliance, not on relations with other belligerents. Three distinct phases resulted from escalating French involvement. Prior to 1778 clandestine assistance took the form of shipments of arms, equipment, and individual volunteers. In 1778 and 1779 naval expeditions led by Jean Baptiste Charles Henri Hector, comte d'Estaing paid brief visits to North America and engaged in operations with mixed forces of Continental Army troops and militia. Between 1780 and 1782 an expeditionary corps under Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau served continuously in the United States, often with the support of a naval squadron. Each phase poses interesting questions.
The Continental Army was created on 14 June 17 when the Continental Congress assumed national responsibility for armed resistance to Great Britain. During the first year and a half of its existence, the army grew to encompass units from all thirteen states and Canada, complete with a command structure and a basic staff organization. Lessons learned during the campaign of 1776 convinced George Washington and Congress to abandon a policy based on a small standing army enlisted for one year's service and supplemented by militia. Beginning with 1777 a large army, nominally enlisted for the duration of the war, assumed primary responsibility for national defense. They created a force of about 120 regiments (including five of artillery and five of light cavalry) Washington and the other commanders of major field armies employed self-contained brigades as the basic unit of maneuver. Each brigade had several infantry regiments, an artillery company, and a small staff, and could sustain limited independent action. [3]
French policy during this period followed the general outlines set in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War by �tienne Fran�ois de Choiseul and later by Charles Gravier de Vergennes. As part of a strategy to weaken the British, France furnished covert assistance to the Americans. At the same time a gradual naval mobilization took place and French forces in the West Indies increased. The latter measures indirectly assisted the Americans by forcing Great Britain to divert resources from North America. Direct aid came principally in the form of artillery, muskets, and other supplies sent during 1776 and 1777, chiefly by Caron de Beaumarchais' firm Hortalez et Cie. The muskets, surplus French army weapons of the 1763 pattern, were superior to British muskets and quickly became the standard infantry weapon of the Continental Army. [4]
Foreign volunteers began serving in the Continental Army in 1776. Late in that year the French government intervened, bringing order to this phenomenon. One contingent was organized by Beaumarchais and Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval. It included Philip Tronson du Coudray who became a major general and Inspector General of Ordnance and Military Manufactories, Philippe -Hubert, chevalier de Preudhomme de Borre and Thomas Conway who became brigadier generals, and a number of lesser officers. Most of these individuals made limited contributions to America. A second contingent, four engineers led by Louis Duportail, were "loaned" to the Continental Army by the French Minister of War, the comte de Saint-Germain. They made a major impact by organizing the Continental Army's engineer operations beginning late in 1777. Duportail rose eventually to the rank of major general and quickly became one of Washington's most trusted advisors. The third major contingent consisted of proteges of the comte de Broglie. Included in this last group were two men who became major generals and held trusted commands under Washington: Gilbert du Motier, the marquis de Lafayette, and Johannes de Kalb. [5]
The second phase of the alliance began in 1778 with France's decision to enter the war directly. France assembled a large army in Normandy and Brittany under Broglie to deceive the British. The concentration not only feigned an invasion of the British Isles but also served a secondary purpose. Maneuvers in September tested two new tactical systems proposed by French military thinkers during the 1770's. One system, l'ordre profond, proposed relying on shock action from dense infantry columns. The alternative, l'ordre mixte, espoused by Antoine Hippolyte, comte de Guibert in his 1772 work Essai g�n�ral de tactique, advocated flexible use of both the line and column and training which enabled men to fight either as regular line infantry or as light infantry. Although a final decision in favor of Guibert did not come until 1791, many officers came away from the 1778 maneuvers exponents of his ideas. [6]
