‘About the Cossacks, and
their usefulness in the field’
(‘Ueber den Kosaken, und dessen Brauchbarkeit im Felde’)
by [the Austrian] Captain A.
Prokesch
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Source: Osterreichisches Militairisches
Zeitschrift, 3. Band, 9. Heft (Wien, 1824) pp. 270 – 339.
part 4
(pp. 297 - 309)
All these characteristics together
obviously make the Cossack very suitable to execute surprise-attacks, and to
relentlessly teasing and threatening a more superior, better armed, and in its
elements more carefully trained force, in order to ruin it completely. In
October 1813 near Kassel, three Cossack regiments destroyed the Hussar Regiment
‘Jerôme’ in such a way, that no man or horse managed to escape; a young guard
detachment of 3,500 men strong, at Langengebode on the road to Hanau, was
attacked by 800 Cossacks. They were pinned down until daybreak, when three Bavarian
battalions arrived, taking prisoner the whole detachment; the elimination of
the noble Polish Lancer Regiment under General Kanopka at Slonim (in November
1812), and many other surprise-attacks executed by Cossacks are well-known. The
most famous are without doubt the failed but brilliant undertaking by
Czernitschev and Tettenborn on Berlin, and the capture of Bremen by the latter.
Both events illustrate and prove the statements that were made; as such, a
short and reliable description of these will be beneficial.
Secret agreements, all over Germany, backed up by huge amounts of money, in addition favoured by the spirit of the German nation, seem to guarantee the success of the undertaking on Berlin. Although Augereau occupied the city with over 10,000 men, he had only 200 horse. All citizens were prepared to rise; Ludwig Kleist was at that time able to raise and arm a whole battalion in the centre of the city, without the French having the least knowledge about it; which proves the spirit and the will of the nation! The Russians on the opposite side of the Oder [River] were in close communications with the inhabitants of Berlin. Between them and Colonel Tettenborn the undertaking was planned, and the day fixed. It was hoped to cut up the whole of Augereau’s Corps. Without hesitation, Tettenborn crossed the Oder with four Cossack regiments, two cannon, and two Prussian squadrons under Major Schill which had been borrowed from York. During the march the situation at once completely changed, which was the real cause of the failure of the undertaking. Tettenborn received a letter from the King of Prussia, in which he was dissuaded to execute the undertaking on Berlin; Major von Lützow was the courier of this letter. At the same time he brought orders for Major Schill not to leave the spot; all Prussian officers which would accompany Tettenborn received the same orders. The royal order left no choice. Tettenborn had to do without the lever of royal consent, and without Prussian troops entering Berlin. Both means was counted upon as a decisive factor to rouse the people to take action.
The Russian Colonel (Tettenborn) now invited General Czernitschev, who was at Frankfurt at the Oder, to take part in the undertaking, and voluntarily accepted to act under his orders. Czernitschev accepted and promised to be in Landsberg at midnight with 3,000 horse. Tettenborn went also there, and next morning they both marched against Berlin. Scouts arrived every hour, reporting that the enemy in the capital still had no clue about what was coming at them. After a while they were only a quarter of a mile away from the city, and at that moment message arrived that “the vice-king [Eugène] was force-marching from Cöpnik to Berlin”. This report startled the Russian partisans; it could bring failure, even defeat, so they halted. And so it became nine o’clock. At that moment, Würzburg dragoons became visible on the low heights before the city. These dragoons were all the cavalry Augereau had. They were discovered now, but a retreat could still safely be executed. Tettenborn placed himself at the head of the Komissarov Regiment, and made a ‘Hurrah’ against these dragoons. The undertaking had begun –the dragoons were routed. In the melee, the Cossacks arrived at the gate. They were welcomed with terrible musketry. The detachment on guard was overrun. The Cossacks chased to the ‘Linden, and dispersed the French units that were trying to concentrate here. It became clear that the enemy was taken totally by surprise. Quickly, Tettenborn dispatched officer after officer to Czernitschev, to invite him to come. Czernitschev however, maybe taking in account that one could not hold Berlin right now, and in order not to provoke the people still inactive because of the weakness of Tettenborn’s force, to start deeds which could do them harm later, restricted his action by marching to the heights in front of the city. Holding even back Tettenborn’s remaining three Cossack regiments. Augereau in the meanwhile gathered his forces at the Brandenburger Gate, and occupied more and more ground, finally after four hours driving the Cossacks out of the city again.
