LUTZOW’S FREIKORPS AND THE ARMISTICE

The attack near Kitzen, 17 June 1813

translated by Geert van Uythoven

Source: “Geschichte des Lützowschen Freikorps” by Ad. S. (Berlin, Posen and Bromberg 1826), pp.37-53.

“The Chef of the Corps [Major Lützow], receiving message of the closing of the armistice on 9 June, decided under these circumstances to give his troops some rest in Plauen, to find out more information about the conditions of the armistice, and in case of any confirmation to come to the necessary agreements with the French commanders about his retreat. If he would encounter any trouble in making those agreements, a way out through Bohemia remained open, where a peaceful passage would not have been denied in any way. The stipulations of the armistice however, as soon turned out, dictated him to take the shortest route to the Elbe. With the Bavarian commander at Hof he made a temporarily agreement to end all hostilities.

Sending a dispatch to Dresden, he received on the 14th, through the Saxon captain and adjutant von Monbé, a written message of Lieutenant-General von Gersdorf with the official report of the closing of the armistice. Making clear his intentions to cross the Elbe in order to return to the army corps of General Bülow, the Saxon Lieutenant von Gösnitz was assigned to him as march commissary. As has been stated officially to Major von Schütz later, General Gersdorf immediately reported the result of the negotiations and the agreements through the Prince of Neufchatel [Marshal Berthier] to the Emperor Napoleon.

On the 15th, Major Lützow departed from Plauen, and bivouacked that evening in the vicinity of Weida. When he arrived in the vicinity of Gera on the 16th, he learned that the volunteer Jäger Schmidt had been imprisoned here. Schmidt had been send there on the 13th, before the armistice had become known, to hand over two French gendarmes that had been captured previously. Major Lützow went to the city in person, were the volunteer Jäger Schmidt was returned to him, and agreed with the French colonel commanding here, that the Freikorps would march around Gera and continue its march to Zeitz. The colonel denied the request to attach a French march commissary to the Freikorps, as the Saxon one would suffice. Major Lützow lunched with the colonel and in the evening he bivouacked with his Corps not far from Dreβdorf.

On the 17th he found Zeitz occupied by Württemberg forces, marched around the city and reported his march by Lieutenant von Gösnitz to the Württemberg colonel von Becker commanding here. Around evening, bivouac was made near Kitzen village near the Floβgraben, not far from Eisdorf and Groβ-Görschen, two miles from Leipzig.

The horses were scarcely unbridled, when news of the advance of a strong cavalry detachment was received. Lieutenant von Kropf, dispatched as parliamentary, found Colonel von Becker at the head of this cavalry, which declared: “The Duke of Padua invites Major von Lützow to stop, while he will send him officers to direct his march further”. Major Lützow agreed, both leaders gave their word of honour that their troops would not engage in any hostilities, and dispatched the Lieutenants von Kropf and Von Gösnitz to Leipzig, to make further agreements. Lieutenant von Kropf was imprisoned immediately in Leipzig.

Soon it was reported to Major Lützow, that more enemy detachments were advancing; he ordered to bridle the horses, to mount, and to march to Alt-Ranstädt immediately; he himself went to meet the enemy troops, and encountered two corps of all arms, about 5,000 men strong, marching to Kitzen. He wanted to ask the leader of the troops for the necessary explanations, at least to gain time for his detachment in case of an emergency. Moving here, he had the bad luck that his horse fell when jumping a ditch, throwing him off. Several Württemberg officers, which were in the vicinity, courteously helped him on his horse again. At the same time he spoke with the Württemberg General Normann, who rode at the head of the first detachment.

This accident has to be mentioned, while it became immediately known to the cavalry of the Freikorps, and caused Cavalry-Captain von Bronstädt to order halt, while one was still in doubt about the cause of the accident, and one would in no case wanted to abandon their leader. General Normann gave his word of honour: “he had only order to occupy the next village”, and he mentioned General Fournier als commander in chief of the whole force.

In the meantime, the enemy troops continued their march on the meadows left of the chaussee which led from Kitzen to Leipzig; to the right of this chaussee there are houses and gardens, which made the terrain mostly inaccessible for horse.

Major Lützow found General Fournier at the head of the second detachment, and demanded from him to stop the advance of his forces until the necessary arrangements for the continuation of his march were made. General Fournier however replied: “L’armistice pour tout le monde, excepté pour vous!” After hearing this, Major Lützow quickly turned around his horse, and he succeeded in, passing the enemy cavalry, to reach the head of his hussars again. However, at that moment the enemy already attacked.

Cavalry-Captain von Bornstedt in the meanwhile had resumed his march along the chaussee again (at the front were the Cossacks and uhlans, followed by the hussars, and finally the infantry), but hardly 500 paces had been covered, when the Württemberg cavalry, which was defiling on one side, suddenly made a turn to the side, after which they threw themselves on the marching troops.