George Washington spent the 1777-1778 winter at Valley Forge. In a major study of the lessons of 1777, Congress, Washington, and the senior officers of the army concluded that the Continentals should adopt basic changes designed to produce a military machine similar to those found in Europe. This decision came only after a major political debate, and it took over a year to fully implement. French officers in the army played a major role in this transformation by furnishing advice and introducing Washington and his subordinates to the writings of Guibert. The Continentals appreciated the flexibility of Guibert's tactics and found them to be within a special tradition developed during the French and Indian War by John Forbes and Henri Bouquet from Maurice, comte de Saxe's Mes Rev�ries. Thomas Antoine, chevalier de Mauduit du Plessis and Louis de Fleury were especially important in this process. French influence also capped this development when Saint-Germain was able to send a former Prussian soldier, Frederick Steuben, to America in early 1778. Steuben quickly won a commission as a major general, appointment as Inspector General (Washington's de facto chief of staff), and the assignment to develop a uniform drill for the Continentals. That drill resulted in the 1779 publication of Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States Part I, a concise manual and tactical handbook espousing Guibert's general concept of combined use of either a line or column according to the tactical situation. Other changes introduced in part by French example included the formation of a topographical engineer staff, a mounted military police, and special units (partisan corps) to carry out raids. [7]
The direct French involvement in North America resulting from the 10 July 1778 declaration of war took the form of a squadron under d'Estaing which sailed from Toulon. It probed British positions at New York and in Rhode Island before suffering damage from a storm and a British naval force which caused d'Estaing to retire to Boston for repairs. Major General John Sullivan had initiated an attack on Newport with a mixed force of militia and Continentals in conjunction with the French ships. That attack ended in recriminations when d' Estaing withdrew. [8]
Following his orders, the admiral sailed to the Caribbean for the winter. During early 1779 several other French convoys joined him, and in August he returned to North America, this time planning to attack Savannah in conjunction with elements from Major General Benjamin Lincoln's Southern Department. That venture collapsed after the bloody repulse of a direct attack on 8 October. D'Estaing sent part of his force back to the West Indies and returned to France with the remainder. During 1779 the French reversed their earlier European strategy to secure Spanish participation in the war. A large French army under No�l, comte de Vaux assembled in Normandy and Brittany to invade England once the joint Franco-Spanish fleet won control of the Channel. Although the invasion never materialized, the army did profit from a period of intensive training. [9]
France returned to a strategy of hitting British colonial possessions in 1780. After considerable discussion, Rochambeau was selected to lead a corps to America to remain there as auxiliaries under Washington's command, a special status analogous to the American Expeditionary Force's in World War I. A naval squadron under the separate command of Charles Louis de Ternay accompanied him. The corps landed at Newport and spent a year there before moving to join Washington near New York. In August of 1781 it moved with part of Washington's Main Army to Williamsburg, Virginia. At Williamsburg the allies joined with other Continentals under Lafayette, Virginia militia, and Fran�ois, comte de Grasse's squadron and troops from the West Indies. The combined forces quickly besieged and captured Yorktown, in effect ending the war as far as operations in the United States were concerned. [10]
Both d'Estaing and Rochambeau campaigned in America after the Continental Army received material aid from France and after the influx of foreign volunteers. Historians usually point to different personalities and backgrounds to explain the different results the two commanders achieved. D'Estaing transferred from the army to the navy in 1759 and never felt, confident enough as a seaman to overrule the advice of his captains. [11] Rochambeau, on the other hand, had thirty-seven years' of distinguished army service. His professional reputation emphasized success as a fighter, disciplinarian, reformer, and exponent of light infantry tactics, and relative freedom from petty intrigue and court politics. He served under Broglie in 1778, espousing Guibert's system, and commanded Vaux's vanguard in 1779. That reputation for tact and professionalism led directly to his selection as commander of the expedition. [12]
Organizational differences between d' Estaing's and Rochambeau's forces are equally important. In 1778 the former had a very weak military contingent with his squadron. That precluded any substantial cooperation with Sullivan's army of Continentals and militia. In addition to the "ships' garrisons, " provisional infantry detachments serving as marines and gunners, he had only two infantry battalions. [13] A year later his strength was about 3, 500 men. Even his subordinates recognized that this total was deceptive. Eight hundred of the men came from hastily raised volunteer units from Saint Domingue. "Ships' garrisons" and a collection of other detachments ranging in size from 30 to 430 men came from fourteen infantry, two dragoon, and two artillery regiments. Few companies, let alone battalions, were intact. D'Estaing then compounded the inherent instability of his units by constantly mixing and transferring officers and men to form new provisional corps. The expedition had only one engineer and six junior artillery officers, none of whom displayed particular skill. [14] He ignored his senior military officers, and his subordinates had little confidence in his abilities. One grenadier captain, summing up the expedition, commented that d'Estaing made "a brave grenadier but a poor general." [15]
