REPORT ABOUT THE EVENTS

REGARDING THE WŰRTTEMBERG FORCES,

BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

16 – 18 October 1813

translated and edited by Geert van Uythoven

“The Royal Württemberg forces, commanded by Lieutenant-General Count von Franquemont, had taken the field with 9,294 combatants and 18 guns, including the Infantry Brigade ‘von Döring’ and a foot artillery battery, which during the armistice arrived as reinforcements. These became part of IV Corps (Bertrand). Together with Infantry Brigade ‘von Döring’, the Cavalry Brigade ‘Normann’ and a horse artillery battery arrived, with a strength of 1,157 combatants. These became part of VI Corps (Marmont). Composition at their arrival was as follows:

UNIT	COMPOSITION	COMBATANTS	NON-COMBATANTS	TOTAL :
In IV Corps (Bertrand) :
Cavalry Brigade von Jett
1st Chevauleger Regiment ‘Prinz Adam’	4 squadrons	517	50	567
3rd Jager Regiment ‘Herzog Louis’	4 squadrons	528	51	579
		1,045	101	1,146
Infantry Brigade ‘von Neusser’
1st Infantry Regiment ‘Prinz Paul’	2 battalions	1,316	57	1,373
2nd Infantry Regiment ‘Herzog Wilhelm’	2 battalions	1,331	57	1,388
Infantry Brigade ‘von Stockmayer’
7th Infantry Regiment	2 battalions	1,109	59	1,168
9th Jager Regiment ‘König’	1 battalion	681	34	715
10th Light Infantry Regiment	1 battalion	707	33	740
		5,144	240	5,384
Artillery
horse artillery	1 battery (6 guns)	132	9	141
foot artillery	1 battery (6 guns)	119	8	127
		251	17	268
Infantry Brigade ‘von Döring
4th Infantry Regiment	2 battalions	1,366	62	1,428
6th Infantry Regiment	2 battalions	1,369	61	1,430
		2,735	123	2,858
Artillery
foot artillery	1 battery (6 guns)	119	9	128
	TOTAL:
	8 squadrons	1,045	101	1,146
	12 battalions	7,879	363	8,242
	3 batteries	370	26	396
		9,294	490	9,784
In VI Corps (Marmont):
Cavalry Brigade ‘Normann’
‘2nd ‘Leib’-Chevauleger Regiment	4 squadrons	507	49	556
4th Jager Regiment ‘König’	4 squadrons	518	50	568
		1,025	99	1,124
Horse artillery	1 battery	132	9	141
	TOTAL:
	8 squadrons	1,025	99	1,124
	1 battery	132	9	141
		1,157	108	1,265
Note: each artillery battery consisted of four 6-pdr cannon and two howitzers.

The bulk of the Württemberg forces, as has been said becoming part of IV Corps, participated for the greater part in very bloody battles, especially the battles of Bautzen and Jüterbogk, as well as in the combat of Wartenburg on 3 October, suffering heavy casualties. On an equal level, the troops were during this harsh campaign weakened by diseases. This was a natural result of the continuous strain and hardships; to be prepared continuously with the enemy so close, cooking often prevented because of the unknown offensive intentions of the enemy, and the own destination deriving out of this; lack of regular tending, especially the lack of strong liquors; the many bivouacs without any straw and wood. On 15 October, strength of the combatants was down to 945 men, so down to a tenth of the original strength:

UNIT	COMBATANTS
Cavalry
1st Chevauleger Regiment ‘Prinz Adam’	60
3rd Jager Regiment ‘Herzog Louis’	65
	125
Infantry
1st combined battalion, light infantry	185
2nd combined battalion, line infantry	135
3rd combined battalion, line infantry	392
	712
Artillery
a battery with four 6-pdr cannon	108
TOTAL:	945

Each of both cavalry regiments in the Brigade ‘von Jett’ formed a weak squadron only, the whole brigade consisted of 125 men. Every one of the three infantry brigades formed a combined battalion, which together counted no more then 712 men. The three artillery batteries were amalgated into a single one of 108 men with four guns. Cadres that had become superfluous because of these inevitable reductions were send back to the kingdom, as well as those guns that had become superfluous because of the small number of troops. In this situation of weakness and dissolution, on the days of battle on which the combatants were still counted in hundred thousands, the Royal Württemberg troops of IV Corps were not capable to fulfil any great task.