The Cossacks and uhlans were missed by the attack while they were at the head of the column. Oberjäger Beczwarzowsky, which command the last Zug, crossed the ditch along the chaussee to the left, and attacked with about twelve uhlans a troop of dragoons, which was fighting with several solitary men; he extricated the Chef of the Corps, which was surrounded by the enemy and already pulled from his horse. But this was only the work of a moment, and immediately the enemy pushed forward again, throwing back the uhlans, so that Major Lützow had only a moment time to reach the village to the right of the chaussee on foot. It had become pretty dark now, some horse had managed to fight their way though the enemy and had reached the village as well, were Major Lützow found Lieutenant von Reiche, Oberjäger Zencker, and several hussars.

The Uhlan-squadron, immediately after the attack, turned left on to the meadows although pressured hard, reformed, and fiercely attacked the pursuing dragoons, throwing them back. Oberjägers Beczwarzowsky, Jenny, and Wezel showing the utmost determination and bravery, but enemy pressure became to much and finally they were forced to retreat.

Worse was the destiny of the others; treacherously attacked, without any means to resist effectively, they became the spoils of the enemy. Despite the utmost efforts of individuals, they had to give way to the unfavourable circumstances and the overwhelming numerical superiority. Everyone was either cut down, either taken prisoner; General Normann had first led his men with ruthless guile, and then drove them on to the attack with bitterness.

Major Lützow’s measures would have been totally different when he, after having received so many assurances of duty and honour, would have had the slightest notion of such an unprecedented violation of the armistice.

Oberjäger Beczwarzowsky, who had resumed command of the Uhlan-squadron (because the only officer of the squadron, Lieutenant von Kropf, had been detained as parliamentary), led them initially straight through the pastures for some time, removing himself from Kitzen roughly to the north. Because night completely fell almost immediately he halted, and asked the men of the squadron if someone knew his way in this region. Uhlan Bischoff, a native from here, offered to lead the squadron. The Cossacks had attached themselves to this squadron, and formed an advance- and rear-guard together with them.

The postal road from Merseburg leading to Leipzig was crossed near Güntersdorf, after which Ketzschlitz on the Luppe was reached. While the bridge here was destroyed during the battle of Gross-Görschen [Lützen], and Uhlan Bischoff did not know the fords of the difficult Luppe, Oberjäger Beczwarzowsky carefully got a guide from Ketzschlitz, who he held with him until reaching the Elbe. Within half an hour a suitable ford was found and used. Soon after the squadron crossed the Elster in the vicinity of Skeuditz, moved around Groβkugel and Landsberg, continuing the advance in the direction of Raguhn on the Mulde. They foddered on the 18th before noon in a village on the height of Bitterfeld. Near Raguhn, the Mulde was crossed and the march continued through the huge forest on the right bank of the Mulde. In the evening around 6 o’clock, near Bockerode the Elbe was reached. At this place, the Elbe is nearly everywhere very deep, already close to the river banks; this circumstance made a crossing very difficult. So although Oberjäger Beczwarzowsky crossed swimming, pulling his horse behind him, the other horses refused to follow him and returned while they lost ground beneath their legs so suddenly. Finally a more favourable spot was found, with a less steep sinking of the river bed. Oberjäger Beczwarzowsky again proceeded the now unbridled horses, and finally saw himself followed by the whole herd, luckily swimming across the river. The men, their equipment and the weapons crossed the river by using the few boats present. Around half past eight in the evening the crossing had been completed. The enemy, which had followed their tracks, appeared on the other side of the river soon after. The squadron stayed in Roslau for the night and then marched over Zerbst, Lohburg, and Genthin to Havelberg, where they arrived on the 27th. The Cossacks returned to the Corps of General Winzingerode.

Major Lützow, who we have left alone near Kitzen for a moment, were he met Lieutenant von Reiche and a few hussars after having lost his horse, received here proof of the extra-ordinary devotion and loyalty of his own men: then Hussar Gebhard dismounted from his horse, and persuaded the major to mount it instead. As a result, Hussar Gebhard became a prisoner of war, of which he was only released by the peace in the year 1814.

As it was to be expected that the enemy would pursue to the Elbe, Major Lützow turned to the Harz with his small detachment, diminished to 21 men. He crossed the Saale using a ford just above Merseburg. On the 18th in the afternoon, he reached a solitary mill beneath Eisleben. He remained here until the evening, obliged to detain everyone passing by until he left again. During the night of the 19th he arrived in the vicinity of Sangerhausen, placed his small detachment inside a forest belonging to the country-seat of Von Heinitz, and went in person to Major von Braun in Mittelhausen, north of Allstädt, the latter place situated on the road from Merseburg to Nordhausen. From here, a messenger was send to the Amtsrath Breymann in Roschwitz near Bernburg, who made preparations for a quick march: at all resting places provisions and fodder was made ready, on the Saale and Elbe boats were prepared. A few days passed until everything was agreed upon and ready in place, while Major von Braun, with honourable self-denial, provided security for the detachment.