The contrast with Rochambeau's expedition is striking. Rochambeau had the rare priviledge of selecting both his staff and his units with only minimal interference from Versailles. High competition for assignments enabled him to pick some of the best officers in the French army, a number of whom spoke fluent English. The four infantry regiments which went to Rhode Island were highly trained veterans at virtually full strength. All four, the artillery battalion, and Lauzun's Legion (the expedition's light troops) had served with him in Vaux's 1779 invasion army. Two of the infantry regiments also participated in the 1778 Normandy maneuvers. [16] The replacements which reached Rhode Island just before the start of the 1781 campaign were also above average in quality. They were veterans transferred from other regiments, not raw recruits, and were thus able to serve effectively almost at once. [17] Rochambeau's troops enjoyed another advantage over d' Estaing's: they had nearly a year to recover from the ravages of their sea voyage before facing combat. [18]
Rochambeau used the year of inactivity at Rhode Island to take steps which adjusted to Continental Army campaign practices. To increase his corps' mobility to a par with Washington's forces he drastically reduced typical French baggage train allowances. He also insured that his unit commanders led their men in practice marches. [19] The corps campaigned in two brigades. Each brigade contained two regiments for a total of four line infantry battalions, a special flank battalion composed of two grenadier and two chasseur (light infantry) companies, and a contingent of field artillery. That configuration approximated the brigade organization employed by Washington. [20] In July 1781 Rochambeau went one step further. His troops shifted from tactical deployment for combat in three ranks to the Continentals' standard of two ranks. [21]
At Yorktown Rochambeau commanded an additional body of troops. These were the men who had come from the West Indies with de Grasse's squadron. Eight hundred men came from the fleet's "ships' garrisons," and several hundred more were hastily organized volunteers from Saint Domingue. One major difference set this force apart from that of d' Estaing: three intact regiments under Claude Anne' de Rouvroy, the marquis de Saint-Simon. Two of the regiments had been in the Antilles for some time. One battalion of each arrived in 1775 and the other in 1777. Each had had detachments at Savannah. The third regiment, like those with Rochambeau, spent 1778 and 1779 in Normandy. It deployed to the West Indies in 1780. [22] The combat value of these complete units greatly exceeded an equivalent number of miscellaneous troops.
One final point distinguishing between the experiences of d' Estaing and Rochambeau deals with the cooperative behavior of subordinate officers and the enlisted men of the allied armies D'Estaing's troops spent very little time in actual contact with Americans. That fact minimized any positive or negative attitudes. In addition, neither of his expeditions worked with the Main Army where French influence in organization and doctrine was strongest. Research by Orville Murphy has demonstrated that early inflated French attitudes toward an American citizen-army evaporated when French professional soldiers gained first-hand experience. [23] On the other hand, by 1777 few Continental officers expected much combat value from militia units except under very particular circumstances. The French officers did make the distinction between Continentals and militia, and many of Rochambeau's subordinates recognized that the former were excellent combat troops although they did not conform to European ideals of appearance of discipline. [24]
D'Estaing's expeditions never had an opportunity to serve with a large body of Continentals trained by Steuben; Rochambeau's corps did. Officers from the latter appreciated Steuben's contributions, and they were impressed with American officers' familiarity with theoretical works, especially those of Guibert. [25] Part of the bridge of understanding came from the presence in the Main Army of Frenchmen, some known to Rochambeau's officers. At the same time, Americans knew de Mauduit and Fleury, now with Rochambeau. [26]
If historians remember Pogue's advice and are not distracted by the incidents of Franco-American friction, they can appreciate the cooperation which led to the victory at Yorktown. The professionalism of Rochambeau, de Grasse, and their senior officers clearly contributed to the greater success of the expeditionary corps. It is important to remember, however, that their Continental Army counterparts ' professionalism played an equal role. Similar infantry and artillery weapons used by both the expeditionary corps and the Continental Army, and a similar tactical organization based on a combined arms brigade helped to overcome many of the obstacles facing the armed forces of two very different societies. The final bridge came in the form of a common appreciation of the concepts of military flexibility proposed by Guibert and other theoreticians.
Robert K. Wright, Jr. , Ph. D.