This failed undertaking was followed by a success at Bremen. Wallmoden stood in Lauenburg and surroundings; Tettenborn in Lüneburg. Marshal Davout was in Hamburg. The latter was because of his strength and positions unassailable, the country in his back was free; Bremen a fortified, well garrisoned post at the Weser [River], between the Elbe and the Rhine. Nienburg and Minden were also fortified crossings at the Weser; Rothenburg finally a communication post between Hamburg and Bremen. Tettenborn asked for permission to General Wallmoden to capture the latter city, which because of its position and its wealth was of the highest importance to the French. Wallmoden, although in doubt about the outcome (then only the unlikely undiscovered preparations and advance to the city could make it more likely), gave permission for the undertaking. On 9 October [1813], Tettenborn gathered all wagons he could find on the left bank of the Elbe near Blekede. On these wagons he put eight hundred Lützow and Reiche Jäger, in addition taking with him the same number of Cossacks, and four cannon. Leaving next morning at 10 am, they drove for two days and two nights under unceasing rain showers, without being stopped by the deep moors and nearly impassable wasteland over Soltau to Werden. Phuel blockaded Rothenburg with a force consisting of Jäger and Cossacks. Other detachments enclosed the whole countryside between Hamburg and Bremen, and all other places occupied by the French, so that no message about what was happening could reach any of all these places. In Werden there was a rest for three hours, until night fell.
Tettenborn wanted to be in front of Bremen early morning of the 13th. The endless march along sandy roads fatigued the foot enormously (most wagons had remained behind, being stuck on the Lüneburger Moor). In Aarbergen Tettenborn, who had advanced further with the Cossacks, had to wait most of the night. This delay was used by the mayor of this place, who was in favour of the French, to send a messenger to Bremen, who managed to reach the city under cover of darkness. If this act of treason had not occurred, Tettenborn would have found the city in such a peaceful state that the garrison would even not have had the time to raise the drawbridge. Now however, although Tettenborn arrived only a short while after the messenger before Bremen, he found a Swiss battalion in the suburbs and the village Hastedt close by, which received him with heavy musketry. No time had to be lost; Tettenborn could not wait for the arrival of his Jäger. His cannon fired a few shots, and sending Cossacks on the flanks and in the back, which the remainder he plunged himself into the village and nearly destroyed all the fear-stricken troops. Few fugitives tried to reach the city again. The pursuing Cossacks reached the gate, but found the drawbridge raised, and from the walls the guns began to fire. Tettenborn was in trouble now; he knew that the city was well garrisoned, and he had nothing then four unicorns. The surprise-attack seemed to have failed. Nevertheless, stubbornly he continued the attack. Jäger and dismounted Cossacks were thrown into the houses, to maintain a heavy fire against the walls; one of his guns covered the wall with grapeshot; two howitzers bombarded the city. The firing was kept up with such a high rate that the enemy believed that the amount of guns was much bigger. Tettenborn hoped for the participation of the citizens –he hoped, the threat to their belongings would provoke them to raise against the garrison. The garrison however managed to keep the people in hand, and the bombardment did not have the desired results. Tettenborn, in order not to deplete his whole supply of ammunition completely, had to let his guns fall silent. Only the musketry continued and became even more heavy with more Cossacks dismounting to participate.
