‘About the Cossacks, and their usefulness in the field’

(‘Ueber den Kosaken, und dessen Brauchbarkeit im Felde’)

by [the Austrian] Captain A. Prokesch

Translated by Geert van Uythoven

Source: Osterreichisches Militairisches Zeitschrift, 3. Band, 9. Heft (Wien, 1824) pp. 270 – 339.

part 6

(pp. 319 - 329)

The Cossack fears horsemen of no nation, except the Turks. For the Polish lancers he has admiration, because these were capable to fight in closed, as well as in open order, and because he had to cope with them almost all the time during the latest war. The French, as long as they possessed cavalry, held back their own in closed order and sent forward the Polish for light duties. The German and French light cavalry are not feared by the Cossack. He will not stand and oppose their formed attacks, and in open order he will surpass them in manoeuvrability. On the contrary, the Cossack will take more notice of heavy cavalry, probably because he will seldom meet those on the battlefield. Still, from such occasions there are several examples of bravery and good results. One of the most significant is the attack of Colonel Jlowaisky XII on 28 September 1812. He marched with 275 Cossacks, as an Advance Guard of Winzingerode, from Dawidowka village to Petrowsky Castle. An enemy force which was 500 cuirassiers strong, advancing from Moscow, opposed him. The combat was undecided for over an hour. At that moment, Jlowaisky executed such a fierce attack that the enemy was defeated, most of the cuirassiers stabbed of their horse, the remainder thrown back into the suburbs. Winzingerode, acquainted with cavalry for over twenty years, declared never to have seen such a brilliant cavalry battle.

During the battle of Laon, the old Girov gave a similar example. Ordered by Field Marshal Blücher to operate in the back of the French army, after an exhausting flank march, late in the evening Benkendorf reached Soissons were Napoleon had deployed his heavy cavalry. The moment Napoleon saw the Cossacks he dispatched 300 to 400 cuirassiers with an infantry battalion to oppose them. Benkendorf took volunteers out of his brigade, about 250 men, and Girov led them against the enemy. Initially, these remained in close order, but then they gave way to the harassing Cossacks. Half of them dispersed in open order, while the other half formed line and tried to advance. Immediately the Cossacks broke in, stabbed the disordered cuirassiers form their horses, and threw back the remainder on the infantry.

An also very remarkable attack was that of the Girov Regiment on 800 guard dragoons and Parisian Hussars, which formed Napoleon’s Rear Guard during his retreat from Fontainebleau during March 1814. Czernitschev was at Plancy on his march to St. Dizier when he received message of Napoleon’s march, which would cost him two days and maybe also his crown, and turned off to the road coming from Troyes, to be close and to be able to shadow him when the Emperor would turn back. He dispatched the Girov and Sisoiev Regiments to Sens. Half an hour before the city these encountered French horse, deployed in squadrons, covering each other. The Girov Regiment attacked, endured a carbine volley, and overthrow the squadrons, the French fleeing back to Sens in great disorder. Many remained on the spot, 230 men and four officers were taken prisoner.

One of the most magnificent cavalry combats was fought by General Tettenborn against the French Emperor himself, when the Emperor in February 1814 passed from the left over to the right bank of the Seine river, and was approaching the Marne river, in order to attack Field Marshal Blücher. Tettenborn crossed the terrain between both rivers and encountered near Fere-Champenoise ten squadrons of the Imperial Guard on their march. He threw himself at them at once with two Cossack regiments, brought them to a halt, chased them several times, and held them in check for a long time. Soon however the open heights were covered with numerous cavalry squadrons; one could count clearly seven regiments; prisoners confirmed the presence of the Emperor. This important piece of information was sent by Tettenborn to both Field Marshals Schwarzenberg and Blücher immediately, of which the one did not know yet about the departure, the other one about the approach of Napoleon. With his Cossacks he continued to harass the enemy, without allowing himself to be intimidated. Many Mameluks and guard dragoons were stabbed out of their saddle. Napoleon realised that his surprise march had been detected, and was not able to get rid of the harassing Cossacks in any way. All main roads were controlled by the French; all secondary roads by the Cossacks. In this way the Marne was crossed. Where a French column marched, sooner or later Cossacks would move in front of it, behind it, and on both flanks. The fighting had no end. What of the enemy stayed behind from exhaustion was taken prisoner; couriers, baggage trains, the same. Trying to do as much harm to each other as possible, both parties arrived in the vicinity of Rheims. Knowing that this place had a Russian garrison, Tettenborn dispatched a detachment there. The French however had taken the city by surprise that same night. Half an hour away from this city, Tettenborn was notified about this, and at the same time he was informed that Napoleon was concentrating here. All roads were choked with troops. The Russian Cossack leader now wanted to contact his own troops again, and following a secondary road he arrived on a height. Here he detected an enemy column consisting of heavy cavalry, marching to Rheims. They noticed his force at the same moment, and they were too close to each other to be able to retreat without a fight. Counting on the element of surprise, he threw himself at the tight mass, although unknown with the strength of his opponent and not knowing what followed the cavalry, and overthrew them with the first charge. The fighting became man-to-man. The French deployed six cannon and opened a fierce fire. Nevertheless they soon came in a disadvantageous position; their cannon had nearly time to extricate themselves, and they were already overtaken when saved by the vicinity of Rheims. The thunder of the cannon had woken the garrison; infantry and cavalry left as supports, and took up the fugitives. The French horse concerned was a guard dragoon regiment; it was completely dispersed, and a squadron that tried to make a stand was completely destroyed. In this way surprise, combined by making the most of the situation at hand, were combined to gain victory.

