‘About the Cossacks, and
their usefulness in the field’
(‘Ueber den Kosaken, und dessen Brauchbarkeit im Felde’)
by [the Austrian] Captain A.
Prokesch
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Source: Osterreichisches Militairisches
Zeitschrift, 3. Band, 9. Heft (Wien, 1824) pp. 270 – 339.
part 3
(pp. 288 – 297)
To cut off a certain part of the country,
surrounding it in a wide circle; to surround an enemy force in such a way that
every possibility to reconnoitre, to receive provisions, to receive information
about the strength and the position of the enemy is prevented, is masterly
executed by the Cossacks. The latest campaigns are full of examples and proof
of this. The encirclement which Davout with his 50,000 men suffered near
Schwerin by Tettenborn, who commanded only four Cossack regiments and some free
corps; the combat at the Göhrde, fought by Wallmoden against Pecheux’ Division;
Tettenborn’s march to Bremen, etc. These faiths of arms, to which we will have
the opportunity to look at more thoroughly later, could not have succeeded
without the ability of the Cossacks to block certain parts of the terrain for
the enemy completely.
A
characteristic which makes the Cossacks especially useful for the ‘light war’,
is their total indifference for a thousand things, which are called ‘obstacles’
in the military sense, which are usually evaded and even are the cause of the
failure of many undertakings when forces encountered them unexpectedly. On the
mainland, there is in a certain way nothing which will hamper a Cossack.
Already when being a child, the Cossack learned to be active and to deserve by
his own efforts the fulfilment of his own needs and comforts. Indifferent and
full of confidence he will tackle all difficulties, full of believe that his
God, the Russian God (‘Rossiskoi Boch’) has more value then every other
God of every other nation. He does not know the scourge of indecision. If he
would have to cross a river, marsh or bog; should he try the strength of the
ice if it would hold; should he reconnoitre a forest, a pass, or a narrow road:
he will never hesitate or being discouraged. If it should happen that he would
be pushed back from the roads, into forests and mountains, he will move quietly
from height to height. Listens, takes a good look all around him, until he has
managed to evade the enemy, and to join his own troops again. Should it happen
that his march is blocked by a river with no bridge in the vicinity, then he
will look for the lowest part of the river bank without hesitation, and will
cross the river swimming one by one, or even whole regiments at once. The
example that in case of emergency the river will become a bridge for the
Cossacks everywhere, gave Tettenborn in France in many instances. Nearly always
he was operating in the back of the French main army, and pressed between its
columns, several times he moved with his whole force from one bank of the Marne
river to the other bank. The example which surprised
most happened during the surprise attack on Bremen (on October 1813). Two
Cossack regiments crossed the wide Weser river in full view of the city,
to cut off communications on the left bank. This beautiful example was even
admired by the enemy. Citizens and garrison applauded the brave swimmers, and
the fire from that place ceased, as if it was chained by some kind of magic.
During
the attack on Holland the adroitness with which six Cossack regiments under
Narischkin and Stael operated between hundreds of waterways and many fortified
places astonished all experienced military buffs. Places were other horse would
think twice before going to, the Cossacks shunned no danger, and indeed
suffered no disadvantages. The service they did before Naarden*, Zutphen,
Deventer, etc., prove their use in intersected terrain, and even with the
relatively static service during blockades.
Beside
that a Cossack is not surprised by any obstacle, he will not be astonished by
anything. The beautiful works of architecture, the products of luxury, all
appearances of nature, which he encountered in the western countries did not
tempt him. In Berlin and Hamburg the most beautiful buildings were made
available to him; he was received with the best meals: but he preferred to cook
his own cabbage soup outside under the open sky, and to sleep on the road
beside his horse. The beautiful things of Paris did not tempt him. He rode
through the city of the Emperor which was filled with all troops of Europe, and
were every pace would open views to him he had never seen before, from the
barrier on one side of the city to the barrier on the other side, with the same
indifference as when he would travel trough a small Russian village. The same
indifference by the way which is characteristic to all Asian tribes.