After the Silesian army had crossed the Elbe near Wartenburg on 3 October, the bulk of the Royal Württemberg forces, in IV Corps, had been engaged in continuous marching and countermarching in the area between Delitsch, Leipzig, Wurzen, and Wartenburg. On 15 October it cantoned in Klein-Witteritsch, while headquarters of IV Corps with the Division Morand was in Eutritsch, and the Italian Division (Fontanelli) was in Groβwitteritsch.

During the night from 15 to 16 October, the Württemberg corps commander received orders to open communications with the troops of the Duke of Ragusa in Lindenthal at daybreak. He had to reconnoitre the roads leading to Lindenthal, and to keep a lookout; while IV Corps had received the task to support the Duke of Ragusa when he should be attacked.

On 16 October during the morning, the destination was changed. The Württemberg troops received orders to take up positions in front of the Gerbert Gate of Leipzig, and to cover that gate whenever necessary. At nine o’clock the troops left. General Bertrand had already marched to Lindenau earlier, with the Division Morand and the Italian Division. The position in front of the Gerbert Gate was maintained during the 16th. In the afternoon, at the end of the battle of Mockern, the Duke of Ragusa arrived at the Gerbert Gate in person. General Count von Franquemont, receiving strong personal urges of him, occupied the Rietschka defile between Gohlis and Eutritsch with three hundred men of the 3rd Combined Infantry Battalion, to cover the retreat of the defeated corps.

On the 17th during the morning, the enemy showed the intention to capture the only weakly held Gohlis village. While this would make the position in front of the Gerbert Gate untenable, General Count von Franquemont ordered two companies of the 1st Combined Infantry Regiment, together 90 men, to advance into the village and to aid in its defence. They succeeded in holding the village. During the skirmisher fight deriving out of this, the Württemberger suffered some wounded. Marshall Ney, who heard the musketry, came to the position of the Württemberger to inform about the cause of the fighting. He agreed with the dispositions of the Württemberg corps commander, at the same time relieving his troops in Gohlis as well as in the Rietschka defile by detachments of the Division Dombrowsky, so that the Württemberger could limit themselves to securing the Gerbert Gate.

In the meanwhile, substantial enemy forces with artillery appeared on the heights opposite Gohlis, which were advancing as well. At the same moment sudden fighting broke out near the villages Witteritsch and Eutritsch. Under these circumstances it was to be feared that, when the enemy would continue its offensive movement to this side of the Rietschka, the small numbers of Württemberg troops in their previous position in front of the Gerbert Gate would be easily compromised and the safety of the gate endangered. Therefore, General Count von Franquemont ordered his troops to retreat across the Partha, and deployed them inside the Gerbert Gate to the right and left of it. He also ordered to make loopholes in the houses on both sides of the gate, to throw up an entrenchment in front of it, and to barricade the bridge. He reported to General Bertrand about what was happening, as well as about his precautions. General Bertrand came over from Lindenau in person, and agreed with all measures that had been taken. The enemy in front of Gohlis in the meanwhile had advanced further, deployed an artillery battery in an advanced positions on one of the foremost heights on the right bank of the Rietschka and opened fire on the Gerbert Gate, without inflicting any damage. The Polish troops had retreated from Gohlis on the Pfaffendorf outwork. The Emperor Napoleon dispatched an orderly officer to General von Franquemont with orders to defend the Gerbert Gate to the utmost. After about half an hour the enemy gunfire ceased, and from ten o’clock in the morning on everything remained quiet.