Although the presence of Westphalian troops –the 1st Cuirassier Regiment and the 2nd Hussar Regiment, which held a resting day on the 24th in Bernburg, Dröbel, Poley, Baalberge, Gröna, Peisen and Leau- gave even more difficulties, the detachment managed to reach Saalhorn (on the Elbe, close to the mouth of the Saale) after a march of a day and a night, over Kloster Mansfeld, Leimbach, Burg-Oerner, Sandersleben, Schakenthal, Plötzkau (on the Saale above Bernburg), and Roschwitz on the 25th at 5 o’clock in the morning. The Elbe was crossed immediately. During the night march from Plötzkau to Saalhorn the old aged Amtsrath Breymann made all side patrols against the villages occupied by Westphalian troops in person.

The treachery, which indeed was the surprise-attack near Kitzen, is so mean, that one would gladly attribute it to a passionate impulse, or to blind rage. When however the following facts are more closely examined, it turns out that it is a carefully calculated plan of the French commanders.

When General Barclay de Tolly learned that Major Lützow was in the vicinity of Plauen he dispatched Major von Schütz to Dresden, to agree upon the necessary measures for the retreat of the detachments still on the left bank of the Elbe. He arrived with his mission with the Prince of Neufchatel on the 17th in the morning. The Prince seems to be prepared to give Major Schütz the necessary powers, assured him however that he did not know where to look for Major Lützow –despite, as has already been told, the fact that the agreement with General Gersdorff was reported to the Prince. In the same way General Monthion, chief of staff of the prince of Neufchatel, pretended that there was no information what however about Major Lützow. He promised however to look for information immediately, and requested Major Schütz to go to Zerbst in the meantime, to take care that Major von Hellwig, in compliance with the armistice, would fall back on the Corps of General Bülow. After his return from Zerbst, Major Schütz learned that Major Lützow had been assailed the same day on which the Prince of Neufchatel had assured him to be without any information about him. Not without trouble, he was able to have another conversation with the Prince, who explained: “that the event should be regarded as an unfortunate misunderstanding; according to all reports, the Württemberger were the assailants, and he had already wrote to Neumark to receive the necessary explanations”.

Also Baron von Martens, who was dispatched to the Prince of Neufchatel by General Bülow on the 24th to request the formation of a combined commission to investigate the event, and to punish the guilty severely, received only evasive replies. Until finally as a satisfaction, the exchange was proposed of all prisoners that were taken by both sides after the closing of the armistice. This proposition was not more as a refusal of satisfaction, as the Allied armies had already delivered all prisoners made after the closing of the armistice immediately after their capture and without any conditions. The Allied powers however were able to find means to repay the violation of the armistice. The fifth article of the armistice stipulated that: “The cities of Danzig, Modlin, Zamosk, Stettin and Küstrin shall be reprovisioned every five days, according to the strength of their garrisons, by the efforts of the commander of the besieging forces”. This stipulation was not fulfilled, so that the treacherous act against the Freikorps benefited the fall of these fortresses.

Of the prisoners, the enemy brought only a hundred to France; during the whole march through Germany, the inhabitants of the cities and villages aided the prisoners to escape, and even as far as from the Rhine several managed to return to the Freikorps luckily, so that the cavalry of it, at the end of the armistice, for the greater part consisted of the original men.

Until 22 June the Corps remained in its cantonments in and around Havelberg; the time of the armistice was used partially to rebuild what the cavalry had lost, partially to unite the various detachments that had been raised for the corps, and to enhance their training. The cavalry-depot, which had been left behind in Tangermünde by Cavalry-Captain Fischer, was ordered to Havelberg as well, and provided enough means to mount all that had arrived from Kitzen dismounted. Many volunteer jäger of the detachments equipped themselves for a second time with their own means, many new ones enlisted. In this way the 2nd Squadron (Jäger-detachment), and the 4th Squadron were raised again. Instead of the 1st Squadron came an uhlan-detachment, which had been raised in Saxony and Silesia by Cavalry-Captain van Galen, in co-operation with Lieutenant Neigebaur. The 3rd (Uhlan) Squadron had been able to reach the right bank of the Elbe luckily. The 5th Squadron was not present at Kitzen.

Although the cavalry had suffered the loss of 305 horses at Kitzen, one was able, in the ways that has been told, to bring the Corps back on a strength of 480 horse.”

© Geert van Uythoven