There is no troop better prepared to execute night marches as the Cossacks. Because of the fact that a Cossack has fixed his sabre and musket firmly to his body, because he uses no spurs, no weapons that clang, indeed wearing few metal on his clothing 1); that in addition the horses are very calm (the Don regiments ride no stallions), the troops move and approach, extend or close in without any noise. It would be as if everyone is holding his breath. During Napoleon’s retreat from Leipzig, Benkendorf executed a night march with the Girov and Gisojev Regiments from Wippach castle to Weißensee, during which he often was only thirty paces away from the enemy, and always had the French piquet’s and vedettes on his flank. He was however never discovered, and neither a man nor a horse stayed behind.
The movements of the Cossacks are simple. Usually they march with three abreast, often with six. The colour of the squadron is always in the first rank; the squadron leader is in the intervals; the remaining officers are on the right and left side of the column. They march when receiving the order: lawoy! in a single line which forms an arc, both wings enclosing the enemy. On those wings the most resolute men of the troop are positioned; then they form the rear guard when the attack fails. In such a case everyone speeds to the centre and closes up tightly. If the terrain is open, the defence during the retreat is executed by echelons, and all troops know exactly the right moment to turn and to close in on the enemy with lose rein. If they are not completely sure about what they will undertake, and if they have the intention of a surprise attack, they execute an interim movement which is peculiar for them, and can only be executed by themselves. They call it: wintiet, i.e. ‘screwing’. They move on the same spot with increasing speed. They seem to want to do then this, then something else, keeping the enemy in the dark about their real intentions, and then at once they attack.
Speed is the soul of all movement of the Cossacks. He is served to this purpose by the ‘ambling’ [‘Paßgang’] of his horse, which is very lasting, and equals in speed the middle gallop of any other horse. Even the walk of a horse of the Don is quick. One can assume that with this the horse will cover a small German mile** in one hour. With which unbelievable speed and endurance Cossacks can march has been proved by Czernitschev and Tettenborn during the last war. The well-known march by the former one from the upper Niemen to the Ula in October 1812, and the march to Kassel in the following year, are nearly fabulous. Nothing less the marches of several small detachments; as for example the march of one hundred thirty Cossacks under Captain Fabek, which participated in the undertaking on Kassel. These 130 men crossed the Elbe near Roßlau, and rode six miles on the first day, to Bernburg; on the second day twelve miles on secondary roads to Nordhausen; on the third day again twelve miles to Kassel. Here, the fought the fourth day until deep in the night, and rode another three miles, to Melsungen. Arriving there, they received orders to raid to Frankfurt. They did as ordered, and seized a few couriers which were going from Paris to Dresden, were Napoleon’s headquarters was. On the sixth day after they had left for Frankfurt they arrived again at the Elbe near Dömitz, fifty miles distance from this city.
In January 1814, Captain Schilling rode with one hundred and fifty Cossacks from the Rhine to Reims in seven marches, assaulted the city and was master of it for three weeks, although surrounded by the enemy and no friendly troops within sixty hours. The brave Major Macklay rode with one hundred and sixty Cossacks from Osnabrück to Amsterdam in eight days, and proclaimed freedom to Holland. At that time it also happened that detachments under Steinecker and Peterson marched from Mecheln to Brussels, were the enemy had counted on a peaceful stay for weeks to come. Captain Arnim, who in the year 1815 was despatched from Chalons with fifty Cossacks to find the Prussians and English advancing on Paris from the Netherlands, arrived at St. Cloud in thirty-six hours, and was the first ally who marched through Paris at the head of his feeble force. On the day the Netherlands army marched into the capital, Arnim already joined his own unit again in Brie-Comte-Robert.