The Russian commander of the partisans was in a painful situation now. How fierce he started his attack; how able he divided his troops over both banks of the Weser [river] and showed them: every hour it became more difficult to uphold the role of being only an advance guard of a much superior force close by, or to maintain the display of strength dangerous to the place. It seemed the moment was not far the truth would become visible for the enemy, and then the only thing left for Tettenborn to do was to retreat empty handed. He however, knowing that only the greatest effort, boldness and activity could give his trick some more time to reach the desired goal, and resolved to try everything to the utmost, decided to threaten the place with storming it. In the evening, he retreated the troops that could be missed in the firing line somewhat, and during the night and the following day these were put to work on 60,000 fascines [faggots], aided by Pfuel who with his force joined him as a blockade of Rothenburg was not necessary anymore. With these, he [i.e. Tettenborn] wanted to fill the ditch and to storm the place the following night. The evening before preparations were ready the troops were in high spirits, and desired the final effort themselves; the hour was already fixed. Before executing the attack, Tettenborn asked the fortress to capitulate; Cavalry-Captain Herbert arrived at the gate, was allowed to enter, and found out to his surprise that a single shot had totally changed the situation in favour of the Allies. The French commander, Colonel Thullier, an old and experienced warrior, had been shot down on the walls. His successor had not the strength to replace him. The garrison, Swiss troops, had no lust to fight; the citizens were restless and forced upon the commander fear and irresolution. Herbert made good use of this, and first refuted the opinion that it was only a party of partisans that stood in front of the gates. It was agreed upon that he would be accompanied by an officer at his return, who would ascertain if General Tettenborn was really present in person, and if everything was the case as had been stated by Herbert. Tettenborn managed to hide his weakness for this officer, and when he returned to the city, confirming Tettenborn’s presence, speaking about the preparations to storm he had seen with his own eyes, the people demanded to capitulate. Negotiations started, lasting the rest of the evening and through the night. When morning already came close, Tettenborn began to fear that daybreak would reveal his weakness. He decided to force a result by ordering, in the presence of the enemy negotiators, the assault to begin within the hour when in the meantime, without the change of any of the stipulations laid down by him, the capitulation would have been signed. In this way Bremen with considerable funds, supplies, 16 guns, and various war materials fell on 15 October in the hands of the Russian commander, who accomplished this by his boldness, carefulness and perseverance, and by his gift to develop and to make the most of the qualities of his troops. As such he was qualified to achieve the extraordinary, from the start right through to the end.
To these both deeds, which prove the speed and boldness of the Cossacks, we want to add a third one, not just as brilliant but more glorious, and more important because of the influence it had on the situation, which shows what a general can achieve with these horsemen against a far superior enemy. We mean the paralysing and pinning down of Marshal Davout near Schwerin, by the same Russian partisans.
In August 1813 [18 August] Davout had crossed the Stecknitz with 40,000 men. Wallmoden, who was opposing him with 25,000 men, retreated in compliance to his orders given by the Crown Prince of Sweden, slowly to the line between Schwerin and the Elbe [river]. Tettenborn, who led Wallmoden’s rear guard, fought several splendid actions with the Marshal, and encircled his main force already during its march with a Cossack regiment in a way that everyone who stayed behind was lost, and communications with Hamburg had been cut. Davout took up a position between the lakes near Schwerin. What his intentions were could not be guessed by the Allies; at this moment it came down to leave no step unnoticed. Then already at this time, the French main army threatened to march on Berlin with strong forces. A connection some way or another with these movements had to be counted upon. Davout, surrounded by Cossacks, was not able to send any message or to receive any. But it had to be considered that Davout would break through this light cordon any moment, to act in a decisive way somewhere. To make a stand in such a case was no easy task for Wallmoden.
All of a sudden, the Crown Prince recalled General Wallmoden: “He would have to march against an enemy corps which threatened to march to Berlin over Magdeburg [Girard’s Division]. General Tettenborn had to remain in place against Davout, and to deceive him about the marching off of Wallmoden”. Wallmoden left on 25 August. Tettenborn remained in place with a very difficult task, which seems to be to much for even the most able general. With a force of 1,500 Cossacks, 300 Lützower horse, and 3,000 foot, he opposed the 40,000 men of Marshal Davout.