3 March 1981
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* "The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's, and do not necessarily reflect the views of either the United States Army or its Center of Military History." [The previous sentence was part of the original typed manuscript. Unless indicating a footnote reference number, text entered between brackets has been injected by webpage editor and is not part of Dr. Wright's original paper.] Return to main text.
1. Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and the French Alliance (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969). Orville T. Murphy, "The Battle of Germantown and the Franco-American Alliance of 1778," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 82 (January 1958), pp. 55-64. Orville T. Murphy, "French Contemporary Opinion of the American Revolutionary Army" (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1957). John Singh, "Plans de guerre francais 1763-1770, " Revue Historique des Arm�es, 3 (#4, 1976), pp. 7-22. C. R. Fonteneau, "La p�riode fran�aise de la guerre d'Ind�pendance (1776-1780)," Revue His-torique des Arm�es, 3 (#4, 1976), pp. 47-85. Return to main text.
2. Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. xii. Return to main text.
3. Robert K. Wright, Jr. , "Organization and Doctrine in the Continental Army, 1774 to 1784" (Ph.D. Dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1980), pp. 151-182. All themes in this paper relating to the Continental Army are discussed in detail in this source. Return to main text.
4. Fonteneau, "La p�riode fran�aise, " pp. 47-51. Paul H. Smith, _et al., eds. , Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976--), especially 3: 211, 320-3; 4: 103-5, 126-8. Nathanael Greene, The Papers of Nathanael Greene, edited by Richard K. Showman, et al. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Rhode Island Historical Society, 1976--), 2: 46-48. Neil L. York, "Clandestine Aid and The American Revolutionary War Effort: A Reexamination, " Military Affairs, 43 (February 1979), pp. 26-30. Arcadi Gluckman, United States Muskets, Rifles and Carbines (Harrisburg: Stackpole Co. , 1959), pp. 55-61. James E. Hicks and Fred Porter Todd, "United States Military Shoulder Arms, 1795-1935," Military Affairs, 2 (1938), pp. 37-42, 175-6. Rebecca and Philip Katcher, "The Pennsylvania Division, 1780, " Military Collector and Historian, 27 (Fall 1975), p. 120. By 1780 the Continental Army planned to use only French 4-pounders as direct support field artillery, considering them the most effective combination of firepower and mobility, but first had to expend existing stockpiles of supplies for 6- and 3-pounders; Henry Knox to the Board of War (copy), 1 Mar 1780, Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society. Return to main text.
5. Wright, "Organization and Doctrine," pp. 203-209. Louis Gottschalk, "The Attitude of European Officers in the Revolutionary Armies Toward General George Washington, " Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, 32 (December 1939), pp. 20-50. Catherine M. Prelinger, "Less Lucky than Lafayette: A Note on the French Applicants to Benjamin Franklin for Commissions in the American Army, 1776-1785," Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, 4 (1976), pp. 263-270. G�n�ral Segretain, "Un Compagnon de La Fayette: Pierre du Rousseau de Fayolle (1746-1780), " Bulletin et Memoirs de la Soci�t� des Antiquaires de l'Ouest, 25 (1901), pp. xix-xxxix. [The original text identified the comte de Brogile as being also a 'Marshal'. The Marshal de Brogile was the older brother of the comte. The military title is removed from the main text as presented in this webpage. The comte de Brogile is the one who had employed Kalb and La Fayette. The elder brother, the Marshal, had commanded the army in Normandy.] Return to main text.
6. Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth Century France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), especially pp. 233-248, 304-320. Fonteneau, "La p�riode fran�aise," pp. 54-61, 81-83. Jacque Godechot, "L'Influence de la Tactique et de la Strat�gie de la guerre d' ind� pendance Am�ricaine sur la tactique et la strat�gie francaise de l'arm�e de terre,'' Revue International d'Histoire Militaire, 41 (1979), pp. 143-146. Return to main text.
7. John Laurens, The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens . (New York: Bradford Club, 1867), pp. 109-112, 134-141. Capt. George Fleming to Maj. Sebastian Bauman, 6 Feb 1778, Bauman Papers, New-York Historical Society. Wright, "Organization and Doctrine, " pp. 209-213, 217-236. C. Fiske Harris, editor, "Diary of a French Officer 1781 (Presumed to be that of Baron Cromot du Bourg, Aid to Rochambeau), " Magazine of American History, 7 (October 1881), pp. 294-295. Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North-America, in the years 1780, 1781, and 1782 Translated from the French by an English gentleman, who resided in America at that period (2 vols. ; London: G. G. J. and J. Robinson, 1787), 1: 79, 133-135. Return to main text.
