During the month of May the regiment
moved to an area across the road from the 32d Infantry Division, an area near Dobodura.
Behind their cantonment area were dense rainforest on hilly land. A number of creeks ran
down from the higher hills in deep channels with high banks. The training became more
specialized. The platoon leaders were particularly interested in developing good scout
teams. Good eyes and ears were essential. I was not satisfied with my trainees. No one
excelled. After working with many, I did not feel that I had a really good scout team.
Some had potential, but that was in the future.
We received a new
group of replacements from the States in May. In going through their files, I found one,
Private Lloyd G. McCarter, who had grown up in Idaho, and later worked as lumberjack. I
told him I wanted him to try out as a scout. He said he had been in the artillery when he
went to parachute jump school and had no Infantry training. I knew this. I also knew he
was a sergeant when he took the voluntary reduction to private in order to qualify for the
parachute school. He agreed to try.
The next day the
six scouts from each platoon were to go through a scout course using live ammunition. The
team ran through half the course with one acting as 1st scout and then changed places
through the latter half. One other problem remained. McCarter had never fired a Thompson
submachine gun. My platoon sergeant, S/Sgt Wendell Wuertz, was an expert with the gun. I
told him to take McCarter back into the forest and teach him to use the TSMG. Later that
afternoon Wuertz came back with a glowing report. He said McCarter was a natural even
though he fired the gun in an unorthodox manner. McCarter was only about five feet six
inches tall but heavily built with huge forearms. He laid the stock of the fun on the
inside of his forearm and fired with the gun on its side. In assault problems firing from
the hip, we taught our men to imagine they were pointing their index finger at the target
and fire. McCarter was an expert in using this method.
I placed McCarter
with my best scout, Neville Powell. LTG Walter Krueger was on an inspection tour. He and
his party, which included LTC Jones and Major Britten, followed McCarter through his test
as 1st scout. They were greatly impressed. Now not only did the 1st squad have a scout
team, but the platoon did also.
During the
Noemfoor operation McCarter, followed by Powell, led the way. The platoon developed a
strong confidence in them. We came to believe that if it was there, McCarter would find it
- that if he could not see it, he would hear it, and if he did not hear it, he would smell
it. I quickly noticed that McCarter loved a firefight. This short, stocky man literally
danced on the coral outcroppings somewhat akin to a ballet dancer. For example, on 19 July
as we followed a trail through the forest of tall trees, a Japanese voice challenged us. I
was behind Powell and saw the entire action. McCarter answered in a guttural,
unintelligible voice and began to advance at his skipping, bouncing run. The puzzled Jap
challenged again. Firing broke out, but the enemy's hesitation was fatal. McCarter and
Powell had killed the four Japs manning the position. McCarter was gleeful.
At the end of the
operation my 1st squad leader was rotated home. McCarter was 24 years old, which was older
than the others, and he certainly had their respect. I named him squad leader and was well
satisfied-for a few days. Then he was gone-AWOL. We heard he was over on the New Guinea
mainland fighting the Japs alongside of the 17th Division, AIF. When we prepared to leave
Noemfoor bound for Leyte Island, he was back and remained until after we landed at Mindoro
and the threat of action was past.
As soon as we
were alerted to jump on Corregidor, he reported for duty. I got him out of the stockade to
go with us. Just as he had done before, he apologized to me for the trouble he had caused.
I had never had one moments trouble with him when he was present for duty. He never
complained and carried out his assigned duties cheerfully. S/Sgt Chris Johnson was my 3rd
squad leader. He was a 501st Parachute Battalion man who had taken thirty days leave
rather than rotation and was now back for duty. I assigned McCarter to his squad.
About two hours
after we landed on Corregidor, F Company was in the 28-D, the last house at the west end
of Senior Officers Row. Soon the CP began to draw fire from the Battery B (Boston) area.