On 18 October, after midnight, the defence of the Gerbert Gate was taken over by the Polish troops under General Dombrowsky. The Royal Württemberg troops marched around six o’clock in the morning from Leipzig to Lindenau, and rejoined IV Corps. This corps received the task to open the line of retreat of the army and to capture the defiles of the Saale river. To support IV Corps in breaking out of the narrow terrain around Lindenau, two French infantry Divisions and several cavalry regiments arrived from Leipzig. After General Bertrand had positioned his troops in column on the heights in front of Lindenau, he undertook a reconnaissance to Plagwitz, and found this village occupied by the enemy. He ordered Général de Brigade Belair to attack the enemy with the French 13th Infantry Regiment, ordering a detachment of 25 men of the Württemberg 1st Chevauleger Regiment ‘Prinz Adam’ to support the attack. The attack was swiftly executed by the French infantry, while the Württemberg cavalry detachment cut off the retreat of the enemy, cutting them off from Klein-Zschocher. As a result, 18 officers, and 696 NCO’s and soldiers of the 3rd Austrian Armeeabteilung were taken prisoner. Württemberg cavalry losses during this short fight were seven men wounded, three horses killed, and four horses wounded. When after this event on the right flank, in the area around Leutsch village, some enemy cavalry appeared, the Württemberg forces and the Italian Division executed a movement in this direction. The enemy cavalry retreated, and nothing further was noticed from the enemy.

When General Bertrand was sure that both flanks were secure, he began his march to Markranstädt with the Division Morand. The Royal Württemberg troops and the Italian Division deployed on the plain between Groβmilitz and Klein-Zschocher, to observe a substantial Austrian corps positioned forward of the latter village. Its strength was estimated at several infantry- and cavalry regiments, with numerous guns. An attack was feared, which however did not materialise.

The reserve park of IV Corps in the meanwhile had left Leipzig, passed Lindenau and proceeded marching to Markranstädt. Before it however could reach the protection of the positions here, the rear end of the column was suddenly attacked by enemy cavalry from the right side, namely from the direction of Leutsch, which cut off seven wagons.

General Count von Franquemont received the order to abandon the previous position with the troops mentioned above, and to form the rear-guard. In order to be able to cross the plainsafely, he also received command of three French dragoon regiments. The march to Markranstädt was executed without any disturbance by the Austrian corps. Arriving at this side of the place, General Count von Franquemont deployed his forces in such way as to enable the park to pass the defile. The enemy, which kept a distance until now, came somewhat closer and brought forward several guns, opening fire against the park and the positions, however without any results. The march was resumed undisturbed to Lützen, and from there to Roecken village, which was reached at half past ten in the night.

On 19 October, around half past one after midnight, march was resumed to Weiβenfels, which was reached around five o’clock in the morning. At nine o clock in the morning, after the bridge had been repaired, the Saale was crossed and the troops deployed on the neighbouring height. General Bertrand made a reconnaissance against Naumburg with part of the Division Morand.

xxxxxxx

Cavalry Brigade ‘Normann’ suffered no losses in such a disadvantageous way. Several combats, fought before the battle days of Leipzig, had inflicted the loss of 180 combatants at the most. The sick were also not very numerous. This brigade counted therefore on 16 October, including its horse artillery battery, still over 900 combatants.

On 15 October General Count Normann stood near Radefeld, a position he had already reached on the 13th in the evening. He formed the advance guard of VI Corps, receiving for that purpose also command of a French light infantry regiment and a French artillery battery.

On 16 October, at nine o’clock in the morning, Normann was attacked by numerous enemy cavalry accompanied by some guns. He engaged the enemy, and kept them at bay until eleven o’clock. At this moment, the attackers were reinforced by some line cavalry regiments, and three light batteries. As General Count Normann was to weak to resist these superior forces any longer without being overwhelmed, he started a fighting retreat from one position to another, back to Möckern and VI Corps, uniting with it around three o’clock in the afternoon. This retreat across open terrain, facing a much more superior and strongly pressing cavalry, was executed in the best order, without suffering heavy casualties. Arriving near Möckern, Cavalry Brigade ‘Normann’ was placed in the second line, to support the left wing of the infantry. When the battle had ended, following the retreat of VI Corps, the brigade also retreated over Rietschka to Schönefeld. Losses of the Württemberg Cavalry Brigade ‘Normann’ on this day were two wounded officers, and fifty dead or wounded others. Five guns of the horse batteries were damaged in such a way that they had to be send back to Leipzig. On 17 October, on which day VI Corps also retreated its rear-guard to the left bank of the Partha, maintaining its positions near Schönefeld, the Cavalry Brigade ‘Normann’ occupied the outposts on the right wing, near St. Thecla.

