‘About the Cossacks, and
their usefulness in the field’
(‘Ueber den Kosaken, und dessen Brauchbarkeit im Felde’)
by [the Austrian] Captain A.
Prokesch
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Source: Osterreichisches Militairisches
Zeitschrift, 3. Band, 9. Heft (Wien, 1824) pp. 270 – 339.
part 5
(pp. 309 - 319)
The statement that these troops cannot be
used in regular formations is fairly common, and much speak for this. The way
of doing battle is for the Cossacks the dispersed formation; the close
formation is less natural to him. But one makes a mistake if he concludes from
this that there are no cases in which they would have to be used in closed
column, in which role it will serve well. The necessary condition for a good
result is however the confidence of their leader. If he will try to fulfil his
task without a hundred percent trust [in his men], nothing will be natural as
the failure of the undertaking. During the last war several formed attacks by
Cossacks on horse, even on foot and guns, have succeeded. For example, the
detachments which formed Czernitschev’s advance guard during his march to Hanau
attacked the young Guard on the narrow roads between Fulda and Gelnhausen with
the utmost resoluteness, and defeated them.
We
westerners, used to prove bravery by enduring enemy fire for a long time
without flinching; as we are drilled to form a firm wall against enemy bullets:
we easy call cowardice something that is the cause of a way of doing battle.
The bravest soldier in the world, the Mameluke, is as shy for enemy fire as the
Cossacks; all Asian tribes are. However, in hours of need, the Cossack will
also be brought to a stand still in fire; then he also, as any other soldier,
is getting more and more used to bullets. Of course his so totally different
way of doing battle can be the cause that he does not see the need to expose
him to enemy fire, and to destroy its strength, when a few moments later this
danger would have been disappeared. In such cases he compares himself with a
fighter who is prevented to protect himself against a punch of his opponent. It
is the task of their leader to assess the necessity, in order not to be in
conflict with the natural and safe tact of the Cossack.
Examples of how the Cossack can be used against foot and guns there are many. To these belong the combats which Tettenborn fought against General Morand during March 1813. This Russian marauder, force marching from Berlin to Hamburg with 1,500 Cossacks and two cannon, learned when reaching Lauenburg at the head of his force that Morand had reached Mölln, coming from Swedish Pommern and moving to the Elbe [river] with 2,500 foot, some horse and 16 guns. Immediately some Cossack-detachments were dispatched to pin down the enemy. This was achieved for some hours; then Morand, becoming scared that he would be cut off from Hamburg, quickly marched off. But the Danish, at that moment still undecided with which side they would ally themselves, prohibited his march through their territory. Morand, who already had the Cossacks around his neck again, had to make a stand between Escheberg and Bergedorf. All advantage of terrain was on the side of the French. Horse could not be used properly, and all Tettenborn had was horse. Therefore he ordered part of them to dismount and to skirmish; the remainder were ordered to surround the enemy. Cossacks on foot stole close to the enemy cannon, despite the grapeshot, and shot down the crews, indeed doing a lot of damage in general. The fighting became a stalemate, until the detachments ordered to surround the French advanced one after the other, to attack the enemy in the back and on both flanks. Morand resisted until night fell. Then he marched down to the Elbe, where he had already prepared a place to cross. He wanted to try to get the river between him and the enemy. But Colonel Tettenborn did not leave him a free moment [and Morand did not make it in time]. At daybreak, Morand had to deploy to defend himself again. The position again favoured the enemy; it could only be reached by a single causeway, and on this causeway six cannon were deployed. With both his own cannon, Tettenborn shot at the enemy foot, and stormed the causeway with dismounted Cossacks. The enemy routed to the Elbe and the prepared boats. On the river bank, the Cossacks took many prisoners and captured the six cannon the moment they were about to be embarked. Morand routed as far as the Weser [river], and only reappeared on the Elbe fourteen days later. Even more unlucky this time, he faced with his corps the Generals Czernitschev, Dörnberg, and Benkendorf, to meet his downfall. Only a few men managed to escape. Six hundred of Tettenborn’s Cossacks again took part in this glorious combat, taking the enemy foot in the back and disordering it.