Bill Bailey, F Company commander, ordered me to clear the old AA area. McCarter soon wiped
out a machine gun in his usual rapid fashion. The area bordered Battery Wheeler's eastern
side. As we advanced deeper into the AA area, the parapet of Battery Wheeler loomed above
us. Our battalion S-3 had been in part of the battery earlier and found it unoccupied. I
had gone far enough earlier to see the number two gunport clearly. I saw no sign of enemy
activity. Still the commanding position of the east parapet of the battery was too
dangerous to leave unoccupied, so I sent four men to occupy it. One of the men was killed,
two were trapped inside a magazine of the battery, and one escaped to bring me the news.
However, he was killed a short time later while pointing out to me the room where the two
were trapped. I had withdrawn my platoon from the AA area and put them in position behind
Battery Wheeler. I had taken a bazooka team, a flame thrower operator and several men
forward to a crater in the berm immediately behind the battery. Pfc Albert Thomas was
killed showing me the magazine room where Sgt Bill Freihoff and Pfc Delby Huff were
trapped. The problem was the door faced the length of the battery and was covered by
machine gun and rifle fire from the Japs in central magazines and the battery control
station. We could see the door at an angle but between the door and us was a steep slope
from the top of the berm down to the level area some 40 feet across to the base of the
giant concrete battery. The road and railroad lay in this level area between the berm and
battery. After Thomas was killed instantly by a bullet in the head, I had the flame
thrower operator attempt to spray the concrete near the Japs with its deadly liquid, but
the operator could not get the weapon to work. It had been damaged in the parachute drop.
Not knowing it at the time, we were very fortunate. Inside the magazine were tons of black
powder, as we would see the next night when the battery blew-up, but we were a safe
distance away then.
I pointed out the
approximate location of the Jap 50 Caliber machine gun to the bazooka gunner, and he hit
the spot with his first round. Then he followed with several more rounds. The hits had no
effect on the thick, reinforced concrete. Observing and firing was very ticklish since we
were not unobserved by the Japs, and we saw what happened to Thomas. During all the melee
McCarter and S/Sgt John R. Phillips had slipped down the slope of the berm in the dark and
were directly behind the battery control station. They engaged the .50 caliber mg in a
duel until they ran out of ammunition. They found a dead trooper still in his parachute
harness and retrieved his M-1 carbine and fired up all its ammunition. Then they started
throwing rock and yelling insults at the Japs creating such a diversion that Freihoff and
Huff ran out the door across the road and around the end of the berm to safety.
On the eventful
third night, 18-19 February, F Company was given two positions to defend. Bill Bailey kept
company headquarters, the 3rd platoon, one squad of the 2nd platoon, the direct fire 60mm
mortar squad, and a section of light machine guns from the 3d machine gun platoon of 2d Bn
headquarters Company to defend Way Hill. I was given the mission of defending the magazine
of Battery Hearn (former Battery Smith #2) which was some 300 hundreds yards away. A deep
valley separated us. We could not see each other because Way Hill was still heavily
wooded. The vegetation and brush had been cleaned off around Hearn down across the valley
and toward the sea past Battery Smith (formerly Battery Smith #1). This area had been in
the middle of the target area where 3,140 tons of bombs had been dropped the past few
weeks. It was completely denuded of brush. We could look down into the valley below us and
see the road and railroad to Battery Grubbs for several hundred yards until they turned
right disappearing around Way Ridge. My force consisted of my platoon, two squads of the
2d platoon, the two conventional 60mm mortar squads, a light machine gun section, a
bazooka team, and two officers beside myself. F Company had lost all their officers except
Bailey and me. 1st Lt. Daniel Lee (a new replacement) was transferred that day from 2d
Battalion Headquarters company to F Company, and 2nd Lt. John Mara of D Company were
loaned to F Company.