8. Robert F. Dearden, "The Siege of Newport: Inauspicious Dawn of Alliance, " Rhode Island History, 29 (February-May 1970), pp. 17-35. Return to main text.
9. Dull, French Navy, pp. 143-169. Fonteneau, "La periode francaise, " pp. 64-76, 84-85. Return to main text.
10. Lee Kennett, The French Forces in America, 1780-1783 (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977). Dull, French Navy, pp. 222-248. Arnold Whitridge, Rochambeau (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965). A. Costantini, "Le corps Rochambeau face aux difficult�s �conomiques du royaume et des Etats-Unis d'Am�rique (1780-1782)," Revue Historique des Arm�es, 3 (#4, 1976), pp. 107-137. The following represent some of the published primary sources dealing with Rochambeau's corps: Howard C. Rice, Jr., and Anne S. K. Brown, editors, The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army 1780, 1781, 1782, 1783 (2 vols. ; Princeton and Providence: Princeton and Brown University Presses, 1972); Harris, "Du Bourg Diary," Magazine of American History, 4 (1880), pp. 204-214, 293-308, 376-385, 441-452, and 7 (October 1881), pp. 283-295; Axel Fersen, "Letters of De Fersen, Aide-de-camp to Rochambeau, Written to His Father in Sweden," Magazine of American History, 3 (1879), pp. 300-309, 369-376, 437-448; Claude Blanchard, The Journal of Claude Blanchard, Commissary of the French Auxiliary Army Sent to t o United States During the American Revolution, 1780-1783, translated by William Duane and edited by Thomas Balch (Albany: J. Munsell, 1876); Ludwig von Closen, The Revolutionary Journals of Baron Ludwig Von Closen 1780-1783, translated by Evelyn M. Acomb (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958); Guillaume de Deux-Ponts, My Campaigns in America: A Journal Kept by Count William De Deux-Ponts 1780-81, translated by Samuel Abbott Green (Boston: J. K. Wiggin & Wm. Parsons Lunt, 1868); and Claude C. Sturgill, editor, "Rochambeau's Memoire de la Guerre en Amerique, " Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 78 (January 1970), pp. 34-64. Return to main text.
11. Charles Moran, "D'Estaing, an Early Exponent Of Amphibious Warfare, " Military Affairs, 9 (Winter 1945), pp. 314-332. This explanation was also given by his subordinates and aluded to in his own account: see Benjamin Kennedy, editor, Muskets, Cannon Balls and Bombs (Savannah: Beehive Press, 1973), pp. 9, 42-47, 64. Return to main text.
12. Whitridge, Rochambeau, especially pp. 46-67. Kennett, French Forces, pp. 11-12. Also see: Fersen, "Letters," pp. 374-375, 445-447; Blanchard, Journal, p. 122; Sturgill, "Rochambeau's Memoir, " p. 42. Return to main text.
13. Fonteneau, "La p�riode fran�aise, " p. 49. These were battalions of the Ag�nois and G�tinais regiments. The other battalions of each regiment had been in the West Indies since 1775. [There appears to be some confusion suggested in the text of this footnote. D'Estaing sailed from Toulon in April 1778 with only French army battalions from Foix and Hainault regiments. These were the only ones he had at Newport, RI, in July-August 1778. Soon after Newport, d'Estaing conducted a series of largely successful operations in the West Indies, where he employed a number of contingents from French colonial regiments stationed in that area. Later, during his 1779 assault on Savannah, d'Estaing had contingents of French regiments Armagnac, Dillon, Ag�nois, G�tinais, Foix, Hainault, Auxerrois, Cambr�sis, and some Metz artillery.] Return to main text.
14. Kennedy, Muskets, pp. 3-5, 18-19, 31-33, 57. Roberta Leighton, editor, "Meronnet de Saint-Marc's Journal of the Operations of The French Army under D'Estaing at the Siege of Savannah, September, 1779, " New-York Historical Society Quarterly, 36 (July 1952), pp. 269, 274, 282. Charles C. Jones, editor, The Siege of Savannah, in 1779, As Described in Two Contemporary Journals of French Officers in the Fleet of Count D'Estaing (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1874), pp. 9-11, 18-21, 40n, 63. Return to main text.