In March 1813, in four days, Tettenborn marched from Berlin over Ludwigslust to Lauenburg with his Cossacks and two light guns –a distance of thirty-six German miles-- fought for two days with a superior enemy, defeated them and entered Hamburg on the third day. The same general went in December 1813, when the Crown prince of Sweden broke into Holstein, in four days from Stecknitz at the Eyder, to be precise from the vicinity of Mölln to Rendsburg; despite the terrible roads, where the horses often sank in the mud up to their belly, across deep ditches, often wading through the water for hours, breaking through the ice. These movements, executed in the rear of the enemy army, continued day and night without any difference, and there was only a rest during the hours necessary to fodder the horses. Everywhere, the enemy was totally taken by surprise and lost their head; then the Cossacks headed off all messages of their approach. In January 1814, just as quick, Tettenborn crossed the Duchy of Schleswig along both coasts. In three days, part of the Cossacks rode from Friedrichsstadt to Kolding, a distance of twenty-four German miles. Compared by its distance however, the most remarkable forced march of this general was that made in January and February 1814 from Holstein into the heart of France. He left the Eyder on 24 January and crossed the Rhine at Cologne on 11 February, a distance of seventy German miles. Near Bonn and Trier a few resting days were held, which was inevitable because of the time of the year; the long distance of the forced march; riding on bottomless mountainous and secondary roads; while having to do fatiguing security service which was necessary because of the presence of numerous fortresses that were not blockaded, and gatherings of the farmers. On 25 February Tettenborm reached Rheims. Therefore, he covered one hundred and fifty German miles in thirty days.
One who compares the speed of a Cossack march against the abilities of a regular horse troop will doubt the truth of such examples when not the whole army, or even more the united armies of Europe, have witnessed this all. In addition, the well-known and with right called famous march of Fürst Koudaschev after the hostilities were resumed in the year 1813; that of Fürst Mentschikov II in the year 1812; the marches executed by Albrecht I, S. Wolkonsky, Alexis, and Michael Orlov and other officers in the campaigns of 1812 to 1815, belong also to this class. It is no miracle at all that officers that had served with the Cossacks, and knew how to lead them, disliked having to execute such undertakings with the utmost speed with regular horse!
It seems to be a deficiency that the Cossacks, like other horse troops and even light infantry, have no trumpeters. Still, seldom one will hear from one of their leaders a complaint about the absence of this means for signalling and establishing order. The Cossack troop seems like a chain which, thrown down carelessly, and how irregular it seems to be, is still linked in a secure way. One small moment is sufficient to point out the law of order. We have mentioned the surprise-attack on Möllns, and we have seen that despite the complete surprise no Cossack fell in the hands of the enemy. So even in this case, were the most speedily concentration, order, and united action is necessary, the trumpet was dispensable. Another example gives the following event.
In February 1813, after the first attacks on Berlin, Colonel Benkendorf rode with the Soulin and Denissov Cossack-regiments from Bankow to Bernau, in order to observe the march of part of Augerau’s force. Fatigued by difficulties encountered and combats, deceived by the false report that the French were at Werneuchen peacefully, the Colonel allowed both regiments to enter Bernau town, to give them some hours of rest. At midnight, when everyone was asleep, the outposts detected the enemy in the vicinity. There was ample time to send message to the colonel, and already shots were fired at four hundred paces from the place. The colonel poured out of the house and called his Hurrah!. In less then a minute the regiment was mounted and riding in the open. Tettenborn had trained his Cossacks in such a way that words sufficed, even that orders for striking camp were not needed. When he wanted to march, he only shouted: “Mount!” through his window, and ordered his horse to be brought. This shout of their well-known leader sufficed; in a few moments everyone was ready to march.
Footnotes:
1) Usually, the Cossacks
wears his sabre the Asian way. The carbine or musket is firm on his shoulder.
Pistols are placed in his belt. His clothing has no buttons. The bridle has no
chains.
* For more information about the siege of
Naarden (17 Nov 1813 – 7 May 1814), see my article about this subject that
appeared in the magazine ‘Miniature Wargames’ No. 118 (March 1993).
** A German mile equals 4,000 ‘geometric
paces’, and equals about 7.3 kilometres.
© Geert van Uythoven