On 18 October during the morning, the same positions were maintained, the Northern Army of the Crown Prince of Sweden began its offensive movement. General Count Normann saw himself threatened by a far superior enemy; a general battle was inevitable, and it was to be expected that it would cost the greater part of the Württemberg Cavalry Brigade. The French supports were nor close, nor in sufficient numbers present; the defeat of the French army seemed inevitable, and the faith of it would not be influenced by sacrificing an Allied brigade. At this moment of eminent danger, General Count Normann allowed himself to be carried away in going over to the enemy with his brigade; about which he gave the explicit explanation that he only had the intention to preserve his troops as the cause leading to this decision, and that he never would fight against the French without the orders of his King. The following remarks will more closely explain the objective reasons of this act, which according to military basics should be condemned strongly and was indeed as such regarded by the field generals.

Major-General Count Normann had the abilities of a good and practical soldier. He was energetic, brave, and determined. He had a good judgment about the use of the terrain and the use of various arms. He retained his presence of mind in moments of danger, and knew how to influence the troops under his command. His physical abilities were good; he had the age of bodily and moral strength. He spoke the French language more then sufficiently. These characteristics recommended him to his French corps commanders, as well as to the French in general, and he had a good reputation in the French army.

Beside his own brigade, usually French troops were placed under his command and when the armistice ended he found himself directly under the command of a marshal. This distinction flattered his ambitions. However, because of these facts he indeed was suspected to have a predilection for the French. The suspicion of the above predilection was real, and greater part of the officer corps of his brigade expressed their dissatisfaction about the Württemberg troops being discriminated in favour of the French. Complaints about this even became indirectly known to the King, who ordered Lieutenant-General Count von Franquemont to express his displease about the matter, and to remember him that the duties he had as a Württemberg general should be his first and holy ones.

In the evening of 16 October, Count Normann came over to the Württemberg corps commander at the Gerbert Gate, At this occasion the remarks of the King were expressed to him, in addition adding that in case of a general retreat the intentions of the King should be followed, and that the Württemberg forces would follow the French army only until having reached the Rhine. They should not cross this river, but instead return to the kingdom.

These messages clearly embarrassed and confused General Normann, which was even more influenced by the memory of the reprimand Normann had received from the King in relation to his behaviour during the incident with the Lützow Freicorps 1). Although having justified himself in military respect, for having acted under direct orders of the French Général de Division Fournier d’Albe, who was leading the undertaking in person, as well as the way the events unfolded, in the eyes of the King he could not clear himself from the accusation not to have acted with at least more respect and carefulness.

Whatever the case, Count Normann felt he had to make good on things, and in the heat of the events he chose a desperate measure. During the morning of 18 October, when IV Corps still was on the heights before Lindenau, an officer of the Brigade ‘Normann’ appeared with Lieutenant-General Count von Franquemont, reporting him in name of his general: “The brigade, until now in good shape, is threatened by an attack of a far superior enemy, and has no sufficient support to expect. Therefore, it has to be feared that it will be largely destroyed, when it will accept battle. He asks for orders how to behave.” The Württemberg corps commander rightly judged this request as very strange, as operationally the brigade was not under his orders. Therefore, he gave the following reply for General Normann to the officer send to him: “Unknown with the task assigned to him, with his position, with the terrain he was on, with possible supports, as well as with the strength and movements of the enemy, the Württemberg corps commander was in no position to give him detailed orders about his operational behaviour from a distance of three hours. He has to get such orders from his own French corps commander. In general however he wants to recommend him two things: to uphold the previous honour of the brigade, without however sacrifice his troops when not necessary.

This answer would not reach Count Normann. Without doubt the quick advance of the enemy forced him to take a decision soon. He expressed his decision to the senior officers of the regiments, which both had young commanders. The proposal of their brigade general was easily accepted: with the general and lively German nationalistic feelings of those days, the voice of strict military duty fell silent and the defection to the enemy was executed without any objections, before the officer dispatched to the Württemberg corps commander had returned.”

Footnote: For details about the events around Lützow’s Freicorps, at which is referred to here, see here.

Source: “Nachricht über die Begebenheiten des Königl. Würtembergschen Truppen-Corps an den Schlacht-Tagen von Leipzig im Feldzuge 1813”, in Militair-Wochenblatt, 22. Jahrgang (Berlin 1837), pp.18-20 & pp.22-24.

© Geert van Uythoven