Tettenborn’s raids into France are rich of events that can be compared, and are prefect examples for officers which would have to command raiding parties in the future. After the battle of Laon this General continued to fulfil his former role. He operated behind Napoleon’s army, guarding every movement. His parties forced their way into the inner reach of the French army with an audacity without any equal. When Napoleon again turned himself against the main army, he opposed his columns again near Epernay. Here it happened that the Papabantschikov Cossack Regiment charged across the bridge, attacking 300 infantry and three squadrons with such audacity that nearly a single man was able to save himself. And when by accident the bridge, which was prepared to be blown, exploded, the enemy saw the Cossacks as already captured. But in full view of the French these calmly recrossed the Marne, without suffering any loss. A few days later, Colonel Pfull with two Cossack Regiments defeated and dispersed General Vincent’s force, who had orders to secure Epernay with 800 infantry and three squadrons.

To be able to make a stand against the Cossacks, during the 1814 campaign it became standard for the French cavalry to start every attack and defence with carbine fire. This weapon, which is commonly eschewed by the Cossack, more then any other weapon, was also the means with which the Danish cavalry in the 1813 campaign was able to keep the Cossacks at bay. Later it made not much impression on them anymore. They learned that it was only a weak aid for embarrassed cavalry. During Blücher’s retreat from Meaux to Soissons in March 1814, Colonel Nostitz attacked with forty Cossacks a whole squadron of Vélites of the Guard on open terrain near the Bridge of Wailly. The Cossacks withstood the fire of the vélites, and then threw themselves upon them, and the whole squadron was defeated.

When all the examples above at least show, that when properly led the Cossack could be used for many services during the war, at least sufficiently useful for any task, it will be useful to say a bit more about the lever with which one is able to make good use of them. For the greater part this has already been explained at the start of this work, and this will not be repeated here. Their vanity, and the trust in their own usefulness is always so strong, that only the smallest provocation will suffice. The presence of foreign officers or troops to witness their deeds has therefore a huge effect on them. The battle at the Aisne river, after the battle of Laon, fought by the Girov, Sisoiev, and Jlowaisky IV Regiments, which has been praised by Prince Friedrich von Preußen and many other Prussian officers, is indeed partially due to magnificent leadership, but also because of the presence of the whole Prussian army. These regiments, and with them the Volhynian Uhlans, ran into the 15,000 men strong enemy Rear Guard consisting of infantry and 600 Polish lancers when they crossed the Aisne river in full view of York’s and Kleist’s Corps, burning the bridges behind them. Czernitschev ordered the attack, and the Cossacks begged to execute it on their own, “so that we can show the Uhlans and Prussians, what Don Cossacks are capable off!”. Indeed, the Girov Regiment succeeded in luring the cavalry away from the infantry, charging them by surprise and trashing them in such a way that over a hundred of these Polish horsemen remained in the hands of the Cossacks. Both other regiments were only a witness of this combat 1).