15. Leighton. "Saint-Marc's Journal, " pp. 278-280. Kennedy, Muskets, pp. 19-21, 36. The quotation from Capt. Phillipe S�guier de Terson of the Ag�nois grenadier company is on p. 21. [When comparing the advantages between d'Estaing's and de Grasse's naval deployments to America, one could add that d'Estaing had to be �the commanding general' as well as �the admiral' of the French forces in 1778. Whereas, in 1780-81, Rochambeau and de Grasse could focus on these functions separately. Further, d'Estaings's opportunity to develop an environment for combined [inter allied] planning was almost non existent; nor did he have the benefit of �some lessons learned' gained from a prior French expedition working with the American insurgents. There is little doubt that both Rochambeau and de Grasse benefited from the experiences of d'Estaing.] Return to main text.
16. Fonteneau, "La p�riode fran�aise, " pp. 79-85. Infantry regiments were the Bourbonnais, Royal Deux-Pouts (a German unit), Saintonge, and Soissonnais. The latter two were present in the 1778 maneuvers. Artillery came from the 2d Battalion of the Auxonne artillery regiment. Lauzun's unit came under the Ministry of Marine and was not part of the troupes de la terre. Two other regiments and some artillery originally assigned to the corps were left behind: the Neustrie and Anhalt (a German [speaking] unit) regiments. Neither had been in the 1778 or 1779 Normandy concentrations. Samuel Richards, Diary of Captain Samuel Richards, Captain of Connecticut Line War of the Revolution 1775-1781 (Philadelphia: Privately printed, 1909), p. 75 makes the particular comment on fluency with English. [There is some question as to how much leeway Rochambeau had is choosing his men. There is evidence that this opportunity applied for only a few of his direct staff. As far as particular units, these regiments had been selected and were already moving towards Brest for embarkation when Rochambeau was put in command of the expedition to America.] Return to main text.
17. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns, 1: 27n. Return to main text.
18. Blanchard, Journal, pp. 45-46, 63-64. Closen, Journals, pp. 28-29. Sturgill, "Rochambeau's Memoir, " p. 39. Return to main text.
19. Harris, "Du Bourg Diary, " 4: 296. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns, 1: 246. Closen, Journals, p. 84. Return to main text.
20. Deux-Pouts, Campaigns, p. 114. Closen, Journals, pp. 97-101. Return to main text.
21. Closen, Journals, p. 92. Return to main text.
22. Fonteneau, "La p�riode fran�aise, " pp. 49, 79-84. Dull, French Navy, p. 377. Kennedy, Muskets, pp. 3-4, 31-32. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns, 1: 56n, 137-139, 148-149. Closen, Journals, pp. 132, 142, 151-152. Closen complained that they were inferior in discipline to the units of Rochambeau's corps. The two regiments were the Ag�nois and G�tinais; the more recent arrival was the Touraine. Return to main text.
23. Murphy, "French Contemporary opinion." Also see his "The American Revolutionary Army and the Concept of the Levee en Masse," Military Affairs, 23 (Spring 1959), pp. 13-20; and "The French Professional Soldier's Opinion of the American Militia in the War of the Revolution, " Military Affairs, 32 (February 1969), pp. 191-198. Also see: Jones, Siege of Savannah, pp. 31-35. Return to main text.
24. Durand Echeverria and Orville T. Murphy, editors, "The American Revolutionary Army A French Estimate in 1777, " Military Affairs, 27 (Spring, Winter 1963), pp. 2-6, 155-161. Harris, "Du Bourg Diary," 4: 299, 302. Chastellux, Travels, 1: 140-141. Return to main text.
25. Ibid. , 1: 79, 133-135. Harris, "Du Bourg Diary," 7: 294-295. Return to main text.
26. Chastellux, Travels, 1: 92n, 106n, 122. Blanchard, Journal, p. 61. Closen, Journals, p. 108. De Mauduit served as the senior adjutant in the corps' artillery park; Fleury as a major in the Saintonge. Return to main text.
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