During the combat which Czernitschev and Hirschfeld fought with General Gerard near Belzig on 27 August 1813, Benkendorf galloped with a few Cossack regiments in front of the whole French position which was covered by the forest of Hagelsberg, from the far right to the far left wing. He attacked, while Czernitschev attacked one wing, the other wing of the enemy. Musketry accompanied the Cossacks and they were received by grapeshot. Nevertheless, the Ilowaisky II Regiment defeated cuirassiers and light foot, in full view of the artillery, and captured even two cannon and several wagons which they took with them. It is known that Gerard, 12,000 men strong, was able to gather only about 2,000 fugitives in Magdeburg, despite the fact that Czernitschev and Hirschfeld had only irregular horse and fresh raised landwehr at their disposal.
A bold attack on foot was executed by Tettenborn in the notable combat near Vellahn, which he executed with only a fifth of the strength of Marshal Davout, who used 25,000 men in the fighting. After the cease fire had been ended Davout had crossed the Stecknitz and Tettenborn, leading Wallmoden’s rear guard, executed a fighting retreat over Gresse to Vellahn. The extreme caution which Davout showed was the cause that Tettenborn decided to offer his opponent a formal engagement. Vellahn was occupied by Lützow Jäger and Cossacks; Wallmoden ordered General Dörnberg to attack by surprise the enemy left flank. Cossacks formed a chain which covered all preparations. It took a while before the troops of the marshal appeared. Immediately substantial Cossack detachments closed, to tease the enemy and to lure him into a quick advance by feigning a rout. But the marshal was more cautious then ever. Because of all the delay Dörnberg had to appear too early. The French spotted him and attacked, and didn’t advance any further. The plan to lure the enemy into the trap that had been prepared failed and the fighting, which had been planned on different terrain, seemed to go the wrong way. Under these circumstances Tettenborn took three Cossack regiments and charged with a loud ‘hurrah’ the enemy foot, taking them completely by surprise. All of these that were deployed in skirmish order routed immediately; the Cossacks followed close and speared over 400 men. Davout advanced with battalion masses and guns to cover the fugitives, and the fighting came to a standstill. His horse kept back fearfully, and for security it positioned itself between their own infantry units. Davout’s brilliantly served artillery alone, greatly outnumbering that of the Allies, was able to prevent a retreat. But he [Davout] was paralysed. His whole line was under fire until late in the night.
In many respects even more notable, while it illustrates the manoeuvrability, and the use of the Cossacks in various roles, is the combat on the Göhrde, fought by Wallmoden against the Division Pecheux in September 1813. From captured dispatches Wallmoden learned that Davout, who was holding Hamburg and the Stecknitz Lines, had send General Pecheux with 7,000 men to the left bank of the Elbe [river], to clear the country in the direction of Magdeburg of the numerous marauding parties and the Cossacks wandering about restlessly. Day and hour of departure were exactly known. Wallmoden crossed on 14 September the Elbe near Dömitz with all troops at his disposal. Tettenborn led the advance guard and speeded forward to the forest called Göhrde. A chain of Cossacks occupied the terrain between the roads to Lüneburg and Ultzen, in such a way that it would be certain that no scout would be able to detect the marching off of the Allies in time.
Soon Pecheux was sighted on the road at which he was expected. He was about 8,000 men strong, having eight guns with him. Wallmoden was much stronger and planned to destroy his Division completely. To that purpose, he placed his troops behind the low heights which intersects the area like waves. The appearance of the Cossacks was not enough to alert the enemy, as they were used by now to meet them everywhere, even far away from larger formations. In addition, these [i.e. the Cossacks] had received the order to retreat until they had lured the enemy into the trap that was prepared. Pecheux however, very on his guard, and sharing the shyness which was common under Marshal Davout’s troops which had experienced a thousand setbacks, halted, and on the next day advanced not one pace. Until now however Pecheux had no sign or message about the dangerous enemy so close by. He send message to the Marshal that he had found troops of Cossacks on the left bank of the Elbe, asking what to do. Davout ordered him to resume his march. This was immediately detected by the Allies, and they prepared to receive the enemy on the 16th at 9 o’clock.
