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The breaking of
the Purple cipher and the brilliant entry, before Midway, into the Japanese naval code
were proof enough that the intellectual base of American cryptanalysis was strong. Yet
once the nation was plunged into war several weaknesses were immediately apparent.
Apparent, indeed, from the very day of the Pearl Harbor attack In spite of prewar
recruitment and farsighted training there was still a critical shortage of personnel in
all areas of signal intelligence
Indeed, a revolution was necessary, as may
be gauged from the experience of a single lieutenant in the Signal Corps, Howard W. Brown.
During the summer of 1941 Brown was Operations Officer in tie Army's little Sigint
unit in the Philippines, which, headed by the able Major Joe Sherr, consisted of no more
than six sergeants, three corporals and six privates. By an agreement between the Army and
the Navy; reached at a conference in Manila in May 1941, the Navy's own Sigint unit, Cast,
was concentrating (in its tunnel on Corregidor) on breaking Japanese diplomatic traffic,
since it alone possessed a Purple machine. Sherr's team did the interception. What is
astonishing is the slowness-and therefore the inefficiency-of the routine as Howard's own
account (in his "Reminiscences of Lieutenant Colonel Howard W. Brown, prepared
under the direction of the Chief Signal Officer) reveals. He is describing the method
for passing over intercepted signals and their translations between his own unit and Cast.
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 Between
the enlisted men's beach and the entrance to the Hospital Lateral, there was a debris
field littered with huge shells and debris.

This is the 'reverse' view, showing the undergrowth
that concealed the enlisted men's beach in the 1970's.

A road has now been rebuilt through the debris
field, and whilst it is picturesque, it lacks any sense of character and history. It
is more like a Tourist Park than a Military Fort. |
And so the system
continued until the Japanese attacked. It may have been secure, but if it be considered as
a means of operating wartime one might be forgiven for judging that they did things
quicker in the days of the Pony Express.
During the weeks after the war began, Brown
strove hectically to improvise, from bits and pieces of the sparse equipment available,
means of interception which would enable him to listen in to radio traffic of the Japanese
Air Force. Though he could not translate what he heard, by identifying individual call
signs he could often calculate when a raid was imminent and warn a threatened
airfield-only to discover, too often, that in these early days the U.S. Air Force had a
blithe contempt for Sigint and disregarded his prophetic voice, with the result that
precious planes were destroyed on the ground. It was war on a do-it-yourself basis. Still,
he became so expert at predicting the appearance of the reconnaissance aircraft which
regularly visited Corregidor, and so won the confidence of the anti-aircraft gunners, that
"we were often able to tell them what 'Foto Joe' was up to, and at times could tell
them at what time, and from where, he was likely to appear. The AA batteries would load
and cock their guns, and pull the triggers as 'Foto Joe' came by trying to gain altitude.
This information and action accounted for about six planes.' Before the end, a capture of
Japanese code books on Bataan made it possible to set up a small radio intelligence office
in Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor which, with four receivers and the occasional use or a
naval direction finder, spent a profitable time monitoring the signal circuits of the
enemy's army and air units in the Philippines, providing early warning about in coming
raids, and even registering Japanese losses. "We were able to confirm 'probables,' or
reports of safe arrival, and the extent of damage, by such messages as: 'Ikamura is
landing in the water, looks like he won't be home,' or 'Taji landed at Nichols with one
motor burning.'"
On the day that MacArthur departed, leaving
General Wainwright to make the final stand, the general summoned Brown to his office
shortly before midnight, shook his hand and said, "I want to congratulate you,
Captain Hart tells me that you have discovered a system to solve Japanese messages. I am
proud of you, and want to thank you." But, unlike Wainwright, Brown too left the
Philippines. After an abortive attempt to establish an intercept station on Mindanao, on
April 14 he was flown off to Darwin in Australia, a passenger in a moribund B-17, one of
whose engines was dead while another was spouting oil, "When we landed, more than one
big strong man kissed the ground."
Extract from
The American Magic - Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan, by Ronald Lewin, Penguin
Books 1983 ISBN 0 14 00.6471 0
The international
telephone cables to and from Manila were secretly spliced into, and 'landed' on Corregidor
where they were routed into the Malinta tunnel system. There, during the 1930's,
monitoring of diplomatic traffic was carried out. One of the block houses on the left has
provision for several cables being landed, and I believe the cables (shown) were landed
through (ie under) enlisted men's beach, because boat anchors were unlikely to foul them.
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