The position on
the 80 by 120 feet top of the magazine was formidable. The slope on the west down to the
12inch gun pad was so steep concrete stairs had been built. The west side facing the
valley and the east side facing Cheney Ravine were so steep they could only be climbed
with great difficulty. The north side sloped gradually down to a railway cut a hundred
yards behind the magazine. A rail line entered a tunnel which entered the magazine at its
northeast corner. This line joined the line behind the magazine and the line to Battery
Grubbs to Battery Way. Directly across from the center of the magazine in the valley were
two overturned trolley cars with their floors facing the magazine defenders. The danger,
obviously, was from the north from any enemy who got past our position. The heavy base of
fire had to be placed on the north in order to place enfilading on the road-railroad to
deny passage of the enemy up this open route to Topside. The second consideration was to
defend the east side against any who got past and attacked us from the rear. I placed my
1st squad and the lmg section on the west front. On the north slope I placed the two 2d
platoon squads and my 2d squad in a heavy defense against attack up the gentle slope.
Putting full trust in Johnson, I gave him the east and south sides
Our savior was
Bill Bailey. Even though the 6th Army G-2 had estimated the defending force would number
no more than 850, he remained cautious. During the afternoon I had taken my platoon to
Battery Smith on patrol. Bailey had the rest of the company going back to the ammo dump at
the Topside barracks bringing more ammunition. Fifty rounds were brought for each mortar.
Bach rifleman was given an extra bandolier of ball ammunition bringing his supply to 184
rounds. The machine guns were brought almost twice the regular supply. In addition a large
number of fragmentation and white phosphorus hand grenades were brought over.
The Navy was
firing intermittent star shells to illuminate the area. At 2200 hr we heard loud yelling
typical of the build-up for a banzai. Soon a flare burst. There, to out disbelief, were
the Japanese marching up Grubbs Road in a column of fours. The front of the column was
near the junction of Grubbs and Belt Line Road coming for us. Our mortars were set for
this, and they commenced dropping their rounds on the road. The Japs were crumpling and
closing up ranks. Soon our machine guns were also cutting swaths in their ranks. Of course
there were periods of darkness of 10-15 minutes between flares. Even so, we could still
see enough to keep fire on the large body of the enemy. Why did we get no fire support
from the cruisers and destroyers as well as our artillery? Every platoon and the support
groups had the same Corregidor map with the same pre-designated numbers and numerals. We
could have called for fire at point "#21" (the intersection of Belt Line and
Grubbs Roads) and so on that night, but we had no communications. Our radio net closed at
dark and did not open until 0600 hr. No wire had been strung. Our battalion and regiment
did not know D Company and F Company had been in a battle for their lives that night until
the next morning. A few Japs who got past my platoon got to Topside and scared the hell
out of the headquarters.
McCarter was at
the northwest corner when the action started. Seeing that some of the Japs were getting
past, he moved to the northeast corner by the "hump" formed where the tunnel
entered the magazine according to mortar platoon sergeant, S/Sgt Johnnie Phillips. He
climbed down the steep slope here and took up his position in a shallow ditch by the side
of the road and opposite the wrecked trolley cars. As you know from the account which is
muchly as I wrote it. He did come back up twice and get a new weapon when his became
disabled. First, he got Pfc Benard Schilli's BAR after Schilli was wounded. Then he got an
M-1 Garand and fired it until the operating rod split. Either shortly before this or soon
afterward, at dawn, he was hit in the chest. Fearing he was dead, Pfc Richard Lampman and
several others got down to him-and, despite fire from a Nambu light machine gun under the
trolley cars, succeeded in dragging and carrying him to the top of the magazine and into
the large crater near the big ventilator. He was calm and seemingly unperturbed. It was
mid-morning before we could get the way cleared to Topside and the wounded could be
evacuated. With a bullet entry near the middle of his chest, I was worried about him going
into shock. Our Medic, Pfc Roy Jensurd, had used his supply of blood plasma long before. I
went to him several times to reassure him we'd get him out as soon as we could. Bach time
he told me not to worry about him, that he was doing allright. I never saw any symptoms of
shock. He was tough and complaint was not in his vocabulary.