Regarding the armament of the Cossacks, the lance is their main weapon. He knows how to use this weapon with great skill and security, nevertheless the fact that it is one and a half foot longer as the Polish lance. He knows how to use his sabre just as well; officers and NCO’s practice them for use against the Turks. The pistol is of less value to him. He considers it not really as a weapon, but only as a tool to scare the enemy. He fires only to fire, not to hit anything, and in common there are few Cossacks which use their pistols. On the contrary, they love to use their muskets and carbines, and on foot they are equal to the best light infantry 2). Hunting, and wars with Caucasian tribes have made the Cossacks suitable for the use of firearms. In front of the fortified places in Moldau, Suvarov often let the Cossacks dismount, to utilise them in storming those places. They competed then with his Fanagora Grenadiers. During the last war it also often happened that the Cossacks were utilised on foot. Several examples have already been given. Tettenborn armed his Cossacks completely with French muskets, and without any difference they had to be able to fight mounted as well as on foot. In the hollow roads of Escheburg, on the dikes of the Low Countries, during the defence of Stecknitz, during the attack on Bremen, etc. they served magnificently. Czernitschev utilised them this way in the suburbs of Kassel, Benkendorf in St. Brice near Rheims. This double service has also the advantage of causing a better obedience in the face of the enemy, a fusion of disorder with order, and a decisive endurance under fire. Their leader however will be able to find in the Cossack immense advantages in his possible double use as a man on foot, and a horseman. He can discard the presence of infantry during undertakings which only can succeed by speed. The highest mobility has reached its perfection this way. One should therefore not be surprised of the fact that Tettenborn, when having received the order at the start of the campaign against Denmark to form the Advance Guard, yielded voluntarily the Prussian infantry and the Hanseatic guns, keeping only his Cossacks and four cannon taken from the enemy. These were also served by Cossacks. In this way he had combined all three arms within his troop.

The Cossack loves the use of a firearm, because of the reason that he fears the one of the enemy. He wants to take artillery with him, and the name Pouchki (cannon) is for him a word of joy, as well as of fear. That one exposes him often to enemy artillery, without support of its own artillery, is the reason that he eschewed this arm so much. He will defend his cannon to the end. He will care for them, as if they were a valuable treasure. He pulls them when necessary, he will aid them whenever possible. He will never neglect to keep an eye on them. He trains them with great precision, and when a shot has effect, the whole troop will explode in rejoicing, often followed by a charge out of pure warlike spirit.

Shouting is for the Cossack a necessary ingredient to all his charges, indeed to all his movements, and it would have serious consequences if this would be forbidden to him as it is for the regular cavalry. Apparent disorder is the character of his charges. When shouting will increase the disorder, as is stated by those opposed to every outbreak of anger, mockery and intoxication, it will have no disadvantageous effect on the charge of the Cossacks. Shouting raises for that matter their own anger, at the same time demoralising the enemy. It is the nature of humans, fighting each other on life or dead, were they will use all his force, that they will not remain silent. In addition, one often hears the regular cavalry, when their charge succeeds and the melee starts, violate their enforced silence.

The shouting of the Cossacks is not a marked word, but an undefined wild howling, which everyone does in his own way, finally ending in a high exultation. The ‘hurrah’ has only come into use during the latest campaigns of the Cossacks.

A precautionary measure, by which one protects the Cossack against being infected by the wrong prejudice, consists of placing a calm and cautious officer with the most forward outposts whenever possible, even if he is less trustworthy or brave. The impression which makes an oral message of such an officer on the troop is often decisive for the moment. The Cossack will judge half words, observes facial expressions, and reads the total behaviour of the man that makes that report, to ascertain the degree of danger. Often his reaction will be based on this. A calm face, even during the greatest danger, is therefore highly necessary for the leader. He orders them to sing songs when he notices that they are becoming restless 3). On a moment of dislocation he calls for volunteers. Usually after such a call, the whole troop concentrates again around its leader, in moments when nothing else would have had this effect on them.

Footnotes:

1) The examples, which value the Cossack gives to the praise of foreigners, is known to many. This is so natural that prove is hardly necessary. This leads also to the consideration how advantageous the attachment of Cossacks to troops of the line is for both. Both are summoned this way to prove their usefulness, and the trust of the Cossacks is raised by the presence of close order supports. These will recover more quickly from the rigours of service, when they know that the outposts are occupied by troops whose alertness is common knowledge in the whole army. In numerous smaller and bigger combats the moment was visible, that the appearance of troops of the line gave the Cossacks new élan. Or how an attack, in cooperation with troops of the line, doubled their efforts.

2) A tenth of every squadron consists of marksmen; Strelki. Rifle and pistols are mostly Turkish or Persian booty.

3) Tettenborn had forty selected singers around him, which whenever he ordered them began to sing several songs, after which usually the whole troop fell in.

Part 7 (final part)

© Geert van Uythoven