The hour came –but not the enemy. It became 10 o’clock, half past ten, finally 11 o’clock; but still no enemy. With all probability, the Allies saw this new delay as proof that there presence was known. They decided to leave their excellent position and to advance on the enemy. Tettenborn received the task to surround the enemy in such a way that they would not be able to go some place, and to pin them down. Wallmoden would march with the greater part of his troops into the back [of the French], and attack him from there. This all happened. Tettenborn found the enemy which was just about to enter a forest, from which it would have been difficult to drive him from there again. Therefore the Cossacks furiously attacked the head of the enemy columns, and drove the advance guard, which had already entered the forest, out of it again. Pecheux, quickly surrounded from all sides, had to halt and to deploy his troops. He took up position on a favourable height and opened fire. In front Tettenborn closed in on the enemy with Lützow Jäger and dismounted Cossacks, his guns replying to those of the enemy, while threatening both flanks with his remaining Cossacks. The French had much superior firepower, and it was clear that Tettenborn would not be able to hold on for long. And indeed, his small troop was already much fatigued before the arrival of Wallmoden became noticed. The dismounted Cossacks were barely able to hold their ground. The four cannon they had with them were at an obvious disadvantage against those of the enemy. Luckily it was already late that day, and Tettenborn decided to hold on until the night in any case.
Not long after, to the dismay of the enemy, a brigade of the Russo-German Legion, commanded by Colonel Pfuel, appeared in their back. Wallmoden followed and immediately stormed the village with separated him from the positions of General Pecheux. Tettenborn renewed his attack as well and his Cossacks caught nearly all enemy skirmishers, defeating their supporting masses [‘Unterstützungsmasse’] one after the other. Pecheux defended himself to the utmost; it seems he wanted to die at the spot. But his guns were lost one after the other, and finally Prussian Jäger captured his last howitzer. The cannon of the Allies advanced into close range of his masses, tearing them to pieces. Now he pulled his troops close together, moving from one height to another in the direction of the Elbe, hoping to save himself. Congreve rockets, used for the first time during this war, carried death, and what was more fear into this compressed mass –Cossacks stabbed the officers down. Smaller and smaller became the number of those which were still able to defend themselves, and the whole marching route was covered with death and wounded. Several thousand had already been put out of action, until the remainder reached a forest in which they found protection over the night. Pecheux escaped with about six hundred men, all that was left of the 8,000 which he had led the same morning. Cannon, baggage, without exception everything was captured by the Allies. So went the heroic battle, of which the French would fight many more during this war, which however was only surpassed by Pactod and Amey on the fields of the Champagne. We are delighted to be able to report that Wallmoden treated all prisoners, because of their brave defence, exceptionally well.
There are many more of such examples. Examples which prove that the Cossack can be used against foot and guns also, with safe and good results, when one knows how to lead them. Even the most difficult task of the soldier, to remain stationary under the fire of guns, has been fulfilled bravely by Cossacks in several occasions. During the combat of Liège [Lüttich] (24 january 1814) the Girov and Sisoiev Regiments endured enemy musketry and grapeshot for three hours. During the capture of Soissons, one of the boldest and most profitable faiths of arms by Czernitschev, the same regiments, in addition that of Diatschkin, endured together with the Jäger Brigade ‘Rehbinder’ the murderous fire from the walls. About forty men of Diatschkin were the first to enter the city.
Acting against horse is a real feast for the Cossack. One can notice the joy in his eyes as soon as the outposts report the approach of horse. He has all trust that he will be able to push them back in the short or the long term, when not able to defeat them in the first charge. The opinion of the enemy is of course also in this case the most reliable. All Frenchmen admit that it was the irregular cavalry which formed the biggest problem for their own horse. “What should one do with these horse?”, they say: “If one wants to capture them, they escape; if one wants some rest, one is not able to drive them away; if one forms a close formation, it is being surrounded; if one extends its own line to the same length of theirs, they concentrate before one realises it, and break through; if one throws them back a hundred times, they still will return, and our horses will be destroyed by this”.
© Geert van Uythoven