We counted 35
dead enemy in the road to his front and around his position. We could not be sure of the
count because when we searched the valley which we dubbed "Maggott Valley" we
found many bodies had been dragged into craters. There were over 300 dead by our count and
estimate (we did not drag the corpses out of the craters until two days later). Some of
the Jap force had diverted to attack Bailey's force on Way Hill, and they counted 125
dead. Some of the enemy force got around to our rear and attacked in three banzai charges
about an hour apart. After the last attack we were out of ammunition. Fortunately, dawn
broke. When the radio net opened I was asked by the D Battery commander if the people in
the railway cut to our rear were friend or enemy. D Battery was in position near the NCO
Quarters looking down the cut several hundred yards away. When I answered that they were
enemy, the artillery 50's made mincemeat out of about 35 Japs caught between the concrete
walls of the cut. We were still drawing fire from the area. Our mortar crews searched
through the pile of mortar shell cartons and found six rounds of live ammunition. They
thought they had put every round into the cut. Our patrol found that every round had hit a
large crater beside the cut and killed twenty Japs. After knocking out the Nambu light
under the trolley car and a few isolated riflemen to our north near the cut and hiding
behind some trees standing near the car barn, the way was clear to get our wounded to
Topside.
Our command was
grossly misinformed by the 6th Army G-2. Their CG, LTG Walter Krueger, did not place much
value in their estimate. Had he done so, there would have been no parachute assault with
heavy supporting units. Actually there were 6,800 defenders. Our command was placing too
much faith in the G-2 report despite the fact that by all indications during the three
days (showed) there were many more defenders. This is shown by the dispositions of the
troops for the third night. There was no perimeter. There was no reserve. F and D
Companies were placed out in isolated positions and out of communications even if
reinforcements had been available.
Back to McCarter,
we never saw him again. I wrote a narrative of McCarter's action and recommended that he
be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Soon afterward, I believe the next day, I was
ordered to report to LTC John Britten, the regimental executive officer. In a stern,
uncompromising manner he announced that my recommendation was out of the question, and he
was reducing the recommendation to a Distinguished Service Cross. I was shocked. After
serving under him for over a year, I felt he was a fair man. I asked him to go with me to
the site of the action and let me show him what happened. He threatened to reduce the
recommendation to a Silver Star if I didn't leave. Years later, Bill Bailey told me that
Col. Jones had taken him to task for my action and that no man in his command with a
record such as McCarter's (this is a nice paraphrase) was going to get a CMH.
After we arrived
back on Mindoro and before we left for Negros 17 April, I received a letter from the
president of the USAFFE Awards Board. He stated that after review it was their unanimous
opinion that the recommendation should be for a Congressional Medal of Honor.
In light of their recommendation he asked me to reconsider, and if I agreed with them to
send two eyewitness affidavits, a hand-drawn terrain sketch, and a weather and light
description. I immediately complied. John Mara and our platoon sergeant, T/Sgt Phillip
Todd, wrote the substantiating affidavits.
During April,
while we were engaged in combat, the company was notified that McCarter had been awarded
the CMH. We were to take him out of combat immediately if he was with the company, and he
was to be given the choice of having the President of the United States present the award
in the White House or go to Manila to have the award presented by the commanding general
of USAFFE, General MacArthur. Of course McCarter had been sent back to the States for
hospitalization.

McCarter recieves his Congressional Medal of
Honor from a well-known President.
(Photo National Archives 111-SC-210829-S courtesy of Bill
Calhoun)
I did not know
how McCarter would settle down after the war. He was discharged in 1945 due to the
severity of his wound. He married and lived a quiet life until his wife died due to
cancer. In February 1956, while despondent over the death of his wife, and in constant
pain because of the bullet which was so close to his heart that it could not be removed,
the best warrior I ever knew took his own life.

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