What the Russian general did first, is doubling the encirclement of the enemy camp, in order to show the enemy a pugnacity which should give him the idea that one wanted him to attack. Next, he concentrated nearly his whole force on the beautiful and completely level plain which stretches out from Schwerin over Ludwigslust, in full view of the enemy. The enemy remained in position motionless, prove that he had been deceived; otherwise he would not have given in to the encirclement in which he was held by Tettenborn, and would have got the idea to threaten the shires Brandenburg or Pommern by executing a few marches. A movement which could have effected the Crown Prince seriously, and which Davout undoubtly would have executed if he would have known the state of events.
In the meantime, the siege at Großbeeren [23 August] was won; Wallmoden returned and the difficult phase had passed for Tettenborn. And although not reinforced by troops, and still opposing the Marshal on his own, he decided to take offensive action. That means, he decided to fatigue the enemy with incessant actions by his Cossacks and Jäger, without engaging in serious combat. He moved his headquarters to Ortkrug, closer to the enemy, and concentrated the main bulk of his force there, in the most idyllic area of the country. From here all raids and attacks were coordinated, and the encirclement and fatiguing of the enemy planned with ingenuity. The area around was patrolled in cleverly chosen directions; all transports which approached the [enemy] camp were attacked, and nearly all captured. All couriers fell in the hands of the Cossacks, so that the Marshal was ignorant about what was happening. From the dispatches that were captured one learned that the Marshal was in constant fear of being attacked, and therefore he recalled all outlying units, raising his strength to 50,000 French, and 10-15,000 Danish troops.
While sufficient provisions were lacking in the French camp, in Tettenborns camp provisions were abundant. To acquire food supplies, the French had to march out with whole battalions and cannon, engaging in combats. No patrol dared to leave out of fear to be captured. Every night a detachment of Cossacks and Jäger received orders to sneak to the enemy camp, to throw back the outposts, to make as much noise as possible, and to continue doing this until daybreak. In the meanwhile, one in Ortkrug took a rest, while the French had to stay under arms night after night. The Cossacks became so bold during these night attacks that the enemy had to regret all negligence immediately. Strength of their parties changed often; their mobility enhanced their appearance in strength. The French, in the dark what the intentions of these attacks were, if they were executed to find the French unprepared when a real attack would take place, had no choice as to endure this all as long as they did not want to take decisive action themselves.
Eight days passed on this way, and the number of signs of the peril the enemy was in became so great that Wallmoden accepted the repeated proposal by Tettenborn to give battle despite the superiority of the enemy in numbers and their well-chosen position. It seems the occasion arose when the French prepared to move to Rostock much stronger, so to divide himself. However, on 3 September in the morning message arrived at Ortkrug, that the enemy had left Schwerin at midnight, starting their retreat to Stecknitz. Tettenborn immediately opened the pursuit with every men available. The posts the enemy had left behind to cover its retreat were immediately ran over, taken prisoner for the greater part. All separate Cossack detachments followed the marshal on his heels, were at his flanks, in front of him, and attacked the advance and rear guards. The French had to halt and reform several times, in order to prevent their retreat becoming a rout. Under unceasingly fighting at last they reached Stecknitz; hundreds of prisoners remaining in the hands of the Allies. Their horse teams and trains were nearly completely destroyed; their horse did not dare to show themselves. Not only, that this [French] corps had been paralysed at a moment were it could have been decisive during the campaign –public opinion from now on changed in fear for the dreaded Marshal to make him an object of mockery for the whole north--, these three examples illustrate how one can make good use of the Cossacks 1).
Footnotes:
1) More details
about these events can be found in the excellent work “Kriegszüge des Generals
Tettenborn”, by Von Varnhagen von Ense (Stuttgardt und Tübingen 1814).
© Geert van Uythoven